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/3a/! '<2-C?Z 



THE PERSIAN PROBLEM 






My thanks are due to the Proprietors of the 
"Morning- Post" for permission to use in this 
book a series of letters written to that paper 
from Persia 

H. J. W. 



'lo 



THE 

PERSIAN PROBLEM 

AN EXAMINATION OF THE RIVAL POSITIONS 

OF RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN IN PERSIA 

WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE PERSIAN GULF 

AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 



A 



BY 



/ 



h/j/whigham 



WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 



RECEIVED, 

JUL 18 1903 

Library, Nayy Dep't. 



NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

153-157 FIFTH AVENUE 
1903 




MAP OV PERSIA 
The doited lines show main trade routes 



i 71 



JJ 



,S 



"P + Ws- 



1 1 



a o s, ow 




Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson &> Co 
London &* Edinburgh 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 
Introduction Pp. 1-10 

CHAPTER II 

FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

The outpost of the Gulf — History of Maskat — First treaty with 
England — Maskat and Zanzibar — Separation of the two kingdoms 
— How England saved Maskat — Our moral claims upon the Sultan 
— The position of the French — Slave dhows fly the French flag — 
Attempt of French Government to secure Jissa as a coaling- 
station — Necessity of supporting the Sultan against French 
intrigue Pp. 11-27 

CHAPTER III 

THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 

Navigation of the Gulf — Life on board a Gulf mail-boat — Caught in 

< a" shamal " — Arrival at Bahrein — History of the Pearl Islands — 

1 Great Britain refuses to annex Bahrein — Bahrein comes under 

/I British protection — British agent appointed — Bahrein a possible 

/ naval station — Description of the harbour — Trade of the islands — 

Turkish control on the mainland .... Pp. 28-40 



viii C0NTENT8 

CHAPTER IV 

CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 

Lack of harbours — An Arab Sheikh — Illicit trade in arms — Under lee 
of Sheikh Shuaib — Landing at Lingah — A miniature coup d'etat — 
The Resident's guard — Unpopularity of the Belgian Customs — 
Trade of Lingah — English station at Bassiduh — History of the 
station — Possibility of establishing free port at Bassiduh 

Pp. 41-55 
CHAPTER V 

SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS? 

Skirting the coast of Kishm — Visit to the salt caves — The town of 
Kishm — The island of Ormuz — Remains of Portuguese prosperity 
— Situation of Bunder Abbas — Earmarked by Russia — Caravan 
routes — Reasons for decline in trade — Insecurity of trade-routes — 
Competition of Nushki road — Embargo on export of cereals — 
Future railway lines — Shall we leave the building of rjilwaysto 
Russia j' — Control of Bunder Abbas gives Russia control of Gulf — 
Advantages of Bunder Abbas as naval base — Need of a definite 
policy Pp. 57-76 

CHAPTER VI 

VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 

The promontory of Mussandim — Elphinstone's Inlet — Remains of the 
Indo-European telegraph station — The aborigines — British Resi- 
dent visits the Pirate Coast — History of the treaties — Suppression 
of the slave trade — Moral influence of the British Resident — 
Characteristics of the Arabs Pp. 77-89 

CHAPTER VII 

THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

Description of the harbour — Pelly's account of Koweit — Sheikh 
Mahomed assassinated by Mubarak — Warlike propensities of 
Mubarak — Supports the claims of the Wahabis — Defeated with 
heavy loss by the Amir of Nejd — Position of the Amir of Nejd — 
Turkish Government assists Nejd against Mubarak — British 



CONTENTS ix 

Government steps in to save Mubarak — Question of Turkish 
" suzerainty " over Koweit — Importance of Koweit as a possible 
terminus of the Bagdad Railway — The Turks occupy Ummkasa — 
Strategical importance of Umm-Kasa — Mubarafrclaims Umm-Kasa 

Pp. 91-107 

CHAPTER VIII 

PERSIAN RULE IN THE DELTA OF THE 
SHAT-AL-ARAB 

History of the Arab tribes of the Delta — Ascendency of Mohammerah 
under the late Sheikh Mizal — Khazal compasses his brother's death 
and becomes Sheikh of Mohammerah — Strength of Khazal as a 
ruler — Opposition of the Arabs to theJBejgjan_Customs — Matters 
finally arranged at Teheran — Visit to Mohammerah — Evading the 
Turkish quarantine — Trade of Mohammerah — Possibilities of the 
future . . . .Pp. 108-124 



CHAPTER IX 

THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 

The Bar of the Shat-al-Arab — Absurdities of Turkish quarantine 
regulations — Steaming up the river — Arrival at Basra — Trade of 
the Shat-al-Arab — Insufficiency of the Tigris river service — 
Serious hindrance to trade — Cricket on the desert — Shooting wild 
boar in the marshes — Incompetency of the Turkish officials — 
Possibility of Turkey losing the control of the Shat-al-Arab 

Pp. 125-139 

CHAPTER X 

THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 

Trade of the Gulf^cam^d_jihTaost_e^ by British steamers — 
New Russian venture — Tot al trade of the Gulf — Preponderance of 
British merchandise — Future prospecisof this trade — Commerce 
cannot increase without improvement in internal communications 
— Very little increase in last decade — Opening of Karun route has 
only produced slight effect — Caravan routes on Arabian side 
always insecure — Great improvement can only be brought about 
by building railways Pp. 140-155 



K 



x CONTENTS 

CHAPTER XI 

THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

Control of the seaports — Description of the harbours of the Gulf — 
Necessity for improving the harbours — Belgian Customs regime 
has done nothing to facilitate trade in this direction — Belgian 
officials regarded by Persians as servants of Russia— Difficulty of 
obtaining redress of wrongs or recovery of debts — Necessity for an 

K active policy in the Gulf — If Russia builds railways to the Gulf 

she must control Southern Persia — Great Britain must anticipate 
her railway policy — Our attitude with regard to the Bagdad Rail- 

)0 way — We may still bargain for control of the BagdacTBasra 

section — Our responsibility with regard to Koweit — British policy 
in Arabia handicapped by complete ignorance of the interior — 
Advantage of opening up communications with Nejd . Pp. 156-175 

CHAPTER XII 

BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 

Ruins of Mesopotamia — A week's excursion in the neighbourhood of 
Bagdad — Pleasures of caravaning — First view of Babylon — Wel- 
comed by the German expedition — A lesson in cuneiform and 
Assyriology — Hospitality of the German savants — New light 
thrown upon the works of Nebuchadnezzar by the expedition — 
Description of the "Kasr " — The Holy Way and the temples — The 
shrunken glories of Babylon — Irrigation schemes of the past — The 
Arab as a day labourer Pp. 176-191 



CHAPTER XIII 

ON THE EUPHRATES 

Jewish hospitality in Hillah — Agricultural riches of the Hillah district 
— Lack of transport — The methods of the Sultan as a landed 
proprietor — Heavy burden of taxation — An Arab feud — Cold- 
blooded murder — The so-called Tower of Babel — The German 
expedition at Birs Nimrud — Brickwork of Nebuchadnezzar — 
Arrival at Kifl — The Jews of the Captivity — Evening service at 
the Tomb of Ezekiel . . . ... . .Pp. 192-203 



CONTENTS xi 

CHAPTER XIV 

THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 

The remains of Kufa — First view of Nejef — Lodgings in the Market- 
place — An insolent Zaptieh — Mobbed in the bazaar — The Zaptieh 
apologises — Across the desert to Kerbela — Picturesque aspect of 
the sacred city — An official reception at the house of the British 
agent — Discuss the prospects of the Bagdad railway with Turkish 
officials — Return to Bagdad — Army of Persian pilgrims on the 
road Pp. 204-215 

CHAPTER XV 

BAGDAD 

Bagdad — Its merchants — Consulate — Climate — As a trade centre — 
Nejef —Railway to coast and expansion of trade — Route of rail- 
way Pp. 216-225 

CHAPTER XVI 

THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 
Characteristics of the country through which the Bagdad railway 



will pass — Gheuzni — Rich resources of Cilicia — The port for the 
Bagdad railway — The passage of the Taurus . . Pp. 226-237 



CHAPTER XVII 
THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 



Position of the German Syndicate — Reasons of the choice of route — 
Large guarantee secures interest on capital — Mining rights — 
Syndicate gets control of the oil-fields of Mesopotamia — Advan- 
tages to be gained by Turkey — -Regeneration of Mesopotamia — 
Settlement of the Arab hordes — The question of guarantee — 
Turkey cannot raise the guarantee unless the existing debt is con- 
verted — No other sources of revenue available — British policy with 
regard to the railway Pp. 238-250 



> 



K 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER XVIII 

THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

Choice of routes from the Gulf to Teheran — Importance of the 
Bagdad Kermanshah route previously overlooked — New factor 
introduced by effort of a British capitalist to exploit the petroleum 
belt of Western Persia — Collecting a caravan — Cost of travelling 
— Question of commissariat — Description of route from Bagdad to 
Kasr-i-Shirin — An Arab festival — The oil-fields of Western Persia 
— Difficulties of transport — Survey of the pipe-line — Political 
importance of the concession — Road to Kermanshah — The Tak-i- 
girra pass Pp. 251-270 

CHAPTER XIX 
KERMANSHAH 

Estimate of inhabitants — Centre of the grain district — Trade of 
Kermanshah — Previous estimates misleading — Importance of this 
trade-route to Great Britain — Apathy of the British Government 

Pp. 271-284 

CHAPTER XX 
PERSIAN CARPETS 

Yarious routes from Kermanshah to Teheran — Hamadan the ancient 
Ecbatana — Sultanabad — Two European firms — Effect of European 
control on carpet manufacture — Originality of design no longer to 
be found in Persia — Aniline dyes — Persian methods — Cheapness 
of labour the most important factor — How to judge a Persian 
carpet Pp. 285-303 

CHAPTER XXI 

ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 

£*, , British interests in Western Persia — Attitude of the British Govern- 

ment — Preponderance of Bj^ish_c^miiierce==Growtli of JRussiaja 
competition— The Ahwaz-Burujird route — Western Persia still 
dependent upon the Tigris steamers — Advantages to be gained by 
opening up the Ahwaz route — Mule-tracks better than macadam- 
ised roads — Luri chiefs must be squared . . . Pp. 304-31G 



X 



CONTENTS 



xm 



CHAPTER XXII 

TEHERAN 

Drive from Kuril to the Capital — First view of Demavend — Approach 
to Teheran — An English hotel — Leading foreigners in Teheran — 
General Houtum-Schindler — The manager of the Imperial Bank 
of Persia — The J Belgian C ustoms — The Russi an Ban k — Foreign 
schemes jn^JT^eran— UniversaTllaTlure — Belgian concessionists — 
" "Pessimistic outlook for Great Britain . . . Pp. 317-331 



X *■ 



CHAPTER XXIII 

GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

Opinion of disinterested foreigner — Is British influence departing ? — 
Difficulty of arriving at facts in Persia — Figures given in " States- 
man's Year Book " — Figures given by Lord Curzon ten years before 
—Comparison shows rapid decline of British trade — But published 
figures most untrustworthy — A truer calculation — Russia's advance 
has been overestimated — No reason to despair yet of British 
trade Pp. 332-346 



CHAPTER XXIV 

RUSSIA'S POLICY 

Efforts to undermine British trade not yet entirely successful — Even 
in the north British manufactures hold their own — Two reasons 
for Russian predominance in the north — First, her position ; 
secondly, her system of bounties — Advantages of her position 
more apparent than real — Manchester almost! as near Teheran as 
Moscow, as far as cost of transport goes — Bounties much more 
important — Russian bounties paid for by profit on the Persian 
loan — Great Britain can only fight the bounty system by improved 
communications between Teheran and the Gulf , Pp. 347-362 



CHAPTER XXV 
RUSSIA'S POLICY— (continued) 

Russian railway policy — Railhead at Eri van— Great Britain must 
respond by similar advance — Pers'a cannot be developed without 



xiv CONTENTS 

railways — At present the Russian railway agreement prevents all 
progress — Natural difficulties of construction by no means insuper- 
able — Question of routes — Whenever Teheran is connected by 
railway with the Gulf, British goods will have great advantage 
over Russian — Russia not yet ready to build railways — Her object 
is therefore to postpone railway building . . . Pp. 363-377 



CHAPTER XXVI 

WANTED A "BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 

Persian loans — First real victory of Russian diplomacy— Extra- 
ordinary shortsightedness of British Foreign Office — Hypotheca- 
tion of the Customs — Extension of the railway agreement another 
victory for Russia — Russia appreciates supreme importance of 
railway control in the East — Her object, therefore, is to obtain 
monopoly of railway building in Persia — This aim must be opposed 
to the utmost Pp. 378-392 

CHAPTER XXVII 

ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 

From Teheran to Resht — Passage of the Elburz mountains — A badly 
constructed road — Accidents en route — Cost of construction — What 
Russia has gained by it — Landing-place at Enzeli — Reach civilisa- 
tion at Baku — A Tartar millionaire and patriot — A cotton factory 
in the Caucasus — Depression in the oil-trade — M. Witte's financial 
policy Pp. 393-405 

CHAPTER XXVIII 

RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA VIA THE CAUCASUS 

Routes from .the Caucasus to Teheran — The Tiflis-Erivan railway — 
Beautiful drive from Akstaf a to Erivan — Mount Ararat — Russian 
civilisation in the Caucasus — Her advance on Persia — What Great 
Britain must do to safeguard her interests . . Pp. 406-424 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



MAPS . 

Map of Persia showing main Trade-Routes . . Frontispiece 
Bunder Abbas and the Islands of Ormuz and Larak 
Safwan, Umm-Kasa, Koweit .... 
Map showing the Route of the Bagdad Railway 
Map showing relative positions of Russia and Persia . 



Page 

56 

90 

238 

406 



A Picturesque View of Maskat 

The "Wells of Wadi on a Festival Day 

Phoenician Mounds, Bahrein 

Pearl Dealers at Bahrein 

Street Scene in an Arab Town ..... 

Mubarak, Sheik of Koweit 

Date Grove, Basra 

View on the Creek at Basra 

Shrine of Kasimain ....... 

Birs Nimrud, commonly called the Tower of Babel . 
Nejef , with Mosque of Ali 



To face page 
11 

24 

32 

48 
80 
96 
. 115 
. 129 
. 184 
. 199 
. 210 



Mosque of Imam Abbas, Kerbela 212 



xvi ILLUSTRATIONS 

To face page 

Mosque of Hussein . . . 214 

Bagdad 218 

Inmost Shrine of Kasimain 222 

The Cilician Gates — Eoad through the Taurus .... 228 

Canon of the Chakit Su, through which railway will pass — 

Road Scene in the Taurus 234 

Bridge at Mosul, over the Tigris 241 

Canon of the Chakit Su 248 

Teheran 324 

Making the Russian Road from Resht to Teheran through the 

Elburz Mountains . . . . . . . .337 

View of the Russian Road from Teheran to Resht . . . 368 

Delijan on the Akstafa-Erivan Road . . . . . . 412 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

The critical moment is fast approaching when the 
question of supremacy in Persia and the Persian 
Gulf must be decided. It is a question involving 
not only our trade with that part of the world, and 
the prosperity of thousands of British Indian sub- 
jects, but also the peace and security of our great 
Indian dependency, the safety of that splendid high- 
way from Gibraltar to Shanghai, which has been 
developed and defended for so many years by the 
power of Great Britain, and finally, the destiny of 
the British Empire itself. Our danger lies not so 
much in our failure to recognise the importance of 
the Shah's kingdom as a piece on the check-board of 
Asia, as in the apparent inability of our rulers in 
Downing Street to grasp the fact that the game is 
already in progress, and that without an immediate 
move on our part, the denoilment cannot long be 
delayed. And it is imperative that the move should 
be in the right direction. We are playing against 
an opponent who thought out his plan of campaign 
long ago, and has never lost an opportunity of 
carrying that plan into effect. His game is masterly 
and consistent because he knows all the time what 
is his final aim. We, on our part, have hardly even 

A 



2 INTRODUCTION 

studied the openings ; not only are our own moves 
made at random, without rhyme or reason, but we 
so little appreciate our opponent's game that our 
countermoves are made entirely in the dark, and 
may or may not prove temporarily successful, but 
can hardly affect the ultimate result. In a word, 
we are without a policy in the Middle East, and 
unless we find one very quickly, the game will be 
finished, and we shall be left lamenting. 

It has been my object throughout the following 
chapters to delineate the present situation of affairs 
in Persia and the Gulf from a political and com- 
mercial point of view, and to indicate the policy 
which that situation requires. From the time that 
Lord Curzon produced his great work on Persia, 
there has been a considerable literature dealing with 
the subject, in which the general reader will find 
many references to the growing influence of Russia 
at the Court of the Shah, to the expansion of 
Russian trade, to the general decline of British com- 
merce and prestige, and to the necessity for strong 
action upon our part. But I have nowhere seen 
any consistent attempt to arrive at the real facts of 
the case, or to suggest any definite line of action. 
A general statement that Russia is driving us out of 
the Persian market is of little value, unless it is 
accompanied by at least a few statistics in order to 
show, in the first place, how far the statement is 
true, in the second place, by what means Russia is 
attaining her ends, and in the third place, in what 
manner we can advance to meet the tide of Russian 
invasion. 



INTRODUCTION 3 

For my own part, I came to Persia with no 
prejudices whatsoever as regards the Persian 
question beyond the general notion, acquired 
through some personal experience of Russian policy 
in China, that we should be very foolish to repeat 
in Persia the fatuous inconsistencies of our attitude 
towards the Russian occupation of Manchuria. To 
permit Russia, or any other Power, to acquire rights 
and concessions in a half-civilised country which can 
only end in the occupation of that country, and 
thereafter to spend three years in nagging and 
making protests against an occupation which the 
youngest clerk in the Foreign Office must have seen 
to be inevitable from the first, is a course of action 
most lowering to our national honour, and detri- 
mental to our chances of success. We do not 
prevent Russia from attaining her ends, but we do 
as far as possible irritate her and arouse her 
hostility. 

In visiting Persia, therefore, I was determined to 
find out whether it was possible to avoid a similarly 
humiliating policy with regard to Russia's descent 
upon the territory of the Shah. And in order to 
arrive at any conclusion it was necessary to find out 
first of all what our interests were in Persia, and 
what they were capable of becoming ; secondly, how 
far Russia was encroaching upon our domain, and 
thirdly, whether it was possible to stay that en- 
croachment. For I am convinced that if Russia 
must have Persia, and with it, a naval base upon 
the Gulf or the Indian Ocean, then the sooner we 
make up our minds to it, and concede the point 



4 INTRODUCTION 

with a good grace, the better for all parties con- 
cerned. 

The results of my inquiries led me' to the con- 
clusion that we cannot possibly make the concession 
without a great loss to our prestige and our 
commercial prosperity in the Middle East ; they 
further proved to my own satisfaction that the 
expansion of Russian influence even in Northern 
Persia is far from being the natural process which 
most writers take it to be. Captain Mahan, for 
example, the most strenuous opponent of Russian 
designs upon the Gulf, thinks it quite reasonable 
that Northern Persia should in time fall entirely 
under the domination of Russia owing to the prox- 
imity of the two countries ; while our influence 
cannot be expected to extend very far beyond the 
shores of the Gulf. An examination of the facts of 
the case on the spot would have shown him that 
distance is not always a question of mileage. At 
the present moment Teheran is only a very little 
nearer to the commercial centres of Russia, as far as 
cost and facility of transport go, than it is to Man- 
chester ; and whenever railways are built in Persia, 
and are kept open on equal terms to all nations of 
the world, the markets of Northern Persia will 
actually be more accessible to British merchandise 
than to Russian. It must always be cheaper to 
carry goods by sea to the Gulf, and to transport 
them over the 500 or 600 miles between the 
Gulf and Teheran, than to bring them all the way 
from Moscow to Teheran by rail. This is a most 
important, if rather obvious, fact which has been 



INTRODUCTION 5 

entirely overlooked by most writers upon Persian 
questions. 

It may well be asked, then, why it is that Russia, 
with so little advantage in point of distance, is so 
rapidly absorbing the trade of Northern Persia. In 
the following pages I have gone as far into this 
question as the chaotic conditions of Persian statistics 
will allow, and I have reached the conclusion that 
to begin with, the commercial predominance of 
Russia has been greatly exaggerated owing to the 
publication of erroneous figures, and furthermore, 
what progress she has made at our expense, has been 
achieved not through greater proximity or enhanced 
facility of transport, but through a deliberate system 
of premiums and State encouragement of trade which 
has for its end the commercial conquest of the whole 
country. The Russian Government has the wisdom 
to see that, once our commercial interest in Persia is 
gone, the British public will never raise a finger to 
prevent Russia following up her economic victory 
by a political conquest. And so it suits M. Witte 
to make us believe that we are in fact losing 
ground very rapidly in the trade of Northern Persia, 
knowing perfectly well that if that belief becomes a 
settled point of view, the whole campaign is practi- 
cally finished. Those writers, therefore, who complain 
dolefully of our vanishing trade and prestige without 
taking the trouble to get at the real facts of the case, 
are doing the British cause a poor service indeed. 
My visit to Persia led me to take a different course. 
I found that British trade had not declined to 
anything like the extent that has generally been 



6 INTRODUCTION 

supposed, that the Russian progress had been effected 
ouly by lavish expenditure on the part of the 
Russian Government, that even the northern mar- 
kets of Persia would be at our mercy if we were 
fighting on equal terms, and that we can still adopt 
measures which will at least to some extent counter- 
act the Russian system of direct State assistance 
to trade which we could never bring ourselves to 
adopt. 

It will be found that the remedy lies first and last 
in the improvement of communications and the 
gradual extending of British influence over Southern 
Persia. And there is only one way of improving 
communications to any marked extent, and that is 
by building railways. This is a matter of such para- 
mount importance that I make no apology for dwelling 
upon it again and again in the following chapters. 
I was so thoroughly convinced of the necessity of 
railways connecting the markets of Persia and 
Mesopotamia with the Gulf that I was surprised to 
find very few advocates of railway building among 
British merchants or British officials in Persia ; so 
much was this the case that one was almost driven 
to the conclusion that there must be some inherent 
obstacle in the way of railway building in the king- 
dom of the Shah, which was not apparent to the 
ordinary traveller. What that obstacle is I have 
never been able to discover. It is quite true that 
Lord Curzon took in his book a very pessimistic view 
of this particular form of enterprise and regarded 
railways as things of a dim and distant future. But 
the crisis in the affairs of Persia has been drawing 



INTRODUCTION 7 

visibly nearer at a rapid rate since Lord Curzon's 
book was written, and nothing short of heroic 
measures on our part will avert a catastrophe. 
Moreover is not the extension of the Quetta Railway- 
to the borders of Seistan the handiwork of Lord 
Curzon himself? In Teheran all great enterprises 
are regarded with a jaundiced eye especially by the 
British, owing to the frequent failures of such under- 
takings in the past. But here is a case where the 
past offers no analogy. For it may broadly be stated 
that until railways are built, no great industrial 
venture, and no effort to exploit the mineral wealth 
of Persia can possibly succeed. Railways, therefore, 
stand in a different category from all other enter- 
prises. 

Nor is it true that the money would never be 
forthcoming to build railways in Persia. I know 
for a fact that ^10,000,000 of capital would be found 
to-morrow for the purpose if the British Government 
were to offer substantial assistance either in the 
shape of forcing the matter on the Shah's notice or 
of guaranteeing a small interest for a certain number 
of years. But why should the British Government 
bear the expense ? Simply because we must either 
bear the expense or abandon Persia to Russia. 
Russia is already spending .£100,000 a year at a 
modest computation, in pushing her trade in Persia ; 
she actually sank £300,000 in the Teheran Resht 
road which she can never get back except in the 
shape of prestige, and she would not flinch at further 
sacrifice of a like nature. How can we possibly 
expect to stem the tide of her advance if we are not 



8 INTRODUCTION 

prepared to make similar sacrifices ? And how can 
our statesmen reconcile with their consciences a 
policy of a blind adherence to the status quo which 
they must know perfectly well Russia only respects 
in outer appearances ? 

We have reached the parting of the ways when we 
must make up our minds either to act quickly and to 
spend our money freely on a given line of action, or 
to retire gracefully from the field and allow Russia 
to reap the rewards which, to be quite impartial, a 
country with a real and definite policy deserves. 
In describing my journey through the Gulf and 
Mesopotamia and Western Persia I have endea- 
voured on the thin thread of personal experience 
to string together a series of essays of which the 
double aim is to show what our position actually 
is to-day in the Middle East, and how imminent 
is the danger of our losing that position which 
has been built up in a hundred years of not inglo- 
rious history. 

It would be impossible at this time to visit the 
Gulf and Western Persia without taking a keen 
interest in the outcome of the Bagdad Railway 
Concession which is of supreme importance in the 
politics of the Gulf. I have, therefore devoted 
several chapters to a study of the German railway 
scheme as it affects the future development of 
Mesopotamia. Here as in the case of Persia, our 
Government seems to have acted in the most hand 
to mouth manner and to have possessed at no time 
a definite policy of its own. The mistake was long 
ago made of regarding a Mesopotamian Railway 



INTRODUCTION 9 

simply and solely as a means of communication 
between the Mediterranean and India, and never as 
an engine for the resuscitation and development of 
Mesopotamia. The Germans having no direct 
interest in India, looked at the enterprise from a 
different and far more practical point of view, and 
have now made it apparent that a railway from the 
Bosphorus to the Gulf is not at all outside the 
sphere of practical politics, and is, indeed, the one 
thing needful above all others for the regeneration 
of Asiatic Turkey. Slowly we are coming to see the 
value of this point of view. But it would puzzle the 
greatest of the prophets to know what are the real 
sentiments of the British Government with regard 
to the Bagdad Railway, and it may be doubted if the 
members of the Cabinet have any definite idea on 
the subject whatsoever. And yet there is no more 
important matter before the eyes of Europe at this 
moment than this very matter of the Bagdad Bail- 
way ; and if I can assist any reader who is not 
familiar with the country or the conditions of the 
people through which the railway will pass, to form 
any definite notion of what our policy should be, 
I shall have attained the object with which the 
chapters on the Bagdad Bailway were written. 

In conclusion I have to state that the following 
chapters, which contain the substance of a series of 
articles written for the Morning Post, would not 
have been printed at all but for the opinion 
expressed by a serious student of Persian politics, 
that they might add a little badly needed light to 
the discussion of the affairs of Persia and the Gulf. 



10 INTRODUCTION 

If they contain information of any value whatsoever, 
they owe it in the first place to the kindness of the 
present Viceroy of India, who not only advised me 
to p'o to the Gulf but instructed his subordinate 
officials in that part of the world to give me all 
assistance in their power ; and in the second place to 
these officials themselves who showed to me, as 
indeed they do to all travellers, the most unfailing 
courtesy and hospitality. I am especially indebted 
to Colonel Kemball, the British Resident in the Gulf, 
who not only allowed me to accompany him round 
the Gulf on his winter tour of inspection, but was 
kind enough to read most of my letters on the Gulf 
before they appeared in print. I have elsewhere 
acknowledged the generous assistance given me by 
General Houtum-Schindler and by Mr. Rabino, the 
manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia in Teheran. 




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CHAPTER II 

FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

Maskat, which is reached from Karachi in some 
forty-eight hours by the mail steamers of the British 
India Company, lies about three hundred miles down 
the Arabian coast from Cape Musandim, and is, 
therefore, outside the Persian Gulf proper ; but its 
natural strength and historical prestige combine 
to make it inseparable from the politics of the 
narrower waters which in the past it has always 
influenced and at times dominated. 

On a clear morning you may bring up the jagged 
mountainous coast of Oman at a distance of thirty 
or forty miles, and an hour or so later the mud- 
coloured houses of Muttra, clustered together under 
the rocks, become visible over the steamer's bow ; 
but the presence of Maskat, save for a glimpse of a 
yellow Portuguese fort, is quite unsuspected until 
the coast is almost reached, and a deep cove suddenly 
discovers itself on the port bow, land-locked on 
every side save the north, with a white flat-roofed 
Arab town occupying the shelving southern beach 
straight opposite. On the east and west sides of 
the cove are precipitous rocks, those on the eastern 
side composing an island three hundred feet high, 
barely separated from the town by a shallow passage, 



12 FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

in the middle of which stands a Portuguese fort 
with a double row of embrasures exactly balanced 
by a similar erection overhanging the town on the 
west. The harbour, though only a little over a 
mile long by half a mile in width, is more capacious 
than it seems, and save against a north-east wind 
is admirably secure. One is struck immediately, 
not merely by the picturesqueness of the town, 
with its gleaming houses lying like a white bar 
between the black rocks and the turquoise sea, 
flanked by the aged yellow masonry of the forts, 
but also by the wonderful strength of the place, 
which with very little assistance from human art 
can be made impregnable both from land and sea, 
while the tiny cove with its precipitous sides can 
give protection to six or seven men-of-war riding at 
anchor under the. eastern bluff. 

At present Maskat is at the mercy of the smallest- 
gunboat of any modern fleet, which, standing across 
the mouth of the cove, could soon reduce the Sultan's 
Palace on the sea-front to ruins without coming 
inside the range of the old smooth-bore cannon of 
the forts generously presented to the Sultan by the 
Government of India. The forts were built by the 
Portuguese and completed, according to the inscrip- 
tion on the western pile, in the year of the Spanish 
Armada, when there was a Portuguese Viceroy in 
India ; and they were admirably adapted to the 
requirements of that age. To-day the Cossipur guns 
are not much better than the old Portuguese cannon 
which bear the date 1606, and in the emeute of 
1895 it is credibly asserted that their round shot 




CH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 13 



frequently fell short of the Sultan's Palace, which is 
not a quarter of a mile away, and on a much lower 
level. It is precisely because Maskat is so defence- 
less to-day, and might be made so impregnable 
to-morrow, that it is a place of considerable value 
on the chessboard of Indian politics, more especially 
as from its position it forms a strong outpost beyond 
the gates of the Persian Gulf, which lie between 
Cape Mussandim and Bunder Abbas. And just 
as Russia is looking greedily towards Bunder Abbas, 
so France, the ally of Russia, is always ready by 
intrigue and subtle agitation to push her influence 
at the Court of Maskat. 

In order that we may protect our vital interests 
in the Persian Gulf it is necessary that we should 
first of all understand the position in which we 
stand with regard to the Arabs of the coast, and 
more especially the Arab ruler of Oman. 

In the years which followed the downfall of the 
Portuguese Empire, Maskat came under the domina- 
tion of the great Nadir, Shah of Persia. But the 
Persian yoke, which never rested heavily on Oman, 
was vigorously thrust off by Ahmed Bin Said, a 
camel-driver of Sohar, who founded the present 
dynasty about 1741 ; and in 1769 Maskat definitely 
and finally refused to pay any tribute whatsoever 
to Persia except for the leased territory of Bunder 
Abbas, on the mainland of Persia itself. 

The century which followed that step saw the rise 
and fall of the Oman power. Ahmed Bin Said and 
his son Seyid Sultan, who usurped the throne from 
his elder brother, were fighting monarchs, who 



14 FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

established a maritime empire from Zanzibar, on the 
African coast, to Gwadur and Bunder Abbas, in 
Persia, and even threatened Bushire and Basra. It 
is probable, however, that the acquisitions of terri- 
tory on the African coast led to the final extinction 
of Maskat as a sea power, for the great Seyid Said, 
who succeeded Seyid Sultan after an interregnum 
about 1807, preferred, not unnaturally, the more 
tropical vegetation and less torrid climate of Zanzibar 
to the barren rocks of Maskat, and towards the end 
of his long reign, which closed in 1856, he confined 
his attentions so exclusively to his African pos- 
sessions that but for the continual intervention of 
Great Britain, or rather the East India Company, 
the dynasty must have fallen and Maskat would 
long ago have become a dependency of Nejd. 

Our first treaty with Maskat was entered into in 
the year 1798, and provided for the total exclusion 
of French and Dutch trade, and especially French 
influence, from Maskat. The treaty bears the mark 
of the period when Napoleon and the Emperor of 
Bussia were putting their heads together to discover 
a plan for the invasion of India. It is curious that 
just a century later in these same waters we are 
compelled to protect ourselves against an alliance of 
the same two Powers. Two years later Sir John 
Malcolm visited Maskat on his way back from the 
capital of Persia, and not only ratified the treaty, 
which had been brought about by our native agent, 
but provided for the residence at Maskat of a repre- 
sentative of British birth. The stipulation, as we 
learn from Morier, who travelled up the Gulf a few 



FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 15 

years later, was carried out in only a desultory 
fashion owing to the desperate climate of the Arab 
stronghold, and it was not until 1 840 that a British 
agent was permanently established at the Court of the 
Sultan, and even he had his residence at Zanzibar 
until the two kingdoms were separated. 

In the meantime Seyid Said proved himself the 
firm friend of Great Britain, to the extent even of 
joining heartily in the campaign of 1819-20 against 
the pirates and — a thing which is even more extra- 
ordinary — in our anti-slavery programme, which 
was initiated about 1822. He was, apparently, an 
eastern potentate of the best type, with an almost 
inordinate love for the British. Captain Hart, of 
the British Government vessel Imogene, has described 
a visit to Zanzibar in 1834, in the course of which 
he had many interviews with Seyid Said, who begged 
him to accept a fine seventy-four-gun cruiser on 
behalf of his king, and asked him to encourage 
British trade, in spite of the fact that by far the 
greater majority of the vessels trading with Zanzibar 
at that time were American. It is unfortunate that 
Seyid Said left to the world no worthy successor to 
his throne. A man of wide views and wonderfully 
catholic taste, he had wives of almost every creed and 
shade, from the granddaughter of a Persian monarch 
to an Abyssinian slave, and Captain Hart has left 
it on record how the Sultan was disappointed at the 
first letter of the Queen of Madagascar, in which she 
offered him a young princess, but regretted the law 
which forbade her to marry him herself. Yet of all 
his progeny those only survived him whose Negro 



16 FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

blood made them hereditarily incapable of govern- 
ment. Seyid Thoweyni, who finally succeeded him 
on the throne of Maskat, by his fatuous policy and 
villainous treachery had already before his father's 
death done his best to ruin Maskat, of which he was 
the Deputy Governor after 1840. Many times did 
Great Britain come to the rescue when Maskat was 
assailed by the Wahabis of Nejd, by the chief of 
Sohar, by the Sultan of the Jowasmi tribe, the 
hereditary enemy of Maskat, and even by the more 
distant power of Egypt ; and once Maskat had been 
clean gone if the British Government had not 
instantly summoned Seyid Said from Zanzibar to 
repair the ruin brought on his kingdom by the vile 
trick by which Thoweyni had entrapped the Sohar 
chief and so raised up a confederacy against him- 
self. 

But the return of the Sultan to Arabia for a few 
months from time to time could only temporarily 
avert the do wnfall of the power of Maskat. Thoweyni 
already in 1852 paid a tribute of 12,000 crowns to 
the ruler of Nejd, and his hold of Bunder Abbas and 
its dependencies was constantly disputed by Persia 
until his death in 1866, when the rule of the Sultan 
was confined to Oman, with the addition of a strip 
of the Mekran coast about Gwadur. 

In the meantime, after Seyid Said's death, Zanzibar 
and Maskat had been separated on condition that 
Seyid Burgash, who got Zanzibar, paid a compensa- 
tion of 7200 rupees a month to Thoweyni, his elder 
brother, who got the poorer province of Maskat. 
This arrangement, which was made by Lord Canning's 



FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 17 

Commission, is a striking instance of the influence 
exerted over the twin Sultanate by the British. 
Thoweyni was murdered in 1866, probably by his 
son Salim, who succeeded him, and reigned for two 
years ; but the throne finally went to Seyid Turki, 
a brother of Thoweyni, and, like him, the son of an 
Abyssinian mother, who asserted his authority in 
187 1. His offspring, Feyzul, now sits on the throne 
of Maskat. There was some doubt when Lord 
Curzon visited the city in 1889 whether the British 
Government would recognise the succession. But 
since that time Seyid Feyzul has proved himself an 
honest ruler, and is now on the best of terms with 
the political agent. 

It will be seen from the foregoing brief survey that 
the critical years for Maskat were from about 1 840 
to 1 866, when Thoweyni was de facto ruler of the 
kingdom. In those years we did undoubtedly save 
the capital of our ancient ally Seyid Said ; and there 
would be no Maskat at all to-day but for our good- 
will. At the same time it must be pointed out that 
we were content to preserve Maskat from extinction, 
and moved no finger to save the territories of Maskat 
on the mainland of Persia. In 1849 and 1850 Seyid 
Sultan was forced to appeal directly to the Resident 
of Bushire to save Bunder Abbas, but our representa- 
tive was unable to act promptly on his own responsi- 
bility, and the Sultan, left to his own resources, 
merely succeeded in staving off surrender by a 
monetary payment to the Persian Governor of 
Fars, who was threatening Bunder Abbas. That 
was the thin end of the wedge, and twenty years 



18 FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

later there was an end of the Sultan's rule in Kishm, 
Ormuz, and Bunder Abbas. 

It is probable that in keeping to our time-honoured 
policy of non-interference except to stop actual war- 
fare in the Gulf we lost a great chance. If, instead 
of backing up Persia in her claims, we had stood out 
solidly for the rights of our older ally of Maskat 
there would have been no Persian Power at all in 
the Gulf to-day; and we should have had to deal only 
with a friendly and obedient Arab ruler instead of a 
feeble Government which is under the thumb of 
Russia. In point of fact, " we put our money on the 
wrong horse." And yet it would be unfair to blame 
those who were responsible for our policy in those 
days. The power of Maskat was most rapidly on 
the decline in the decade between 1850 and i860, a 
period in which we fought two great wars and had 
other things to think of than the Persian Gulf ; nor 
could the statesmen of the Fifties quite foresee the 
time when the shadow of the Northern Colossus 
should have lengthened to such an extent as almost 
to darken the waters of the Indian Ocean. Un- 
fortunately, we cannot repair the mistakes of that 
period ; but we can guard against a repetition of 
them. 

Having by our action on many occasions saved 
the throne of Thoweyni almost against his own will, 
even if we did not preserve the empire which he was 
determined to throw away, we further placed him 
under an obligation by securing for him the Zanzibar 
subsidy when he succeeded to Maskat. His own 
weakness very soon obviated the necessity for the 



FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 19 

continued payment of this tribute by Zanzibar, and 
it was not until 1873 that the British Government 
undertook to pay the sum itself as a reward for the 
final abolition of slave markets in both Maskat and 
Zanzibar. It is important to bear this point in mind, 
because it might otherwise be supposed that Great 
Britain, having taken Zanzibar under her protection, 
was legally or morally bound to continue the annual 
subsidy. This is so far from being the case that the 
British Government two years ago made it abun- 
dantly clear by stopping the subsidy that the Sultan 
received it only by the goodwill of his powerful 
ally ; for he could certainly never have compelled 
payment on the part of Zanzibar. It can hardly be 
doubted, then, that in view of our past services, and 
of the present helplessness of Maskat against foreign 
attack, from which our gunboats preserve him, and 
finally of his yearly stipend, the Kingdom of Oman 
is practically, though not nominally, under the pro- 
tection of Great Britain. It is true that the Sultan 
still enjoys the privileges of treaties made with his 
grandfather by the French and American Republics, 
and these treaties grant the extra-territorial rights 
usual to European Powers in the East. But it must 
not be forgotten that the French Treaty of 1844 was 
only made with the permission of the British 
Government, and it did not prevent us from taking 
over the Protectorate of Zanzibar in 1890. 

It would be inconceivably foolish in the light of 
past events to relinquish one tithe of our moral 
rights over Maskat ; and yet to-day we are constantly 
on the verge of admitting that we have no stronger 



20 FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

claims to exert our influence in Oman than the 
French, who have never, done a single thing to 
advance the country or develop its trade or police 
its waters. It was only in 1894 that a French 
Consul was appointed to Maskat, but before that 
time the French had been a thorn in our side by 
encouraging Arab dhows to fly the French flag, and 
so engage in the prohibited slave trade with im- 
punity. This indefensible habit became so common 
that in 1891 the Sultan of Maskat was driven to 
issue an order, with the full approval of the Indian 
Government, in which his subjects were warned not 
to resort in future to this method of protection. 
Since 1 89 1 he has twice been informed that he has 
the Indian Government behind him in this matter, 
and in June of 1900 he went to Sur, accompanied by 
the British political agent, harangued the dhow owners, 
and got their assurances that those of them who were 
flying the French flag would henceforth give up the 
practice. Next year, however, the French cruiser 
Catinat arrived at Maskat, the senior naval officer 
interviewed the Sultan, and afterwards, M. Ottavi, 
the French Consul, went to Sur and undid all the 
work of the previous year. The dhow owners who 
had agreed to give up the use of the French flag 
have not done so, and the result is that the flag 
question remains just where it stood before 1891. 
The Sultan is sincerely desirous of exerting his 
legitimate rights in the matter, but he cannot do so 
in the face of the French Consul's opposition without 
firm backing from the British Government. 

Questions of this sort cannot be left to convenient 



FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 21 

occasions. The Sultan is fortunately on the best of 
terms with the British political agent, at Maskat, 
but that is all the more reason for backing him up 
when he is trying to act in the best interests of his 
country. Nor can we dismiss the whole matter as 
trivial. The very folly of the French in thwarting 
our anti-slavery efforts is sufficient in itself to 
indicate that they have some motive beyond the 
mere desire to protect Arabs who are engaging in 
the illegal slave traffic. 

Our position in the matter is not too clear. The 
French tried exactly the same tactics at Zanzibar, 
where our best efforts to stop the traffic between 
the mainland and the islands were spoiled by the 
dhows, which crossed under the French flag to 
Pemba with perfect impunity. But when the 
Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 put Zanzibar 
and its dependencies directly under our protection 
we were able to employ a very strong argument 
against the use of the French flag on Arab dhows. 
Since French gunboats could not patrol the waters 
these dhows would have gone free altogether if right 
of search had been refused to British gunboats. 
Morally the case of Maskat is on exactly the same 
basis, since there is no record of any slave having 
been set free by a French gunboat. Technically, 
however, we have no protectorate, and we can only 
stop the abuse through the Sultan himself, and it 
would be unpardonable weakness on our part. to 
refuse him support simply because our consent to 
his action in 1891 was the consent of; the Indian 
Government and not of the British Foreign Office. 



22 FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

Such a course would not only be discreditable, but 
it would be fatal in its results. 

Nor is there the slightest reason for hesitation 
now. The French Treaty gives the French Consul 
jurisdiction over bond-Jlde French subjects in Maskat 
or its dependencies, but it was never intended that 
the French flag should protect the Sultan's own 
subjects from the arm of the law ; and the abuse is 
doubly wrong when the French flag is used, as it 
constantly has been, to screen slave-traders from 
detection. It is impossible to believe that the 
French Government or the French people would 
uphold such an abuse if it were really brought 
home to their notice. But the question has 
also its political side. It is only four years since 
M. Ottavi carried through a secret agreement with 
the Sultan whereby the small port of Jissa, five 
miles south-east of Maskat, was granted to the 
French Government as a naval station. The intrigue 
leaked out, it is said, through a paragraph in the 
French press, and the British admiral very quickly 
put a stop to its ratification by a threat of instant 
bombardment. The danger was averted, but the 
French had shown their hand, and every doubtful 
action on their part must now be watched with 
suspicion. 

Knowing what one does of French Consuls in the 
East, one is almost driven to the conclusion that 
M. Ottavi is one of those officials whose constant 
aim is to undermine British influence and cause 
annoyance to British officials at any cost. It is 
a curiously unsatisfactory game to all parties con- 



FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 23 

cerned, but it is one which is undoubtedly persisted 
in by many French Consuls and political agents, 
and has now an increased importance on account 
of the Franco-Russian Alliance. There used to be, 
and, perhaps, still is, a paper published in Arabic at 
Beirout which is spread over the Arabian Peninsula 
and the Persian Littoral, and seldom fails to pro- 
duce an article inspired by the French Consulate at 
Maskat in which Great Britain is decried and every 
little action of the British agent viewed with sus- 
picion. 

For the present the French are quiescent. The 
Jissa incident was a fiasco, and M. Ottavi has been 
removed to another sphere of action, having found 
something more than his match, perhaps, in the new 
British political agent who arrived at Maskat in the 
autumn of 1899. But the dhow question is not 
settled, and may at any moment become acute, so 
that M. Ottavi, though he has been succeeded by a 
consul of a very different type, has not laboured 
altogether in vain. 

Even without the assistance of the French Consul 
our relations with the Sultan of Maskat cannot be 
free from difficulty. It has recently been pointed 
out in an able article by Mr. Cantine, of the 
American Mission, that the Sultan is on the horns 
of a dilemma. If he displeases us he loses his 
subsidy, which is a matter of considerable import- 
ance to him ; if he follows our advice too closely he 
is bound to incur the hostility of the Sheikhs of 
Oman, over whom he exercises a somewhat pre- 
carious suzerainty. But the dilemma would be in 



24 FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

no way serious if he could depend on our thorough 
support. The slightest show of military strength 
would be sufficient to overawe the Arab tribes of 
the interior, who have apparently very few soldierly 
qualities. This has been fairly well proved both in 
the affair of 1889, which Lord Curzon describes in 
his book on Persia, and again in 1895, when the 
Bedouins were incited by the Sheikh Saleh to enter 
the town of Maskat by stealth and seize the Sultan's 
Palace. In both cases protracted fighting took place 
without any adequate result in the shape of a 
casualty list, nor would it be possible for the town 
to be attacked at all if the hills behind were even 
moderately well defended. The affair of 1895 was 
one of those regrettable incidents which happen in 
diplomacy as well as in warfare. The British 
political agent of those days had a great oppor- 
tunity of asserting British supremacy in Maskat 
when each side in turn appealed to his authority. 
Instead of settling matters with a firm hand, he left 
the Sultan to make his own bargain with the 
Bedouins, and contented himself with sending in a 
heavy bill of damages. 

Of course it may be argued that we desire no 
supremacy in Oman nor in any part of the Arabian 
Peninsula outside of Aden. We have, moreover, 
an agreement with France of over forty years stand- 
ing, whereby both Powers renounce all intention of 
territorial acquisition in the kingdom of Oman. Yet, 
in spite of that agreement, circumstances have forced 
upon us certain obligations with regard to Maskat 
until we have reached a position where we do exer- 



9 $ 




FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 25 

cise a protectorate over the Sultan in all but name. 
He accepts our subsidy ; his chief adviser is the 
British Political agent ; the very life of his capital 
depends upon its commercial intercourse with 
India, carried on by means of British steamers ; and 
he is now put in direct communication with the 
outer world by the extension of the Indo-Persian 
cable to Maskat. The so-called Kingdom of 
Oman, over which the Sultan owns hardly more than 
the shadow of authority, can only advance on the 
road to civilisation by coming more and more under 
the influence of a European power, and we owe it to 
our past history to take care that that European 
Power is Great Britain and none other. Nor could 
a single stone be thrown at us on account of any 
action we may take to open up the interior of the 
Arabian Peninsula. Of all passages in British 
history there is none which shows the British 
Government in a better light than that which deals 
with the Nineteenth Century history of the Gulf. 
Fifty times at least in the past hundred years we 
have had an excellent opportunity of annexing as 
much Arabian territory as we liked, but on every 
occasion we have set our faces agaiDst territorial 
aggrandisement, and aimed solely at the pacification 
of the Persian and Arabian seas. And not content 
with destroying the power of the pirates, we have 
courted unpopularity, and still court unpopularity, 
with the Arabs by Our anti-slavery policy. Starting 
in 1822, we gradually forced on the various tribes 
more and more stringent treaties, until to-day 
slavery is as illegal in Oman or the Gulf as it is in 



26 FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 

the State of New York, and our men-of-war alone 
of all the navies of the world have spent torrid 
summers in stamping out the evil. That we get 
little thanks for it is a matter of course. Indeed, 
there are those who tell us that we benefit nobody 
by it, least of all the slaves, who rather enjoy slavery 
than otherwise. Still, whatever political force we 
may lose by it, no true British subject would ever 
regret for one moment the self-imposed task nor 
forego his privilege of holding out freedom to every 
one who seeks his protection from the bonds of 
slavery. 

Whatever unpopularity we may earn in this direc- 
tion might be easily counteracted by firmness of 
political control, and it is the bounden duty of those 
who are responsible for our foreign policy to see to 
it that no other Power is allowed a territorial foot- 
ing on the coast of the Arabian Peninsula or the 
shores of the Persian Gulf. 

The prospects of Oman belong more properly to 
a chapter on the trade of the gulf in general. But 
it may be said here that of the trade of Maskat, 
which amounts to nearly half a million sterling per 
annum, the bulk is in the hands of British or British- 
Indian merchants, the shipping is entirely British 
and native, and there are some two thousand Indian 
subjects of the King-Emperor in the dominions of 
the Sultan. The French, who are our only political 
opponents in this sphere, have practically no trade 
at all and very little prospect of any in the future, 
and yet they would like to undermine our influence 
and, if possible, secure a harbour on the coast. In 



FRENCH INTRIGUES AT MASKAT 27 

the face of such designs, it is necessary for us to 
make it abundantly clear, not only that we shall 
suffer no encroachment, but also that should we at 
any time find it necessary to assert a more definite 
control over Oman we are under no obligation 
whatever to grant compensating advantages to 
France or any other Power on the Arabian Peninsula. 



CHAPTER III 

THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 

Leaving Maskat, the steamers of the British India 
company visit Jask, Bunder Abbas, and Lingah, on 
the Persian coast, cross to the islands of Bahrein, 
near the opposite shore, recross to Bushire, and 
finally wend their way through a foot of mud on 
the bar of the Shat-el-Arab to the Turkish port of 
Basra. But since the plague at Bombay and 
Karachi necessitates quarantine at the Persian 
landing-places, I was unable to visit Bunder Abbas 
and Lingah on the upward journey, and am com- 
pelled, therefore, to jump immediately to Bahrein, 
leaving the Persian towns to be dealt with later. 

Despite the quarantine nuisance, which one must 
admit is unavoidable, the voyage in itself is intensely 
interesting to those who are not familiar with the 
Arab in his native waters nor with the weird, and 
often grand, scenery of the rugged Persian coast. 
The navigation of the Gulf, which is entirely desti- 
tute of lights and imperfectly surveyed, is not with- 
out its attractions even to the unnautical traveller 
for whom the chart may still have a fascination in 
such a sea of rocks and headlands and forlorn 
islands ; while the captain who has spent his life 
navigating the Gulf may still find excitement in 



THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 29 

waters where the book is often at strange variance 
with his sounding-lead. There is a sad story of a 
captain of a tramp steamer who lately came all the 
way from Beira on the African coast to Bushire, 
near the head of the Gulf, with no better guide than 
a cheap atlas ; yet as soon as a kind friend gave him 
a few charts to help him on to Basra, he promptly 
went hard aground. 

Then, apart from the excitement of navigation, 
there is plenty of new colouring in the motley crowd 
on board, where Moslems and Hindus, Sheikhs and 
horse-dealers, pilgrims and pearl-merchants are 
huddled together on deck amid a strange confusion 
of cargo and household goods, among which sheep 
and goats and gazelles contentedly stray. During 
the earlier part of my journey the Fast of Bamazan 
was still in force, and during its continuance good 
Moslems, even when they are on a journey — though 
some claim a dispensation on that account — only eat 
by night, and great was the anxiety of my fellow 
passengers for the coming of the new moon. On the 
first night of the calendar moon the sky was hazy, 
and the Koran recks nothing of calendars, so that 
the rejoicings were loud on the second evening, when 
the thin silvery band was faintly visible as the sun 
sank behind the rocks of Cape Mussandim. As 
chance would have it we were steaming away from 
Bunder Abbas at the moment, and the course from 
there to Lingah necessitates so many and such rapid 
changes of compass that the glad Arabs, who had 
instantly fallen to prayer and thanksgiving, were 
sore put to it to keep their faces towards Mecca. 



SO THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 

The habit of prayer, while it speaks well for the 
religious fervour of the Arab, has its drawbacks on 
the circumscribed deck space of a Gulf mail steamer. 
It was my fortune to travel in company with a 
Sheikh of the mainland who went on a journey, like 
the great barons of old, attended by his whole 
retinue of hawkers and sword-bearers, menials and 
mullahs, of whom the last named were so conscien- 
tious in their duties that there was no moment of 
the day or portion of the deck which was secure 
from their desperate supplications. 

But the triumph of cacophony was achieved when 
we left Lingah on the evening of a day's gluttony — 
there is no other word for the reaction after 
Ramazan — and the biting, rending " shamal " caught 
us fair on the beam in very mid-gulf. All night 
long above the howling of the wind and the racing 
of the screw a despairing wail of " Yah Ali, yah 
Hussein," went up to the unheeding heavens, 
mingled with the more variegated appeals of the 
Banian merchants and their wives, who, not content 
with calling upon every god in the Hindu calendar, 
interrupted their cries to urge the Shiah Moslems of 
Bahrein to fresh endeavours, in order that no 
possible means of salvation might go untried. I 
believe the captain narrowly escaped deification 
when he steered his ship safely through the shoals 
into Bahrein harbour the following afternoon. It 
was a night worth experiencing, but not lightly to 
be repeated. 

The little archipelago, of which Bahrein proper 
and the Island of Maharak are the only considerable 



THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 31 

members, being in the very centre of the famous 
pearl oyster beds of the Gulf, has an importance far 
above its intrinsic merit as a group of habitable 
islands, and has passed through many vicissitudes, 
including the inevitable Portuguese conquest, Persian 
domination, subjugation to Maskat, and attacks 
from the Wahabis, the Turks, the Egyptians and 
the British. 

The present ruling tribe of Utubis came over from 
the mainland in the eighteenth century, conquered 
the Persian Shiah Mohammedans who were then in 
possession of the islands and are generally alluded 
to in the old reports of the time as the " aborigines," 
and from the beginning of the ninteenth century to 
the present day they have continued — with one 
brief interval of Maskat rule — to hold their own, 
thanks to the protection frequently aiforded them 
by Great Britain. 

As long ago as 1815 the Bahrein chief appealed 
to the British Resident for support against Maskat, 
and obtained a sort of informal assurance of friend- 
ship which encouraged him to stand against the 
Imam of Maskat and defeat him with heavy loss ; 
but the Sheikh subsequently — a year or two later — 
showed that perfidy which was characteristic of his 
successors by openly joining the pirates who were 
then in the zenith of their reign of terror. In 1820, 
after the great campaign of the British against the 
pirates, Bahrein was willing enough to subscribe to 
the anti-piracy contract of that date. 

In the years that followed the Utubi rulers did 
their best by a craven and foolish policy to ruin 



32 THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 

their rich possessions. In 1836 we find the Sheikh 
Abdulla paying tribute to the Wahabis, at a time 
when the Wahabis were still the scourge of the Gulf, 
in order to get protection from them against the 
designs of Persia, and two years later he is buying 
his freedom from Egypt ; while his sons, by their 
cowardly tyranny over the so-called " aborigines," or 
Persian Arabians of the islands, are gradually driving 
the population over seas and reducing a once fertile 
garden to a desert. 

It was at this point that the Imam of Maskat 
implored the British Government, without success, 
to annex Bahrein in order to save the islands from 
utter disaster — a otriking tribute to our influence, 
coming as it did from a ruler who had always wanted 
Bahrein for nimself. The British Government, how- 
ever, was bent on abstaining from any acquisition of 
territory and from all interference in the internal 
quarrels of the tribes ; so the affairs of Bahrein went 
from bad to worse until Abdulla was attacked and 
driven out by his grand nephew Mahomed- bin- 
Khalifa in 1843. 

For seven years the ex-chief of Bahrein was a 
danger and a menace to the peace of the Gulf, and 
once more the British Government had the offer of 
taking Bahrein under its wing by restoring Abdulla, 
who was profuse in his promises. But again the 
Besident declined to interfere and Mahomed-bin- 
Khalifa was able by desperate resorts to hold the 
position he had usurped. At one time he was paying 
the Wahabis four thousand crowns in tribute to 
keen Abdulla safely away in the interior of Nejd, a 



THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 33 

course which merely resulted in his having to fight 
his grand-uncle on the coast just opposite Bahrein, 
Then Turkey stepped in and attempted to gain 
Mahomed's allegiance by promise of protection, while 
Persia dallied in turn with both Mahomed and 
Abdulla. 

In despair, Mahomed threw himself on the Resi- 
dent's mercy, and urged on him the advantages of a 
close agreement between Great Britain and Bahrein 
by which the British Government would have 
asserted a suzerainty over the pearl islands. But 
for the third time in the course of less than twenty 
years the Resident was forced to forego the oppor- 
tunity of annexation in deference to the established 
rule of conduct laid down for herself by Great 
Britain, and nothing more than expressions of good- 
will passed between the Sheikh and the British 
representative. 

It is worth while dwelling on this period in the 
history of Bahrein, because the annals of the time 
show most clearly that here, as elsewhere in the Gulf, 
Great Britain refused absolutely to succumb to 
repeated temptations towards territorial acquisition 
and gave one more proof of the singlemindedness of 
her civilising policy in the Gulf. Surely it was no 
small thing to put aside so steadfastly a prize for 
which every other ruler within hail was greedily 
contending. 

Finally Abdulla died at Maskat on his way to 
Zanzibar, and Mahomed was left in acknowledged 
possession of Bahrein. Still, though his grand-uncle 
was removed from the scene of action he was yet 



34 THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 

open to the intrigues of more powerful foes. His 
intense conceit, combined with entire lack of the 
ability to run straight, left Bahrein so open to foreign 
encroachment, especially on the part of Turkey, 
whose hand had already been stretched out to the 
coast of Arabia, that in 1861 the British Govern- 
ment was driven to complete a treaty with the 
Sheikh by which he was bound to abstain from 
piracy, war, and the slave trade, in return for the 
protection of Great Britain against foreign aggres- 
sion. In other words, it was made clear that the 
British Government would not tolerate the encroach- 
ment of any foreign Power, with or without the 
Sheikh's consent, in this part of the Gulf. 

Mahomed proved as faithless as his predecessors, 
with the result that a brazen breach of the treaty 
was rewarded in 1867 by the bombardment of 
Manameh, the capital of Bahrein, and the Sheikh 
was deported to Aden. Isa-bin- Ali, his nephew, was 
set up by us in his stead, and still rules in Bahrein. 
The protection policy has been elucidated in further 
treaties, first in 1880 when the Sheikh agreed to 
make no treaties with and grant no coal depots to 
foreign countries, and to receive no foreign consuls 
without our consent; and, secondly, in 1892, when 
he undertook to alienate no territory to any foreign 
Power. It should be added that Bahrein joined in 
the Anti- Slavery Treaty of 1847, an d by the agree- 
ment of 1 86 1 was thrown open to all articles of our 
trade subject to a 5 per cent, duty ad valorem. 
We have thus in the course of a hundred years, 
during any period of which we might easily have 



THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 35 

annexed this emporium of the pearl trade, arrived, 
with the strongest disinclination, at the stage of 
protection. 

Mr. Zwemer, who lives in Bahrein and knows the 
island well, has this to say on the subject : " Oppres- 
sion, blackmail, and bribery are universal, and except 
in commerce and the slave trade English protection 
has brought about no reforms on the island. To be 
'protected' means here strict neutrality as to the 
internal affairs, and absolute dictation as to affairs 
with other Governments. To ' protect ' means to 
keep matters in statu quo until the hour is ripe for 
annexation." 

It is necessary to point out that Mr. Zwemer, who 
is elsewhere strong in his commendation of British 
policy in the Gulf, is here hardly as fair to us as he 
might be. To begin with, the development of com- 
merce and the abolition of slavery make together 
a rather large exception to the statement that 
"English protection has brought about no reforms;" 
nor is it easy to understand why it is that two 
American writers, Mr. Cantine and Mr. Zwemer — 
Northerners, too, bien entendu — find so little to 
commend in the whole anti-slavery campaign under- 
taken by Great Britain in these waters at enormous 
expense and with so little material reward. In the 
second place, has Mr. Zwemer considered what would 
be the present state of Bahrein if it had fallen, as it 
-inevitably must have done but for our protection, 
under the influence of Persia or the sway of 
Turkey ? 

I am prepared to admit that Bahrein would 



36 THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 

commercially and judicially be better off if it were 
regularly annexed by Great Britain ; but what out- 
cries against us would there not be throughout the 
world if we were to annex the pearl-beds of the Gulf, 
what talk of land-grabbing and insatiate greed ! 
Besides, matters have evidently changed since he 
wrote the above paragraph, even though it was 
only three years ago or less. I find that in the whole 
of last year, there were only two cases of burglary 
and one of murder — a fairly good record for a popula- 
tion of 60,000 people, among whom no reforms have 
been brought about. One begins to wonder, indeed, 
whether reforms in such communities are always an 
unmixed blessing. As for the official tyranny and 
corruption which undoubtedly exist, as they exist 
everywhere in the East, among Eastern races, it is 
only fair to say that there has been an enormous 
improvement in this direction since the British agent, 
Mr. Gaskin, was stationed at Manameh in March 
1 900, instead of the native representative. 

On the whole, whatever one may think about the 
wisdom of our policy in the Gulf, we have much to 
pride ourselves on from a moral point of view in the 
fact that, next to the barren post at Bassiduh, on 
the Island of Kishm, which is still British territory, 
we do not possess a foot of land on the shores of the 
Gulf which we have spent so much time and so many 
lives in opening to the peaceful trade of the world — 
and this in spite of the fact that there is absolutely 
no Power which could say us nay if we cared to 
annex the whole coast-line of the Gulf. 

Bahrein being, all against our will, nearly British 



THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 37 

territory, possesses a great interest for us at the 
present moment. After Koweit, Bahrein is as 
desirable a naval station from a geographical stand- 
point as one could find in the Gulf. It is situated 
just about halfway between Cape Mussandim and 
the mouth of the Shat-al-Arab, it is extremely 
fertile, and possesses an excellent water supply — an 
unusual luxury in these parts. The climate, which 
was long ago ranked with that of Maskat, Kishm, 
and Bassidore as the vilest in this quarter of the 
globe, has been in reality greatly traduced, if we 
are to credit Mr. Zwemer and various Europeans 
who have had a real experience of its character. 
Personally, I can testify to its being almost unduly 
cold and bracing in winter, and the summer heat 
cannot be compared with that of Maskat or Kishm, 
if the thermometer is any criterion. The harbour 
was considered a good one fifty or sixty years ago— 
I suppose because the intricacy of the channels 
among the shoals rendered pursuit intu Bahrein 
difficult in the days of piracy and dhow warfare. 
In reality it is a very bad harbour indeed, being not 
much more than a roadstead protected on the south 
by Bahrein proper and on the east by the little 
Island of Maharak, and exposed to all winds which 
come out of the N.E., N., or N.W. The shore 
shelves so gradually that it is impossible for a 
steamer of seventeen feet draft to come nearer 
than a mile and a half to the town, so that cargo 
and passengers alike have to be carried first by 
boats, and then by the donkeys for which Bahrein 
is famous to the beach. Still, the harbour 



38 THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 

could doubtless be improved and made moderately- 
effective. 

It must not be forgotten that the little squadron 
in the Gulf needs very badly a station of its own, 
where the men could occasionally get ashore and find 
recreation and fresh water ; and failing Koweit, 
Bahrein is, perhaps, the best place that could be 
selected. As a trade emporium, the islands are 
likely to increase in importance owing to the fact 
that they are the distributing-centre for all the 
Arab coast west of El Katr, and will soon, perhaps, 
secure the trade of the coast east of Katr as far as 
Cape Mussandim, which up to the present has been 
supplied by Lingah on the Persian coast, where the 
new system of customs worked for the Shah by 
Belgians is ruining business. But the chief value 
of Bahrein lies in the pearl-fisheries, which are 
apparently an inexhaustible source of wealth. 

Fifty years ago about ,£70,000 worth of pearls 
were exported from the coast. In 1901 the "record" 
figure of ^475,341 was reached at Bahrein alone. 
Naturally, with such an article of export, Bahrein 
has a great buying capacity, and our fellow subjects, 
the thrifty Banians of India, do a roaring trade in 
the import of rice, which they sell on credit at the 
beginning of the pearling-season at a rate of interest 
equivalent to about 100 per cent, per annum. 
Bahrein also exports donkeys of a fine breed, 
which fetch sometimes as much as £25 a head in 
Persia. 

Altogether, the trade of Manameh and Maharak 
is in a flourishing condition, and amounted in 1899 



THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 39 

to ,£1,300,000. In 1900 the figures were lower, 
owing to a failure in the pearl catch. But in 1901 
the high-water mark was very nearly reached. 
Since the British agent has come to Bahrein there 
have been indications of an increased desire on the 
part of merchants to trade there, and Bahrein Arabs 
as well as the Banians look to the British Resident 
to further their interests. 

The population of the islands is put by Mr. 
Zwemer at 60,000, which is short of the 360 villages 
which are said to have existed on the island before 
the scourge of the Utubis and other piratical tribes 
laid it waste. But with good government and 
security from attack, the Island of Bahrein proper, 
which is 27 miles by 10, would soon become again 
the garden which it once was. It will also in time 
have a valuable trade connection with the interior 
of Arabia. At present El Hasa and El Katif face 
the islands on the mainland and control a great 
trade-route. They, in turn, are controlled by Turkey, 
which is utterly powerless even to police her own 
territories. Just before I visited Bahrein, two 
caravans to and from the interior were attacked 
by brigands close to El Hasa and robbed of nearly 
two lakhs of rupees. The Turkish authorities, with 
their apologies for troops, are quite unable to bring 
the offenders to book, and so the El Hasa route 
is rendered practically useless. When the Turks 
finally vanish from the Gulf, as they must eventually 
do, this valuable trade may be reopened, or rather 
opened effectually for the first time, and Bahrein 
will then attain a greater importance, though Koweit 



40 THE PEARL ISLANDS OF THE GULF 

must, with its fine harbour, be the chief port of 
entry for Nejd. 

The revenue of Bahrein consists chiefly of the 
customs, which are farmed out by the Sheikh to a 
Banian for 1 20,000 rupees (about .£80,000), besides 
a small tax on pearl-boats and an impost on law- 
suits. For the size of his territory, the Sheikh of 
Bahrein is a very rich man, and might be much 
richer if the customs were properly collected under 
British management. This is one of the reforms 
which really is needed, since a properly conducted 
Customs Department might improve the harbour 
beyond recognition, and so benefit the trade of the 
islands to a large extent. 

As it is, pace Mr. Zwemer, British protection 
means much more than mere regulation of external 
relations. Bahrein is already a prosperous little 
mart, and, as might be expected, it is a German 
merchant of an enterprising nature who is reaping 
the benefit of our influence. 



CHAPTER IV 

CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 

On reaching Bushire I was fortunate enough to 
find the Lawrence about to start down the coast 
with the Resident on his usual winter tour, and 
availing myself of the kind invitation of Colonel 
Kemball I was able not only to land at Lingah and 
Bunder Abbas, which I had already seen from the 
deck of the mail steamer, but also to touch at many 
points on the coast which are seldom visited by 
European travellers. 

It was intended first to stop at Tahiri, the site of 
the ancient Siraf, whose ruins still proclaim its past 
splendour. But a strong southerly wind not merely 
precluded a landing on the open coast but played 
such havoc with our appetites that we were glad to 
find a kindly refuge in a little bay, about a hundred 
and twenty miles down the coast from Bushire, 
where we were secure from anything but a north- 
west wind. 

The shores of the Persian Gulf have been fre- 
quently abused for their lack of decent harbours, a 
reproach which is so misleading as to necessitate a 
few words on the subject of the coast-line, which I 
have examined by the aid of field-glasses, from Jask 
to Bushire. 



42 CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 

The great plateau of Persia, which resembles in 
many respects the veldt of South Africa, breaks 
precipitously towards the sea all along the southern 
boundary of the country. But the abrupt mountains, 
though they frequently seem to hang right over the 
waters of the Gulf, never quite project to the shore, 
but are protected from the waves by an intervening 
space of shelving land which varies in width from one 
to twenty miles. There is, therefore, no place on the 
Persian coast where the mountain scarp so intrudes 
on the sea as to form a natural harbour. At the 
same time it rises so abruptly and so near the shore, 
that the rains which scour its face have no time, 
even if they were frequent enough, to combine into 
a great river before they reach the sea, or vanish in 
the torrid sands at the foot of the cliffs. The only 
variations in this grand but monotonous landscape 
are formed by occasional spits of sand and coral 
which run out into the sea at Bushire, for instance, 
and Naband and Jask, and by islands like Sheikh 
Shuaib, and Kishm, and Ormuz, which, lying off the 
mainland, form channels which are more or less 
protected from the prevailing winds. It is quite 
true that the protection which is given by the sandy 
spits at Jask and Bushire is not only poor in itself, 
but rendered even less useful by the shelving 
bottom, which prevents an ordinary cargo-steamer 
from coming near the shore. Still, they form the 
beginnings of harbours which might easily be im- 
proved, as, for example, in the case of Bushire, 
where a little dredging would convert an open road- 
stead into a splendid haven. Then, again, the 



CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 43 

Islands of Kishm and Ormuz are so situated as to 
provide almost unlimited anchorage, which at 
present is never used. As for the Arab coast, 
which I shall come to later, it possesses some of the 
finest harbours in the whole of the East. 

Just opposite to our anchorage was a little fortress 
flying a red Arab flag, one of the many Arabian 
villages on the Persian coast which were pirate 
strongholds in the early days of last century. A 
small party from the Lawrence landed about a mile 
further up the beach to look for gazelle, and its 
members were shortly accosted by a somewhat 
ragged horseman with a good rifle slung over his 
shoulder, who eagerly inquired what our business 
might be, and explained that the Sheikh had been 
unable to go out to call on the ship on account of 
the weather. "When we went to see the Sheikh, 
who was sitting in audience at the gate of his fort 
surrounded by a picturesque crowd of Arabs, armed 
for the most part with modern rifles, we discovered 
that it was not the weather so much which had 
delayed his coming as the fact that, not being an 
expert in flags, he had suspected our arrival to be in 
some way connected with the new Belgian customs, 
and he was prepared — so, at least, he assured us — * 
to give the new custom-house officials a warm re- 
ception. As the village, like many of the Arab 
villages on this part of the coast, pays but a nominal 
tribute to the Persian Governor of Dashtistan, and 
exists on a meagre export of tobacco and a con- 
siderable import of firearms, which is strictly pro- 
hibited by the Persian Government, one could 



44 CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 

understand and appreciate the feelings of the Sheikh 
towards the new Belgian regime, which, though it 
has been in force on the Persian coast for close on 
two years, has not penetrated to the smaller villages, 
which keep up all the brisker trade in rifles since the 
regular ports have been closed to the illicit traffic. 
It will be interesting to know, when the time comes, 
if the Sheikh proves as good as his word, and repels 
the unfortunate customs intruder with force of arms. 

Personally, as one visiting the Gulf for the first 
time, I was amazed to find the whole coast dotted 
with villages which not only are inhabited by more 
or less pure blooded Arabs, but actually fly the red 
Arab flag over their little strongholds, and own only 
such allegiance to Persia as custom and a habit of 
non-interference has rendered mildly acceptable to 
both parties. One can only arrive at the conclusion 
that since the Persian Government, which is, per- 
haps, the most inefficient in a hemisphere of ineffi- 
cient Governments, without a single battalion of 
troops, is able to maintain its sway over the once 
turbulent tribes of the coast, these tribes, in spite of 
their ferocious-looking riflemen, are sunk to a depth 
of cowardice which sadly belies their piratical 
ancestry. 

The old Sheikh, who was almost Nubian in colour, 
and endeavoured to conceal his age by a foppishly 
henna-dyed beard, grew quite communicative when 
he discovered that we were not custom-house 
officials, and he displayed a certain amount of 
political acumen. He chatted about the Koweit 
affair, in which our conduct appeared to him very 



CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 45 

mysterious ; for were we not ostensibly supporting 
Mabaruk, while all the time we were harbouring in 
Bombay a brother of Mabaruk's bitterest enemy ? 
To take both sides in a vendetta is a course for 
which there is abundant precedent in Arab history, 
provided that you have an ulterior motive in de- 
ceiving both parties. But granted that we meant 
Mabaruk well, there seemed to be no sane excuse for 
failing to do away with the enemy when he was 
within our gates : and as we could never in a 
hundred years have explained our attitude to the 
Sheikh we returned to the question of the customs. 

In the establishment of Belgian officials over the 
customs of the country he saw clearly the finger of 
Russia, whose influence he seemed to deplore, not 
because he dreaded Russian rule so much as because 
the new regime might interfere with his legitimate 
profits. He even went so far as to discuss the rifle 
trade, whose centre is Maskat, until he suddenly 
remembered that he was speaking to strangers of 
an illegal practice, and pulled himself up short. We 
returned to the Lawrence with the impression 
that, on the whole, the Persians are possibly 
making a mistake in arousing the antagonism of 
tribes which they only rule by sufferance, an im- 
pression which was of necessity mixed with con- 
tempt for the people who allowed themselves to 
be so ruled. 

Next day we left our shelter, but owing to stress 
of weather we were again forced to find protection 
from the wind under lee of the island of Sheikh 
Shuaib; for it was useless to go on to Lingah as 



46 CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 

long as the south wind made a landing there im- 
possible. 

Sheikh Shuaib is a desolate, wind-swept island, 
where a few wretched villages sent their hundred 
or so male inhabitants to the shore to discover the 
reason of such an unwonted spectacle as that of a 
British gunboat a mile oif shore. They, too, mis- 
took us at first for the Belgians, and having no 
rifles such as are possessed by the Sheikh whom I 
have already mentioned they tried to frighten us 
oif their territory by assuring us that small-pox was 
rampant in their villages. They seemed intensely 
relieved to find that we were merely British, and 
therefore had no designs on the trade in arms, which 
they too enjoy with the Arab coast. 

By this time the south wind had blown itself out, 
and we were able to push on to Lingah, which is 
some two hundred and eighty miles from Bushire, 
and under the jurisdiction of the Governor of that 
place. 

Lingah is generally considered to be the prettiest 
port on the Persian coast, an opinion which is based 
perhaps, on the few extra palm-trees which adorn 
its environments and the peculiarly rugged rampart 
of mountains in the background. In reality all 
the coast towns present exactly the same features, 
a low straggling line of flat-roofed, mud-coloured 
houses along the beach, flanked to right and left, 
perhaps, by groves of date palms, an arid sandy 
plain behind, tilted slightly upwards towards the 
solid mountain wall. The palms may be more or 
less numerous, the houses, as at Bushire, a little 



CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 47 

more pretentious than usual, the outline of the 
mountains a shade more fantastic, as where Grubb's 
Notch behind Lingah — a cone in a Y-shaped depres- 
sion — resembles exactly the foresight of a rifle ; but 
it is hard to say which place is most picturesque or 
most dreary. Lingah boasts a blue-tiled minaret 
and a small dock as its distinctive marks, but as we 
had to land at low tide the dock in no way lessened 
the discomforts of that damp operation ; in fact its 
chief use seemed to be to give a resting-place to a 
large buggalow which had once got in during the 
spring tides and was unable to get afloat again. 
Once ashore, we were able to gather some idea of 
the wealth of the place by a visit to the bazaar, 
where in clean stalls were displayed the wares of 
India and Maskat, of Arabia and Birmingham, of 
Germany and Persia, the chief articles being the 
piece-goods of Bombay and Manchester, and the 
carpets of the country. The townspeople who 
thronged about us in the narrow covered way, both 
Arabs and Hindus alike, were sufficiently well, and 
sometimes even gorgeously, dressed to betoken a 
fair measure of prosperity. The town was originally 
a haunt of the Jowasmi (Kawasim) pirates, whose 
power was finally broken by the British expedition 
of 1819-20, during which Lingah was sacked and 
its boats burned. 

Since 1819-20 Lingah continued to be ruled by a 
Sheikh of the Jowasmi tribe, under allegiance to 
Persia, until 1887, when the Persepolis, the one 
ship of the Persian Navy, arrived in the roads and 
set up a Persian Governor. The Arabs made little 



48 CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 

or no resistance, and have remained ever since under 
direct Persian rule with one short interval in 1898, 
when the Sheik Mahomed, a descendant of the old 
Arab rulers, executed a miniature coup d'etat, but 
in a few months was compelled to succumb to the 
Darya Begi, or Persian admiral, who, arriving with 
the awe-inspiring Persepolis, found no difficulty in 
re-establishing Persian rule. The Arab popula- 
tion is perhaps 10,000 strong, yet the gallant 
admiral was able to reduce the citadel with two 
hundred Persian soldiers, the marks of whose bullets 
are still fresh on the towers of the fort. Now there 
is not even a single real Persian soldier in the place. 
When the Resident went ashore to return the 
Deputy Governor's call he was received by a guard 
of perhaps thirty armed men whose motley clothes 
and variegated methods of saluting plainly asserted, 
what was undoubtedly the fact, that they had only 
a few minutes before been recruited from the byways 
of the bazaar. 

The Deputy Governor described himself as a 
native of Lar, the capital of the province in which 
Lingah is situated. But his physiognomy and dress 
alike indicated a strong mixture of Arab blood. 
Though Lingah is in Laristan the Deputy Governor 
is under the Governor of Bushire and struck one as 
being of less importance than the Armenian who 
collects the customs under the new Belgian adminis- 
tration, and has certainly less authority with 
the natives than the Arab Mullah who rules 
over the morals of Lingah and occasionally dis- 
plays his religious fervour by broaching the 



CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 49 

casks of wine or beer imported by infidel foreign 
merchants. 

Here, as elsewhere, the Belgian customs form the 
chief topic of conversation. The prosperity of Lingah 
depends almost entirely on her trade with the Arab 
coast on the opposite side of the Gulf. As a port of 
entry for the interior of Persia it has long ceased to 
be of any value, since Shiraz is supplied by Bushire, 
and Yezd and Kerman by Bunder Abbas. It is 
doubtful, indeed, if it sends any goods beyond the 
limits of its own province of Laristan, on the Persian 
mainland. On the other hand, it has become 
so useful as a distributing- centre for the so-called 
Pirate Coast, which is absolutely devoid of harbours 
which steamers can visit, that during the last half- 
century Lingah has increased in wealth faster than 
any other port in the Gulf. Fifty years ago, accord- 
ing to Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly's report of 1863, the 
customs of Lingah were farmed for 200 tomans 
instead of the previous 100 tomans. A little later, 
owing to the representations of the more heavily 
taxed Bunder Abbas, the impost was raised to 2000 
tomans, and in 1 863 Colonel Pelly guessed the trade 
of Lingah to be equal to about one -fourth of the 
trade of Bushire, which was then reckoned at roughly 
sixty- two lakhs of rupees. The figures of 1 900 show 
a total of three hundred and six lakhs for Bushire 
and a hundred and forty-five lakhs for Lingah, which 
points not only to a greatly increased total for 
Lingah, but also to the much more rapid growth of 
her trade as compared with that of Bushire. In 
reality the increase at Lingah is partly due to the 

D 



50 CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 

fact that she is a distributing-port, and the same 
items constantly appear both as exports and imports. 
Yet, allowing for all the vagaries of the Gulf trade 
reports, there can be no doubt about the rapid im- 
provements since Colonel Pelly's days. 

On the other hand, if Lord Curzon's figures are 
correct, there has been a great falling off since 1889. 
The export of pearls, for instance, has fallen from 
something over ^300,000 in 1889 to ^225,000 ten 
years later, and the sterling value of the import of 
cotton goods is just half as great to-day as it was 
when Lord Curzon visited the Gulf. 

Lingah, therefore, having reached the height of 
its prosperity about 1890, is now once more on the 
downward tract — a tendency which must be attri- 
buted to the rival claims of Bahrein, which will 
become more and more the emporium of the Gulf, 
and especially the centre of the pearl trade, now 
that it is definitely under British protection. This 
is a subject to which I shall return in discussing the 
general trade of the Gulf. It is sufficient for my 
present purpose to point out that, though Lingah is 
in some ways more central in its position than 
Bahrein, it has not the advantages of being under 
the protection of a great trading Power, and there- 
fore is bound to suffer at the hands of its rival. 

In the face of this gradual decline we found the 
Persian Government in the process of doing its very 
best to precipitate the ruin of this clean little mart, 
through the agency of the Belgian customs. Accord- 
ing to the old treaties with Persia foreign merchants 
can only be subjected to an import and export duty 



CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 51 

of 5 per cent, ad valorem. In actual practice the 
duty exacted was considerably less than 5 per 
cent., some articles like foodstuffs being entirely 
free, while the customs, being farmed almost in- 
variably by natives of India, were not likely to press 
hardly on the Indian merchants who held the bulk 
of the foreign trade in their hands. The Belgian 
regime came into existence in March 1900, and 
though the new officials began rather cautiously, 
they very soon raised the duties to an effective 5 
per cent., thereby causing great dissatisfaction all 
along the coast. In the case of Lingah the impost 
was peculiarly hard to bear, because, being levied 
on imports and exports alike, it frequently was 
applied to the same goods twice, these goods being 
intended for re-export. This is a process which 
would be considered unfair in any other country in 
the world, and is actually contrary to the spirit of 
our treaties with Persia. The result is shown in 
the growing inclination of the merchants to change 
their market to some spot under another flag. 
Those of them who own sailing-craft are already 
shipping direct to the Arab coast, and many others 
will be driven to make Bahrein their headquarters. 

There is another way out of the difficulty for the 
merchants of Lingah, and it is one which has 
already suggested itself to some of them. Right 
opposite to the town of Lingah is the west end of 
the Island of Kishm, of which about a square mile 
has for many years been British territory. In the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there must 
have been a far larger town on that site than the 



52 CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 

present Lingah to judge from the extensive remains 
of the old Portuguese settlement. Now, why should 
not the trading part of Lingah be transported to 
this spot, which we call Bassadore, and which, being 
British soil, would be beyond the reach of the Bel- 
gian customs ? In other words, why not create a 
free port like a miniature Hong Kong in the Persian 
Gulf? 

We were able to form at least a superficial idea of 
the qualifications of Bassadore as we landed there 
after leaving Lingah. This was the headquarters 
of our troops and ships in the Gulf after the expedi- 
tion of 1 8 19. The troops were originally quartered 
at the opposite end of the island, close to the town 
of Kishm, but when five or six officers and half the 
men had died of heat, while the thermometer burst 
at 160° inside a tent, they were removed to Sallack 
Point, opposite to Henjam, and finally in 1821 to 
Bassadore, where they remained for two years. After 
that Bassadore — our corruption of the native name 
Bassidu — continued to be a depot for the Indian 
Marine down to 1879. The climate is only less 
oppressive than that of the town of Kishm ; but 
certainly it seems no worse than that of Lingah on 
the mainland, since the station is on a small pro- 
montory, surrounded on three sides by the sea, and 
well removed from the mountains, which so often 
screen the coast towns from the breeze. When we 
landed we found a small masonry pier still in good 
repair, which is only useful at high water, the scanty 
remains of the naval station in complete ruin, sixty 
or seventy tons of coal long since spoiled by exposure 



CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 53 

to wind and weather, a few rusty anchors, a well- 
filled and long-disused graveyard, and an aged Arab 
resembling the ghost of Robinson Crusoe's Friday, 
whose business it is to keep the British flag flying 
over this desolate spot. The old station consisted 
of a small plateau rising from 40 ft. to 100 ft. 
above the sea, about a mile or a little more square, 
and cut off from the rest of the island by a clearly 
defined depression. The greater part of the plateau 
is covered with the ruins of the old Portuguese 
town, which are nothing more than heaps of stone 
and the more recent remains of the naval depot. 
There is no drinkable water on the plateau except 
what is collected in tanks from the rainfall. The 
tanks are in wonderfully good repair, and were half 
full of water owing to a twenty minutes' fall in 
December ; they may now be used by the people 
of Lingah, whose supply, from a similar source, has 
run completely dry through thirteen months of 
drought. 

As a naval station Bassadore is partly condemned 
by the very fact of its abandonment ; yet it is 
superior in respect of harbourage to most of the 
existing ports of the Gulf. There is deep water 
within half a mile of the shore, but the approaches 
are through shoals by channels which give soundings 
of only twenty feet at low water. Still, at high 
water, the biggest ship afloat could make its way in 
if the channels were buoyed. The anchorage is 
unfortunately exposed to the south-west wind, 
which is one of the worst that haunts the Gulf, so 
that it cannot be deemed altogether satisfactory. 



54 CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 

As a distributing-centre Bassadore would have 
several advantages over Lingah. It is just as con- 
veniently situated with regard to the Arab coast, 
and, being British territory, it would not be subject 
to the vexatious tyranny of the Persian customs. 
It would be strange, therefore, if the action of the 
Persian Government should lead to the founding of 
a new mart in the Gulf under the British flag. If 
such should prove to be the case the Persians would 
have only themselves to blame, since nothing but a 
natural and spontaneous exodus of the merchants 
from Lingah could restore to active life this aban- 
doned piece of British territory. 

It has been the opinion of many British authorities 
in the Gulf, from the days of Sir John Malcolm down 
to the present time, that the trade and general 
prosperity of the Gulf would be greatly increased by 
the establishment of a free port under British rule, 
which should be at once the headquarters of our 
naval squadron, and the distributing-centre of our 
trade and the trade of all nations. In other words, 
what has been wanted is a Hong Kong or a Singa- 
pore in this part of the world. As it is there is no 
real emporium, for Bushire has no commanding 
position in trade, and never will have under Persian 
administration ; there is no station for our squadron 
and last of all the British Resident, the " uncrowned 
King of the Gulf," has his abode on Persian soil. I 
am very far from saying that Bassadore will answer 
the purpose as a British free port. It has the dis- 
advantage of being only a small part of a Persian 
island ; it is a desperately barren spot, without a 



CRUISING ON THE PERSIAN COAST 55 

drop of water save what the grudging heavens 
vouchsafe in the form of an infinitesimally small 
rainfall, and there is no room for a catchment 
system such as provides the port of Aden. Its 
situation is central as regards the Arab coast, but 
it commands no trade-route either to the interior of 
Persia or Arabia ; while the harbour, or what is 
dignified with that name, would require considerable 
artificial aid before it could be accepted as by any 
means adequate. 

If any money is to be spent on making a harbour 
there is at least one place which would far sooner 
repay the trouble than Bassadore, and that is 
Bahrein, which is fast becoming the most important 
trade centre in the Gulf. But even here one would 
not be inclined to force the natural course of events. 
That a free port will sooner or later be established 
under the British flag in the Gulf, I have not the 
slightest doubt ; but its position will be largely de- 
cided by the development of the new routes into 
the interior, and more especially the final alignment 
of the Turko- German Railway. But there is no 
reason why, in the meantime, a flourishing little 
settlement should not grow up again on the ruins 
of Bassadore, where at present only flocks of pin 
tailed grouse, and a few freed negroes, enjoy the 
protection of the British flag. 



OHAPTEE V 

SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS? 

Leaving Bassadore, we skirted the south coast of 
Kishm for three hours, until we came opposite the 
end of a red range of volcanic hills, which runs down 
at right angles to the shore from the centre of the 
island. Here we landed to explore the famous salt 
caves that have been for centuries the only valuable 
asset of the island, which is said to have produced 
quantities of corn, and vegetables, and wine in the 
days when Nearchus sailed the Gulf in support of 
the conquering hosts of Alexander the Great. The 
caves, which are apparently very numerous, can be 
discovered only by following up the streams of salt 
which run from the foot of the red hills to the 
beach. The entrances are generally a few feet 
high, but the interiors widen out into cathedral-like 
halls, with vaulted roofs, from which gleaming 
stalactites of pure salt hang like icicles. The cave 
that we first entered tunnelled its way sheer through 
a hill five or six hundred feet in height, into a 
little valley beyond, in the circumference of which 
there were other cave mouths like gigantic rabbit 
burrows at the foot of the hills. The floors of all 
the caves are pure salt, into which the foot sinks as 
in the sands of the sea, and the supply seems well- 



58 SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 

nigh as inexhaustible. The outer surface of the 
hills are red with iron oxide, except where they are 
discoloured by sulphur, and they are so destitute of 
vegetation as to make the existence of gazelles 
about their slopes almost miraculous. The salt 
industry is carried on by a few Arab dhows, and is 
evidently guarded somewhat jealously by the Sheikh 
of Kishm. It can hardly be doubted that with 
scientific exploitation this part of the island might 
be made to yield a valuable output of sulphur, iron, 
and perhaps copper, as well as salt. The caves in 
any more accessible part of the world would be a 
mine of wealth to an enterprising agent for holiday 
tours. 

Just east of the caves, and easily visible from the 
red hills, is the Island of Henjam, which, lying off 
the south coast of Kishm, forms a channel that might 
be converted into an excellent deep-water harbour. 
Passing to the southward and then turning 
again north-east we ran between Kishm and Larak, 
and dropped anchor off the town of Kishm, which is 
at the extreme eastern point of the island, just sixty 
miles from Bassadore on the west, and which con- 
tains the residence of the Sheikh. We found the 
town in partial ruins, owing to an earthquake that 
occurred a year or two ago, and we had difficulty in 
believing the Arab guide, who put the population 
at 7000. It is, in fact, a settlement of very little 
importance, being the capital of a peculiarly arid 
island, whose agricultural wealth, if it ever existed, 
has long since vanished, and whose mineral resources, 
which may be considerable, are quite undeveloped. 



SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 59 

The small population subsists for the most part on a 
meagre carrying- trade similar to that of Lingah, but 
on an infinitely smaller scale, and likely in the 
same way to be spoiled, such as it is, by the new- 
customs administration. The climate in summer 
was fatal to the British force which was camped a 
mile or so from the town in 1820, and it is intolerable 
even to the natives, who desert it altogether if they 
possibly can during the worst months. 

From Kishm we went to Ormuz, a small island 
nine and a half miles to the eastward of Kishm, if 
anything more desperately barren. Save for a low 
spit running out north towards the mainland, Ormuz 
is a mass of volcanic hills four miles in both length 
and breadth, rising to a height of 690 feet, and 
resembling irregular heaps of red earth and white 
lime. The red is oxide of iron, the white is salt. 
There is no water on the island except what is col- 
lected in tanks from the scanty rainfall, and very 
little life of any sort beyond a few hundred fishermen 
huddled together in huts on the site of the old 
Portuguese city and the ubiquitous gazelle, which 
seems to thrive on red ochre, and is credibly 
asserted to slake his thirst in the salt waves on the 
beach. 

Ormuz, which was once the richest mart of the 
East, the great emporium where the trade of the 
East met that of the West, is now a barren island, 
scarcely inhabited, and about as picturesque as any 
piece of waste land which has recently been turned 
over to the tender mercies of the jerry-builder. Yet 
on closer inspection one has no difficulty in believing 



60 SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS? 

that the little spit of level ground which projects to 
the north and ends in the ruins of a once impregnable 
fortress was the site of a city of 40,000 inhabitants. 
In fact that number might be well within the mark, 
for of the square mile and a half of level ground 
between the fort and the hills there is not a yard 
which is not covered with the rubble of ancient 
habitations now sunk in sand and coated with salt. 
The fortress is interesting as being the strongest of 
the many defences that the Portuguese built for 
themselves along the shores of Arabia and Persia, as 
the special work of the great Albuquerque himself, 
and as the cynosure of many experienced travellers. 
One can well imagine that Ormuz, with its frowning 
stronghold and beautiful churches and clustered 
white houses reflected in the blue waters of the Gulf, 
with its bulky galleons and rakish frigates lying at 
anchor beneath the castle, was once a pleasing sight 
to eyes that had grown weary with the long beat up 
the barren Arab coast. It is a sight that is never 
likely to be seen again, however, even though the 
Moin-ut-Tujar has got a concession to exploit the 
island, and Ormuz should send red ochre in tramp 
steamers to London in place of the pearls and 
silks and spices which once burdened the argosies of 
Portugal. 

From the fort to the mainland is not quite three 
miles, but Bunder Abbas, which is all that is left to 
represent the glories of Ormuz and Gombroon, is some 
distance along the coast, and altogether twelve and 
a half miles from our anchorage at Ormuz. 

To tell again the history of Bunder Abbas and its 



SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 61 

neighbouring Islands of Kishm and Larak and 
Ormuz would be simply to borrow, and spoil in the 
borrowing, the admirable little historical fantasia — 
if the metaphor may be allowed — which is by no 
means the least charming part of Lord Curzon's 
" Persia." It will be sufficient to indicate the posi- 
tion which Bunder Abbas holds in the trade and 
politics of the Gulf to-day, and to speculate for a 
moment on the probabilities and possibilities of its 
future. In following my brief argument I would 
ask the reader to bear particularly in mind that 
Bunder Abbas is the port which Russia is supposed 
to have ear-marked for herself, and which writers 
in the Spectator, the National Review, and the 
Fortnightly have recommended as an acceptable 
oifering to our Asiatic rival. Unlike Lingah, 
Bunder Abbas is no longer a distributing port for 
the Gulf to any appreciable extent, nor does it to 
the slightest degree fill the proud place of Ormuz as 
a half-way house between East and West. It is 
simply the terminus which connects the long caravan 
route from Yezd and Kerman with the sea ; other- 
wise there would be no possible reason for the 
existence of this long line of dingy houses built on 
a dingy shore, destitute of fresh water, and caught 
between the direct rays of a pitiless sun and those 
which are reflected from the sheer wall of mountain 
rock that rises to the height of 7690 feet just fifteen 
miles to landward. From Bunder Abbas to Kerman 
the distance is 380 miles, and thence to Yezd there 
are a good 200 more. As far as Yezd the Bunder 
Abbas route should have matters all its own way as 



62 SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 

far as foreign trade is concerned. But up to the 
present time Bunder Abbas has aspired, not without 
success, to spread its tentacles to Teheran in the 
north and Seistan and Meshed in the north-east, and 
even sends a portion of its trade beyond the bounds 
of Persia to Kabul and Central Asia. 

In the year 1900 there was a sudden decline of 
between 50 per cent, and 60 per cent, in the total 
value of the Bunder Abbas trade, for which the 
British Vice-Consul assigns five reasons : 

(1) The change of administration in the customs. 

(2) The growing popularity of the Nushki route, 
which is a rival as far as Seistan and Meshed is 
concerned. 

(3) The insecurity of the Bunder Abbas- Yezd 
route. 

(4) The embargo on the export of cereals. 

(5) The heavy rates for transport which obtained 
during the year. 

Of these causes some at least are merely tempo- 
rary, especially the first. For the opposition with 
which the establishment of the Belgian regime was 
met in its first ys&v disappeared to a very large 
extent in 1901, and this opposition was possibly the 
most serious hindrance to the trade of the twelve 
months. For general purposes, therefore, it would 
be better to take the returns of 1899 as more truly 
representative. In that year the total trade of the 
port amounted to 1,12,16,160 rupees, or ,£747,730 
sterling. Of this over thirty lakhs were exports, 
and nearly eighty-two lakhs imports. Of the total 
bulk of the trade ,£629,268 was with Great Britain 



SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 63 

and India ; that is to say, we held 84 per cent, of 
the import trade. Every steamer that touched at 
the port during the year flew the British flag. 
Parenthetically it may be remarked that the trade 
of Russia with Bunder Abbas in 1899, and I believe 
all previous years, was absolutely nil. From these 
figures it will be seen that though the business of 
Bunder Abbas falls a long way below that of Bushire, 
which in the same year amounted to, roughly, one 
and a half millions sterling, and even falls consider- 
ably short of Lingah's ,£1,1 50,000 — though here the 
figures are rather misleading owing to the inclusion 
of the re-exports — still the total is sufficient to show 
that the trade of Bunder Abbas is by no means a 
small quantity. When we compare the figures for 
1899, the date on which Lord Curzon based his 
calculations, it will be found that with regard to 
most articles of commerce there has been little 
alteration in the imports, except in the case of tea, 
where the figures have risen from 600 to 3000 tons. 
The exports, on the other hand, have suffered a 
distinct decrease, especially in the amount of opium 
sent to China, which is due, it is alleged, to the 
adulteration of the article. 

In 1 90 1 the total value of the trade rose to 
,£575,000 which was a great improvement on 1900, 
but still a long way short of 1899. It is to be noted 
that Russian trade is now represented by imports to 
the value of ^2746 carried in the subsidised steamers 
which now run between Odessa and the Gulf. 

On the whole the commercial condition of Bunder 
Abbas cannot be regarded as satisfactory since it is 



64 SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS? 

bound to lose a large portion of the tea-trade which 
alone has increased in the last ten years, but which 
must now follow the Quetta-Nushki route. The 
Nushki route, starting from Quetta and skirting 
the south-west corner of Afghanistan, is not only 
shorter, as far as Seistan and Meshed is concerned, 
but it is now well patrolled right through Beluchistan, 
and is practically as safe as Piccadilly. It has yet 
to obtain the sanction only given by custom in the 
East, but seeing that the Bunder Abbas route is 
still most unsafe — two caravans having been attacked 
within two weeks of our arrival at Bunder Abbas, 
and robbed of all their goods — it is almost a matter 
of course that in time the Nushki route must absorb 
all the trade between India and North-east Persia, 
which is tantamount to saying that Bunder Abbas 
will continue to deal only with Kerman and Yezd, 
and possibly Teheran. Now that the Karun route 
is thoroughly opened Teheran must be omitted, and 
nothing but Kerman and Yezd remains. We are 
thus reduced to the conclusion that instead of taking 
the 1899 figures as a true criterion in judging the 
prospects of Bunder Abbas we ought rather to 
regard the meagre total of 1901 as the truer estimate 
for the future. At any rate, we may be justified in 
saying that the record so far reached, which is about 
three quarters of a million pounds sterling, is likely 
to remain a record as long as present conditions hold 
good. On the other hand, this small total by no 
means represents the possibilities of Bunder Abbas, 
though it may rather more than exhaust the proba- 
bilities. 



SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 65 

Under a less fatuous government than that of 
Persia the caravan route to Yezd, which is now the 
scene of yearly depredations, might be rendered very 
easily secure. The other day, when we were in 
Bunder Abbas, the brawny Afghan traders had 
volunteered to go out to punish the marauders who 
had cut up a caravan within fifteen miles of the sea- 
port. The Persian Deputy Governor was unable to 
accede to such a proceeding, and yet had nothing 
better than an ill-armed mob to send out on a fruit- 
less punitive expedition, which could never come 
within a hundred miles of the culprits. 

It was suggested by Lord Curzon that the presence 
of British Consuls at Kerman and Yezd and Bunder 
Abbas might in some way render the road more 
open. We have now British representatives at 
two of those places, but it is difficult to see how they 
can do the work of the Persian Government and 
the Persian Army combined. Again, the arbitrary 
embargo on the export of cereals throughout the 
past half-century has been a constant hindrance to 
trade by discouraging the cultivation of the soil and 
reducing the buying capacity of the population, yet 
the Persian Government still persists in enforcing 
its foolish veto. If this embargo were removed and 
the caravan route thoroughly secured against attack, 
which is not too much to ask of even so impotent a 
Government as that of the Shah, the trade on this 
line of import and export might be considerably en- 
couraged. But even so there is a limit to the possi- 
bilities of the trade which is distributed from a port 
by a caravan route among people whose numbers and 

E 



66 SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS? 

habits and requirements are practically stationary. 
The only chance for a great improvement at Bunder 
Abbas lies in railway development. Whatever form 
the future railway system of Persia may take it is 
almost certain that a line will eventually join Bunder 
Abbas, Kerman, and Yezd. When that is the case 
it is reasonable to suppose that one penny a ton per 
mile for the carriage of goods will be considered a 
high charge and Yezd will be brought within a day 
of the coast. At the present time, though it is quite 
impossible to arrive at a definite charge for transport 
on the caravan route, since it varies enormously from 
month to month and even from day to day, still 
.£12 per ton from Bunder Abbas to Yezd may be 
taken as a more or less typical price, and it works 
out at something like $d. per mile, the journey occu- 
pying not less than thirty-two days. 

Any little improvements, which may affect trade 
for the present, are as nothing when compared with 
the revolution that would be created by a system of 
haulage which would reduce the price of carriage to 
one-fifth or less of the present charge, and the time 
of transit from thirty-two days to twenty-four hours. 
Nor are we altogether justified in disregarding the 
possibility of such a change. Bunder Abbas is at 
present a port of entry and exit for about half a 
million pounds' worth of British-Indian trade, and 
the principal merchants of the place ,are British- 
Indian subjects. In the event of Persia adopting 
ordinary modern methods of transport that trade 
might indefinitely increase and would continue to 
be largely British-Indian, provided the railway 



SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 67 

system was in the hands of no hostile Power. At 
the very worst Bunder Abbas must always be the 
outlet for the trade of the rich centres of Kerman 
and Yezd. Yet we find writers of high standing 
recommending the gratuitous surrender of this port 
to Russia, the avowed rival of Great Britain in the 
trade and politics of Persia. 

From a commercial point of view there is but one 
possible argument in favour of allowing Russia a free 
access to the Gulf. I have pointed out that the 
trade of Bunder Abbas and its general prosperity, to 
say nothing of the concomitant prosperity of its 
hinterland, depend first of all on the security of the 
routes and a more enlightened policy of administra- 
tion, but secondly, and to a far greater extent, on 
the opening up of the country by railways. The 
question is whether or not we should be content to 
allow our trade in this quarter to languish and die 
away under existing conditions, or, by encouraging 
the Russians to come to Bunder Abbas and to con- 
nect that port by rail with central and northern 
Persia, we should indirectly assist the regeneration 
of the Shah's dominions. 

I do not see any escape from the conclusion that 
of the two alternatives the second is decidedly pre- 
ferable. If there were only these two alternatives 
I would almost be persuaded to follow the lead of 
those writers who advocate the encouragement of 
Russia in this quarter of the globe. But I do most 
emphatically assert that there is another and in- 
finitely better course open to us; and that is to 
insist on the development of Lower Persia under 



68 SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 

our own management and protection. That we 
should ever have allowed Russia to get a practical 
option on railway concessions in Persia argues a 
deplorable want of foresight in our dealings with 
the Shah. There can be no possible excuse for our 
acquiescing in the further renewal of the Russo- 
Persian railway agreement when the present term 
expires. Whatever form the future railway system 
of Persia may take, it is almost a matter of course 
that the great plateau will be connected with the 
Gulf and the Indian Ocean by lines running at right 
angles to the coast, just as in South Africa the 
railway arteries go from Capetown and Port Eliza- 
beth, East London, Durban, and Delagoa Bay from 
the coast to the upper veldt, cutting the edge of 
the tableland at right angles. The Bunder Abbas- 
Kerman-Yezd route is one that naturally suggests 
itself as being commercially advantageous, and from 
an engineering point of view not only feasible but 
greatly preferable to the exceedingly arduous 
Bushire-Shiraz way. There would be no more 
difficulty in constructing a line from Bunder Abbas 
to Kerman than there was in connecting Capetown 
with De Aar by way of the Hex River Valley. If 
anything the Persian tableland by the alignment 
mentioned, would be more easily reached. But this 
railway and all other railways in Lower Persia must 
be controlled by Great Britain, provided always that 
the Shah's Government is unable to cope with the 
task. If this means the partition of Persia, then 
Persia must be divided, unless we are to allow Russia 
to dominate the whole kingdom. That there is any 



SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS? 69 

great danger to us in such a partition a study of 
the map of Persia enables one to deny. All Persia, 
as Lord Curzon has pointed out, is divided into two 
parts by the great Salt Desert, which runs for five 
hundred miles from north-west to south-east, and 
presents a barrier as insurmountable as the bleak 
Karakoram or the snows of the Himalayas. Those 
writers who dread our coming to close quarters by 
land with Russia have overlooked this important 
strategical fact ; otherwise they would surely be 
prepared to admit that it were better to extend our 
influence and government, if need be, to this natural 
boundary, than to surrender to our rival one of the 
most important bases in all the Indian waters. 

It is a truism to say that Bunder Abbas controls 
the Persian Gulf. The most elementary knowledge 
of geography will convince any one of that — Bunder 
Abbas including, _ of course, the Islands of Ormuz, 
Larak and Kishm, without which Russia would 
never accept the place, even as a free gift. "What 
is not so generally recognised, however, is that 
Bander Abbas can be made into as fine a naval base 
as there is anywhere in the world. 

The description which is usually given of the port 
conveys the idea of an open roadstead which only 
enormous expense could convert into a tolerable 
harbour, which would then be open to attack from 
the sea. A casual look at the map will show that 
this is very far from being the case. Just to the 
west of the present town — which is itself a good 
way east of the original Gombroon — the Clarence 
Straits between the Island of Kishm and the main- 



70 SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 

land gradually narrow down until they are less than 
three miles in width, and yet they contain, abun- 
dance of deep water. It is here that the Russians, 
if they ever came to Bunder Abbas, would make 
their naval base, about ten miles west of the present 
town, where all the navies of the world could man- 
oeuvre without running into one another. The 
main drawbacks are a shelving beach, which would 
necessitate some dredging, and partial exposure to 
a south-east wind, which is greatly obviated, how- 
ever, by the shelter afforded by the Islands of Larak 
and Ormuz and the east end of Kishm. At any 
rate a tenth of the sum which the Russians have 
spent already on Dalny would be quite sufficient to 
make a magnificent harbour anywhere towards the 
eastern end of the Clarence Straits. Once made it 
would be absolutely secure from attack, since forts 
on the Islands of Kishm, Larak, and Ormuz would 
prevent any hostile ship coming within twenty miles 
of the anchorage. Indeed, it would be impossible 
for any traffic to go on into the Gulf without the 
permission of the Power which might hold Bunder 
Abbas and its adjacent islands. 

Imagine Russia with her fleet secure inside Kishm 
and her railway connecting Bunder Abbas with 
Central Asia on the one hand or Tiflis on the other, 
with her Cossacks dominating Persia as they do 
Manchuria at the present moment. What vestige 
of influence would there be left to Great Britain 
anywhere in Persia ? What chance would there be 
for our growing trade with that country against a 
close-fisted rival who would control the railways and 



SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 71 

the main entrance to the Gulf? But this is not by 
any means the worst of. such a situation. With a 
Russian base at Bunder Abbas either we should have 
to withdraw our men-of-war from the Gulf alto- 
gether, and forfeit the position which we have built 
up in a hundred laborious years, or we should be 
compelled to resort to the no less objectionable 
course of occupying a flying base on the opposite 
shore as a counterpoise. It would be Port Arthur 
and Wei-Hai-Wei over again almost to the last 
letter. Russia would hold a well-defended port at 
the end of a railway system which would give her 
complete control of the country through which it 
ran. We on the opposite shore would be driven to 
occupy a port which is not connected with anything 
at all in our system and would be a useless drain on 
our resources. Just opposite Bunder Abbas, at a 
distance of something over fifty miles, is the finest 
natural harbour on the whole coast of Arabia. It 
goes by the name of Elphinstone's Inlet. As a har- 
bour it compares favourably with our acquisition at 
Wei-Hai-Wei ; the surroundings are rather more 
barren than the Shantung promontory, and the 
climate is said to be worse than anything on this 
side of the river Styx. Except that Wei-Hai-Wei 
has the advantage of being a pleasant summer 
resort, which Elphinstone Inlet assuredly has not, it 
would be difficult to find a more perfect analogy. 
And with all the experience we have had in China 
it is impossible to see how we could avoid repeating 
the Wei-Hai-Wei episode if Russia were really to 
acquire Bunder Abbas. Then we should be forced 



72 SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 

to provide a fleet of four or five battleships, with a 
first-class cruiser or two, since we cannot imagine 
that Russia is going to acquire Bunder Abbas as a 
health resort. Our Indian coast, which is far from 
being strongly defended, would become instantly- 
vulnerable, and the people of Great Britain, the 
long-suffering taxpayers, would find themselves 
face to face with a constant menace to their Indian 
Empire, with the necessity of adding a new fleet 
to the British navy, and fortifying a new naval base 
on a barren spot where the heat is more intol- 
erable than in any part of our existing tropical 
possessions. 

The more one contemplates the result of such a 
disastrous policy the more is one amazed that there 
should be found sane people in Great Britain to 
advocate it. And what is the most amazing part of 
it all is that the advocates of this strange line of 
action ask us to give gratuitously to Bussia what 
she has never had the audacity to ask, and what in 
any case is not ours to give. Personally I am con- 
vinced that Bussia will sooner or later attempt to 
reach the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean. The 
presence of the cruiser Varyag in these waters, 
plainly sent round as an advertisement to the 
natives, the subsidising of ships at absurd rates 
to create a spurious trade, the evidence of little 
intrigues in the neighbourhood of Bunder Abbas, 
the anxiety of Bussia to retain the monopoly of 
railway concessions in Persia — all these things for 
any one who has studied Bussian methods in the 
East point to one conclusion. But whatever her 



SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 73 

intentions may be — and they have never been 
veiled in this respect — Russia, which up to two 
years ago had not a vestige of trade in these waters, 
and now, owing to her recent endeavours, has only 
an infinitesimally small portion of the whole, could 
hardly yet have the face to openly suggest that she 
should plant herself down on our very doorstep for 
the purpose certainly not of friendly intercourse, 
but of direct menace. Yet what she could not pos- 
sibly demand we are, for some vague friendship to 
be gained in return, to give her freely, at the cost 
of enormous increase in our naval expenditure. By 
what right do we give away Persian territory ? 
How is it to our advantage to encroach thus 
vicariously on the integrity of a country which we 
have been at such pains to preserve intact ? I can 
only conceive one possible argument in favour of 
such a course, which must run as follows. Persia 
is already so much under the thumb of Russia that 
we might as well hasten on the final debdcle and 
know the worst. If this is not Russophobia in its 
most abject form, there is no meaning in that hack- 
neyed term. 

One must admit that the Shah's government is 
already an anachronism in the existing stage of the 
world's development, and our policy of jealously 
guarding the integrity of Persia is daily becoming 
more and more of a sham. But the true corollary 
of that policy is surely not to assist Persia to 
become an integral portion of the Russian Empire, 
which is exactly what the result of giving Russia a 
port on the Gulf would be. If Persia must come 



74 SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 

under foreign domination, it is due to our Indian 
Empire to see that that portion of Persia in which 
Indian trade is most vitally interested should be 
controlled by the British Government ; nor can there 
be any strategical advantage in allowing Bussia to 
bring her borders up to our Beluchistan frontier, 
supported by a naval base in Indian waters, in pre- 
ference to selecting another and more effective 
conterminous boundary in Persia which would leave 
the Gulf and the Indian Ocean entirely in our 
hands. It is just because I believe that Great 
Britain can still hold her own against Russia in 
Asia — which I take to be the reverse of Busso- 
phobia — that I see no necessity for giving away 
a strong piece in the game without the slightest 
necessity or without any kind of tangible quid 
pro quo. 

As a matter of fact, the dominating position of 
Bussia at the Court of Teheran is apt to be 
exaggerated ; for if she holds the whip hand over 
Persia in the North, we can equally if we like con- 
trol the weak Government of the Shah in the South. 
It may have been forgotten by many that Bunder 
Abbas and its adjacent islands were not Persian 
territory at all fifty years ago, and would not be 
to-day if we had raised our finger to assist our ally 
the Sultan of Maskat, who was formerly in possession 
of them for at least half a century. It may further 
be news to some of those who have not visited the 
Gulf — it certainly was to me — that there is not a 
single really Persian village or town on the coast of 
Persia from Mahommerah, on the Shat-al-Arab, to 



SHALL WE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 75 

Gwadur, on the Beluchistan border. Every town, 
village, and island is inhabited by Arabs, with a 
very small sprinkling of Persian blood among them, 
over whom the Persian Government would be quite 
incapable of asserting its authority should any con- 
certed rising take place. It is only a year or two 
since there was a temporary overthrow of Persian 
authority at Lingah ; the Sheikh of Kishm would 
like to declare his independence. And for some time 
it was an open question whether the Arabs of 
Mohammerah would submit to extension of the new 
customs regime to that port. 

The only reason that can be given for the accept- 
ance of Persian rule by the coast people is one which 
holds good very often in the East. The Arab, like 
most Orientals, is made to be governed as long as 
he is not interfered with in his domestic arrange- 
ments, and he willingly bows to the powers that be, 
just as his ^relatives across the Gulf at El Katif and 
El Hasa and throughout Nejd acknowledge the over- 
lordship of the Sultan of Turkey, which is backed 
by no real power whatsoever. Still, Persia must 
never forget that she governs her coast only on 
sufferance, and at the very first whisper of any 
intrigue we could seize every port she possesses in 
the Gulf and the Indian Ocean without firing more 
than a few blank cartridges. This would be a pity, 
for it would deprive the Shah of a large and grow- 
ing source of revenue. 

The fact is that our supremacy in the waters of 
the Gulf gives us an enormous power over Lower 
Persia whenever we like to exert it ; and it is a 



76 SHALL AVE GIVE RUSSIA BUNDER ABBAS ? 

pity, perhaps, that owing to our policy of " pru- 
dential reserve " with regard to Persia — the phrase 
was coined by Morier nearly a hundred years ago — 
we are apt to let the Shah fall into error respect- 
ing the true balance of affairs, and at the same 
time to give reason to the faint-hearted to suggest 
that since Russia has the half she may just as 
well have the whole, and have done with it. 
There are obvious reasons why we should still prop 
up for the moment the crazy structure of the 
Persian Government, but we cannot for ever stop 
the hands on the clock of history. If we are in- 
different to the modernising of Persia there is 
another Power which assuredly is not, though that 
Power, too, may have its own reasons for not 
hurrying on the denoilment. There are so many 
nations besides ourselves which turn keen eyes 
towards the crumbling Kingdoms of the East that 
to pursue for ever the cult of the status quo is 
not possible, even if it were desirable. When the 
time comes for the regeneration of Persia we shall 
have practically no choice between turning over 
the country to Bussia and doing part of the re- 
generating ourselves. If the regenerating alterna- 
tive is a troublesome and expensive task it is 
bound to be far cheaper and more expedient, not 
to say more honourable, than the policy of total 
abandonment. 



CHAPTEE YI 

VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 

Feom Bunder Abbas on a clear day the Arab coast is 
distinctly visible outlined against the sky, between 
the Islands of Larak and Kishm, which stand up in 
the foreground. The distance is exactly fifty miles 
from the little pier at Bunder Abbas, but it is less 
than thirty from Larak across to Cape Musandim on 
the Arab side of the Gulf; so that the Power which 
holds Bunder Abbas Bay with Larak and Kishm as 
its outposts has complete control over the narrow 
waters at the entrance of the Gulf. 

Having set down Captain Boxer, the new British 
representative at Bunder Abbas, and left him to 
support existence as best he might in the only 
possible house of the place, out at the wells of 
Nabaund, a mile or two along the shore from the 
smelly little town, we started about midnight, not 
sorry to leave this desolate part of the earth, and 
full of admiration for the long-suffering agents of 
the British Empire, who, at a moment's notice, may 
be sent from a pleasant officer's mess in a cheery 
Indian cantonment to the barren sands of a filthy 
Persian port, where the mail steamer calls once a 
week ; where there is, perhaps, one other European 
with whom to associate ; and where the summer 



78 VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 

climate — which lasts for eight months out of twelve 
— has taxed the originality of writers for many- 
centuries to find language commensurate with its 
horrors. 

At daybreak the Lawrence found herself under 
the shadow of that rugged, mountainous promontory 
above which hover the protecting spirits of sea and 
air, to whom, it is said, Arabs and Hindus alike 
offer sacrifices at the beginning and ending of their 
voyages out into the unknown Indian Ocean. 
Certainly the spirits of the air have chosen a far 
from ambrosial resting-place, since of all the barren, 
arid, rock-bound coast of the Arabian Peninsula this 
cape is, perhaps, the most gloomy and forbidding. 
The whole promontory, which may be fifteen or 
twenty miles in length, and so perforated with inlets 
that it is at one spot near the base only 400 yards 
in width, reminds one of an enormous system of slag 
heaps round the mouth of some Titanic coal pit. 

We were making for Elphinstone's Inlet, one of 
the many natural harbours of the promontory, and 
by all means the best. It is so completely land- 
locked that its presence would never be guessed by 
any one unacquainted with the coast. Steaming 
along beneath the shadow of Jebel Shem, a mass of 
rock which rises to 3000 ft. between us and the 
morning sun, we suddenly become aware of an open- 
ing into the side of the mountain, to which the 
attention of the mariner is directed by a small pillar 
erected on a little island just opposite, by the staff, 
perhaps, of the Indo-European telegraph, which 
once had a station here. 



VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 79 

Once inside this gash in the rock wall the 
Lawrence found herself at the beginning of a 
long arm of the sea, which extends for seven and 
a half miles to the foot of another mountain called 
Sibi, of the same height as Jebel Shem, and which 
is so irregular in shape as to vary constantly from 
half a mile to three miles in breadth. The sides 
of the inlet are mostly precipitous and completely 
devoid of vegetation, rising about a mile inside the 
entrance to a sheer precipice, which extends nearly 
to the top of Jebel Shem, and must be considerably 
over 2000 ft. Opposite this precipice, which is on 
the north side of the inlet, there is a diminutive 
island, with the remains of the telegraph office built 
there as a landing-place for the Gulf cable forty years 
ago. It is almost a relief to know, even at the pre- 
sent moment, that the station was abandoned about 
three years later. What the telegraph officials must 
have suffered during three years on this wretched 
little island, surrounded on all sides by frowning 
walls of rock, accumulating and reflecting the 
terrible heat of the Arabian sun, it is quite im- 
possible, at least in this pleasant winter weather, to 
conceive. There are seventeen fathoms of water in 
most parts of the inlet and ten fathoms right up to 
the shore. This is the harbour which we should be 
compelled to take and hold if we should ever be 
weak enough to allow Russia to acquire Bunder 
Abbas. 

Perfect as the harbour is from a defensive point 
of view, the climate is so awful in summer as to 
make it almost untenable for Europeans. It may 



80 VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 

be argued that Bunder Abbas is just as bad. But 
this is not quite the case. The residential part of 
Bunder Abbas might again be transferred to the 
Island of Ormuz, which is distinctly cooler than the 
mainland, and which was, as we know, the site of a 
great city, full of the merchants of all the seven 
seas, three hundred years age. Besides, behind 
Bunder Abbas Ginao rears its mighty bulk, a sheer 
7000 ft. and more, with a great plateau behind it, 
where fruit and grain grow, and where life, if not 
too pleasant, is quite supportable at a height of 4000 
to 5000 ft. This ready-made hill station could be 
brought within a few hours of Bunder Abbas, by 
rail, and would go very far to mitigate the pains of 
the Persian Gulf summer. 

Colonel Pelly, who long ago saw the necessity of 
creating a naval station and trade emporium in the 
Gulf, suggested for the twin purpose the village of 
Khasab, which lies in a well-sheltered cove just 
outside the mouth of the Elphinstone Inlet, and 
being gifted by Nature with fresh water — a rare 
commodity in the Gulf — is distinguished under the 
dark cliffs by a grove of palms and a little vegeta- 
tion. But though the climate would be a little less 
torrid than that of the Elphinstone Inlet itself, the 
heat, even of the January day, when we steamed 
past Khasab, was sufficient to make one pause 
before recommending the place as a desirable naval 
or mercantile base. 

As we were returning from the far end of the 
inlet we were surprised to find the quiet waters 
alive with antiquated fishing craft, from which 




STREET SCENE IN AN ARAB TOWN 



VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 81 

almost naked men shouted to us in some outlandish 
jargon, waving at the same time their poor wares 
of dead fish to attract the foreigners' attention. 
Being in mid- channel with seventeen fathoms under 
our keel it was impossible to stop and interview 
them, though it was all we could do to keep the 
paddle-wheels of the Lawrence free from the poor 
creatures' boats. We were left, therefore, to take 
it for granted that these were Colonel Pelly's 
" singular race of men, driven by stronger growths 
of humanity into this remotest corner," who are 
also mentioned by Lord Curzon and called by him 
Shihiyins. 

Leaving them to their undisputed possession of 
this weird harbour, it was our pleasant duty to 
proceed along the Arabian coast of the Gulf and to 
visit the Sheikhs of the pearling villages, who are 
called the TruciaL Chiefs because they are bound, 
originally by an annual truce, and now by a per- 
petual treaty, not to indulge in any hostilities by 
sea. Every year the British Resident visits the 
different villages, distributes rewards, listens to 
complaints, and smooths down differences. The 
first treaty was in 1806, when the British were 
compelled to bind down the piratical Jowasmi tribe 
to respect the British flag. But as the Jowasmis — 
turned from peaceful traders into fanatical brigands 
by the influence of the Wahabi Chief of Nejd — 
continued to carry on their depredations with 
frightful cruelty to captured crews, and on one 
occasion attacked and boarded his Majesty's ship 
Minerva, and murdered the entire ship's company, 



82 VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 

it was necessary first in 1 809, and again ten years 
later, to send against the pirates large expeditions, 
which so completely crushed their power that since 
1820, when the first general treaty was made with 
the coast Sheikhs, no great expedition has been 
necessary. The Gulf has been free from piracy on 
a large scale. Still the practice was from time to 
time carried on under the guise of warfare, so that 
in 1835 it was found advisable to bind the Sheikhs 
by a truce lasting six months, that is to say, during 
the pearling season, not merely to abstain from 
piracy but to avoid all hostilities by sea. So success- 
ful was this truce found to be that it was annually 
renewed until 1843 when it was extended for ten 
years, and on the expiration of that term in 1853, it 
was made a perpetual treaty. It is the business, 
therefore, of the British Resident to take care not 
only that no piracies are committed on the Gulf, but 
that no wars are carried on between independent 
Sheikhs and the parties to this arrangement are not 
only the Sheikhs of what is called the Pirate Coast, 
but also the Chief of Bahrein, and the Chief of the 
Promontory of Katr, who was bound down to keep 
the peace in 1867; though we have had constant 
trouble with the last named power ever since the 
present Sheikh Jasim succeeded in 1878, and put 
himself under Turkish protection. 

Nominally the jurisdiction of the Resident extends 
only as far as the seaboard, and even so there is a 
case on record where the ex-Chief of Bahrein applied 
for leave to fight against the usurper, his grand- 
nephew — a fight which would involve operations on 



VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 83 

the sea. The consent of the Resident was given, 
but I believe this is the only instance of war by 
sea being permitted since the first signing of the 
truce in 1835, and even then the ex-chief was 
defeated on the mainland before he could put to 
sea. In actual practice the jurisdiction of the 
Resident holds good in an informal way even on the 
mainland. There are continual feuds between the 
different chiefs, who, debarred from fighting by sea, 
can hardly be restrained from attacking each other 
by land. Still, these feuds are frequently settled by 
appeal to the British representative. 

We had an excellent instance of this when we 
reached Abuthabi. A certain tribe under the Sheikh 
of Abuthabi wished to settle on land claimed by the 
neighbouring Chief of Shargah, who was determined 
to prevent what he considered an attempt at land- 
grabbing. Hostilities were already rendered difficult 
by the treaty ; for the Resident can and does forbid 
any supplies to go to the disputed spot by sea, and 
a land commissariat is much more expensive. Yet 
the Sheikh of Abuthabi, a magnificent Arab, being 
the greatest Sheikh on the coast, felt that he could 
not possibly give in, especially as he had spent 
20,000 rupees on getting an army ready. He 
would be a laughing-stock, he said, if he drew back 
now. 

Such is the moral influence of the British Resident 
that in the course of an hour's talk he persuaded the 
Sheikh to give up his warlike ambitions, and the 
result will be an amicable arrangement. In point 
of fact, the Sheikh of Abuthabi did not in his heart 



84 VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 

of hearts want to fight, and he will be only too glad 
if he can " save his face " by saying that the great 
British Government will not let him fight. 

Thus it comes to pass that an arrangement which 
was originally brought about to protect the pearl 
trade, which is the very life-blood of these Arab 
tribes, has become a means of preserving the peace 
on the mainland as well. Properly speaking, the 
Trucial Chiefs inhabit just half the Arabian coast of 
the Gulf, which is divided into two parts by the 
Promontory of Katr. But Katr and Bahrein are 
included in the treaty by separate agreements, and 
it is only because the Turks have been allowed to 
extend their sway over Katr and Hasa and Katif 
that any piracies still go on beyond the mouth of 
the Shat-al-Arab, which, being under Turkish rule, 
is still a haunt of robbers. It was distinctly un- 
fortunate that we ever allowed Jasim to succeed to 
Katr in 1878, or at least that we allowed him to 
accept office under Turkey and introduce a Turkish 
garrison into Bida, the chief village of Katr. This 
was only the natural result, however, of the careless- 
ness which permitted the Turks to occupy Hasa and 
Katif — opposite to the Island of Bahrein — under the 
pretext of putting Abdullah bin Feyzul back on the 
throne of Nejd. This happened thirty years ago, 
when we still tried to restrict our influence as far as 
possible to the waters of the Gulf, and professed 
entire indifference to whatever might happen on the 
mainland. Thus, though we acknowledge no Turkish 
authority over Katr, we allow a Turkish garrison to 
remain in Bida, the head village of Katr ; and we 



VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 85 

fully admit the claims of Turkey over Hasa and 
Katif, which is tantamount to giving over these 
fertile districts to robbery and brigandage for ever. 
It would have been quite simple to have treated 
Hasa and Katif as we did Bahrein, to which the 
Turks also make, even to-day, absurd claims, and 
if we had done so there would have been no 
vestige to-day of real Turkish authority backed by 
troops on the shores of the Gulf. So plain is this to 
the eye of the most casual observer that it is diffi- 
cult to understand what in the world our Government 
was thinking of thirty years ago when it allowed 
Turkish troops to settle permanently on the shores 
of the Bight of Bahrein. 

As for our own influence over the coast, no one 
can doubt its beneficence, and it is especially gratify- 
ing to see how the British Resident is able to trans- 
cend the actual treaty, and act as arbiter in disputes 
which, not so long ago, would certainly have led to 
instant bloodshed. To the eye unaccustomed to the 
Arab character there is something distinctly amus- 
ing, if it is not almost pathetic, in the spectacle of 
these handsome, black-bearded, hawk-eyed men, in 
the very costume of the picture Bibles of our youth, 
patriarchs and dictators in their own little spheres, 
yet so completely outside the world of to-day, that 
it is impossible to treat them otherwise than as very 
young school-boys, who must be encouraged to be 
good by presents of expensive toys. There is no 
one in the world, not even among the royalties of 
Europe, who can surpass the Arab Sheikh in that 
natural dignity which expresses no thought of self- 



86 VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 

conceit, but is at the same time instinct with the 
quiet pride of race. Yet there is no one who is so 
completely childlike as this same magnificent patri- 
arch, who does not particularly want to fight, but is 
afraid of being laughed at if he holds back. It is 
difficult to believe that the splendid looking chief 
who walks majestically along the deck of the 
Lawrence, followed by a picturesque retinue of 
Arabs and Negro slaves, is the same person as the 
old man you see half an hour later squatting on a 
carpet in the stern of a fishing-boat, eagerly tearing 
open the paper wrapping of his present to see how 
the British Government has treated him. After all, 
he and his tribesmen are so completely cut off from 
communication with the outer world, that it would 
be unfair to expect too much of them in the way of 
enlightenment. They live along the shores of a 
barren peninsula, entirely dependent on the pearls 
of the banks for their subsistence. There is not a 
possible harbour on the whole coast between Elphin- 
stone's Inlet and Bahrein, the shore being exposed 
to the prevalent winds of the Gulf, without a vestige 
of protection. At Bas-al-Khaima, the ancient 
stronghold of the Jowasmi tribe, we were able to 
communicate with the shore because there was no 
wind. At Umm-ul-Kawain (Amulgavine), which 
we next visited, the fine long-boat of the Sheikh 
was badly bruised by contact with the side of the 
Lawrence, and when we reached Shargah, the 
present capital of the Jowasmis, a shamal (north- 
west wind) had set in further up the Gulf, and for 
forty-eight mortal hours we were tossed helplessly 



VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 87 

to and fro on the crests of an in-rolling sea, until we 
were very near setting off to Bushire with the work 
of the tour unfinished. 

When at last, on the third day, the old Jowasmi 
Chief came out with the British Agent — both 
splendid specimens of the well-born Arab — and he 
attempted to commit a statement of his grievances 
and requirements to writing, he fell so sick with 
the tumbling of the Lawrence that he was obliged 
to cut short his letter in the middle. At Debaye 
the sea was not quite so bad, and at Abuthabi it 
had reduced itself to a slight swell, and we were 
able to go ashore and visit the town. The town is 
really nothing more nor less than a collection of 
wattle huts on a sand-spit, with a few stone build- 
ings, occupied by the Sheikh and his brother, and a 
little bazaar built in stone by the enterprise of our 
fellow subjects from Karachi, who have something 
like a monopoly of the foreign trade. 

It will be seen, therefore, that no merchant 
steamers could possibly call at these Arab ports, 
and their foreign trade must be carried on by means 
of some distributing-centre like Lingah or Bahrein, 
to which their native craft can ply. At each stop- 
ping place, the Arabs crowded on board to inspect 
the British gunboat, and at each place presents were 
distributed according to the importance of the 
Sheikh, and his deserts. Shot-guns and rifles, 
telescopes and phonographs, were bountifully dealt 
out to these great, dignified grown-up children, 
who, childlike, were not at all above making their 
wants distinctly known. One Sheikh who got a 



88 VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 

shot-gun said he would much have preferred a rifle ; 
and another — Abuthabi, I think — startled the Resi- 
dent by asking for a steam launch, one of the few 
things we did not keep in stock. Occasionally, on 
these tours, slaves make their escape to the British 
ship, and claim manumission. This time we only 
had one application, at Lingah. At Abuthabi we 
discovered on going ashore that the Sheikh had 
given strict orders for no boats to leave the shore, 
except with his permission, during the visit of the 
Lawrence. In this way he keeps his slaves, and 
avoids friction with the protecting Power, whose 
anti-slavery policy is the one thing which the Arab 
can neither understand, nor pretend to admire in 
our behaviour. 

They are, on the whole, a rather delightful people 
in their primitive simplicity. For a short time they 
were»so inspired with the Wahabi religious craze 
that they ceased to be peaceful traders, and became 
the most bloodthirsty pirates. But it is quite 
apparent that they never really wanted to be 
pirates, nor is there much trace of the Wahabi 
religion left among them now that the old fanatical 
power of the Nejd reformers has been crushed by 
the Rashids of Hail. They exist on the pearl trade, 
which on the Pirate Coast alone may amount to 
,£300,000 a year (not including Bahrein), and they 
have often abandoned a vendetta in the middle in 
order to attend to the more lucrative business of the 
pearl season. They are now held strictly to their 
engagements by the British Government, through 
its Resident at Bushire ; and there is probably not 



VISIT TO THE PIRATE COAST 89 

an Arab on the coast who has not cause to bless the 
British Government, even if he fails to understand 
why Great Britain should spend large sums of 
money in protecting an industry by which no British 
merchant is directly profited. He rather regards 
the British Resident as a benevolent being belonging 
to another sphere of existence, whose acts are to be 
no more called in question or accounted for than the 
ways of the winds and the waters. 



Umvn Kasct m , _ 




The positions of Safwan and Umm-Kasa are conjectural, but those indicated 
above are sufficiently accurate for practical purposes. Umm-Kasa (Moom- 
gussur) controls the Khore Abdulla. The Turks have now occupied Safwan and 
Umm-Kasa with a half-battalion at each, and they desire to occupy Subiya, 
which would give them the north-east corner of Koweit Harbour. Subiya can 
certainly be claimed by Mubarek. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

Though Koweit is one of the cleanest and most 
prosperous ports in the Gulf, there is nothing in the 
aspect of the place or its surroundings to suggest 
the anxiety of nations concerning its political inde- 
pendence. Undoubtedly the "Grane" or "horn" 
on which it stands is a noble sheet of water, contain- 
ing a deep anchorage of some twenty miles east and 
west, with an average breadth of five. A low island 
lies half way across the wide mouth of the bay, and 
as the south shore is convex and the north concave, 
the inner half of the horn is practically land-locked, 
producing a harbour with anywhere from twenty to 
thirty square miles of deep water. The shore shelves 
gradually, so that at no place is it possible for a 
large ship to come much nearer than a mile and 
a, half to the shore, that being the distance at which 
I found H.M.S. Fox lying in five fathoms oif the 
town when I visited Koweit. It would, therefore, 
require a large expenditure of money to make a 
really satisfactory port, with landing wharves and 
docks, anywhere on the shores of the Grane. 

The general aspect of the landscape is more dreary 
than that of any other port that I have seen on the 
Gulf, and that is saying a great deal. There are no 



92 THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

rugged mountains in the background as at Bush ire 
or Bunder Abbas ; indeed, the land is so low on all 
sides that it is barely visible across the bay. The 
date groves, which redeem Lingah and the pirate 
towns from absolute barrenness, are here con- 
spicuous by their absence, though there are a few 
at Jehara, which is at the extreme head of the horn. 
One solitary tree rears an unblushing head a mile or 
more to eastward of the town of Koweit, constitut- 
ing by its singularity a mark to navigators. The 
only other features of the landscape which offer 
themselves as aids to seamen are an old ruined fort 
a few miles inland from Koweit, a tomb on the 
island at the entrance to the harbour, and a clump of 
date palms on the south coast outside the entrance. 
In all Arabia it would be difficult to find a more 
featureless monotony. 

The town, which is on the south side of the 
" Grane," has risen to a respectable degree of pros- 
perity, as Arab towns go, by the fact of its being^ 
the natural port for the interior kingdoms of Nejd 
and Jebel Shammer, now joined under one ruler, and 
also by reason of the wise economy of its rulers, who 
have always kept it practically free of duty. It is 
also the gate of one of the many pilgrim routes 
across the Arabian peninsula to Mecca, and that in 
itself means money in the pocket of the Sheikh. It 
seems, moreover, to have kept, perhaps through its 
position, more or less aloof from the everlasting 
feuds of the Arab coast which were so disastrous to 
trade in the earlier part of last century ; and, what 
is remarkable in this country, the Sheikhs, up to the 



THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 93 

time of the late chief's removal, had enjoyed long 
reigns and had died in their beds. 

The population of Koweit has been variously 
estimated at different times by visitors as 10,000, 
12,000, and 20,000; probably the second figure is as 
correct as such estimates can be. The number of 
sailors belonging to the port has been put as high as 
4000, so that it is clearly seen that Koweit is a 
maritime principality, dependent on the sea and the 
commerce of the sea for its riches. The land about 
it produces nothing at all, and the dominions of the 
reigning Sheikh might as well be limited to the 
town of Koweit, the summer residence among 
the date trees at Jehara, and the shore of the 
Grane if it were not for the fact that the family of 
the chief has grown rich from the commerce of the 
port, and has been able to acquire valuable pro- 
perties on the Shat-al-Arab, which are even now 
a source of dispute and litigation. 

A description of the town and the harbour will 
not, however, disclose any reason for the presence of 
a big second-class cruiser like the Fox, just off 
the little port ; nor for the trenches round the town 
dug by British marines, nor for all the hubbub 
about Koweit in the Press of Europe during the 
last two years. Of course there is the harbour, 
the best by all odds in the Gulf. But why should 
we be more anxious about the harbour now than 
at any other time in the past fifty years ? It is 
true that the Grane has gained a new importance 
since the Germans came to the fore in Arabian politics 
with their Mesopotamian Railway which should 



94 THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

find its best access to the sea in the harbour of 
Koweit. But Koweit was on the political carpet 
even before the German Commission, which travelled 
from Bagdad to Basra in 1900 to hit upon a pro- 
visional alignment for the railway. Nor can we 
attribute our increased interest in the place to the 
quarrel between the Sheikh of Koweit and the Amir 
of Nejd, since we have always disavowed any right 
or desire to interfere in the internal disputes between 
Arab rulers as long as they avoid hostilities by sea. 
The fact of the matter is that the present situation 
is the outcome of all these conditions with a few 
more besides which cannot be appreciated without 
examining the recent history of this part of Arabia, 
and bringing it up to date. The subject is, for most 
people, a dull one and I shall endeavour to be as 
concise as possible. 

To explain the existence of Koweit at all, it is im- 
possible to do better than to quote a government 
report of 1874, where Colonel Pelly, who, as British 
Resident in the Gulf, visited Koweit both in 1863 
and 1865, gives the history as follows: 

The family of the present Sheikh (1863) has ruled at Koweit 
some five generations (250 years), for as these men live to the 
good old age of a hundred and twenty years their generations are, 
of course, nearly double ours, or about fifty years each. Originally 
the Sheikh's progenitors dwelt in a small fort called Moom-gussur, 
situated at the head of the Khore Abdullah, near Bunder Zobeir. 
They were the pirates of the North of the Persian Gulf and the 
lower channels of the Shat-al-Arab. But about 250 years ago 
the Basra authorities attacked and expelled them. The original 
Sheikh then came down the Boobian creek with his followers and 
debouched on the bay at present known as that of Koweit or 
Grane. Crossing the bay, he settled down on its southern shore 



THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 95 

and there erected a fort or " khote," hence the name Khote or 
Koweit. The term Grane is rather applied to the shore line of 
the entire bay from its resemblance to the curve formed by two 
horns ("keor" or "ghern," meaning horn). The settlement was 
subsequently increased by the son of the founder, who erected the 
longer portions of the present walls, which, however, have since 
been again extended along the shore line as the increase of popu- 
lation from time to time demanded. 

Perhaps no conjuncture of circumstances could have seemed less 
favourable to the creation of athriving commercial settlement than 
the arrival of a band of Arab pirates upon a barren shore, with 
brackish water and backgrounded by a series of Bedouins. Yet 
what is the fact ? Here is a clean town with a broad and open 
main bazaar and numerous solid stone dwelling-houses stretching 
along the strand and containing some 20,000 inhabitants, attract- 
ing Arab and Persian merchants from all quarters by the equity 
of its rule and by the freedom of its trade. . . . The sailors- 
of Koweit are highly reputed, and there may be some four 
thousand of them afloat ; but Koweit sends to Muscat for boat 
builders, as they are esteemed superior workmen. . . . Horse 
forage comes in part down the Boobian creek from Bunder Zobeir. 
Mutton, which is good, and milk, butter, &c, they receive from 
the Bedouins, who flock to the town and are pitched in tents or- 
huts all along the outside of the walls. These Bedouins are not 
allowed to enter the town armed, but they sell at the gate, where 
the chief daily sits and looks on. Koweit may boast of some 
6000 fighting men within its walls, but the policy has been to- 
keep the peace internally and with all its neighbours ; and it pays 
no tribute to the Amir Feyzul, but maintains friendly relations 
with him. It receives no tribute, revenue, or customs from any 
one, save small offerings at the gate or from merchants, amount- 
ing to 20,000 reals (Austrian dollars) per annum, and a compli- 
mentary present of dates from Basra, in token of suzerainty and 
for the supposed protection of the mouths of the Basra river. 
The government is patriarchal — the Sheikh managing the 
political, and the Kazee the judicial, departments. The Sheikh 
himself would submit to the Kazee's decision. Punishment is 
rarely inflicted ; indeed there seems little government interference^ . 
anywhere and little need for any. 



96 THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

" When my father was nearly a hundred and twenty years 
old," remarked the Sheikh to me, " he called me and said, ' I 
shall soon die. I have made no fortune, and can leave you no 
money ; but I have made many true friends ; grapple them ; 
while other States have fallen off around the Gulf from injustice 
or ill-government mine has gone on increasing. Hold to my 
policy, and though you are surrounded by a desert, and pressed 
on by a once hostile and still wandering set of tribes, you will still 
flourish.' ". . . . The water at Koweit is brackish, but fever 
is unknown. Dysentery and ophthalmia are rare; and when 
men commence begetting new families at eighty and die at a 
hundred and twenty the country cannot be considered as pre- 
maturely exhausting. 

Colonel Pelly gives in the above terms his report 
to the Indian Government. The condition of 
Koweit socially and commercially might be de- 
scribed to-day in exactly similar terms. But poli- 
tically the scene is changed. The Sheikh of Koweit, 
instead of being surrounded only by wandering 
tribes, is likely to be ground between the Powers of 
Turkey and Great Britain, with Germany and 
Russia interested spectators of the game. Only a 
few weeks before I visited Koweit three large British 
men-of-war, with two attendant gunboats, lay off 
the town in the magnificent harbour. The squadron 
is now reduced to a cruiser and two gunboats. The 
young officers of the Fox have already introduced 
the Arabs to the game of football, and they are 
likely to require a permanent cricket ground at 
Koweit. Indeed, the Sheikh says he is quite 
anxious to learn the British game of cricket. 

The change was originally brought about by the 
untimely death of the late Sheikh Mahomed, who, 
along with his brother Jirrah, was assassinated by 



THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 97 

another brother the present chief Mubarak. This, 
though a common enough event in Arab principa- 
lities, was a sufficiently unwonted incident in the 
annals of Koweit to create a new situation. Beyond 
the fact that Mubarak was obliged to sleep in a 
different chamber each night for some time to avoid 
assassination himself, he does not seem to have suf- 
fered from a guilty conscience nor to have been in 
the least ashamed of himself. The British Govern- 
ment had no interest in the matter, nor could the 
avowed policy of Great Britain in the Gulf allow 
her to interfere, since it is a fact that if Great Britain 
were to interfere whenever an Arab Sheikh is done 
to death by an aspirant to the Sheikhdom, she would 
have little time to attend to the weightier affairs of 
the Persian Gulf. Mubarak contented himself with 
obtaining some acknowledgment of his succession 
from Turkey, and then he proceeded to upset all the 
tradition of his race by embarking on a career of 
conquests in the interior, which he would have done 
very well in all the circumstances to leave alone. 

It must be remembered that in 1886 Mahomed 
bin Bashid had gone to Biad to rescue the Amir 
Abdullah from two nephews who had imprisoned 
their uncle and usurped the supreme power in the 
Wahabi dominion. Mahomed bin Bashid defeated 
the nephews, but he took the rescued Abdullah 
back to Jebel Shammer with him, and henceforth 
the house of Saud, the great Wahabi dynasty, was 
overthrown and the Bin Bashids were rulers of all 
Nejd. Now we know from Colonel Pelly's report 
that Koweit was on friendly terms with the Wahabi 



98 THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

ruler Feyzul, though it is distinctly stated that no 
tribute was paid to Iliad ; but it is not to be sup- 
posed that the astute rulers of Koweit were likely 
to move a finger to help Iliad against Bin Bashid, 
since as long as Koweit gets its share of the pilgrim 
trade it did not matter much who ruled over the 
interior. There was, it is true, an unsuccessful 
attempt on the part of the heirs of the Wahabi rulers 
to recapture Iliad in 1890, but it does not appear on 
record that Koweit lent a helping hand on that 
occasion. But now Mubarak, having usurped the 
Sheikhdom of Koweit, must needs call attention to 
himself by a glaring departure from the wise and 
the peaceful policy of his forefathers, by espousing 
the cause of the Wahabi claimant, and marching in 
1900 to the attack of Hail itself, the capital of the 
Bin Bashids. Of course, Mubarak has an excuse. 
He maintains that Abdul-Aziz, the present Bin 
Bashid, had given support to the sons of his mur- 
dered brother Mahomed ; and that he had no choice 
but to march out and attack Bin Bashid before Bin 
Bashid had a chance of striking. If this is the case 
it may still be pointed out that Mubarak's defensive 
campaign attained to rather large proportions, since 
he had at one time captured Biad and Oneyza, and 
was getting very near to the stronghold of Jebel 
Shammer itself, when he was finally checked and 
severely defeated, a younger brother losing his life 
in action. 

Mubarak, who is not more truthful than other 
Arabs, denies the defeat altogether ; but the fact 
remains that he came back to Koweit in a desperate 



THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 99 

state, his troops riding six men on a camel. From 
that time Bin Rashid has not only re-established his 
rule throughout Nejd, but is able to act on the 
offensive against Koweit, or has been until a short 
time ago, when Iliad is said again to have fallen 
into the hands of the Wahabi claimant. So we 
arrive at the point when Mubarak found himself 
confronted with the hostile Amir of Nejd, and with 
only his battered forces to put against him. It really 
does not matter very much how Mubarak came to 
fall out with Bin Rashid. It may be, as he says, that 
he had to strike in his own defence, or it may be that 
he was wantonly bent on a career of aggression, if 
not conquest. But in any case he was de facto ruler 
of Koweit, and as such we could not allow him to 
succumb to the power of Nejd. It is nothing to us 
that one Sheikh should murder another in the same 
family and usurp power ; but it is quite a different 
affair when a great Power of the interior like Nejd 
threatens to encroach on a maritime principality, and 
thus disturb the mystic status quo. 

So far the course of events is moderately simple. 
Mubarak is threatened by Nejd, and we step in to 
save him from extinction. But the part played by 
Turkey in this embroglio has still to be accounted 
for. When Mahomed Bin Rashid overthrew the 
Wahabi power in 1886 he had the sense to secure 
his position as ruler of Nejd by avowing his allegi- 
ance to the head of the Mohammedan religion. Not 
that he paid tribute to Turkey. On the contrary, he 
received, and his successor still receives, a consider- 
able sum — ^"4000 a year when the provincial treasury 



100 THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

can meet the demand — to safeguard the pilgrims on 
their way through his territory to Mecca. Turkey 
professes to govern Nejd from Basra and from El 
Hasa ; but as a matter of fact the Bin Rashid family 
is virtually independent, and the Turkish Govern- 
ment would rather accept a proffered allegiance, how- 
ever nominal, than risk a rupture which might 
destroy all shadow of Turkish dominion throughout 
the Arabian Peninsula. It is easily understood, 
therefore, that when Nejd came to blows with 
Mubarak, each ruler defending the cause of the 
claimants to his opponent's throne, Turkey, in spite 
of all her promises to Mubarak, could hardly do 
otherwise than support the Amir of Nejd. 

The situation is further complicated by the fact 
that Turkey was already in 1899 contemplating 
some move against Koweit, even before Mubarak 
took up arms against Nejd, and by her suspicious 
intentions necessitated a show of activity on our 
part. But her hostile attitude has not been clearly 
proved, and in any case it would be a sheer waste of 
time to explore that particular passage of the laby- 
rinth of Persian Gulf intrigue. It is sufficient for 
our purpose to define the situation at the close of 
1 90 1, when Mubarak found himself face to face with 
the victorious Amir of Nejd, seeking not merely the 
restoration to their rights of Mubarak's nephews, 
but vengeance on Mubarak for his campaign of the 
previous year, with Great Britain willing to protect 
him but Turkey distinctly against him, and made 
even more hostile by the fact of his relying on the 
power of Great Britain. 



THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 101 

At this juncture it seemed good to our Govern- 
ment to assert the independence of Koweit, as one 
step, at least, towards the destruction of that shadowy 
Turkish supremacy which is such a serious drawback 
to the progress of Arabia, and especially that part of 
Arabia which lies along the shore of the Persian Gulf. 
It was the more necessary to take action at a time 
when other schemes were afoot, and the harbour 
of Koweit, by becoming acknowledged Turkish 
territory, might be alienated to the Power which is 
proposing to build a railway through Mesopotamia 
to the Gulf. The question that naturally arose was 
whether or not Koweit was tributary or subject to 
Turkey. The answer depends a great deal on the 
interpretation of certain words, like " suzerainty," 
"sovereignty," "tribute," &c. In the records of the 
Bombay Government, where the history of the Gulf 
during the first half of the last century lies encased, 
there are at least three references to the position of 
Turkey with regard to Koweit, and all three show 
a distinct acknowledgment of Turkish supremacy, 
though I cannot find any proof of tribute paid by 
Koweit .to Turkey. Two of these references are 
due to Captain Kemball, a trustworthy authority, 
who states that the people of Koweit " acknowledge 
the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte," but adds 
that it is " purely nominal." He, like Colonel Pelly 
in the passage quoted above, speaks of the subsidy 
paid in kind by the Turkish Vilayet of Basra to the 
Sheikh of Koweit in return for his supposed protec- 
tion of the mouths of the Shat-al- Arab from piracy. 
But this is a local arrangement which could not be 



102 THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

held to imply direct suzerainty. Still, both Captain 
Kemball and Colonel Pelly agree in saying that the 
people and Sheikhs of Koweit always have acknow- 
ledged the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte (Kemball 
says " sovereignty "), Colonel Pelly adding that 
" the Arabs acknowledge the Turks as we do the 
Thirty-nine Articles, which all accept and none 
remember." Again, Lord Curzon, writing in 1891, 
says : " Koweit now nominally forms part of the 
Vilayet of Basra, to which it pays tribute." Yet it 
is quite certain that Koweit did not pay tribute to 
Busrah in 1891, and probably did not at any time 
do so. Lord Curzon appears to have followed 
Colonel Pelly's report fairly closely in his descrip- 
tion of Koweit, and has taken the idea of tribute 
from the colonel's loose use of the word " tributary " 
which he in one passage applied to Koweit, though 
he had just previously stated most distinctly 
that Koweit received rather than paid tribute to 
Basra. 

The point is perhaps rather a fine one. Yet it is 
possibly worth while to make it clear that there is 
no historical proof of any tribute being paid by 
Koweit to Turkey at any time since the founding of 
the present town on the bay, and therefore, though 
it would be a mistake for us to try to ignore the 
evidence of some acknowledged power of Turkey over 
Koweit in the past, we are certainly, in maintaining 
now the independence of Koweit, depriving Turkey 
of no territory or source of revenue to which she can 
advance a shadow of a claim. We are merely assert- 
ing that a vague suzerainty, based on no actual 



THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 103 

occupation of territory or exercise of power, cannot 
be construed into tangible political authority. But 
then a further question has still to be answered — 
Under what flag is Koweit ? Assuredly not under 
ours ; for we maintain Mubarak's independence. 
On the other hand, we can hardly allow him to fly 
the crescent of Turkey. Yet this is the flag which 
he has for many years used, the reason as given 
nearly forty years ago by Colonel Pelly, being 
that the Sheikhs of Koweit found it more convenient 
to trade with Bombay under the Turkish flag than 
under an unrecognised Arab ensign. This is doubt- 
less a reason, but it does not alter the difficulty of 
the present situation. Mubarak says that he did 
not fly the Turkish' flag at all, but one of his own 
which is identical or almost identical with the cres- 
cent banner. But then Mubarak will say almost 
anything when he is hard put to it. At all events 
there was a great sensation created in diplomatic 
circles when it was telegraphed that a British naval 
officer had hauled down the Turkish flag at Koweit, 
and some versions had it that he had substituted 
the Union Jack. Of course, this was a fabrication. 
The British senior naval officer at Koweit had nothing 
to do with Mubarak's flag, and Mubarak is certainly 
at liberty to fly his own colours since we have pro- 
claimed his independence to the world. Unfortu- 
nately, we have made a slight reservation which, to 
the Arab mind, may seem like splitting straws. 
Viscount Cranborne openly admitted in the House 
of Commons in January 1902 certain ill-defined 
rights of Turkey over Koweit. 



104 THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

This may possibly be a good move from the 
point of view of the European diplomatist, but 
it hardly fits in with our actions on the spot. 
One of the great stumbling-blocks of Gulf politics 
has always been the pretensions of Turkey to a 
sovereignty which she cannot possibly make effec- 
tive, or even justify from a technical point of view. 
When we steamed into Koweit Harbour we dis- 
tinctly intimated by our actions that we and not 
Turkey had the right and the power to interfere in 
the affairs of the Sheikh, and having hopelessly com- 
promised him in the eyes of the Turk by our gratui- 
tous friendship, we could hardly do less than free him 
for ever from a bond which was neither a protection 
nor a benefit in any shape whatsoever. To assert 
now that he is still liable to that ill-defined bond is 
to leave him in a very false position, not wholly in- 
dependent, yet a traitor to the Power to which we 
say he is bound by an indefinite tie. And all this 
difficulty because we are slaves to the status quo. 
Last year (1902) Mubarak was in a most critical 
position. The Amir of Nejd, egged on undoubtedly 
by the Turkish officials on the spot, was threatening 
him on the land side ; his trade with the interior 
was ruined, the lucrative passage of pilgrims was 
stopped, the Turks were deadly hostile to him, and 
his nephews were bringing a law-suit in the Turkish 
Courts to recover valuable date-bearing properties 
entered in the name of their father on the Shat-al- 
Arab. There was a growing feeling against him in 
Koweit itself, and the cause of his nephews was 
being financially aided by Yusuf bin Ibrahim, the 



THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 105 

brother of the dead Sheikh's wife, a partner in a 
rich Bombay firm. It is true that British gunboats 
and cruisers were lying in front of his town ready to 
shell an enemy which had no intention of attacking 
him outright, but one cannot imagine that Mubarak, 
who in his heart of hearts cares as little, it may be 
supposed, for the British as for the Turks, was 
greatly consoled by the prospect. 

He had, in fact, played his cards rather badly. 
To begin with, it is a fatal mistake, when you go in 
for murdering a Sheikh whose seat you want, to 
leave any of his progeny alive. It is almost as fatal 
to overlook a rich brother-in-law. Having raised 
himself to power by such questionable means, the 
man I have described should have been content to 
make friends with the mammon of unrighteousness 
instead of raising up the power of Nejd against him- 
self. Still, such are the sudden changes of fortune 
in Arabian politics, that he seems now to be weather- 
ing the storm. Biad has undoubtedly fallen again 
into the hands of the Wahabi claimant, whose name 
apparently is Abdul-Aziz bin Bahman bin Saud, but 
I cannot be sure about the genealogy. The Amir of 
Nejd was at one time in 1902 reported to be in a 
desperate state ; but the news from the interior is 
not trustworthy, and the long quarrel between Bin 
Bashid and Mubarak has yet to be decided. In 
the meantime the Turks have not been idle. They 
have occupied Safwan and Umm-Kasa between 
Zobeir and the Khore Abdulla, giving them 
command of the head of the Khore, and they 
propose sending troops to a place called Subiya, 



106 THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 

which is down the Boobian creek, so near the north- 
east corner of Koweit harbour as to give them a 
practical command over the entrance. In other 
words, they mean to stake out as much of the 
Arabian shore of the Gulf as is left to them before 
it is too late. 

Naturally enough, Mubarak claims Safwan and 
Umm-Kasa and Subiya as his own, though he has 
but the vaguest notion of their geographical position 
or, indeed, of any geography at all. His claims to 
Safwan and Umm-Kasa may not be very strong, 
though Umm-Kasa is apparently the spot called 
Moom-gussur by Colonel Pelly, from which the 
Koweit tribe originally came 250 years ago, driven 
thence by the power of Basra. Subiya contains 
a farm of his arch-enemy Yusuf bin Ibrahim, and so 
might be considered a dependency of Koweit, and 
should certainly be kept free of Turkish power, since 
it might be made to command Koweit harbour. On 
the other hand, if Mubarak can lay no claim to these 
spots in the desert, it is equally pertinent to ask 
what really valid claims has Turkey to put forward. 
The whole matter would not be worth arguing about 
if it were not that Umm-Kasa is situated near the 
head of the Khore Abdulla, and, if the charts are 
correct, the Khore Abdulla would make an excellent 
harbour for the terminus of the German railway, fail- 
ing Koweit; and it, therefore, behoves us to see 
that Turkey assumes no undisputed territorial claim 
to a harbour on the Gulf, which she might after- 
wards alienate to a foreign Power. It would be in 
accordance with the proverbial irony of fate if our 



THE IMPORTANCE OF KOWEIT 107 

strong action with regard to Koweit should result in 
Turkey establishing herself at a strategical point 
which she would never otherwise have dreamed of 
occupying. For some unknown reason it has always 
been considered that the harbour of Koweit is the 
only suitable port on the Gulf for the terminus of 
the Bagdad Railway, and yet, if the charts are to 
be trusted, the Khore Abdulla contains a channel 
four fathoms deep at low water, with a basin a 
great deal deeper at the head, near Umm-Kasa. 
Undoubtedly great changes have taken place since 
Colonel Pelly found four fathoms of water right up 
to Zobeir, for in those days the Khore Abdulla was 
practically a mouth of the Shat-al-Arab. But it is 
a simple matter to verify the charts, and one rather 
wonders why we have not done so sooner. Last 
year a British gunboat did explore the Khore, and, 
I believe, found that there is plenty of water for 
deep-draft ships nearly as far as Umm-Kasa. If 
this is the case, the Koweit question loses some of 
its importance unless Mubarak can make good his 
claims to Umm-Kasa, for the latter place becomes 
a possible terminus for the Bagdad Railway. It 
is to be noted that in the latest report of the rail- 
way scheme no mention is made of Kasima, the exit 
originally chosen for the railway in Koweit harbour. 
It is merely stated that the railway will terminate 
at some point on the Gulf. There can be little 
doubt that the Turkish Government was inspired by 
the German Embassy to occupy Umm-Kasa without 
loss of time. 



CHAPTER VIII 

PERSIAN RULE IN THE DELTA OF THE 
SHAT-AL-ARAB 

Mohammerah, which with as much precision as is 
possible in this part of the world may be called the 
Arab capital of Arabistan, or that portion of the 
Tigris and Karun Delta which is on the Persian 
side of the Shat-al-Arab, has enjoyed in recent 
years a disturbed history analogous in a certain 
degree to that of Koweit. The Arab tribes inhabit- 
ing the delta of which the Cha'b with its many sub- 
divisions is by far the most important, have reached 
that state of dependency on Persia which would in 
a few years have been attained by Koweit in its 
relations with Turkey had it not been for the timely 
intervention of Great Britain. There was this also 
in the condition of Arabistan, which led to the ex- 
tension of direct Persian control, that the Arabs 
were much more numerous and inhabited a far larger 
territory than their brethren at Koweit, and being 
split up into different branches, practising the usual 
internecine feuds of all Arabs, they have fallen an 
easy prey to the aggressive but not otherwise for- 
midable power of Teheran. 

Throughout the eighteenth and early part of the 
nineteenth centuries the Cha'b Sheikhs, with their 



THE DELTA OF THE SHAT-AL-ARAB 109 

headquarters at Fellahieh, a long way east of 
Mohammerah, were among the most powerful chiefs 
on the shores of the Persian Gulf. Gradually, how- 
ever, they felt the pressure on both sides of them of 
Turkey and Persia, and after paying tribute to both 
States alternately, they veered towards the side of 
Persia, the final step being taken when Jabir Khan, 
of the Mohaisen tribe, succeeded his father at 
Mohammerah, and was recognised by the Persians 
as chief of all the Cha'b tribes, to which his own 
family had formerly been subservient. The Persian 
Government, by thus setting up a ruler over the 
Cha'b, whose very continuance in power was depen- 
dent on support from Teheran, obtained a hold over 
the delta country which would have been impossible 
with the Cha'b united under a Sheikh of a Cha'b 
family. Jabir was succeeded in 1881 by his son 
Mizal, who appreciated like his father the necessity 
of leaning on Persia, and was rewarded by a politic 
absence of Persian interference. The Persian 
Governor- General of Arabistan resided at Shushter, 
and received the revenues handed over to him by 
the Sheikh of Mohammerah, but beyond an occa- 
sional official visit at which costly presents exchanged 
hands, he left the Sheikh to manage his own affairs 
in the way that pleased him best. This was the 
state of affairs when Lord Curzon visited Moham- 
merah in 1889. Lord Curzon predicted a more direct 
exercise of Persian authority in the near future, and 
went so far as to say that the Persian Government 
was not likely to tolerate such a show of independ- 
ence in any Sheikh of Arabistan after Mizal's death. 



110 PERSIAN RULE IN THE 

The opportunity for verifying that prediction has 
now occurred. In 1897 Sheikh Mizal met the fate 
of so many rulers over the Cha'b, and fell with three 
bullets in his body, fired from the rifle of his own 
Commander-in-Chief. There are excellent grounds 
for believing that the murder was indirectly the 
work of the Sheikh's brother, Khazal, who now rules 
in the dead man's stead. It should be remarked in 
parenthesis that these frequent assassinations which 
bring no punishment with them, are not so repre- 
hensible as they may at first appear. To begin 
with, the Arab puts a very small value on human 
life. The other day, in the heat of argument, an 
Arab in the streets of Mohammerah, to close the 
discussion, lifted his rifle and shot his man through 
the head, whereon a bystander, the brother perhaps 
of the victim, took quick aim and killed the first 
Arab. The only comment on the occurrence was 
that the Martini — which has been largely imported 
of late — was a dangerous weapon. But besides this 
carelessness of life, which is by no means an un- 
pleasing trait in the Arab character, there is another 
factor in the case which must not be forgotten. The 
Arab owns no law but the law of the tribe ; and one 
of the chief of the tribal laws lays down that any 
man, be he Sheikh or hind, who acts against the 
tribe, or in such a way as to endanger the privileges 
of the tribe, is a traitor, and liable to be shot down 
without mercy. 

I am not aware that Sheikh Mohammed of Koweit 
had ever been guilty of a sin against the tribe, beyond 
the fact that he would not fall in with the warlike 



DELTA OF THE SHAT-AL-ARAB 111 

views of his brother, Mubarak. But in the case of 
Mizal, Sheikh of Mohammerah, it is easy to see that 
his policy of leaning on Persia might be construed 
by the Arabs as a policy of treason, destined to 
undermine and destroy the ancient privileges of the 
Cha'b. Hence, what would seem to us a dastardly 
outrage may have been regarded by the Arabs as 
an act of justice. 

The Persian Government was merely interested in 
the matter in so far as it might prove a loser or 
a gainer by the succession of Khazal. The new 
Sheikh was bound, like his brother and father before 
him, to look for support to Teheran, and to pay his 
revenue promptly. But he has also shown himself 
to be an administrator of no mean ability, and he 
may even entertain ambitions not less dangerous to 
himself than those of his imitator, Mubarak. At all 
events, he has, though of the Mohaisen tribe him- 
self, united the Cha'b as they have seldom, if ever, 
been united before, and is perhaps the most powerful 
Sheikh that Arabistan has ever known. Even in the 
days of his father, and of his brother, the Cha'b 
Sheikhs of Fellahieh were always more or less in- 
dependent of Mohammerah. But now Khazal keeps 
the Sheikhs by him in Mohammerah, and Fellahieh 
is a sort of Arab Republic, paying taxes, however, to 
Khazal. 

To this extent therefore, Lord Curzon's prediction 
has not come true, for Mizal is dead, and yet a more 
powerful successor lives in his place who is probably 
less amenable to Persian influence, inasmuch as he is 
more secure in his dealings with the tribes. On the 



112 PERSIAN RULE IN THE 

other hand, the time has now come, which Lord Curzon 
foresaw, when the Persian Government is about to 
assert its authority more definitely over the delta 
country, and the issue is not yet clear. The estab- 
lishment of the Belgian custom officials throughout 
Persia has been the immediate cause of the move on 
the part of the Central Government. For two years 
after the late M. Simais introduced the Belgian 
system into Bushire and Lingah and Bunder Abbas, 
Mohammerah continued to go its own way, the 
Sheikh collecting the customs as of yore and remain- 
ing practically supreme in his own sphere. But in 
the beginning of 1902 a Belgian official was told off 
to go to Mohammerah and inspect the ground for 
future operations. He came up with a great flourish 
of trumpets, backed by the entire Persian Navy in 
the shape of the gunboat Persepolis. He also talked 
rather proudly and intimated that unless the Sheikh 
immediately handed over the customs the Governor- 
General of Arabistan, who is the Shah's own son, 
would come with an army and teach the Arabs a 
lesson. The Persepolis anchored in the river off 
Mohammerah, ready to blow the town to pieces if 
opposition were shown. 

But the Belgian had reckoned without his host. 
The Arabs, who are armed almost to a man, resented 
to the utmost this attempt to foist a foreign autho- 
rity on them. It is not merely that the various 
chiefs have been accustomed to levy dues at different 
points along the Karun by a method not unlike the 
likin barriers of China and object not unnaturally to 
losing this source of income ; but on general princi- 



DELTA OF THE SHAT-AL-ARAB 113 

pies they are prepared to resist the establishment of 
a system by which they will not only suffer financially 
but may be robbed of some part of that freedom from 
restraint which the Arab prizes so highly. The 
result was that the commander of the Persepolis-. — 
who rose to the post of chief officer of the Persian navy 
from the humbler position of river pilot for the mer- 
chant steamers — not liking the look of things at all, 
and fearing for the safety of the one ship of the Persian 
navy, made a clean bolt for Bushire, taking with 
him the discomfited custom-house official. The Shah's 
son, who was to descend on Mohammerah from his 
Governor- General's palace in Shuster and bring the 
Arabs to their senses, contented himself with leaving 
Shuster to take up a strategic position still further 
away from the Arabs at Dizful, and there the matter 
rested for six months. 

The Persian governor of Arabistan was evidently 
incapable of bringing the Sheikh to terms ; so the 
powers that be at Teheran had resort to diplomacy. 
The Sheikh's agent was invited to the capital where 
he carried on negotiations for some time with M. Naus, 
the Controller of Customs. Matters were finally 
settled in the Eastern way. The price was fixed, 
the Sheikh was bought over, and the Belgian regime 
is now established at Mohammerah. 

Yet in coming to such an agreement with the 
Persians, the Sheikh, who has married a Persian 
Princess, and may already be regarded with some 
suspicion by the Arabs, runs a very serious risk of 
meeting the same violent death which he provided 
for his own brother. The Arabs do not acknowledge 



114 PERSIAN RULE IN THE 

the Persian claims to rule over them beyond the 
necessity of paying revenue to Persia, which they 
regard not so much as a token of dependence, but as 
a monetary payment for the protection which Persia 
affords to them, or has in the past afforded to them 
against Turkey. The issue was one of no little 
importance ; for if the Persian Government were to 
prove itself incapable of vindicating its authority, 
and the whole of Arabistan should fall away from 
its rather precarious allegiance to Teheran, an 
enormous change would take place in the politics of 
the Gulf, and the Shah, with his already failing 
prestige thus rudely shattered, might lose in a 
moment his control over the whole Persian littoral 
of the Gulf and Indian Ocean. 

How to get about from one place to another in the 
Persian Gulf in these days of rigid quarantine is a 
question to tax the ingenuity of a blockade-runner. 
Having enjoyed the hospitality of the Lawrence on 
her journey to Koweit, I was able to avail myself of 
her partial immunity from quarantine at Basra, and 
spent the two days that were demanded of her by 
the voracious Turkish health officer in the luxury of 
her wardroom, which was a great deal better than 
spending ten days on the wretched insanitary 
quarantine island, which is the lot of every one who 
arrives in Basra on board the British India mail 
steamers. But even so I was not much nearer 
Mohammerah, since I could not visit that port, 
which is only eighteen miles down the Shat-al-Arab 
on the opposite bank, without doing five days 
quarantine on my return to Basra ; and this in spite 



DELTA OF THE SHAT-AL-ARAB 115 

of the fact that there is no plague or infectious 
disease at all at Mohammerah, or at any other port 
in Persian territory. In reality the regulation is a 
pure farce, since it is impossible to prevent natives 
of the country going backwards and forwards by 
" bellam," the Arabian counterpart of the gondola. 
Europeans, however, by their dress and their scarcity 
are almost bound to be caught, which makes the 
regulation even more absurd, since it is only 
operative against Europeans, who hardly ever fall 
victims to plague. Still, as I was a stranger in the 
place, and less likely to be closely watched, I left 
most of my kit in Basra, and dropped down the 
river to Mohammerah, trusting to luck to get back 
unobserved. When the time came I found the feat 
of running the lines almost disappointingly simple. 
There are certain Arabs at Mohammerah who make 
a living out of conducting native passengers past the 
Turkish guards on the river to Basra. The Turkish 
soldiers at the different guard-houses on the banks 
are partners in the business, which thus becomes 
profitable to all parties concerned, including the 
passengers, who only pay a few " krans " per head to 
get through. There is a little more risk about 
passing a European through the lines, since there 
may be inquiries about his sudden arival at Basra ; 
consequently the tariff is rather higher, though not 
exorbitant considering the number of consciences 
that must be bought. 

When I had completed my visit to Mohammerah, 
I got into my " bellam " along with my conductor, 
whose business it was to square the officials, and 



116 PERSIAN RULE IN THE 

after waiting for the tide to come up the river, we 
got away about half an hour before sundown. The 
remaining minutes of daylight were spent in polling 
up the Persian shore of the river past the Sheikh's 
residence at Feilieh, just a mile above Mohammerah, 
and underneath the beautiful new palace which the 
Sheikh has built for his royal Persian bride. Half a 
mile further on a creek marks the end of Persian 
rule on the Shat-al-Arab, and the Turkish boundary 
is shown by a couple of wattle huts, from the roof of 
which the crescent banner is displayed. Before 
reaching the creek my " bellam " put into shore to 
await darkness. The four Arabs in the boat, in- 
cluding the briber of Turkish officials, got out on the 
bank, spread their straw mats, and murmured full 
and fervent prayers towards the glory of the de- 
parting sun, which was throwing a blood-red stain 
on the quiet waters of the great river. The scarlet 
turned to crimson, and the crimson to dull purple, as 
the gun from the Sheikh's palace declared that the 
sun was set, and the day done. Then, the prayers 
finished, we ship the bamboo poles, and paddle 
swiftly and silently across stream, till we gain the 
deep shadow of the date-palms, showing black 
against the evening sky, for the river is narrowed 
by an island here, and there is no escape from the 
watchers, unless the " bellam " can pass unobserved 
in the dense shadow, which is intensified by the 
afterglow of sunset behind the trees. I am even 
compelled to relinquish my cheroot, and a recalcitrant 
rowlock must be coaxed to give up its groaning. 
Breathlessly we creep along by the bank, but all 



DELTA OF THE SHAT-AL-ARAB 117 

to no avail, since the Turks have had their eyes on 
us before we crossed over, and a boat is waiting to 
intercept us. Except, however, for the pleasure of 
evading the guard, the capture makes no difference 
to the final result. My conductor has ready a few 
krans, which he immediately thrusts into the willing 
hand of our interceptor, and we proceed on our way 
with only a brief and inevitable argument with 
regard to the amount which ought to be paid for 
a European. Then the river widens out, the tide is 
running strong, my four Arabs lengthen the swing 
of their paddles, and away we go up mid-stream in 
the brilliant moonlight, completely unashamed. An 
occasional shout of " Ho bellam ! " from the shore 
only quickens our stroke, until we are going along 
at six miles an hour, secure from capture, and free 
from further toll. By nine o'clock we have passed 
the quarantine station at Basra, and the faithful 
Sultan heaves a sigh of relief as he turns the 
" bellam " towards the shore under the bows of the 
Turkish guard-ship, and we feel ourselves free men 
once more. Our conductor is well pleased, too, for 
he has run us through the blockade according to 
contract with only a single call on his purse, which 
leaves him a handsome profit. Though an accom- 
plice to this bribery and corruption, I cannot 
pretend to the slightest compunction, nor have 
I the least fear that in publishing my own crime I 
shall make the way of bribery more difficult for 
future quarantine runners, since I am certain that 
the Turkish officials recognise so fully the advantage 
of a system which allows a few of their soldiers to 



118 PERSIAN RULE IN THE 

collect their pay, which they would otherwise get 
with extreme difficulty, that they are not likely to 
put a stop to the immoral practice. 

At Mohammerah I found the political situation as 
I have described it above, the Governor-General 
resting on his oars at far away Dizful, and being 
in no way inclined to use force to compel the Arabs 
to accept the new customs regime. Mohammerah 
is an unprepossessing village about a mile up the 
Karun River from the point where it joins the Shat- 
al-Arab. One reason of its meagre aspect is to be 
found in the policy of the late Sheikh Mizal, who 
feared lest the place should by becoming rich in out- 
ward appearance, attract the cupidity of the Persian 
Government. Since his untimely death a more 
independent attitude has been taken up by his 
brother Khazal, so that the village is being gradually 
improved by the building of good brick houses. At 
the corner where the two rivers meet there is the 
British Consul's house on the north side and the 
ruins of an old fort just opposite which was reduced 
by the British men-of-war in 1856. It is now wholly 
dismantled and is used as a quarantine station. A 
mile up stream on the Shat-al-Arab is Feilieh, where 
the Sheikh lives, and where his two river steamers 
and steam launches are moored. Higher up again 
his Princess's palace, standing out white against the 
date-palms on the bank of the river, is almost an im- 
posing edifice. Half a mile beyond that, as before 
said, the Persian territory ends, and Turkish misrule 
begins. The opposite or right bank of the Shat-al- 
Arab is, of course, entirely Turkish. The Sheikh 



DELTA OF THE SHAT-AL-ARAB 119 

has four guns under a canopy at Feilieh, which stand 
always ready to return the salute of the mail steamer, 
and his people are plentifully supplied with the rifles 
which for short are called Martins. The tribes have 
never been more united than now, they own no sort 
of allegiance to the person of the Shah, they hate 
Persian rule though they have embraced the 
Persian religion, and it is quite possible that they 
may be encouraged in their contumacy by the 
example of Koweit. 

Whatever may be the outcome of the crisis the 
future condition of Arabistan could hardly be worse 
than the present. Readers of Lord Curzon's 
" Persia " are familiar with the aspect of the fruit- 
ful country as it presented itself to the traveller 
fourteen years ago. There has certainly been no 
improvement since then. Situated at the junction 
of two navigable rivers, in the heart of as fertile a 
delta as there is in the world, Mohammerah should 
be a flourishing port and market-place. But the 
agricultural wealth so enormous in potentiality is 
sadly dwindling away under the worst government 
the world knows. With the exception of the rice 
lands about Fellahieh and the date gardens which 
form a fringe along the river banks there is no 
irrigated soil in a huge delta which is peculiarly 
fitted for irrigation ; even the old natural channels, 
of which there used to be six according to the old 
charts, are rapidly drying up, until only the Bar- 
meshir is left beside the main course of the Shat-al- 
Arab. The Government, so far from undertaking 
public works, which are conspicuous by their absence 



120 PERSIAN RULE IN THE 

everywhere in Persia, has actually gone out of its 
way to discourage the production of grain by put- 
ting an embargo on all cereals leaving the country. 
The result of this fatuous policy is to convert 
Arabistan, which ought to be as rich as Lower 
Burma, into an almost starving community. The 
only one who does not lose is the Sheikh, who gets a 
large part of his revenue in grain, which, in spite of 
all embargoes, he must export. In other words, he 
has a monopoly of the grain trade, and grows rich 
on it. 

But Mohammerah is not only the centre and 
natural port of what ought to be a rich grain-pro- 
ducing country ; it is also the port of entry for the 
famous Karun trade route which was opened at the 
instigation of Great Britain to foreign trade in 
1888. The route, indeed, is a double one, bifurca- 
ting at Ahwaz, about seventy miles up the Karun 
from Mohammerah. From Ahwaz the enterprising 
firm of Lynch Brothers has built a road through the 
difficult Baktiari country to Isfahan, which ought 
to compete on most advantageous terms with the 
Bushire-Shiraz route to the same place ; the other 
trade channel is by way of Shushter, Dizful, and 
Khoremabad into Northern Persia. It is just sixty 
years since Lieutenant Selby took Layard across the 
Ahwaz Rapids and close up to Shushter in the gun- 
boat Assyria, proving that the Karun was navigable 
for merchant steamers. It was not until nearly half 
a century later that the route was thrown open to 
foreign trade, and at the present day there is one 
steamer plying every fortnight between Mohammerah 



DELTA OF THE SHAT-AL-ARAB 121 

and Bunder Nasri, the new commercial village just 
below Ahwaz, and one steamer, the Shushan, running 
between Ahwaz and Shushter. The Shushan, having 
been brought down for repairs during the winter, 
was still waiting for a freshet to take her up over 
the Rapids. The Malamir, which Messrs. Lynch 
Brothers run on the Lower Karun, cannot possibly 
pay her expenses, and while I was at Mohammerah 
came down from Bunder Nasri with exactly one 
package as cargo. As for the two caravan routes 
which the Karun is supposed to open up, the Ahwaz- 
Isfahan road is now finished, but little patronised, 
while the Dizful Khoremabad line is chiefly used by 
tribes of brigands and wild lions. In other words, 
the much-vaunted Karun route, in spite of the money 
spent on it by the British pioneers of this part of 
the world, is not much more advanced to-day than 
it was fourteen years ago. 

And yet, as compared with the Bushire-Shiraz 
route, it has great advantages. The average time 
occupied in the journey from the mail steamer at 
Mohammerah to Isfahan vid Bunder Nasri has been 
reduced to an average of twenty days. The journey 
from Bushire to Isfahan can hardly be done in less 
than thirty. Prices for mule freight vary so 
enormously during the year that it is impossible to 
draw any accurate conclusion ; but roughly it may 
be stated that where it costs ^ioa ton to carry 
goods from Bushire to Isfahan, the charges from 
Mohammerah to the same place, including steamer 
freight on the Karun, will not exceed £j. And 
when it is considered that the last-named calcula- 



122 PERSIAN RULE IN THE 

tion is made on the basis of existing charges when 
the new road is just open, it will be seen that the 
Karun route as far as Isfahan and beyond is con- 
cerned might be made just a ioo per cent, cheaper 
than the Bushire-Shiraz journey. 

It may be asked, then, what stands in the way of 
the development of the Karun route. There are 
many reasons which contribute to the disappointing 
result. First of all, the new road is hardly yet 
ready for traffic. It is apparently impassable in 
winter, there are hardly any decent caravanserais 
on the way, and the first two stages are devoid of 
water. All these objections can be overcome in time 
by expenditure of money ; but it is a question 
whether or not Messrs. Lynch will be prepared to 
go on advancing money for the road without more 
encouragement than they have yet received from 
their own Government. As it is, the money advanced 
by them to the Baktiari chiefs for the building of 
the road has not yet been recovered, and may 
not, perhaps, be recovered without some difficulty. 
Secondly, there are vested interests in the Shiraz 
route, and the muleteers are accustomed to it, and 
it is difficult here as elsewhere to introduce innova- 
tions into the East. Thirdly, the Persian Govern- 
ment is not in the least anxious to assist the 
merchant, whether he be foreign or native, as is 
proved by the fact that nothing is done to put down 
the robberies of the Lur tribes on the Dizful road, 
which up to date has been almost useless as a trade 
route. Still worse is the embargo on the export of 
cereals, which by a stroke of the pen robs the people 



DELTA OF THE SHAT-AL-ARAB 123 

of their main source of wealth, and so deprives them 
of their purchasing power. 

It must not be supposed that the trade of 
Mohammerah has not increased at all by reason 
of the Karun route. On the contrary, the returns 
for the year 1900 show that the volume of exports 
and imports is just about double what it was in the 
year 1891, when the first report on the trade of 
Mohammerah was published. But the totals for 
1900, which amount to ,£115,339 for exports and 
£"281,854 for imports, are still woefully short of 
what they should have been under decent adminis- 
tration. The increase is not always traceable to 
the opening of the river to foreign trade. The 
export of horses, for instance, which accounted in 
1900 for ^45,580, is entirely due to the heavy 
export duty levied on horses by the Turkish 
Government, which prevents their leaving the 
country by the usual channel of Basra. Again, 
both exports and imports show a considerable in- 
crease owing to the fact that Mohammerah has 
become in recent years a distributing-centre for the 
Turkish side of the Shat-al-Arab, and especially 
for Koweit. On the whole, therefore, the Karun 
route, if not a failure, has been hitherto a great 
disappointment, and while of the three main reasons 
given above two may be removed in the near future, 
it would need the most sanguine temperament to 
believe that the third and most important will ever 
be got rid of without strong pressure from without. 
The Persian Government is, after all, the main 
stumbling-block, whether it be on account of its 



124 THE DELTA OF THE SHAT-AL-ARAB 

active malignity or its passive incompetency, and as 
long as our own Government is content to treat the 
powers that be at Teheran with such distinguished 
tenderness as it has in the past, no great improve- 
ment need be expected. The mere posting of 
consuls, though good in its way, is not in itself 
sufficient to smooth away obstacles to trade. 

I have already pointed out that our two consuls 
on the Bunder Abbas Kerman route have not pre- 
vented, and cannot prevent, the constant raids on 
the caravans passing through that country. Equally 
our consul at Mohammerah — and no one in the 
Gulf is better able than he is, by experience, to 
grapple with the Arab and the Persian — cannot 
unaided go out and reduce the Luristan robbers 
to subjection or collect subscriptions from the 
Baktiari chiefs. It is the business of the Persian 
Government to do these things, and it is the 
business of our own Government to hold the 
Persian Government to its engagements. At 
the present moment a new source of wealth is 
being opened to Mohammerah through the con- 
cession granted last year to a British syndicate to 
exploit the petroleum of Persia. The intention 
just now is to bore for oil in the district west of 
Kermanshah and bring it by pipe to Mohammerah 
for shipping. The success of this enterprise would 
make Mohammerah a place of great importance in 
the politics of Southern Persia. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE POSITION OF TTJBKEY IN THE GULF 

Basra is fifty-eight miles from the mouth of the 
Shat-al-Arab, which has a channel deep enough for 
the largest steamers, except at the bar, where there 
are only nine or ten feet at low water. There are 
two passages over the bar, the shortest and easiest 
being the one now in use, where the steamers have 
to cross over five miles of shallow water. This bar 
is the one obstacle in the way of Basra becoming 
the great port of entry for Turkish Arabia. The 
mail boats crossing at half tide can take about four- 
teen feet up to Basra, but the larger ocean steamers 
of Messrs. Strick and Messrs. Buckland must lighten 
before entering and leaving the river, and are forced 
to employ supplementary cargo-boats running back- 
wards and forwards between Basra and the bar. 
Whether or not a deep channel could be dredged 
and kept in a workable condition is a matter for 
experts. It would, at all events, be a costly under- 
taking, though I have been told that the older and 
more tortuous channel could be rendered practicable 
with a proper system of buoys and a reasonable 
amount of dredging. In any case there is no chance 
of improvement under the Turkish regime. Even 
the buoys in the present channel have been put 



126 THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 

in places by the British India Steam Navigation 
Company, and are kept up by it, and it is a marvel 
to the uninitiated how the navigating officer ever 
manages to come on the outer buoy at all, fixed as 
it is far away from all sight of land, in waters where 
currents are strong and irregular. Sometimes a 
little search is necessary, and then twelve hours 
may be lost by missing the tide. 

We were more fortunate than that on the Law- 
rence, for, leaving Koweit overnight, we made the 
buoy soon after daylight, with as much precision as if 
it had been a mountain, and were in the river opposite 
Fao, the telegraph station, at eleven o'clock. Here we 
gained our first experience of Turkish quarantine. 
The junior officer went ashore with our mails and 
despatches, and, though we have not been within a 
thousand miles of plague-stricken Karachi, he can 
only speak to the British telegraph clerks with a 
Turkish official standing between to ward off the 
foul infection which the Turks apparently attribute 
to every foreign race. The despatches must be 
handed over to the Turk, who takes them gingerly 
between finger and thumb as if they belonged to 
some species of venomous reptile, powders them 
carefully with some disinfectant, and then passes 
them on to their proper recipient. Owing to this 
ridiculous tomfoolery the poor clerks, who must in 
any case lead something of a dog's life on the sand- 
spit at the mouth of the river, are even robbed of 
what little pleasure they might get out of an occa- 
sional visit to the weekly mail steamer. 

Forty miles further up we drop anchor for a 



THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 127 

moment at Mohammerah to pick up the British 
Consul's despatches, and an hour after dark we have 
passed the quarantine station and found a berth just 
opposite the creek leading to the town of Basra, 
which is about a mile back from the river. 

The Shat-al-Arab, with its broad stream and deep 
mud channel is a fine water-way for trade, and 
sufficiently picturesque owing to the thick belts of 
date-palms which line both shores, and especially 
the Turkish side. As the Lawrence ploughed her 
way up stream, she drove hundreds of wild duck 
before her, keeping them always, however, just a 
shade beyond the range of a twelve-bore. Partridges, 
plump and excellent for the table, frequent the 
islands and the shore, and snipe, in any other season 
but this abnormally dry one, offer sufficient induce- 
ments to the sportsman. On the right bank the 
date-gardens are well irrigated, and above Moham- 
merah there are constant signs of life and average 
prosperity. Abu Khassib, the centre of the date 
industry, is passed a few miles above Mohammerah 
on the Turkish side, and soon afterwards a large 
mansion which might be taken for a hydropathic 
establishment at home, gives evidence that even 
under Turkish misgovernment Arabs occasionally 
grow rich. 

Before visiting the sights of Basra we were com- 
pelled to do forty- eight hours' quarantine, which 
was a harmless infliction as we spent it on board the 
Laivrence, but which raises the whole question which 
I have dealt with in describing my visit to Mo- 
hammerah. Considering that I came twice to Basra, 



128 THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 

and altogether did only forty- eight hours' quarantine 
on board the Lawrence, it ill becomes me, perhaps, 
to complain, since most travellers have on each 
occasion of arrival to spend ten days in an insanitary 
hovel on an island in the river. Still, for the public 
good, a protest should be made against an abuse 
which only affects Europeans to any great extent, 
and is a considerable hindrance to trade. All the 
mail-steamers have been at least ten days out from 
Karachi before they reach Basra, and yet a full ten 
days' quarantine is exacted on arrival, contrary to 
all the rules of the Venice Convention, and against 
all the dictates of common sense. It is exactly as if 
all passengers by P. & O. steamers were obliged to 
do ten days' quarantine on arrival at Marseilles. 
What happens is that all the natives who can afford 
it, get off at Mohammerah and finish their journey 
by "bellam" (the native river boat), hiring an 
experienced man to bribe their way through the 
quarantine guards. The Europeans in most cases 
would be caught at the game, and so they alone, 
who hardly ever catch plague, are compelled to do 
quarantine. 

But this is not the most ridiculous part of the 
system. All other steamers or sailing-boats coming 
from anywhere else in the world, and having touched 
at a Persian or Arab coast port, are subject to five 
days' quarantine, though there is no plague or epidemic 
of any sort at any of the Persian ports. The term 
used even to be ten days, but it has been reduced 
lately to five on account of representations made by 
the British Consul. Thus the Lawrence coming 




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THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 129 

from Bushire would, properly speaking, have been 
liable to five days' detention, but being a government 
boat she escaped with two. This concession was 
made after the Russian gunboat Gilyak came up the 
river and was put in quarantine. The Russians very 
soon settled matters by telegraphing to Constanti- 
nople. After that the Turks could hardly refuse 
similar privileges to British men-of-war. Even when 
you have got ashore, your difficulties are not over, 
for a supposed outbreak of plague at Bagdad has 
lately necessitated quarantine of five days against 
that city, and there have been times when the 
opposite sides of the river were quarantined against 
one another. Since the foreign trade and shipping 
of Basra are almost entirely British, these regula- 
tions interfere mainly with the comfort and profit of 
our countrymen. If the trade were Russian, there 
would probably be a different tale to tell. 

Basra is distinctly pleasing to the eye that has 
grown weary of the barren gulf landscape. Along 
the river front are the houses and go-downs of the 
foreign merchants, and the Custom House, all good 
enough brick buildings, showing white against the 
dense background of date trees, though the epithets 
vastes et bien comprises, used in a recent pamphlet 
by an enthusiastic French doctor, are perhaps a little 
too strong for these modest mansions. Between the 
Custom House and the premises of Messrs. Gray and 
Mackenzie, the Basra creek runs up in pretty per- 
spective to Basra proper, which is about a mile from 
the river. The Wali has his residence on one side, 
and other rich natives have houses overlooking the 



130 THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 

creek, which have a certain architectural beauty, 
chiefly due to the " shanoshin " or projecting 
windows, mullioned in wood, the seats of honour in 
the various houses. Underneath the windows the 
bellams, well built and graceful, ply to and fro, 
while an antiquated swing bridge fills the middle 
distance ; and in a photograph the place almost 
merits the title of the " Venice of the East" which 
some hyperbolical traveller once applied to it. But 
only in a photograph. In real life the tide falls 
twice a day, leaving eight feet of noisome mud on 
both banks, and at best the creek is little more than 
a picturesque cloaca maxima which also serves to 
provide drinking water for the poorer people. The 
rich can afford to send a mile away to the Shat-al- 
Arab for theirs. It is surprising, in the circum- 
stances, that cholera epidemics are not more frequent. 
The bazaar is fairly clean and more extensive than 
any of those I had previously visited in the Gulf, 
but there are no local industries beyond the packing 
of dates, and the shops are full of the usual blue 
packets of French sugar, Maskat turbans, and Man- 
chester atrocities. The main trade of the place 
depends on the export of dates, which in the year 
1900 amounted to ^380,000; wool from up country 
accounted for ,£256,080; barley, ^382,122; and 
wheat only ,£35,379. Sesame seed and liquorice 
are the only other articles of importance in a list 
which shows a total of over one and a half millions 
sterling. The report for 1901 was disappoint- 
ing owing to the fact that the rainfall has been 
terribly scanty in the last eighteen months and 



THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 131 

the up-country districts are almost in a state of 
famine. 

The date trade is apparently a rather speculative 
business, depending a good deal on the output of figs 
and other dried fruits in other parts of the world. If 
there are not enough figs to go round, English and 
American children, it seems, take kindly to dates, 
but they do not clamour for them if they can get 
anything else in the dried-fruit line. Hence an 
enormous export from Basra, such as occurred in 
1 900, is almost sure to cause a glut in the market 
unless there should have happened to be a 
simultaneous dearth of figs, and so prices fall, and 
the year 1901 is apt to be a bad one for the ex- 
porters. For wheat, on the other hand, there is 
always a market, and it is sad to note, that the 
whole amount of wheat exported in 1900 from 
Mesopotamia, the granary of the ancient world, was 
144,516 cwt. Various reasons are assigned — lack 
of transport facilities, want of rain, want of irriga- 
tion canals, over- taxation of the peasantry — but the 
main and sufficient reason is to be found in the 
the Turkish Government. 

The imports for 1900 were also satisfactory in so 
far as they exceeded the total of the previous year, 
but as they amounted in all to ,£1,264,055, while a 
decade earlier, only three years after consular reports 
for Basra were instituted, the total was £i,n7>3 1 9> 
it cannot be said that vast progress is being made. 
The reason again is not far to seek. Seventy-five 
per cent, of the imports of Basra are destined for 
Bagdad and for Persia, vid the Bagdad-Kermanshah 



132 THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 

route. To carry this trade there are nominally 
seven paddle- steamers running between Basra and 
Bagdad, four belonging to the Turkish Government 
and three to Messrs. Lynch Brothers (Limited). But 
of the four Turkish boats two are nearly always laid 
up, and they all run so slowly that on the average 
only one Turkish steamer leaves Basra each week. 
Messrs. Lynch, who took over a concession granted 
in the 'thirties to the East India Company, accord- 
ing to which three British merchant steamers and 
two armed vessels were allowed to run on the river, 
are now confined to one steamer a week by the 
Turkish Government, so that their third steamer is 
employed only when one of the two others requires 
docking. The amount of cargo, therefore, that can 
go from Basra to Bagdad is limited to the amount 
that two weekly steamers can carry, each taking a 
barge alongside. 

The Turkish Government cannot afford new 
steamers, and Messrs. Lynch, who can, are not 
allowed to add to their fleet. Even the barge 
towed alongside is a recent concession which the 
Turks want to recall, as it was granted only in order 
to remove a temporary congestion. None of the 
steamers are of modern construction, consequently 
the carrying capacity is extremely limited, so that 
the most liberal estimate of the amount of cargo 
that can be taken up or down the Tigris is less than 
nine hundred tons a week. The result is that there 
is a constant surplus of cargo lying in the yards of 
Messrs. Lynch which can never be worked off, and 
the freight charges are correspondingly high. The 



THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 133 

distance from Basra to Bagdad is roughly five 
hundred miles by river, the passage is five days 
(with luck), and the charges amount to 36s. a ton. 
That is to say, it costs as much in most cases to ship 
from Basra to Bagdad as it does from London to 
Basra. The railway route from Bagdad to Basra or 
Koweit should not exceed three hundred miles, so 
there is ample room for railway competition pro- 
vided the authorities do not limit the size of the 
trains to five cars a day. They are quite capable 
of doing anything equally foolish. In any case, 
until a railway is built or the river service vastly 
improved it is a physical impossibility for the trade 
of Bagdad and the Kermanshah route to increase to 
any marked degree, and Basra as the port of entry 
for that trade must suffer sympathetically. As it 
is, the British community seems more flourishing 
here than elsewhere in the Gulf. Besides the firm 
of Lynch Brothers there is the prosperous house of 
Grey and Mackenzie, who act as agents for the 
British India steamers ; Messrs. Bucknall and 
Messrs. Strick, who run steamers direct from London 
to the Gulf, have also their agents ; and there is a 
branch of Messrs. Hotz and Co., a firm which is 
partly British and partly Dutch. Jews, Armenians, 
Greeks, and even Italians, are settled in Basra, but 
among the great commercial nations Great Britain 
reigns supreme. The British community is large 
enough to keep a club in existence and to organise 
tennis and billiard tournaments. Its members can 
even raise a cricket eleven, and do battle with the 
gunboats that come up the river for water. They 



134 THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 

cross the river and spread a cocoanut matting in the 
desert, and the man who can make his fifty — every- 
thing run out — in the heat of the day has indeed 
earned his laurels. Basra was undefeated until the 
Lawrence arrived and proved victorious by a single 
run. 

Of sport there is an abundance if you are content 
with wild fowl, sand-grouse, partridges, and snipe. 
The wild boar which frequent the marshes are shot 
for their tusks, but cannot be utilised for pig-sticking 
except at a great distance from Basra. With the 
aid of the Lawrence launch we visited the marshes 
and followed the wild duck about for ten miles or 
more in native dug-outs, and slaughtered three pigs 
on a reed island. Shooting pig on foot is not a 
wildly exciting game, except under conditions where 
you have half a dozen Arab gillies all armed with 
Martinis, who go perfectly mad at the sight of the 
unclean beast, and let off their rifles with extra- 
ordinary rapidity in all directions. The sport is 
thus attended with considerable danger to every one 
except the pig. 

These marshes, which are really immense lagoons 
stretching to the horizon on every side, are formed 
by the overflow of the Euphrates, the ancient canals 
which carried the water off being completely choked 
up. In a country therefore that merely needs a little 
irrigation to make it a mine of agricultural wealth 
there are here hundreds of square miles of good water 
going to waste in the desert. 

It requires a very short residence inside the limits 
of the Turkish Empire to arrive at some idea of the 



THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 135 

extraordinary incompetence of the Turkish Govern- 
ment. Right opposite the mouth of the Basra Creek 
a dredger lies stranded in the mud of the river bank, 
having never earned a single piastre to repay the 
cost of bringing so expensive a machine all the way 
from Europe with the avowed purpose of improving 
the channel of the Shat-al-Arab. A little higher up 
the rusty carcase of a rakish blockade runner of the 
American Civil War is hidden in a creek where she 
was grounded after doing a single trip to Bagdad. 
The Turkish Government had bought her at a high 
price to supplement the river service, but could not 
afford the coal to keep her going. 

The Provincial Treasury seems to be constantly 
at a loss how to raise the most trivial sums of money. 
The other day, when Bin Bashid was twelve miles 
away at Zobeir, waiting to co-operate with Turkey 
in an attack on Koweit, the order came from Con- 
stantinople to Basra that the Amir of Nejd was to 
be paid his subsidy in full. The amount was, I 
think, ;£T2000 ; but in any case it was quite beyond 
the capacity of the Wali's exchequer. A draft was 
tendered on Bagdad but scornfully rejected by the 
Amir's agent, who knew better than to accept a 
Turkish I O U. Finally half the sum was scraped 
together by hook or crook before the Amir departed 
with no great respect, it may be supposed, for his 
liege lord. Yet the Turk goes happily along on his 
bold career as careless of results as the Last of the 
Dandies, profuse in promises and recklessly extra- 
vagant on the verge of bankruptcy. The troops are 
rarely, if ever, paid, yet the garrison of Basra is 



136 THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 

being strengthened to admit of a strong policy on 
the Gulf. Detachments have been pushed out to 
Safwan and Umm-Kasa, and while I was at Basra a 
battalion was ordered to El Katif, and the pretty 
brigantine Sohaf was told off to act as transport. 
But the Sohaf could not leave the river because it 
was quite beyond the powers of the Basra Vilayet 
to provision her. Perhaps, too, she did not alto- 
gether relish the idea of meeting British gunboats 
in the Gulf. She is armed with six 4-inch breech- 
loading guns, but it is quite possible that her ammu- 
nition is lacking, and her steaming powers are almost 
contemptible. Yet this is the ship which was sent 
with orders to Mubarak when there were three 
British men-of-war in Koweit harbour. 

You will learn most extraordinary lessons in 
natural history by coming to Basra. The Turkish 
commodore, who is a delightful old gentleman, is 
convinced that Australia is inhabited by an abori- 
ginal race with tails two feet long. It was the com- 
modore who discovered that the wealthier classes in 
England pass the winter in diving-bells at the bottom 
of the sea for the sake of the greater warmth thus 
obtained, while in Scotland, he maintains, there is 
an aristocracy which dwells entirely in baskets sus- 
pended from high bridges. One can see that the 
assertion respecting Scotland might be based on pic- 
tures in the illustrated papers when persons of 
distinction were let down in baskets during the con- 
struction of the Forth Bridge ; but the origin of the 
diving-bell theory is wrapt in mystery. Personally, 
I found the Turkish authorities most agreeable 



THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 137 

people. The commodore of the port rose, according 
to his own confession, to his present rank by means 
of a crib which he employed in a wholly unexpected 
examination ; but he is nevertheless an interesting 
if not altogether competent official. The Wali, who 
has lately come to the Vilayet of Basra, is a type of 
the courteous Turkish soldier. His predecessor made 
rather a muddle of the Koweit affair, and it was 
doubtless considered politic to employ an officer of 
engaging personality who is entirely without initia- 
tive. As Wali of Basra he is an independent Pro- 
vincial Governor, but as commandant of the Basra 
troops he comes under the jurisdiction of the Field- 
Marshal of the Bagdad Army Corps, whom I found 
at Basra taking charge of the Koweit question. The 
Wali was most interested in the Bagdad railway 
scheme, which attracts him greatly, as from a mili- 
tary point of view he is keenly alive to the advan- 
tages of quick communication. Naturally we did 
not touch on the dangerous ground of Gulf politics. 
Here the field-marshal is supreme, and since the 
old Wali went there has been a closer watch on the 
telegraph wire to prevent official secrets leaking 
out. It is known that the affairs of the Gulf are 
still engaging the attention of the Turkish Govern- 
ment, as the postmaster at Basra is so busy sending 
official telegrams that he has no time to serve out 
postage stamps to ordinary customers. 

I have already touched on the strategic im- 
portance of Umm-Kasa which the field-marshal has 
occupied with his troops, so it is unnecessary to go 
into the question again, though it may not be out 



138 THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 

of place to emphasise the point that the occupation 
of hitherto deserted spots in a country which may 
be nominally Turkish, but has never been properly 
demarcated, might properly be regarded as a breach 
of the status quo, certainly as serious as any action 
which we might take at Koweit. 

The whole Basra Vilayet is, of course, entirely 
Arab in character and population, the only Turks 
being the officials and the thousand or twelve 
hundred troops which occupy the town and the river 
banks of the Shat-al-Arab, and belong to the Bagdad 
Army Corps. To the eastward the Turko-Persian 
boundary is more or less defined, but to the west 
and south-west it is impossible to say where Turkish 
power begins or ends, though the Turks themselves 
would probably claim the whole Arabian Peninsula. 
Until some line of demarcation is determined, the 
movement of troops in disputed territory is more 
than we ought to allow. Zobeir, of course, the old 
Basra, twelve miles to westward of the river, and 
once joined thereto by a canal long since choked up 
and useless, is in undisputed Turkish territory ; but 
whether Safwan or Umm-Kasa, between Zobeir and 
the Khore Abdulla, can be properly regarded 
as Turkish, any more than Koweit, is open to 
question. 

The question of the date gardens claimed by 
Mubarak is a private matter, and must be settled 
by the courts ; but the occupation of Umm-Kasa is 
a different affair altogether, and belongs to the 
sphere of international politics. 

There can be no doubt that the recent occurrences 



THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE GULF 139 

in Koweit have dealt a severe blow to Turkish 
prestige in the Gulf. Already the Arabs, who 
certainly do not love Turkish rule, have begun to 
talk of the Shat-al-Arab as a British stream, and 
at Mohammerah the Cha'b recognise the rise of 
British influence at Koweit as the beginning of the 
end. If Turkish ascendency goes at the mouth of 
the Shat-al-Arab, then Persian rule will, it is said, 
go too, and the whole delta will become British. 
Even the children at Basra who are employed on 
the buildings of the new British Consulate, and who 
sing all day long at their work — to the detriment, it 
must be confessed, of the work — have learned a new 
song, which they proclaim with great vigour. The 
first verse announces that there are four British 
men-of-war anchored at Koweit, and the second goes 
on to say that the Turkish flag has been lowered 
and the Union Jack floated in its place. So out of 
the mouths of babes and sucklings the Turkish doom 
is foretold. This is undoubtedly an extremely 
sanguine view of the future ; but if it were to be 
fulfilled, the Garden of Eden, which is only sixty 
miles above Basra, might blossom again, and the 
paradise of the ancients might be regained out of 
the present wilderness. 



CHAPTER X 

THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 

As I have described at some length the ports of the 
Persian Gulf, many of which are rarely visited by 
Europeans, and then only by British officials who 
are debarred from describing them, except in 
Government reports, which few people ever dream 
of reading, it remains only to take a general survey 
of our political and commercial position in these 
waters, which are every day assuming greater im- 
portance in the eyes of the trading nations. Politics 
and commerce are so inextricably intertwined at the 
present day that it is almost impossible to treat 
them separately ; yet as a general survey cannot be 
undertaken in the space of a single chapter, it will 
be as well to make the attempt, and deal first with 
the trade question, and afterwards with our general 
policy. 

In discussing trade questions in this part of the 
world, it is inexpedient for several reasons to refine 
too much in the matter of figures, for the simple 
reason that the existing statistics must from the 
very nature of things be inaccurate. The annual 
reports are compiled by the British Consuls from 
ship's manifests, and from such information as the 
merchants of the different ports volunteer to give. 



THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 141 

There is practically no record of the merchandise 
that is carried up and down the Gulf in native craft, 
and the customs, even under the new system, in 
Persia, give but a vague clue to the real statistics. 
It seems rather absurd, therefore, to be particular 
to a rupee where the number of lakhs cannot always 
be relied on, and I shall confine myself, therefore, to 
very round figures. 

For trade purposes it is best to regard Maskat 
and Mohammerah, and Basra as Gulf ports — though 
geographically they are distinct from the Gulf — be- 
cause their commerce is of a similar nature t© that 
of Bushire and Bunder Abbas, and moves through 
precisely the same channels. Politically also, with 
the exception of Basra, they are within the sphere 
of the British Resident at Bushire. 

The trade of the Gulf is carried almost exclusively 
by British steamers, or steamers running under the 
British flag, and by native craft. The British India 
Company has a weekly series of steamers running 
up and down the Gulf, with an average of iooo tons 
or a little over. Each steamer gets iooo rupees 
(,£66 125. 4-d.) a round trip for carrying the mails, 
but is not otherwise subsidised. There is the 
Bombay Persia Line, chiefly owned by Parsee 
merchants in Bombay, which sends a steamer up 
the Gulf about once in three weeks, and there are 
two firms, Messrs. Bucknall, and Messrs. Strick } 
who run direct steamers, about once a month, be- 
tween England and the Gulf, at rates considerably 
cheaper than the P. & O. charges from London to 
Bombay. The Messageries Maritime used to run a 



142 THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 

monthly steamer from Bombay in connection with 
the Marseilles boat, but that service has completely 
fallen through, and in 1900 one Austrian and one 
Turkish steamer alone came to the Gulf to vary the 
monotony of the British flag. In 1901 the Russians 
descended on the scene with two heavily subsidised 
steamers, which created considerably greater excite- 
ment than the arrival of a new comet, owing to the 
suspicion with which every Russian move is re- 
garded in this part of the world, and I have been 
told on good authority that the subsidy is ^5000 a 
trip. Whatever the success of the venture may be 
in the future, it can hardly be regarded as a re- 
munerative enterprise up to date, especially as the 
Komiloff is not made for the Fao bar, and on one 
occasion had to wait two weeks for sufficient rise in 
the tide to carry her over. At all events up to the 
present the British flag may be said to monopolise 
the trade of the Gulf as far as steam traffic is 
concerned. 

What that trade amounts to must be gathered 
from a collation of the trade returns which appear 
in the Administration reports of the Gulf, and the 
annular consular reports on the foreign trade of 
Basra and Bagdad. The total trade of the whole 
Gulf in the year 1900 amounted in round figures to 
^8,640,000. This total is probably swollen by 
duplicate entries on the export and import sheets ; 
but, on the other hand, much of the merchandise 
borne in sailing-craft escapes notice, and may be 
taken to balance the error of double entry. The 
figures for 1900 were decreased as far as the Arab 



THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 143 

ports and Lingah were concerned by a failure in the 
pearl beds, but, on the other hand, there was a 
larger export than usual at Basra, and the trade 
of Bushire was considerably above the average, so 
that for the general commerce of the Gulf, the year 
1900 may be considered fairly typical. There is no 
way of ascertaining in many cases where the articles 
of import originally came from, since they are almost 
inevitably carried in British bottoms, but as the 
same articles exactly are imported to all ports of 
the Gulf, and Turkish Arabia, and as the reports for 
Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Bahrein do 
differentiate between the various nationalities, a 
more or less trustworthy indication is given of the 
proportionate shares of foreign countries in the Gulf 
trade. These figures show that of the exports of 
the Gulf, 40 per cent, go to British India and the 
British Isles ; while of the import trade, the United 
Kingdom and India together are responsible for 
over 63 per cent. And it must be remembered that 
in the remaining 3 J per cent., British and British 
Indian firms are deeply interested, since the whole 
amount is carried in British ships, consigned for the 
most part to British or British Indian firms, and 
often sold at retail by British Indian settlers. Out of a 
total of more than eight and a half millions sterling, 
this proportion is by no means inconsiderable, and 
is large enough — especially when the potentialities 
are weighed — to make the Gulf very well worth 
holding. In contrast it may be stated that France 
sends less than 4 per cent, of the imports (mostly 
sugar), Austria ij per cent., Germany less than 1 



144 THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 

per cent., and Russia for all practical purposes may 
be left aside, her contribution being, comparatively 
speaking, infinitesimal. 

The question that next arises is : What are the 
prospects of this trade in which we are so vitally 
interested, and what are we doing to develop it ? 
Our great authority for things Persian, the present 
Viceroy of India, found the trade of Persia, and 
particularly of the Gulf, in an exceedingly promising 
condition — promising, that is, for Persia — a little 
over ten years ago. He happened to visit the Gulf 
at a time when the opening of the Suez Canal, and 
the development of steam communication with 
Bushire and Basra had raised the foreign trade 
of Southern Persia and Arabia from insignificance 
to at least a respectable figure. He states, for 
instance, that in the fifteen years between 1873 an d 
1888 the trade of Bushire had increased by 5,000,000 
rupees, and in rather shorter space Bunder Abbas 
had made a similar advance. But when we look 
back over the intervening period between 1889 an d 
1900 we shall find no equivalent progress. There 
has been no retrogression, it is true; on the con- 
trary, a few steps forward have been taken, but 
there is certainly no comparison between the pro- 
gress made in the period 1890- 1900 and that made 
in the previous decade 1 880-1 890. 

To give a few examples. One finds that the 
whole trade of Bushire, which in 1889 was 
.£1,325,898, has risen to £"2,030,000 in 1900. But 
the trade of Lingah, which was given as £"1,176,086 
in 1889, is only returned as £"966,000 in 1900, while 



THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 145 

the commerce of Bunder Abbas has dropped from 
£689,635 to ,£433,000 in the corresponding years. 
Similar results would be arrived at by going all 
round the coast, nor must it be argued that 1900 is 
an unfair year to quote owing to the failure of the 
pearl banks, for, whereas the year was a bad one for 
Lingah and Bahrein, it was a record season for 
Bushire. It would be tedious and useless to wade 
through the figures of each previous year. The 
conclusion to be drawn is invariably the same, that, 
except in a few special directions, the trade of the Gulf 
has increased very little since it reached, about 1889 
or 1 890, the natural level which had been made for 
it by the opening up of steamer communication. 
For special signs of progress special reasons may 
generally be assigned. There has been, for instance, 
a far larger import of tea to Bunder Abbas by reason 
of the fact that there has been a demand in Central 
Asia for the teas of India, which are everywhere 
ousting the China leaf ; but the tea trade is likely in 
future to follow the new Nushki route. Bahrein, 
too, in 1 90 1 took a great leap forward owing to the 
abnormally large take of pearls, the establishment 
of a British Agent there, and the gradual inclination 
of the Indian and Arab traders to make Bahrein the 
distributing centre for the whole Arab coast. The 
opening of the Karun route has also brought a 
small increase of prosperity to Mohammerah. But 
beyond a certain point the trade of the Gulf cannot 
increase, now that the results of the development of 
steamer traffic have been fully felt, until a similar 
revolution takes place in other directions. Two 



146 THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 

things must happen before the imports can rise. 
First of all the purchasing power of the people 
must increase, and secondly land communications 
must be improved. This may appear an obvious 
remark, but it is one which is not always thoroughly 
appreciated. 

To begin with, it is almost impossible for the pur- 
chasing power of the people to increase under the 
present forms of government which hold sway along 
the shores of the Gulf. Both in Persia and in 
Turkish Arabia the people can become richer and 
better able to buy the luxuries or even the necessities 
of life only by being relieved of the many iniquitous 
impositions put on them, and by systems of irriga- 
tion which will increase the productiveness of the 
soil. Both these conditions are out of the question 
in Persia and Turkey as they stand to-day. So far 
from encouraging agriculture both Governments do 
their very best to hinder it by such measures as the 
present embargo on the export of cereals, which 
takes away all inducement to sow grain. Even 
where there is no embargo the Government, by one 
means or another, exacts whatever profit the peasant 
may make above the mere means of subsistence, and 
thus renders it more advantageous to leave agricul- 
ture alone. Unless, therefore, a revolution takes 
place in the methods of Persian and Ottoman rule, 
which no one can at present foresee, it is useless to 
hope for any increased power of purchase in the 
native of Persia or Arabia. But trade might still 
be increased if internal communications were to be 
improved, because then the native would be able to 



THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 147 

move what wares he has to sell more easily, and he 
would pay less for the imported articles, and so his 
consumption would be greater. What, then, has 
been done to improve the channels of trade from the 
Gulf to the interior in the last ten years ? Practically 
nothing at all. 

The Arab coast remains almost impervious to 
inland trade, as it always has been. In fact, the 
growth of Turkish power at Hasa and Katif and the 
recent warfare between Koweit and Nejd have 
practically closed the caravan routes altogether. 
The trade of the Arabian coast, therefore, is almost 
entirely confined to the little towns and villages 
which fringe the pearling coast. Maskat acts as port 
of entry for the whole of Oman, but there, if the 
inland routes are still open, they are in no way 
improved, nor are they likely to be for some decades 
to come. The four ports on the Gulf which do com- 
mand caravan routes are Bunder Abbas, Bushire, 
Mohammerah, and Basra. Of these Basra and 
Bushire are by far the most important. Of the 
whole trade of the Gulf Basra is responsible for 
32 per cent., Bushire for 24 per cent., Bunder Abbas 
for 6 per cent., and Mohammerah for not more than 
4J per cent. All these places are really ports of 
entry for the interior of Persia, since of the Basra 
imports at least 65 per cent, are destined for the 
Bagdad-Kermanshah route. Now of these four 
routes only that which finds its exit at Mohammerah 
has been at all improved in recent years. The 
Bunder Abbas roads to Kerman and Yezd are 
infested with brigands, whom the Persian Governor 



148 THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 

of Bunder Abbas is powerless to suppress. The road 
from Bushire to Shiraz is just as arduous as it 
has always been. The charges for transport on these 
roads varies enormously, but the latest quotations 
available show rates varying from 47 to 105 krans 
for the transport of 775 lbs. between Bushire and 
Shiraz (£ 1 equals fifty-three krans). Taking eighty 
krans as an average, this works out at something 
like £4 js. a ton. That is to say, where it costs at 
the utmost 30s. a ton to carry goods from London 
to Bushire it requires an outlay of £4 js. to get 
a ton forwarded 183 miles inland from Bushire to 
Shiraz, and the charge from Bushire to Isfahan may 
be roughly estimated at ^10 or ^12. The camel 
rates from Bunder Abbas to Kerman and Yezd and 
beyond are equally high, so that the inland trade 
with Persia is limited to the articles which can bear 
the weight of such a tax. 

When the Karun was opened to foreign trade it 
was expected that traffic charges would greatly 
decrease and trade would simultaneously prosper. 
I have already, in describing Mohammerah, shown 
how fallacious these expectations were. The new 
country and the new markets which were to be 
opened up by the Shushter-Dizful-Khoremabad 
route are not a whit more free of access to-day than 
they were ten years ago. No improvement has been 
made in the track — road is always a misleading term 
in Persia — and at this very moment the Lur tribes 
are a menace to all traffic. The real achievement in 
connection with the Karun Biver is the Ahwaz- 
Isfahan road just opened, which shortens the land 



THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 149 

journey from steamer to Isfahan by just about half 
the distance from Bushire to Isfahan. Curiously 
enough our energies seem to have been entirely 
bestowed on bridging over the gap between Ahwaz 
or Shushter and Isfahan, instead of being directed 
to the more important Dizful-Khoremabad country. 
No doubt the Ahwaz-Isfahan road is a great im- 
provement on the Bushire -Shiraz-Isfahan route, or 
would be if merchants were in a position to patronise 
it, but it opens up no new market. The Bakhtiari 
country, through which it passes, contains no towns 
and practically no resources, and Isfahan is already 
supplied from Bushire. In building the Ahwaz- 
Isfahan road Messrs. Lynch Brothers evidently had 
in view not so much the development of a new 
trade, but the shifting of the existing trade of 
Isfahan and beyond from the Bushire-Shiraz line to 
the Mohammerah -Ahwaz route. But trade will not 
be so easily diverted in the East. If there were a 
great reduction in cost of traffic the merchants 
would be forced to a change of venue. But, the 
improvement in rates is not yet — whatever it may 
be in future — sufficient to make the new route 
attractive. It is merely a difference of 30 per cent. 
That is to say, instead of paying ^ioa ton from 
Bushire to Isfahan, you would pay £7 from 
Mohammerah to Isfahan, with a break of bulk at 
Ahwaz. It is hardly likely that the merchants 
of Bushire will all emigrate to Mohammerah on 
account of this saving, especially as they have the 
advantage at present of supplying both Shiraz and 
Isfahan from the same base. It is quite possible 



150 THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 

that when a sufficient number of caravanserais are 
built and muleteers have been induced to come and 
settle down with their mules in the district the 
Ahwaz-Isfahan route will become gradually more 
popular ; but the final increase to the bulk of the 
Gulf trade will never, perhaps, give adequate returns 
for the amount of money spent on building the road 
and the bridges. 

Indeed, the Bakhtiari chiefs are the principal 
gainers by it, since they have got something 
approaching to a road through their country for 
which they are supposed to pay — the payment up 
to date being purely hypothetical. 

The real value of the Karun River in opening up 
the Dizful-Khoremabad line of country has been 
strangely neglected, and the Lurs continue to make 
all traffic if not impossible at least dangerous and 
unprofitable. Here, again improvement may be 
hoped for, but the final result cannot be large 
because the cost of transport will always be 
enormous. The Upper Karun between Ahwaz and 
Shuster being in the Shah's own hands nothing 
need be expected in the way of facilities for trade. 

As far as the inland trade with Persia is con- 
cerned it may be laid down as axiomatic that it 
cannot increase to any large extent without a 
complete revolution in the management of the 
country. The opening and improving of roads may 
help a little, but very little towards benefiting both 
the merchants and the natives. A great change can 
be brought about only by the building of railways. 
Lord Curzon ten years ago warned his readers 



THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 151 

against ambitious schemes for regenerating Persia 
by means of the iron horse, advocating rather the 
extension of mule tracks and roads as the precursors 
of railways. But in the past few years the public 
mind has been instructed on the building of rail- 
ways, and it is impossible to agree to-day with the 
sentiments of 1890 in such a matter. Mule -tracks 
and roads are antiquated methods of communication 
in these days, and it is not at all certain that it 
is not a sheer waste of money and time to insist 
on the gradual evolution of trade channels by the 
various stages of track, road, and rail. Roads in 
civilised countries have long ceased to be main 
arteries of traffic. They can properly be regarded 
only as feeders. If Japan a few years ago had 
been persuaded that she must rise gradually to 
naval power by first building wooden sailing-ships, 
and afterwards ironclads, she would certainly not have 
reached the position which she occupies to-day. It 
is hardly less ridiculous to insist that a country must 
be covered with a network of roads before she is 
worthy of a railway. It will be remembered that the 
Government of India was with difficulty persuaded 
to build railways in Upper Burma after the last 
war, the same argument being used, that roads 
must precede railways. Fortunately, the railway 
was strategically necessary, and was therefore built, 
and proved so successful from a commercial point of 
view that it is difficult to understand the mental 
attitude of those who opposed it. 

China, fortunately for herself, will be covered with 
railways long before she possesses a single trunk 



152 THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 

road worthy of the name. Our Government has 
shown a wonderful breadth of judgment in supply- 
ing Uganda with steam communication with the 
sea while roads are hardly yet made. The ideal 
policy, therefore, for countries that are aspiring to 
civilisation is to cut the Gordian knot by construct- 
ing railways at once. Given railways for the main 
channels of trade, roads, as feeders, will speedily 
follow. But to insist on the road first is really to 
postpone progress for an indefinite period. It 
appears that our Government has been exceedingly 
backward, if not culpably ill informed, in this matter. 
In countries where our political interests are very 
great, the Government has allowed other Powers to 
come in and secure railway concessions which will 
always prove a stumbling-block to us in the future 
from a political point of view. Since it is of little 
value to criticise our commercial policy in Persia 
without at least suggesting a new and a better one, 
I maintain most emphatically that we should imme- 
diately fix our attention beyond all other things 
in Persia on the development of the western and 
southern provinces by railways. A single line join- 
ing Bunder Abbas or Bushire with the plateau 
would be of more service to trade than a hundred 
mule-tracks, and it will be a disgrace to British 
enterprise and to British statesmanship if any other 
country before ourselves carries out such a scheme. 

The importance of railway communication is 
clearly shown by an examination of the figures of 
the Bagdad-Kermanshah route. In the last chapter 
I showed that the transit trade through Basra and 



THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 153 

Bagdad is limited to 900 tons a week each way at 
the very outside. I might with more truth have 
said 600, but I used an outside figure in order to 
concede as much as possible in the argument. This 
is because Messrs. Lynch can only run one steamer 
a week each way, at the very most, towing a barge 
alongside. The Turks do the same. The result is 
that cargo is shut out constantly, and it sometimes 
takes six months for a bale of Manchester goods to 
get from London to Bagdad. The charges for freight 
— the Turks and Messrs. Lynch sharing a monopoly 
— are extravagantly high. The precise charge from 
Basra to Bagdad works out at 36s. or 375. a ton, 
and goods carried locally, for instance, from Bagdad 
to Amarah, must take their chance and pay a 
correspondingly high rate. 

Those who oppose the German railway scheme 
frequently do so on the grounds that it cannot 
be built without raising the customs tariff, which 
would be a serious blow to British trade. 

Whether or not we should submit to the raising 
of the tariff is a question which I am not here con- 
cerned to answer ; but it is only fair to point out 
that a railway could carry freight from Basra or 
Koweit to Bagdad at a maximum charge of 125. 
a ton, which is exactly one-third of the present 
charge, and the goods would be delivered in a single 
day instead of spending months in the go-downs at 
Basra as they do now. In other words, British 
trade, even if it were taxed 3 per cent, higher at the 
port, would get far more compensating advantages 
by the boon of cheap and rapid transport. It may 



154 THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF 

be remembered that here, as often elsewhere, the 
truism about water transport being much cheaper 
than rail is proved to be most fallacious. So much 
depends on the nature of the water and the character 
of the transport. One can quite understand that 
Messrs. Lynch Bros, would lose by railway com- 
petition, and one sympathises with the difficulties of 
their position, being limited, as they are, to two 
steamers and two barges ; but this is a matter which 
cannot be regarded from the point of view of any 
individual firm. The German railway, if it is built, 
by providing a cheap means of transit from the Gulf 
to the edge of the Persian plateau at Khanikin, will 
not only make this route into Persia by far the 
most frequented of all the southern and south- 
western channels, but it will so demonstrate the 
advantages of railway traffic even to the distorted 
mind of the Persian that an extension into Persia 
is bound to follow, and we shall have German 
enterprise, and not British, to thank for the change. 
I am very far from asserting that the extraordin- 
arily misgoverned territories of Persia and Turkish 
Arabia can be saved by railways alone. My main 
object is to show that there is a natural limit set to 
the foreign trade of a country which is not provided 
with modern means of communication, and if Persia 
has not reached that limit she has very nearly done 
so. The opening of new roads may benefit her 
slightly, and much has yet to be done in the way of 
suppressing lawlessness among the semi-independent 
tribes, but there can be no comparison between the 
progress to be made in those directions and the 



THE COMMERCE OP THE GULF 155 

enormous advance which would be brought about by 
the building of railways. To reduce, for instance, 
the time of the journey from the coast to Isfahan 
from thirty days to twenty-four hours, and the cost 
of carriage from ^ioa ton to ^"i, would be in itself 
a revolution so far reaching that other changes 
in the treatment of the peasant, the taxing of 
the people, and the development of agriculture 
by irrigation might very well be expected to 
follow. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

Next to the development of internal communica- 
tions, the management of seaports and the tariff 
regulations may be said to have the greatest influence 
on trade. Real harbours can hardly yet be said to 
be in use in the Gulf if we leave aside the picturesque 
cove of Maskat, which is outside the Gulf, and sup- 
plies only the nearer parts of Oman. Bushire, 
Lingah, and Bunder Abbas on the Persian coast are 
merely open roadsteads, where a landing can some- 
times only be effected with difficulty, and for days 
it may be impossible to work cargo. There is a 
dilapidated stone pier at Bunder Abbas, which is 
left high and dry at low water ; at Lingah there is 
a diminutive dock, which, when I visited the port, 
was mainly occupied by a small sailing-ship that had 
got inside on an abnormally high tide, but could not 
be removed ; at Bushire, Nature has been more kind, 
and cargo can be brought alongside the Custom 
House in boats in almost any weather, provided the 
boats can get out to the steamers, which cannot come 
nearer than from two and a half to three miles. I 
have shown elsewhere that a magnificent harbour 
could easily be constructed near Bunder Abbas, 
utilising the deep water of the Clarence Straits 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 157 

between Kishm and the mainland. But, though it 
might be well worth the while of Russia to undertake 
such a scheme in order to provide herself with a first 
class naval base, the Persian Government would be 
quite incapable of any such alteration, and the most 
that could be expected would be the extension of the 
pier so as to facilitate the landing of cargo from the 
vessels and the regulation of the boat service. 
Lingah is in a similar plight. Nothing short of enor- 
mous expenditure on breakwaters could make it 
much better than it is at present, though much 
could be done to improve the boat service and 
prevent the damage to cargo and the constant thefts 
which take place between the steamer and the Custom 
House. 

Bushire, on the other hand, could be immensely- 
improved at a cost that is certainly not beyond the 
capabilities even of the Persian Government. The 
purchase of a dredger and the deepening of a very 
short channel would allow steamers to get close 
up to the town, and then the building of wharves, 
so that the ships could come alongside, would be a 
simple and remunerative undertaking. Bushire would 
then be one of the best of the possible harbours 
in the Gulf. Mohammerah t at the junction of 
the Karun and the Shat-al-Arab, has great natural 
advantages, and is indicated as the base terminus of 
the railway which some day will run by way of the 
Karun and Diz Valleys to Khoremabad and North- 
Western Persia. But the river bar is a drawback 
almost fatal to the future of Mohammerah and Basra 
as ports for ocean-going steamers, and it is. not at all 



158 THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

certain that the Diz Valley Railway will not even- 
tually cross the Karun about Ahwaz and run, vid 
Behbahan, to Bushire. The same difficulties which 
stand in the way of Mohammerah are even more fatal 
to Basra, since on that side of the Shat-al-Arab there 
is such an ample harbour as Koweit within easy 
reach. Koweit is, of course, the really great harbour 
of the Gulf, and it bears the same relation to the 
twin rivers of Mesopotamia as Alexandria does to 
the Nile or Karachi to the Indus, being near enough 
to the delta to become the natural exit for the wealth 
of the alluvial valley, and yet far enough removed 
from the actual mouths of the combined streams to 
avoid the silt which is brought down by their 
currents. The remaining port of Bahrein, Manameh, 
is sadly deficient in safe harbourage, yet it is not 
certain that a better situation for the actual haven 
might not be found, and in the meantime much 
might be done to facilitate the landing of cargo. 

The question is — What can Great Britain, the 
most interested nation in the Gulf, do to improve 
its seaports ? Obviously we cannot be expected to 
spend money on other people's harbours, even if we 
were allowed to do so. There was one method open 
to us in the case of Persia which has unfortunately 
been closed by recent events. When the customs of 
Persia were put under foreign control three years 
ago it might have been expected that at least a por- 
tion of the enhanced revenue would be used for the 
improvement of the trade channels of Persia. 

The new regime came into force as far as the Gulf 
was concerned on March 21, 1900, and a full duty 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 159 

of 5 per cent, ad valorem was immediately exacted, 
and finally secured in spite of the opposition of 
many merchants of Shiraz, Bushire, and Bunder 
Abbas. M. Simais, who was in charge at Bushire, 
actually started a scheme for a system of lighters to 
make the working of cargo easier and more expedi- 
tious. But his untimely death while he was in 
Europe on leave has knocked that scheme on the 
head, and his successor appears in no way inclined 
to follow in his footsteps. 

There seems to be little doubt that Great Britain 
made a great error in consenting to the appointment 
of Belgian officials to the Gulf ports. To give the 
Belgians their due the work of the Custom House 
is done in a much more satisfactory way than here- 
tofore ; there is less damage to cargo, the thieving 
which was prevalent under the old system has been 
practically stopped, and, above all, a much larger 
revenue is collected by a much less wasteful system 
than the old way of farming the customs. The total 
sum collected, or, rather, delivered to the Govern- 
ment, under the old system was 2,400,000 krans, or, 
roughly, ,£45,300. In 1900, though the new system 
was inaugurated only in March, and though for a 
month or two business was almost at a standstill, 
and the full 5 per cent, could not at first be exacted, 
M. Simais succeeded in securing a total of ,£74,470, 
an enormous increase for the first year. But the 
increase for 1901 was ever so much greater. If the 
trade returns are at all nearly correct and a full 
5 per cent, is exacted the revenue collected should 
amount to £"170,000. 



160 THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

But who is benefited by this great increase ? Cer- 
tainly not the Persian people, on whem not a penny 
of the money will be spent, and certainly not the 
foreign merchants, out of whose pockets a large por- 
tion of the increase is bound to come. The Shah, 
who likes visiting Europe, is really the one person 
whose interests have been considered in the matter, 
and indirectly the Russian Government, which has 
lent money to the Shah on the security of part 
of the customs. As British and British Indian 
merchants are chiefly interested in the fiscal policy 
of the Gulf, Great Britain might very well have 
demanded that the Gulf customs should have been 
collected by British officials with authority to employ 
a certain proportion of the receipts on the improve- 
ment of the harbours. In China and Korea, where 
British officials administer the foreign customs, the 
system has been attended with excellent results 
because a liberal policy has been followed and a cer- 
tain portion of the customs receipts has been em- 
ployed on public works such as lighthouses, beacons, 
buoys, &c, which have greatly facilitated the trade 
of all nations. Even in Korea Mr. M'Leavy Brown 
has insisted that the streets of Seoul should be 
improved before the whole revenue of the ports was 
handed over to the Emperor for his private expenses. 
A British customs service for the Gulf might have 
been equally beneficial to the foreign trade of these 
waters, and so also to the Persian Government. It 
is impossible to say the same for the Belgian regime. 
So far nothing has been spent on improving the har- 
bours, or lighting the coast, or building respectable 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 161 

Custom Houses to protect merchandise from the 
effects of weather. Since the sad death of M. Simais 
it does not seem likely that anything will be done 
in the future. 

•In theory the Belgians were, of course, chosen as 
being entirely disinterested. In practice this is very 
far from being the case. Any one who has any ex- 
perience at all of foreign enterprise in the East 
knows that Belgium is financially, if not politically, 
an informal participator in the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, and the appointment of Belgian officials at 
the Gulf ports is hardly less detrimental to our 
interests than the appointment of Russians would 
have been. Even the Persians and Arabs recognise 
that much, and regard the Belgians as the servants 
of Bussia, which means that their appearance in 
Southern Persia is a distinct blow to British prestige. 
That the Belgians have no vital interest in the trade 
of the Gulf is not at all in their favour, for it not 
merely leaves them indifferent to any public works 
which might facilitate trade, and induces them to 
regard their functions as simply a means of putting 
money into the pockets of the Shah. It may not 
be even now too late to insist that a certain portion 
of the customs revenues should be spent on harbour 
improvements. 

There is, unfortunately, no apparent chance of a 
similar opportunity in connection with the port of 
Basra, where the Turkish customs and the Turkish 
system in general are obstacles to trade which are 
almost ineradicable. The nominal import duty on 
foreign goods is 8 per cent., but the Turkish 



162 THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

officials set their own values on the goods. The 
Custom House is ill-adapted for the purpose of 
housing cargo, thefts are of common occurrence, 
and redress is hardly ever obtainable. But still, 
merchants are to arrive at a modus Vivendi according 
to which losses in one direction are balanced by gains 
in another, the Turkish Exchequer being the only 
sufferer. That the trade of Mesopotamia would be 
enormously increased by the building of the railway 
with an exit to the sea at Koweit there can be no 
shadow of doubt. The service of river steamers is 
useless as a means of developing the great agri- 
cultural wealth of the country, and the Arabs, even 
when they cultivate the ground, have often no 
cheap means of bringing their grain to market. 
It would probably pay the British merchant and 
manufacturer over and over again to submit to an 
increase of the tariff if the building of the railway 
could be assured thereby. 

Finally, with regard to the harhour of Bahrein, it 
is difficult to say with absolute certainty if the 
present roadstead opposite Manameh could ever be 
made a really good haven. A harbour may be con- 
structed almost anywhere in these days provided 
money is no object. The question is whether or not 
the resources of Bahrein would run to breakwaters 
as well as dredgers. Pending the solution of that 
problem much could be done by building a pier 
and buying lighters. At present the steamer stands 
about a mile and a half from shore in a shallow bay 
which is completely exposed to any wind between 
a north-wester and a north-easter. The cargo is 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 165 

put off into boats, which cannot reach the shore 
owing to the small depth of water, so at a certain 
distance from land the bales and boxes are trans- 
ferred to the backs of the sturdy Bahrein donkeys, 
which finally deposit them ashore. Needless to say, 
the whole system is as cumbersome as any to be 
found east of Suez, and causes endless worry and 
delay, not to mention the expense. 

Mr. Gaskin, our agent at Bahrein, is doing his 
best to encourage the Sheikh to interest himself 
in public works, but the task is a thankless one. 
The Sheikh is totally without ambition so far as 
the advancement of his islands is concerned, but 
exceedingly jealous of his prerogatives. It is difficult 
to get him to spend money for which he sees no 
immediate return, and equally hard to get him to 
consent to an improved method of collecting revenue 
which might seem to endanger his independence. 
Yet it is our imperative duty to develop the resources 
of Bahrein, which could be made a flourishing little 
mart if brought more directly under British rule. 
It is the centre of the pearl trade, the main source 
of wealth in the Gulf; it is already a distributing 
port for the Arabian coast anywhere west of El 
Katr : and now that Lingah is subject to a rigid 
tariff it might quite possibly usurp the place of that 
port as emporium for the pirate coast. It also com- 
mands one of the few caravan routes into the interior 
of Arabia. This last asset is of little importance as 
long as the Turks misgovern El Katif and Hasa, but 
is one which can never be wholly taken away, because 
there is an underground channel of fresh water all the 



164 THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

way from Riadh to Bahrein providing wells along 
that route and supplying the Bahrein islands with 
abundance of clear water — a most unaccustomed boon 
in the Gulf. That the 'growth of British influence 
over Bahrein has produced a good effect on trade is 
shown by the trade returns of recent years, and, 
above all, by the fact that a German merchant, the one 
European trader in the Gulf outside Basra and 
Bushire, has chosen it for his headquarters. He was 
originally located in Lingah, but he has found better 
prospects, it seems, under the auspices of Great 
Britain, and financially has had no reason to regret 
his enterprise. The customs of Bahrein are at 
present leased to an Indian merchant and money- 
lender. If the collection were put into British 
hands it would be easy to pay the Sheikh as much 
as he gets at present, lower the tariff, and still have 
a surplus for harbour improvements on a modest 
scale. It would be better, perhaps, to pension off the 
Sheikh at aliberal rate and administer the islands alto- 
gether, making Bahrein either a free port or one with a 
nominal tariff of 2 per cent, ad valorem. The advan- 
tage to our trade and prestige in the Gulf would be 
certainly great, and the risk and expense very small. 
It is impossible to leave the discussion of trade 
affairs without a reference to the work that is being 
done for British and Indian merchants in the Gulf 
by the officials on the spot. There is probably no 
part of the world to which British steamers ply 
where you will not find merchants complaining that 
their Government does nothing for their interests ; 
and it would be strange if such complaints were not 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 165 

heard in these Persian waters. It is usually a 
question of redress of wrongs or the recovery of bad 
debts ; and a glance at the administration reports of 
recent years gives a strong impression that the com- 
plaints are not altogether unfounded. It must 
be remembered that there is no mixed court in 
Persia ; in fact, there is no court of any sort 
worthy of the name. When disputes arise between 
foreigners and natives they are settled, or rather 
they ought to be settled, through the medium of an 
official called the Karguzar, whose business is to 
stand between Persians and Europeans. In practice 
this official becomes simply an obstructionist. He 
can always be approached by the Persian debtor, 
and his plan of campaign is to refer everything to 
Teheran, which is like postponing matters to the 
Greek Kalends. It is obvious, therefore, that if 
any one is to blame for the everlasting delay in 
settling the claims of British merchants it is the 
Minister in Teheran. The most the British Consul 
at the port can possibly do is to jog the Minister's 
memory ; and the Minister can only act in so far as 
he is supported by the Home Government. It 
would be much more satisfactory if a mixed court 
were to be instituted at Bushire for the trying of 
cases involving Europeans and natives, and if all 
reference to Teheran were avoided, except in special 
cases. But this is rather more than can be expected 
of either the British or the Persian Government. 
At all events it is unfair that any blame should 
attach to the consuls at the ports of the Gulf, who 
are indefatigable in their work, 



166 THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

It must be understood that there are sometimes 
cases where a British Consul will not assist a national 
because he will not lend himself to a dishonest cause. 
But merchants have surely no right to complain 
because British officials happen to be honest men. 
Besides, it is very doubtful whether or not, in the 
long run, foreign officials of other nations really do 
half as much for their nationals as the British 
Consuls do for theirs, for the reason that in most 
countries of the East where foreign trade brings 
foreign merchants together, British influence is so 
far preponderant that a British official has more 
power than most of his colleagues combined. I 
know that the merchant who complained to me most 
bitterly in this part of the world of his consul 
happened to be a German. I know also that the 
British agent in Bahrein did his best to persuade 
a British firm to take up a discovery of asphalt 
that he had made on the islands, and could not 
make it move in the matter. In the meantime 
the German merchant of Bahrein has stepped in 
and is preparing to exploit the discovery. Such 
cases as this make one a little sceptical when 
British merchants maintain that other foreign 
consuls do more for their nationals than the 
British. 

As regards the general politics of the Gulf, we are 
interested chiefly in our relations with Russia and 
Germany. I have already stated as strongly as 
possible the objections to allowing Russia to establish 
a naval base at the very mouth of the Gulf; but it 
is not sufficient to offer merely a passive resistance 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 167 

to such a step. What we want above all is a clearly- 
defined and active policy. 

When Lord Curzon promised to impeach the 
Minister as a traitor who should consent to Russia 
obtaining an outlet on the Gulf, he used strong 
language ; but he did not even then go far enough. 
If it is vital that our control of Indian waters should 
remain undisputed, then the first steps to under- 
mining that control are at least as important as the 
later advances ; and the Minister should be im- 
peached who should consent to a railway being built 
by Russia from Teheran, or any part of Northern 
Persia, to the Gulf or the Indian Ocean. Such a 
railway once built, the port follows as a matter of 
course, just as the seizure of Port Arthur was a 
necessary corollary of the Manchurian Railway con- 
cession. But as it would be carrying the dog-in- 
the-manger attitude to an extreme to hold that 
Persia must be kept free of railways for our political 
advantage, there is only one course open to us, and 
that is, to insist that all concessions for railways in 
Southern Persia must first be submitted to Great 
Britain, and to build them ourselves. 

To suppose that railways can never be run at a 
profit in Persia is sheer nonsense. There are pre- 
cisely the same difficulties to be overcome here as in 
South Africa, and as there are now six lines running 
from the coast up to the plateau between Capetown 
and the Zambesi, and running at a profit, there is 
no reason to suppose that Persia with a much larger 
population in proportion to the size of her territory, 
and with apparent resources of great richness, would 



168 THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

not support similar lines under European manage- 
ment. But it must be remembered that Russia is 
carrying out her great railway schemes as a Govern- 
ment, and we must at least lend Government support 
on our side. It is a serious disadvantage to our policy 
in Persia that whatever progress we make is due 
almost entirely to private initiative, whereas Russian 
enterprises have the power and resources of the 
Russian Government behind them. 

What alignment Southern Persian railways must 
take is a matter for experts. The main tendency is 
certain to be from the coast inwards, getting up to 
the plateau as soon as possible by the easiest route. 
The one obviously indicated is the Karun-Dizful- 
Khoremabad route, because this line would follow the 
mountain furrow to a certain extent, instead of going 
from ridge to ridge, as a line from Bushire to Shiraz 
would do. Roughly speaking, a profitable system 
would, in the end, be obtained by a trunk line 
starting at the Khanikin end of the Khanikin 
branch of the Bagdad Railway and running by 
Kermanshah, Sultanabad, Isfahan, Yezd, etc., along 
the southern edge of the great salt desert right on 
to Beluchistan and India, with branches going down 
at intervals to the coast, of which a Khoremabad- 
Dizful-Mohammerah branch, and a Kerman-Bunder 
Abbas branch would perhaps be the most important. 
But such a system can only be achieved by begin- 
ning with the branches which rest on the sea-coast. 
The scheme may seem chimerical to-day, but seeing 
that only twelve years ago Lord Curzon expressed a 
belief that a Mesopotamian railway would never 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 169 

materialise in his day, there is no reason to suppose 
that pessimistic views of a Persian system may not 
be equally erroneous. Anyhow, the main thing is 
to fight Russian influence by offensive measures, 
since a passive policy has never saved us in the past 
and is not likely to help us in the future. 

Turning now to the Arab Coast, we are confronted 
by different, yet in some respects similar, problems. 
Because we gave up the idea of a Mesopotamian 
railway ourselves, we cannot with any show of 
reason oppose the German or the so-called German 
scheme. We are right, however, to bring it about if 
possible that such a railway should terminate at 
a port more or less under British protection. If 
it terminates on Turkish soil we may be bothered 
with inumerable complications in the future. The 
Turks have gaily promised an enormous guarantee 
which, even if the necessary revenues are assigned, 
may not always be obtainable ; and then the 
Germans may want to seize the port to secure 
payment. So it would save all trouble in the future 
to make it impossible for any railway to terminate 
in the Gulf except at a port which is distinctly 
under British influence. That is why I lay stress on 
Turkish occupation of a deserted swamp at the head 
of the Khore Abdulla. For recent affairs at Koweit 
will make German capitalists and Turkish officials 
chary about bringing their railway to that port 
if another exit can be found on what is clearly 
Turkish territory. Umm-Kasa might be the very 
spot required. 

Again, it must not be forgotten that the bar 



170 THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

of the Shat-al-Arab can be dredged and then Basra 
would be as good a terminus as any point on the 
harbour of Koweit or the Khore Abdulla. 

We ought to have recognised long ago that it was 
essential to our position in the Gulf that any 
Mesopotamian railway as far as the Bagdad-Basra 
portion of it is concerned should not be built by any 
European Power except ourselves ; and we ought 
to have set about building it long ago. Un- 
fortunately we never do possess a clearly defined 
policy anywhere in the world, and so we content 
ourselves in this case by decrying the whole railway 
scheme as impracticable. Fortunately for us there 
are still great obstacles in the way of its realisation 
which cannot easily be overcome without our 
assistance. And that being so we may still be able 
to bargain for the control of the Bagdad-Basra 
section. But in any case we must make it clear 
now, and not later, that there is a doctrine for 
the Gulf which is not the doctrine of the status quo 
but a doctrine whereby we reserve to ourselves 
the right of all political development in the Gulf, 
while leaving the trade open to all nations. That 
our Government has to a certain extent followed 
out a theory of this sort in the case of Koweit 
is probably to be attributed to the fact that we 
have one of the ablest statesmen of the day at the 
head of affairs in Calcutta. But to pretend that we 
have not distinctly committed a breach of the status 
quo is about as futile as to pretend that black 
is white. I will not go over all the ground which 
I traversed in the chapter on Koweit. It is enough 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 171 

to assert again that the conclusion of the whole 
matter is that Koweit has always since its founding 
admitted Turkish suzerainty, that for some fifty 
years Sheikhs of Koweit have flown the Turkish 
flag, that this connection, though vague, has always 
been political and not merely religious, and finally 
that our present ally Mubarak was actually con- 
firmed in his rule by Turkey at his own instance. 
When, therefore, we come in and subsidise Mubarak 
and induce him to throw off his allegiance to the 
Porte, and thereby sweep away Turkish suzerainty 
over the most important harbour of the Gulf, if we 
do not thereby disturb the status quo there is no 
meaning in words. But that our action therein 
is improper or immoral can only be maintained by 
the worshippers of the laisser /aire policy. If our 
interests in the gulf are threatened by the Turkish 
flag at Koweit, then we have no option but to get 
that flag hauled down. Only, having thus acted 
with nothing more than common sense, it is surely a 
mistake to partly stultify our action by admitting 
any Turkish claims whatsoever. Turkey undoubtedly 
had claims over Koweit : now she has none. 

We cannot get even an indirect footing on the 
mainland of the Arabian Peninsula, however, 
without incurring new, and possibly tiresome, 
obligations. 

We have become responsible at once for Mubarak's 
actions, and for his policy with regard to Nejd. In 
a word, Mubarak is something of a handful. He has 
embarked on a career of aggression and even con- 
quest which we cannot altogether ignore. Now it 



172 THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

will make a considerable difference to the future of, 
the interior of Arabia if the power of the Bin Bashids 
is overthrown and the Wahabis put back in their 
old capital at Riadh. It behoves us at least to 
know something of the rights and wrongs of the 
quarrel. From all accounts I should be inclined to 
back the Bin Bashids as being good rulers and better 
men than the Wahabis. The present Bin Bashid, 
Abul-Aziz, is attacking our man Mubarak, and is 
nominally subject to Turkey ; but it is not at all 
certain that he might not be fairly easily brought 
over if he were properly approached. He must know 
by this time that Turkey is not only a weak Power, 
but financially incapable even of paying his subsidy 
with any promptness. Unfortunately, we have no 
dealings with the Amir. In fact, the only attempt 
that was ever made to open up political relations 
with the interior dates back nearly forty years, when 
Colonel Pelly visited the old blind Feyzul, the 
Wahabi ruler of Nejd in those days. Our policy of 
rigidly abstaining from interference in the internal 
affairs of the Arabs has brought us to this pass, that 
we are grossly ignorant of affairs happening within 
a few miles of our telegraph station at Fao, and we 
are allowing our man Mubarak to carry on a policy 
in the interior which, for all we know, may be ex- 
tremely detrimental to our interests, and at all 
events, is hardly understood by us at all. It would 
be a more enlightened course for us to pursue if we 
were at once to open up negotiations with the interior, 
discover who really is the best man to govern Nejd, 
and to confirm him in his position by monetary assist- 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 173 

ance if necessary. In the end we might so achieve 
an influence over Riadh, Oneyza, and Jebel Shammer, 
all of which are variously, vaguely, and often errone- 
ously called Nejd, that we should eventually get the 
Turks at Katif and Hasa pinned between us and our 
friends in the interior, and their control over their 
portion of the coast strip might become limited and 
innocuous. 

Only in this way is there much chance of the 
interior of Arabia being opened up to foreign trade 
and foreign influence. As long as the Turks are 
recognised as supreme, internecine warfare will 
continue and the caravan routes will be blocked to 
traffic. 

There is no reason to believe that it would be 
difficult to extend our influence to the interior pro- 
vided our policy continues to be just and disinterested 
as it has been in the past. It is a lesson in Gulf 
politics to see the Brisish Resident go round the 
Gulf without any show of force beyond a few guns 
for saluting purposes, and deal out justice with 
impartial hand to a lot of turbulent Arab chiefs, 
who, however anxious they may be to fight against 
their neighbours, invariably respect the Resident's 
wishes in this matter, and usually obey him as im- 
plicitly as a child does its father. The British, with 
all their experience in the East, are undoubtedly 
more fitted than any other Europeans to govern the 
Arab, who is impatient above all things of physical 
restraint, and full of that sporting instinct which 
appeals at once to the British character. The Arabs 
are as lazy, improvident, and untruthful as any 



174 THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 

people in the wide East ; but they are so much 
children of Nature, so physically strong, and such 
lovers of horses that they certainly strike the traveller 
as being the most attractive people between Aden 
and Vladivostok. I can see nothing to lose and 
everything to gain by winning over the Arabs of 
the interior. Their one objection to us is that we 
put down the slave trade, a policy on our part which 
they can so little understand, that they even speak 
of our captures as piracy, being sometimes convinced 
that we take the slaves, not to release them, but to 
keep them for our own use. But when greater 
precautions are taken on the African coast to put a 
stop to the nefarious traffic the slave trade will 
soon become a thing of the past, and all reason for 
friction between ourselves and the Arabs will be 
removed. 

Lastly, it is imperative that we should possess a 
decent coaling-station somewhere in the Gulf. The 
general public at home is not aware probably that a 
British tar is unable to land anywhere in these 
waters except on the barren rocks in Maskat harbour, 
where generations of sailors have spent weary hours 
in painting their ships' names in huge white letters 
on the almost perpendicular cliffs. The sailor, officer 
and man, has a wretched, thankless task in the tepid 
waters of the Gulf. Yet I do not know that a plea 
has ever been put forward in his behalf. Any amount 
of sickness might be avoided by providing a station 
ashore where the men could occasionally get relaxa- 
tion from the endless tedium of life on board ship, 
and the Gulf station might become, if not popular, 



THE POLITICS OF THE GULF 175 

at least bearable. Bahrein seems to be the most 
suitable spot for such a purpose. It has plenty of 
fresh water, it is more or less central, and the climate 
in summer, though vile enough, is not so ghastly as 
that of Bushire or Bunder Abbas. 

On the whole, apart from the question of setting 
up a naval station and trade emporium under the 
British flag, the need for the future is a more intelli- 
gent policy with regard to internal communica- 
tions. It is not enough to sit on the fringe of 
the Gulf and keep our eyes on the sea. Great 
Britain may be an insular Power, but the British 
Empire in the East most assuredly is not, and it 
requires for its safety a continental policy — that is 
to say, an appreciation of the needs of our continental 
position. 



CHAPTER XII 

BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 

The visitor to Bagdad, if he is not confronted with 
many modern objects of interest beyond the kaleido- 
scopic details of a flourishing Eastern bazaar, has an 
embarrassment of riches to choose from in the way 
of archaic ruins. The valley of the twin rivers is 
literally strewn with the rubble of past ages. In 
his way over the desert the traveller tramples at 
almost every step on broken bricks that date back 
to the Babylonian period. His eye is constantly 
arrested by the sheen of potsherd that was burnt 
blue when the Mohammedan religion was in its 
infancy. The few landmarks of the dreary waste 
are mounds of sand-covered masonry such as 
Akarkouf or Birs Nimrud or Babel or the Arch of 
Ctesiphon, whose origin or intention is still some- 
times a matter for conjecture in spite of all the 
science on the nineteenth century. 

Unfortunately, most of the remains of Mesopo- 
tamia's greatness are without interest or beauty, 
except in the eyes of the archaeologist. One visits 
the Arch of Ctesiphon and the ruins of Seleucia 
because one has ample time to inspect them while 
the river steamer ploughs its way up stream round 
the tortuous bends of the Tigris. Zobeide's tomb is 



BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 177 

within half an hour's ride of the Residency in 
Bagdad, and the strange pile Akarkouf, a mass of 
brick-work like Birs Nimrud, with less apparent 
meaning attached to it, is not much more difficult of 
access. Otherwise it is safe to assert that few 
foreigners would ever go near them. For my own 
part, fate took me to Babylon because it happened 
to lie on the easiest route to Nejef and Kerbela, 
which have much more than a mere antiquarian 
interest, containing as they do rich shrines whither 
a yearly increasing stream of pilgrimage is directed, 
and which especially attract attention at present as 
points on the route of the much-canvassed Bagdad 
Hail way. I am free to confess that in the event 
I found the ruins of Babylon much the most 
interesting feature of an eight days' tour, a fact 
which is accounted for by the presence at Babylon 
of the German exploring expedition under Dr. 
Koldwey and the extraordinarily kind way in which 
he and his colleagues, Dr. Weissbach and Mr. Andre, 
endeavour to make archaeology easy for the most 
Philistine visitors. 

Babylon itself is some sixty miles from Bagdad, 
and the journey to and fro is a matter of forty-eight 
hours or less if one of the waggonettes which run 
daily to Hillah can be secured. But it is much more 
to the purpose to spend at least a week in going to 
Babylon, Hillah, Birs Nimrud, Kin, Kufah, Nejef, and 
Kerbela. In this way a little circuit is made which 
is usually taken by travellers in the reverse order, 
but which I was obliged to accomplish in the order 
given because, owing to the crowd of pilgrims, a 

M 



178 BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 

waggonette to Kerbela could not be procured and it 
was rather simpler to begin by riding on horseback 
to Babylon. The whole journey covers a distance of 
about 250 miles by road and river, and cannot 
be done comfortably in less than seven or eight 
days, though sanguine guides believe that five 
are sufficient. The best way is to start with a horse 
for personal use and two good donkeys, one for 
baggage and the other for the use of a servant and 
interpreter, without whom the traveller who cannot 
speak Arabic is hopelessly at sea. A camp bed, 
blankets, and a few cooking utensils are the main 
essentials. The owner of the donkeys runs behind 
and makes himself useful by stabling and feeding 
the horse at night. The donkeys of the country 
can do their five miles an hour with great ease 
and keep the pace up for twelve hours out of the 
twenty-four for short journeys, and that is more than 
the average rider is likely to require. 

Leaving Bagdad at daybreak the caravan can 
make Mahmoudieh, the first village on the road, in 
four hours' steady going, after which a halt for 
breakfast or tiffin is desirable. Mahmoudieh has a 
fine new " khan " or caravanserai, with clean rooms, 
for the better class of travellers, and as this is a great 
rarity in Mesopotamia it may be better for fastidious 
people to start later in the day and sleep the first 
night at Mahmoudieh. Otherwise one goes on from 
there to Haswa, just an hour beyond the spot where 
the road to Babylon and Hillah branches off the main 
route to Mosseyib and Kerbela. 

At Haswa, which is simply a " khan " with a few 



BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 179 

mud huts outside, the accommodation for the night 
is far from luxurious. The caravanserai is, as usual, 
a large, square, fort-like structure of mud bricks 
enclosing a yard, round which are a series of niches 
four feet or so from the ground, intended to serve as 
resting-places. Each traveller selects his own niche 
and tethers his horse beneath him. If all the niches 
are full, there is a great, raised platform of brick in 
the centre of the yard, where he can spread his 
blankets. As the night was cold and rain threatened 
when I arrived, I secured the use of one of the huts 
outside, where horse and donkeys and servant and 
the owner of the hut and his family made a comfort- 
able party for the night. There is one advantage of 
such a lodging — that it does not tempt the wayfarer 
to lie slothfully in bed. I had finished breakfast 
and got well on my way before the sun showed above 
the level horizon, and before 9 o'clock had passed 
Mahawill Khan, from whence a glimpse is first 
obtained of the big mound which marks the site of 
Babylon, and is still called Babel. 

The scenery of Mesopotamia requires very little 
description. The glaring whitish-brown of the desert 
is only relieved by very occasional patches of green, 
where a canal gives water enough for agriculture. 
Owing to the drought this year, rain-fed crops are 
entirely absent. The plain would be a dead level 
were it not for the remains of ancient canals, whose 
high banks are increased in size by frequent sand- 
storms, and generally magnified into low ranges of 
hills by the ever-present mirage. Occasionally a 
distant caravanserai looms high above the horizon 



180 BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 

like a great castle, growing disappointingly smaller 
and meaner as the traveller approaches, while towards 
the Euphrates marshes a great city seems sometimes 
to float in the distant haze, which contracts at closer 
inspection into a group of Arab tents. On such a 
featureless plain the bulky mound called Babel, 
though not more than 150 ft. high and perhaps 
100 yards square, is an imposing landmark, standing 
high above the dark fringe of date trees, which 
marks the sinuous course of the Euphrates. 

As the rider proceeds beyond Mahawill Khan, he 
passes a smaller mound on his left, which has been 
the subject of fruitless excavations. Soon after- 
wards he enters a perfect mesh of old and new 
canals, crossing and recrossing one another in an 
apparently aimless fashion, until he passes through 
a gap in one bank higher than the others and more 
regular, which he may or may not recognise as the 
great wall of ancient Babylon. By this time he 
has left the mound of Babel on his right hand, and 
has discovered that farther on to the front there are 
two other mounds of somewhat similar aspect, but 
less conspicuous because closer to the date groves 
by the river. On the first of these a number of dark 
figures are easily descried at some work which 
resembles a railway embankment ; this is the famous 
" kasr " where Nebuchadnezzar once held high 
revelry. The second mound is surmounted by two 
small domes of obviously Mohammedan style, which 
seem absurdly out of keeping with the hoary remains 
of Babylonian greatness. It is here that a saintly 
Mohammedan has been laid to rest, perched high on 



BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 181 

the buried structure of a heathen temple, a cuckoo's 
egg in the nest of a crow. The mound takes the 
name of the dead Mohammedan, and is popularly- 
known as Amran. Striking off to the right front 
from the Hillah road immediately after passing the 
gap in the wall, I came in ten minutes to a date 
garden on the river bank hard by the " kasr " 
mound, where a well-made outer door and a clean 
brick building denoted the residence of Europeans. 
Dr. Koldwey, whom I disturbed in the task of 
sorting out basket-loads of broken bricks and 
pottery, came immediately to the gateway, waived 
all introductions, and showed me my room as if he 
had been expecting me for days, taking it for 
granted that I had come to stay. The hospitality 
of the desert seems to be infectious, for Dr. Koldwey 
and his colleagues, Dr. Weissbach and Mr. Andre, 
not only welcome all visitors, but take it almost as 
an insult if any Europeans pitch a camp within 
reach of Babylon instead of billeting themselves 
on the German Expedition ; and when this hos- 
pitality of the desert is combined with a feast of 
learning at which the men of science contrive to 
make one forget the immense gulf fixed between 
knowledge and ignorance, the traveller is indeed 
fortunate. 

It is sometimes said that no European can become 
a great Chinese scholar and keep his reason. When 
it is remembered that there are at least as many cunei- 
form characters as there are Chinese characters in 
Giles's dictionary — which contains, if memory 
serves, some 14,000 — and further, that while in 



182 BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 

Chinese each character signifies primarily a single 
word, in cuneiform a character may stand for a word 
or a syllable or a phrase, some faint idea of the diffi- 
culties of Assyriology may be obtained. Then when 
one understands that whereas Chinese is a living 
tongue, the key to the cuneiform character was lost 
two thousand years ago, and has to be deciphered 
without any aid in the shape of spoken language or 
tradition, one is filled with admiration, amounting 
almost to awe, of the men who can read off the 
writing on one of Nebuchadnezzar's bricks more 
easily than the average Englishman can read a page 
of Chaucer. Not that Dr. Koldwey or Dr. Weiss- 
bach are really at all awe-inspiring. On the contrary, 
Assyriology, if you listen to them, becomes almost a 
simple affair, mainly because they scorn tradition 
and conjecture and believe only what Nebuchad- 
nezzar plainly tells them by his writings and his 
buildings. In the light of such direct history the 
Herodotus of our youth becomes even a more un- 
mitigated romancer than we ever suspected him of 
being. Gone are Semiramis and the hanging gardens 
of Babylon ; gone are Queen Nitokris and all her 
works ; gone, too, it must be sadly confessed, is a 
great part of that Babylonian magnificence which 
has been the byword of ages. 

The fact is that until the German Expedition 
came to Babylon about three years ago, nothing 
much better than most untrustworthy tradition was 
known of the great city where the Jews spent their 
captivity. It is very doubtful if Herodotus ever 
saw Babylon with his own eyes, and by the time 



BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 183 

Alexander came to Mesopotamia Babylon was well 
on the road to ruin. Centuries of rapine and sand- 
storm have converted the ruins into insignificant 
mounds of dust and debris in which the thrifty 
Arabs have mined for the well-tempered bricks which 
they cannot bake to-day. 

All the modern village ofHillahis built of valu- 
able inscriptions, of which not a single word could 
be deciphered a hundred years ago. It so happens 
that September 1902 was the centenary of cunei- 
form knowledge, for then just a hundred years had 
elapsed since the first inscription was haltingly 
read. Fifty years ago, when the great French Ex- 
pedition came to Babylon, the knowledge of cunei- 
form was so far behind what it is to-day that the 
French men of science may be forgiven for the extra- 
ordinary nature of their conjectures which gave to 
Babylon dimensions not far short of those of modern 
London with its suburbs, and thereby produced a 
wholly erroneous idea of what greatness in those 
days meant. Since then, under the auspices of Sir 
Austen Layard, Mr. Bassam has added something 
to the common fund of knowledge by valuable dis- 
coveries, but compared to the extensive and thorough- 
going operations of the Germans he can hardly be 
said to have done more than scratch the surface ; 
and any traveller's book of the last twenty years 
will show what vague notions were held of the 
architecture and topography of the ancient city. To 
the least experienced eye the aspect of things to-day 
is entirely changed. Dr. Koldwey with his 200 
Arab labourers assisted by a miniature railway 



184 BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 

has laid about two- thirds of the " kasr " bare and 
the Palace of Nebuchadnezzar, or rather its founda- 
tions, live yet to tell the true tale of the past. 

At the present day every one who builds a house 
in Bagdad or Basra attempts to make his roof a little 
higher than the rest that he may look down on his 
neighbour. The same desire prompted the ancient 
Kings of Babylon to raise their palaces on mighty 
pedestals, so that the whole city might be beneath 
them, and since the Mesopotamian plain offered no 
natural point of vantage they were compelled to 
construct an artificial acropolis of brick and mortar. 
Practically all that is left to-day of the "kasr" is 
the foundation-work or solid brick mass, though the 
Temple of Melita is partially existent, and enough of 
the flooring and partition-walls of the palaces to 
enable the explorer to draw fairly accurate conclu- 
sions as to the size of the rooms. 

The whole "kasr" with its enclosing walls is 
about 500 yards by 300, and it includes within 
its space three palaces, a temple, and a canal, 
besides a portion of the famous Holy Way which 
Herodotus described for us. Thus the " kasr" bears 
some resemblance to the fort at Agra with its three 
palaces merging into one another, but there the 
likeness stops, for the citadel of Nebuchadnezzar can 
in no way have compared with the fort of the Moguls 
as far as size or architectural beauty or richness of 
material is concerned. Instead of the white marble 
and red sandstone of Agra, there is nothing but a 
monotony of mud bricks and burnt bricks in Babylon 
— good material of the kind, it is true, since they 



BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 185 

have stood the wear and tear of ages, and are still 
as good as new, but still bricks and nothing more. 
The temples were built almost entirely of mud brick 
with whitewashed walls — which was considered good 
enough for the gods — and the largest of them were 
wretchedly small in comparison with the shrines of 
to-day. As for the royal apartments, they remind 
one somewhat of the Emperor's bedroom in the 
Forbidden City of Pekin. As far as the explora- 
tions go, there is not, in fact, a trace of a room in 
the " kasr " which would be considered large enough 
nowadays for a lady's boudoir, with the exception 
of the great hall of the Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin 
incident, which may have been 50 ft. or 60 ft. long. 
This is the chief apartment of the southern palace, 
which has the advantage over the northern in point 
of architecture and situation. The great hall faces 
south with a magnificent view over the larger part 
of the city. Before the hall is a court with a 
well and two round objects which may have been 
the bases of pillars supporting a portico or protec- 
tions for the roots of two palm-trees. Then comes 
the outer wall of the " kasr " going sheer down in a 
precipice of solid brickwork to the waterway which 
once was a wide canal, or perhaps a branch of the 
Euphrates itself. To the left the Holy "Way, whose 
brick pavement, covered with bitumen, is almost 
intact, crossed the waterway by a bridge long since 
departed, and proceeded in a long sweep to the 
great temple which lies partly disclosed in the 
mound which is called Amran. If we could replace 
the Euphrates or the canal in its artificial bed, and 



186 BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 

clothe the farther bank with date-palms and blos- 
soming fruit-trees, if we could reconstruct the great 
temple on its brick mass in the place of the shape- 
less Amran, and build again the great edifice just to 
the left whose raison d'Ure is not now so much as 
conjectured, if we could repeople the Holy Way with 
the picturesque crowd of an Eastern city, or see it, 
perhaps, on the festival day when the great image 
of Nebuchadnezzar's favourite god was borne in 
triumph from the temple to the "kasr," and if we 
could fill up the dead space between the Holy Way 
and the distant city wall with the buildings of a 
great metropolis, and hear again the hum coming up 
to the terrace of the mart of the ancient world — if 
we could do all this, then, as we looked out from the 
hall of feasting where the concubines of Nebuchad- 
nezzar once drank from the chalices of Jerusalem, 
we might not compare Babylon with London or New 
York or even Tokio, but we should admit that the 
captor of Israel had some reason to be proud of his 
handiwork. If for no other reason Dr. Koldwey 
and his colleagues would have a claim on our grati- 
tude in that they have, so to speak, put Babylon in 
its place. 

Historians nearly always give an exaggerated 
idea of past grandeur because they forget to put in 
the qualifying clause of comparison, and even men 
of science like the French explorers of fifty years 
ago went utterly wrong in their map of Babylon. 
Instead of an enormous square which included both 
Babel and Birs, fifteen miles apart as the crow flies^ 
and extended over a huge space on both sides of the 



BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 187 

Euphrates, Babylon has been reduced to a compara- 
tively small triangle, two sides of which were formed 
by walls running at a slightly obtuse angle to one 
another with the river subtending the angle and 
forming the main protection on the third side, just 
as the Jumna forms one side of Delhi and Agra. 
Dr. Koldwey estimated the extent of the walls as 
not greater than fourteen kilometres, or about eight 
miles. In other words, Babylon was ever so much 
inferior in size to modern Pekin, and the " kasr," 
though a massive structure, could in no way com- 
pare for magnificence with the Forbidden City. The 
great temple in the heart of the Amran mound may 
have been richly enough decorated with gold and 
precious stones, but it would certainly, if complete 
to-day, fade into insignificance beside the shrine of 
Hussein at Kerbela, and the lesser temples of Melita 
in the "kasr" and of Ninop beyond Amran were 
seemingly rather paltry affairs. What is concealed 
in the Babel mound will not be known until the 
German expedition turns its attention in that direc- 
tion, but the main aspect of the city will not be 
altered by discoveries there. In fine, Babylon if 
reproduced to-day would cut as poor a figure among 
the world's capitals as the Ormuz of the sixteenth 
century would among the commercial ports of the 
present. The best that can be said of it is that up 
to the present time its glories have never been sur- 
passed in Mesopotamia. And even taking the shrunk 
circuit of the real walls, it need not be assumed that 
all the space within them was occupied by dwellings 
at the same time. It is usual in the East to find 



188 BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 

waste places within the walls of all large cities. An 
example is furnished by Nankin, where a good bag 
of pheasants may be got on any November day 
inside the city gates ; while in Persia there are few 
cities which are not half composed of ruins. There 
is no reason to suppose that things were very dif- 
ferent in Babylonian times, and it is quite certain 
that the various cities round about Babylon rose to 
eminence at different periods. 

Another and more practical light which has been 
thrown on the district by the German Expedition 
has reference to the ancient schemes of irrigation 
which are rife in Mesopotamia. We should like to 
know if the climate of the country has changed, and 
if the desert was ever a forest country. That it 
was not greatly different from what it is to-day 
may be gathered from the records of Alexander's 
time. Nebuchadnezzar certainly used other woods 
than the date-palm in the construction of his palaces 
and temples, whose names are preserved in the 
cuneiform character, though they cannot be identi- 
fied. But these woods may have come from the 
Chaldean hills above Mosul, or even from the teak 
forests of Ceylon and Burma. What Nebuchad- 
nezzar does tell us most plainly is that he built 
canals, and he was particularly proud of his canals, 
and they were considered a great boon to the 
country. In other words, the problem which faced 
the agriculturist of Mesopotamia was much the 
same as it is to-day. Only the average visitor 
makes the mistake of attributing the existing re- 
mains of waterways which intersect the Euphrates 



BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 189 

country by the hundred to the public works depart- 
ment of the Babylonian. The German explorers, 
who are practically the only authorities on the 
subject, say that they cannot identify any of these 
canals outside the walls of Babylon with the irriga- 
tion works of Nebuchadnezzar. On the contrary, 
the canals belong for the most part to the Moham- 
medan era, and, what is most important, they were 
never, probably, much more extensively used than 
they are at present. The reason why they are so 
numerous is not difficult to find. The Arab deals 
with a canal as he does with a house. He uses it 
and abuses it until it goes to rack and ruin, and 
then sooner than go in for extensive repairs, he finds 
it simpler to build a new one. This accounts for the 
fact that the canal beds cross each other, and often 
run close together in a way that shows conclusively 
that they were not all utilised at the same time. 
The casual observer who talks of the palmy days of 
Mesopotamia when the whole country was irrigated 
by canals needs to be reminded that there is no 
trace whatsoever of a great irrigation scheme for 
Mesopotamia, nor is it at all certain that there ever 
was a time when many more canals were in use than 
at present. 

Again, the expedition, besides accomplishing ex- 
cavations on a scale never attempted before, and 
making discoveries far beyond the dreams of pre- 
vious explorers, has had a most beneficial effect od 
the surrounding country. Only a few years ago 
the mounds of Babylon concealed scattered villages, 
from which hungry Arabs stole out at night to rob 



190 BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 

the caravans passing between Hillah and Bagdad. 
Lying in wait behind the ancient walls on the sides 
of disused canals they pounced easily on their prey, 
and made all traffic on the road risky and expensive. 
Now the whilom brigands are working peacefully at 
the excavations, having learned the advantage 
which regular labour has over chance depredations. 
I have heard it said that it will be impossible to get 
any decent labour for the purposes of the Bagdad 
Bailway out of the Arabs ; but Dr. Koldwey's ex- 
perience rather tends to disprove this theory. In a 
small way he has got distinctly satisfactory results. 
The ordinary wage is three good piastres a day, 
equivalent to 6d. in our money, and though the 
ill-fed Arabs were poor workmen at the outset they 
they settled down to their task after a month or 
two of experience and regular food, and on the 
whole they answer the purpose exceedingly well. 
They cannot do the work of the European navvy, 
but then you can get at least four Arabs for the 
same pay that the poorest British labourer would 
demand. Dr. Koldwey can always get more labour 
than he requires, and I have been told by many 
people in Hillah, and Nejef, andKerbela, that the sup- 
ply of labour at 6d. a day is practically inexhaustible. 
When it is remembered that the soldier gets his food 
and clothing, and a nominal 3s. ^d. a month, which is 
never paid oftener than once in six months, and some- 
times not even then, it will be seen that 6d. a day 
paid with perfect regularity is almost wealth to the 
Arab in a country where grain is exceedingly cheap. 
Dr. Koldwey pays his men "bakshish" for any 



BY THE WATERS OF BABYLON 191 

particular discovery which is made, partly to give 
them an interest in the work, and partly to prevent 
robbery. The result is that he has only had one 
case of robbery in three years' experience. Just 
before I arrived he had unearthed a bas-relief on 
the brickwork of the " kasr " which had delighted 
the Arabs exceedingly. It was a beast with the 
legs and feet of a lion, but the skin, head, and 
forked tongue of a snake, with a pair of horns and 
the tail of a scorpion, altogether a notable creature, 
which seemed to have stepped straight out of the 
vision of a Daniel or an Ezekiel. The rate of 
" bakshish " for such a discovery was naturally high, 
and the Arabs were well contented. 

The main result is that Babylon, instead of being 
a dreary waste of sand undulations and mounds, 
has taken such definite shape as to suggest, at all 
events, to interested travellers the brave days — 
which were not so very brave — of Babylonian great- 
ness. I would endeavour at greater length to 
show what a debt of gratitude travellers owe to the 
German explorers, were it not that it is foolhardy 
for an outsider to wander at large in the sacred 
fields of archaeology, into which I may have already 
intruded too far to escape rebuke for unconscious 
error. 



CHAPTER XIII 

ON THE EUPHRATES 

From Babylon to Hillah is an easy hour's ride, the 
road passing through a break in the ancient wall and 
almost immediately entering the date-gardens of the 
modern town. Hillah is built on both sides of the 
Euphrates but the larger part is on the right bank 
and must be reached by crossing a rickety bridge 
of boats. I was the guest of a wealthy Jew who like 
many of his race has settled down and prospered 
in the Land of the Captivity. He himself was 
absent making a tour of his properties in Klifl, 
Nejef, and Kerbela ; but his son who spoke both 
French and German entertained me most hospitably. 
Of course we talked of the new railway scheme 
which seems to interest everybody immensely from 
the local governors down to the Arabs in the 
street. The signing of the January irade had just 
been published in the Bagdad newspapers, though 
we were already well advanced into March and the 
news had long before filtered through to Bagdad by 
private channels. In Hillah the people had heard 
exaggerated reports. The German Consul in 
Bagdad had been preparing lodging for the 
150 engineers and so on. These rumours I was 
compelled to deny even to the extent of throwing 



ON THE EUPHRATES 193 

some doubt on the prospect of the railway being 
built at any time in the near future. This was a 
blow to the merchants of Hillah whose hopes have 
been running rather high in the direction of improved 
means of communication. 

The Hillah district, which from an agricultural 
point of view^may be taken to include Kerbela, Kifl, 
and Kufa and all the land irrigated by the Hindiah 
Canal, is the most important grain-producing 
centre in Mesopotamia. Unlike the Bagdad country 
it is not dependent on the fickle rainfall because the 
Euphrates is a different kind of river from the 
Tigris, flowing at a higher level between lower 
banks so that a yearly inundation may be looked for 
with something like regularity. 

That advantage is increased by the existence of 
the so-called Hindiah Canal, which is really a branch 
of the Euphrates running into the sea of Nejef and 
out again at the lower end under a different name. 
The whole country between the Euphrates and the 
Hindiah becomes a vast lake at high water, most 
of which affords splendid seed- ground when the 
river falls. There are also more canals in working 
order here than on the Tigris side because irrigation 
is much simpler ; and generally speaking over the 
whole country hangs an air of prosperity which is 
seldom felt in Mesopotamia. Yet only a small 
fraction of the grain produced in the Hillah district 
finds its way to outside markets, because there is 
no adequate method of transport. A very small 
portion goes across to Bagdad on the backs of 
camels, mules, and donkeys, but that is an expensive 

N 



194 ON THE EUPHRATES 

means of locomotion and very restricted in capacity. 
A larger amount of excellent rice and barley and 
wheat of Hillah goes by native boats down the 
Euphrates to Basra. Here again the freight-charges 
interfere enormously with profits. In a bad year 
when the price of grain is high at Hillah and it 
hardly pays to export there is sure to be plenty 
of boat-space at about ios. a ton. In good years 
when there is a large surplus for export the boat- 
men cannot cope with the bulk and the charge 
is ^i a ton to Basra. Even this is a good deal 
cheaper than the river steamers charge from Bagdad, 
but it is subject to many drawbacks. The journey 
is a long and dangerous one. At best boats can get 
to Basra in ten days. Very often, and especially 
about the time of harvesting, the river has fallen and 
all traffic is stopped indefinitely. Furthermore it is 
impossible to ensure cargo by native craft because 
the first thing the Arab does when his boat gets 
aground or into any other difficulty is to throw 
everything incontinently overboard. It is the risk 
and the delay as well as the high freight-charge 
which make the grain trade of Hillah so uncertain and 
so much less profitable than it ought to be. If the 
district were tapped by railway not only would the 
charge to the coast be reduced 65. or 7s. a ton as a 
maximum, but the supply of tonnage would be 
practically inexhaustible, and the delay and the risk 
would be eliminated. 

It is hardly to be wondered at if the merchants of 
Hillah regard the future railway as a great boon in 
prospect. But why, I was constantly asked, are 



ON THE EUPHRATES 195 

Germans building the railway and not the British ? 
And why, the next question was, does not Great 
Britain or any other European Power take Mesopo- 
tamia and govern it ? The Hillah district has parti- 
cular reason to regret Turkish Government. It may 
not be generally known in Europe, but it is a fact 
that the Sultan draws an enormous private income 
from the grain -land on the Euphrates. Moreover, 
his private demesne is constantly increasing. To be 
a neighbour of one of his Majesty's representatives 
is to see your boundary-marks moved back year by 
year ; or else a forced sale is proclaimed in the 
Gazette. The sea of Nejef, which has recently 
dried up to a large extent, is of course a perquisite 
of the sovereign ; and it suits the Sultan very well 
to encourage the Euphrates in its vagaries, because 
where the face of the earth is altered year by year 
there can be little fixity of tenure, and in the 
consequent disputes regarding the ownership it is 
the Arab cultivator and not his master that goes to 
the wall. Again, while the Arab is taxed down to 
the last blade of grain and the last hair on the 
sheep's back, the Padishah is of course exempt from 
all burdens and can therefore sell his produce at cut- 
throat rates and reap all the profit of the market. 
It may be supposed then that the Arab does not 
desire to pray too fervently for the head of his 
religion. The cultivator's life is one long struggle 
with the tax-collector, and for all the money that 
goes into the State coifers and the Sultan's privy 
purse there is not a penny that comes back in the 
shape of public works. Even the soldiers are not paid. 



196 ON THE EUPHRATES 

Hillah happens to be the headquarters of a 
brigade of the Bagdad Army Corps, so there is no 
mistake about facts that are only too patent. The 
soldier is supposed to get 3s. \d. a month. He 
really gets 35. 4c?. in six months, and twice in the 
last two or three years even this payment has not 
been forthcoming. On one occasion the enraged 
soldiers sacked the shops as a sort of revenge. The 
shopkeepers went to the Wali, who simply said 
" What can I do ? You must go to the field- 
marshal for redress." Needless to say the field- 
marshal gave none. And again, when the Sultan 
was concentrating troops at Divaniyeh the other 
day on account of the Koweit aifair, all the camels, 
mules, and donkeys were requisitioned for transport 
purposes without any sort of payment. I am glad 
to say that before they got to Divaniyeh, which is 
two or three days' march from Hillah, most of the 
camels had bolted and left their unaccustomed 
riders with bruised limbs on the desert. Somehow 
about 9000 troops were concentrated at Divaniyeh, 
but how they were ever to march from there to 
Koweit not the field-marshal himself could say. 
Even with food and transport it is doubtful whether 
or not the Bagdad Army Corps recruited from the 
town Arabs, ill-paid and half-drilled, would in any 
way sustain the reputation of the Turkish Army. 
At all events the difficulty of concentrating 9000 
men at Divaniyeh, 200 miles from the coast and 
scene of action, must have convinced the Sultan 
of the absolute necessity of a railway for strategic 
purposes, 



ON THE EUPHRATES 197 

Of civil government in this part of Arabia, beyond 
the limits of the towns, there is absolutely none. As 
I was sitting on my Jewish host's verandah an Arab 
Sheikh had just been murdered in the fields by some 
men of a hostile tribe, and about an hour later we 
heard that the Sheikh of the hostile tribe and his 
daughter had both been shot dead by a man of the 
first tribe. Now, my host told me, there would be 
a feud necessitating at least a dozen murders on 
either side, until peace-makers should arise, and the 
side having made the highest "bag" in the mean- 
time would pay a certain sum of money by way of 
compensation at the rate of ^50 for each man shot 
in excess of the number killed by the other side. 
There is no real stand-up fighting in the whole 
business. Each death is compassed by taking the 
opponent at a disadvantage by a pot-shot from some 
safe place of concealment. It is cowardly, cold- 
blooded murder and nothing more. Yet the Turks 
do practically nothing to stop it. Every Arab you 
meet on the road has a gun or rifle slung over his 
shoulder. It used to be a long spear, but that 
weapon is almost entirely superseded now by the 
double-barrelled shot-gun which in turn is giving 
way to the Martini rifle, especially in the country 
nearer the coast. 

I sympathised with my friends in Hillah, but I 
was unable to hold out any hopes of the immediate 
annexation of Mesopotamia by Great Britain which 
they seemed rather naively to desire. The feeling is 
not at all confined to the Jews. Even the most 
rigid Mohammedan in these parts who has conversed 



198 ON THE EUPHRATES 

with the Islamites from India, who come to the 
shrines of Nejef and Kerbela, owns that there is one 
government in the East which is run in the interests 
of the people. 

My host, not content with entertaining me at 
Hillah, insisted on passing me on to his agents at 
Kifl and Nejef. For that I was sincerely thankful 
as there are no hostelries, in our sense of the word, 
in any of these Arab towns. My host also advised 
me to take a zaptieh with me, which I had omitted 
to do in leaving Bagdad, but as the local governor 
was not to be disturbed in his slumbers before nine 
o'clock in the morning, he gave me one of his own 
Arabs armed with the usual double-barrelled gun as 
a protector for the way. Not that the protector is 
really needed against attack since the Arabs rarely 
molest Europeans, but the mere fact of having an 
armed escort of even one man gives the traveller an 
added importance in the eyes of the natives and may 
save him a few annoyances. 

The ride from Hillah to Birs Nimrud which stands 
up as a great landmark between the Euphrates and 
the Hindiah Canal is accomplished easily in three 
hours or rather less. The reputed Tower of Babel 
is a conical mound with a tower-like ruin on the top, 
the whole standing nearly 500 feet above the 
plain, and therefore, the highest point of vantage 
within hundreds of miles. On the Eastern side is a 
lower and much more extensive mound which 
conceals the ruins of the ancient city which was 
attached to the curious shrine. The two mounds are 
separated by a depression which once doubtless held 





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ON THE EUPHRATES 199 

a broad canal. "Walking over the lower mound, 
which is covered with pottery of the later Moham- 
medan era, I came on the full view of Birs across 
the depression, with extensive excavations on the 
near side of the mass and a neat camp perched half 
way up the slope on a little shelf above the miasma 
of the Hindiah river and marshes. 

Here was Mr. Andre, who for weeks had lived 
at Birs superintending the excavations there and as 
hospitably disposed towards visitors as his colleagues 
at Babylon. He has already laid bare almost the 
whole of the temple which is hidden in the North 
East side of the mound and which exactly resembles 
in architecture the other temple built by Nebuchad- 
nezzar at Babylon. These all consist of open courts 
of no great dimensions with the " adita " or image 
chambers opening from them. There is generally a 
chief " aditon " large enough for a decent sized room 
with smaller chambers to right and left. Behind 
the chambers is a narrow passage where perhaps the 
priests of Baal went as we are elsewhere told to rob 
the sacrifices offered to the god. The temple at Birs 
is made of mud-brick with the usual burnt brick 
flooring over the courtyard ; Nebuchadnezzar 
evidently having believed that burnt brick through- 
out would be wasted on his gods. The walls have at 
some period been discoloured by fire. 

Behind the temple and now forming part of the 
same mound is the immense cube of brickwork 
which local tradition has identified with the Tower 
of Babel. Needless to say tradition, as it sometimes 
does, has here proved itself untrustworthy. It was 



200 ON THE EUPHRATES 

Nebuchadnezzar who built this strange pile, making 
it of unburnt brick with a thick case of burnt brick 
outside. The whole is pierced with air-shafts like 
pigeon holes, apparently for the purpose of drying 
the bricks. The tower-like remnant on the top is 
solid like the rest and forms part of the general 
mass, but whether or not the square sides were 
originally carried out to the top or whether the 
general aspect of the building was that of a pile of 
cubes getting smaller by steps towards the summit 
no one has yet decided. Nor have the German 
explorers as yet explained why Nebuchadnezzar 
built this great block of brickwork : for so far, at 
least, Nebuchadnezzar himself has thrown no light 
on the subject. He frequently speaks of the mass to 
which he gave a name as well as a local habitation, 
but the name conveys no meaning ; and all that the 
builder has said about it is that he built it well and 
strongly, the remark which he makes about all his 
works. On the top are masses of vitrified brick 
which some great fire has fused and melted and left 
harder than adamant. What the fire was no one 
knows except that the native belief that lightning did 
the work is obviously erroneous. I suggested that 
perhaps here the furnace was heated unto seven 
times for the faithful three who would not bow 
down to Nebuchadnezzar's graven image. But the 
men of science scorned such idle conjecture. Besides 
there is already a place in Babylon which the 
learned doctors show to all visiting clergymen as 
the scene of the ordeal of Shadrach, Meshach and 
Abednego. 



ON THE EUPHRATES 201 

The nature of the contents of the mound of Birs 
was vaguely known before the German expedition 
arrived on the scene. Sir Austen Layard had ex- 
tracted cylinders from one corner of the pile and 
Mr. Rassam had made extensive excavations un- 
covering part of the temple ; but he never lived on 
the mound to superintend the work and his results, 
from an architectural point of view, in no way com- 
pare with the discoveries of the business-like German 
expedition. Yet the endeavours of the Germans 
have only begun at Birs, so that a great deal of light 
may soon be shed on this strange piece of human 
handiwork before many months are over. In the 
meantime Mr. Andre* keeps lonely watch over his 
Arab workmen. If the romance of the locality has 
died out in the course of so many centuries his tiny 
camp has at least the advantage of being situated 
above any other in Mesopotamia and of commanding 
a view that can hardly be surpassed in this part of 
the world. North and south the waters of the 
Hindiah and the Euphrates have made great lakes 
on the surface of the desert, where ducks and geese 
and storks and pelicans abound. In the dry spaces 
the land is wonderfully green with the rich spring 
crops. To eastward a mass of date-trees marks the 
course of the Euphrates with the mound of Babel 
faintly visible on the horizon. To the west beyond 
the waters of the Hindiah a yellow belt of desert 
shows in strong contrast with the green of the 
irrigated lands out of which, just thirty miles away, 
the golden dome of Ali at Nejef shines like a pearl 
in the early morning. About the same distance to 



202 ON THE EUPHRATES 

northwards a starlike dome, catching the horizontal 
rays of the sun at its setting, tells where Kerbela 
lies hidden in a ring of well-watered date-gardens. 

Leaving Mr. Andre to the undisturbed enjoyment 
of this wide landscape, I rode on in the afternoon to 
Kin, which I reached an hour before sundown in 
time to admire the picturesque aspect of the little 
Jewish village which stands out like an island in 
the Hindiah marshes, well clothed with waving palm- 
leaves and conspicuous by reason of the broken 
minaret and tower which mark the tomb of Ezekiel. 
The Jews live in a group of courtyards built round 
the sacred structure, the whole being surrounded by 
a wall with only one gate in its extent, which is 
carefully locked by an Arab custodian each night at 
sundown in order that the Jews may not stray 
abroad. Most of the dwellings round the courtyards 
belong to the wealthy Jew in whose house I had 
stayed at Hillah. His agent received me at Kin 
and gave me a charming room overlooking the inner 
courtyard, where I found evening service going on in 
the synagogue adjoining the tomb. The synagogue 
did not seem to be large enough for the congregation, 
which overflowed into the courtyard and was com- 
posed of men and boys intoning with great fervour 
passages from the book of the prophet. The religious 
ardour, especially of the boys, did not prevent their 
raising their eyes in curiosity to the window where 
the unwonted appearance of a foreigner drew away 
attention from the matter in hand. The women, for 
some reason, did not take part in this evening service, 
but contented themselves with going about their 



ON THE EUPHRATES 203 

household avocations, which they fulfilled coram 
publico with the usual vociferation of the East. 
Some of them strolled across occasionally to converse 
with the worshippers, while two pretty damsels bare- 
faced in the literal sense joked with my stalwart 
Arab protector who had brought them letters perhaps 
from their swains in Hillah. 

It seemed like a pleasant family gathering, though 
in point of fact, there were several pilgrims from 
other lands present in the synagogue — one or two 
from distant parts of Persia and several from Jeru- 
salem and Damascus. Of religious intolerance there 
was absolutely none. The Moslem Arabs share with 
the Jews their respect for the buried prophet of the 
captivity, and when I went down later to the court- 
yard I was allowed free access to the synagogue and 
the tomb chamber which is just beyond. The Jews 
looked on me almost as a co-religionist and I was 
glad to observe that the pretty damsels before men- 
tioned did not deem it necessary to hide their pleasant 
features and silken gowns beneath the hideous black 
domino of the country as Moslem women would have 
done. It was with some regret that having aban- 
doned my horses and donkeys, I prepared next morning 
to set sail in an Arab boat from the pleaant Jewish 
community to Kufa and Nejef the homes of Moslem 
intolerance. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 

The journey from Kin to Kufa is most easily- 
accomplished by hiring a boat and going down the 
Hindiah with the current. I was unfortunate 
enough to encounter a tremendous dust storm, 
which prolonged to five hours a journey that might 
in favourable circumstances be covered in three. 

Kufa is an insignificant village on the site of the 
capital of the early Caliphs. It still possesses a 
mosque dedicated to the daughter of the Prophet, 
which has small pretensions to architectural beauty ; 
otherwise Kufa is remarkable only as being the 
river port for Nejef or Meshed Ali, as it is more 
popularly called. I had no difficulty in procuring 
four stout donkeys, and was able to start with- 
out delay for the quaint walled city in the desert, 
where Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, 
lies entombed. As soon as the bazaar of Kufa is 
passed and the mound of an ancient canal behind 
the town surmounted, the golden dome of Ali's 
mosque is largely visible in the centre of a square 
town with mud walls, which stands conspicuous 
about four miles away in the midst of the barren 
desert. Not a tree nor blade of grass detracts from 
the dead monotony of the plain. The only object 



THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 205 

that catches the eye between the canal mounds and 
the distant city is a rest-house in process of con- 
struction, which is being built, half way between 
Kufa and Nejef, by some pious Persian for weary 
pilgrims. Outside the walls the ground for hundreds 
of yards in every direction is a mass of small tombs, 
where the bones of fortunate Shiahs are laid to 
rest. To the south there are visible in the sands of 
the desert the foundations of a suburb that might 
have relieved the congestion of the city inside the 
walls if the plan had been carried out. For some 
reason or other the Sultan raised an objection, and 
permission is still withheld. 

The power of the central government is of a 
curious kind, as it cannot prevent constant murders 
within a mile or two of the headquarters of the 
brigade commander, but can effectually prohibit the 
building of a few houses in the open desert. 

Passing through a well-built gate of noble pro- 
portions, which would have done credit to a 
provincial capital in China, I came on a large 
open market-place, where the waggonettes were 
drawn up after their arrival from Kerbela. For 
nearly an hour we threaded our way in and out of 
the narrow streets leading oif the market-place 
until at last we discovered my Hillah friend's 
agent, a handsome Arab with a numerous progeny, 
who conducted me back to his rest-house near the 
gate, where his patron puts up when he visits 
Nejef. It was a neat little house built round a 
miniature courtyard, with its front on the market- 
place, but entirely devoid of windows, a peculiarity 



206 THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 

which I afterwards discovered to be of great 
service. 

As I had still an hour or two of daylight I sallied 
out with my trusty courier, a native Christian of 
Mosul, who on such occasions assumes the language, 
garb, and manners of the most truculent Moham- 
medan, and proceeded down the main street of the 
bazaar, packed almost to the suffocating point at 
this season of pilgrimage, in order to look in at the 
gate of the golden mosque. We had almost reached 
the great outer courtyard when a Turkish zaptieh 
(policeman) brushed through the crowd, and began 
in a hectoring way to abuse my courier for allowing 
a Feringhi to walk through the bazaar without 
police escort. Up to that moment we had not 
attracted the slightest attention. Indeed, during 
the previous hour, when we had been looking for 
the agent's house, I might have been an Arab or a 
Persian for all the curiosity I excited. Now, how- 
ever, everything was changed. The loud tones of 
the zaptieh, and his insolent attitude, immediately 
drew round us all the boys of the bazaar and the 
lewd fellows of the baser sort, and since the zaptieh 
was for taking me at once to the Kaimakam (local 
Governor) there was no way to avoid a row or loss 
of dignity except to be beforehand with him, and 
hale him before the Kaimakam on the charge of 
creating a public riot. 

The Kaimakan, whose house was at no great 
distance, was profuse in his offers of help and 
hospitality. But I found it difficult through my 
courier, whose valour rather waned in the presence 



THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 207 

of authority, to express my indignation at the be- 
haviour of the zaptieh. I ended by extracting a 
sort of promise that the man would be punished, on 
which I put little reliance, since he sat down with 
perfect ease in the Kaimakam's presence, and gave 
a much more fluent version of the story than my 
servant. I was then given two aged and decrepit 
Turks in a sort of uniform, without swords or other 
distinguishing weapons, to escort me round the 
bazaar. 

In the meantime the passions of the mob had been 
duly aroused by a period of waiting outside the 
Kaimakam's house, and I was received with a 
regular howl of derision, which swelled into a roar 
as we proceeded towards the mosque, and were 
jostled past the gate with hardly a chance of 
admiring even the fine gold-decorated archway. 
As we turned back towards my lodgings we passed 
through more open side streets where bricks were 
handy, and the air was soon full of badly directed 
missiles. The aged zaptiehs did nothing at all to 
stop the riot beyond occasionally pouncing on the 
smallest and most innocent boy available, and 
beating him soundly, a course which naturally 
added to the fury of the pack. Keeping ahead of 
the throng, which fortunately was rather impotent 
in the narrow ways of the bazaar, we managed 
without quickening pace to an undignified extent to 
reach the market-place, and enter the courtyard of 
the rest-house, with nothing more serious than a 
little brick dust on our coats to show for the one- 
sided encounter. The zaptiehs also took refuge in 



208 THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 

the house, bolting the door securely, and taking 
advantage of the fact that there were no windows, 
which indeed was a great blessing, as by this time 
the market-place was full, and my appearance on 
the roof with a camera was greeted with such 
volleys of stones at close quarters as to put photo- 
graphy out of the question. 

Since the crowd was causing serious inconvenience 
to my host, some of whose family were in the rest- 
house and could not get out again, I insisted on one 
of the guardians of the peace who had taken refuge 
with me going at once to the chief of the police, 
since the Kaimakam was obviously of little use, and 
bringing him to me. By this time it was nearly dark 
and the crowd had begun to disperse, so that the old 
zaptieh could go without much danger. He went, 
and finally returned with a genial old Turk, who was 
introduced as head zaptieh. From him I learned 
that, as I had expected, the Kaimakam had not 
punished the man who was responsible for all the 
noise in the first place, and had no intention of doing 
so. I therefore threatened reprisals when I returned 
to Bagdad ; which caused some dismay, as Turkish 
officials do not like reports being made against them 
by foreigners. Finally, a compromise was effected 
by the guilty zaptieh being sent for and being forced 
to apologise and promise that the next time he saw a 
foreigner walking quietly down the street he would 
not molest him with his attentions. 

I mention the incident because it is characteristic 
of the Turk and the Mussulman. It is commonly 
stated that the Shiah Mohammedans who go to visit 



THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 209 

Kerbela and Nejef are desperately fanatical and 
abusive towards strangers. My own experience was 
that, travelling at the very height of the pilgrim 
season, I never once met with anything but courtesy 
at the hands of the pious Mohammedans either in 
the towns, in the roadside inns, or on the desert 
itself. For a whole hour I had wandered about the 
streets of Nejef without attracting as much atten- 
tion as a European generally does in the bazaars of 
Bombay or Calcutta. It was only after the zaptieh 
began addressing me in an insolent and excited way 
that a mob of boys and loafers assembled, and the 
hue and cry once raised nothing short of a cavalry 
charge could stop it. But this has nothing to do 
with religious fanaticism, as it is exactly what would 
occur in any large town in Europe or America if the 
idlers of the street saw the police treating a strange- 
looking foreigner like a rogue and a thief, and knew 
that they could hunt the outlandish person with 
impunity. The action of the zaptieh is very 
intelligible. He raises a row in order to extract 
" bakshish " for quelling it, and it hurts his profes- 
sional pride to see a foreigner going about without 
an escort, for that is deliberately to spoil trade. If 
there were no foreigners to escort about Mesopotamia 
the zaptiehs would never earn a living at all, and it 
does not suit the police to see a Feringhi evading 
the payment of" bakshish." Not that the foreigner 
objects to paying the customary toll in the least. 
Only it is much more pleasant to move about 
without the help of a useless escort, who thinks to 
add to his importance by belabouring small boys and 



210 THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 

playing the bully generally. Still, since the zaptieh 
is sure to pounce on the stray foreigner in an Arab 
town and make trouble for him — I had a similar 
experience at Amarah, on the Tigris — there is 
nothing for it but to acquiesce in the custom 
and take a zaptieh to begin with as the lesser of 
two ills. 

I cannot say that I was altogether sorry to leave 
Nejef by waggonette early next morning. To be 
treated like a pariah and outcast is not pleasant, 
even when your assailants are merely ignorant 
boys. Besides, my presence must have been to 
some degree disconcerting to my Arab host, who 
showed me the greatest kindness and hospitality. 

I have already said that the old sea of Nejef is 
partly dried up — though it is never safe to make 
positive statements about the waters of these parts, 
which change from year to year. At all events 
a large portion of the sea is now arable land, and 
Nejef may almost be said to be situated in a grain - 
district where before were only barren desert and 
salt marsh. 

It is quite impossible to say what the population 
of the town may be, since the figures given to me 
varied in true Arab fashion. The ever- changing, 
floating population of pilgrims interferes consider- 
ably with exact calculations. Thirty thousand 
is a moderate estimate, while at times there may 
be as many as 20,000 pilgrims within the walls. 

Nejef is not merely important as the last resting- 
place of the sainted Ali, but it serves as a starting- 
point for a pilgrim route across the desert to Mecca, 



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and the advent of a railway connecting the town 
with the boundary of Persia would give an enormous 
stimulus to the pilgrim traffic. At Nejef one is on 
the route of the railway which comes from Bagdad 
across the Euphrates to Kerbela. Thence forty 
miles or a little more brings the line to Nejef across 
the desert. After Nejef the railway taps the grain- 
district of the Hindiah-Euphrates Doab at Kufa or 
another point further south, and then makes the 
best of its way to Zobeir and Basra and the Gulf. 
At this time of the year there is a constant flow of 
traffic between Kerbela and Nejef, though it falls 
far short of the immense stream between Bagdad 
and Kerbela. In order to avoid guesswork, I took 
the trouble to count the passengers on foot, and on 
mules or donkeys or horses, who passed us on the 
way to Nejef, and my total had already exceeded 
600 human beings with treble the number of beasts 
before darkness stopped the count. This did not 
include the inmates of the covered waggonettes, 
which run daily in each direction. The ordinary 
number of these waggonettes is eight each way, each 
vehicle — which is called an " arabana " — carrying 
eight passengers. 

Just now the horses are out at grass, and the 
number of arabana is cut down to four each way, 
though it is precisely the season for making a profit. 
As a rule the European can get a whole arabana for 
his own use by paying about 305. This I found to 
be quite impossible owing to the limited number of 
horses and mules available, and I was constrained to 
travel with seven other passengers in a space eight 



212 THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 

feet by four, into which our baggage had also to be 
taken. Fortunately the mules and horses, which 
we changed three times on the way, were so dead 
beat that it was possible to walk nearly the whole 
way, otherwise the journey to a European, who 
cannot adapt himself to cramped positions like the 
Arab or the Persian, would have been intolerable. 
As it was, when we saw at last the domes and 
minarets of Kerbela floating in the evening haze at 
the far end of the long lake which runs parallel 
to the route I felt inclined to utter the fervent " Ya 
Hussein " of the devout Shiah. 

We had been going ever since an hour before 
daybreak, and the track, which winds along the 
edge of the marsh in order to keep on the hard sand 
just between the desert and the water, cannot 
exceed fifty miles at the outside. Yet, when the 
sun set, we still had two hours of painful flogging 
through the darkness, guided by the rings of flame 
round the great domes of Hussein and Abbas, until 
we came on a labyrinth of canals and date-gardens 
and an enormous graveyard with dim lights among 
the habitations of the dead, and we knew that we 
were close to the Sacred City. Passing through 
a tumble -down gateway in a ruined wall we found 
ourselves in wide busy streets, where I recognised 
so many Indian faces in the little shops which were 
still open that one might have fancied oneself in the 
outskirts of Bombay or Delhi. In one direction was 
heard the wild music of a Turkish military band, in 
another the chant of a belated pilgrim caravan was 
distinct above the uproar of the bazaar, while in 



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THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 213 

front of us loomed the lights of a big market-place 
where the babble of voices and the thronged benches 
of the coifee shops, the Eastern counterpart of the 
French cafes, with their seats out on the public 
street, showed clearly that the Kerbela season was 
in full swing. 

The arabana pulled up in front of a hostelry with 
a wonderful picture of a waggonette and horses over 
the door. Here I found a kavass from the British 
Agency awaiting me, and in five more minutes I 
was in a pleasant apartment of the house of the 
India Nawab who looks after the British Indian 
subjects in the city of Hussein. Next morning 
I found most of the distinguished people of the 
place had come to call on me, including the Turkish 
Governor, the judge, and the head Mullah. I would 
have given anything for a good interpreter in order 
to converse with all these interesting people, who 
spoke no European language. As it was I had 
to get along as best as I could with my Christian 
servant, whose English was limited and not at all 
adapted to the discussion of high politics. 

The Turkish Governor wanted to know whether 
or not there was any trouble still in Indian waters — 
by which I suppose he meant to refer to the Koweit 
affair — and then all turned with eagerness to the 
railway question. I was assured that Kerbela had 
grown wonderfully in recent years and that it only 
needed railway connections to make it the most 
flourishing city of Mesopotamia, which, indeed, 
may be true, since the stream of pilgrims from 
Persia and India is growing to huge proportions. 



214 THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 

The general impression was that the German 
Government was building the railway, and it was 
quite beyond the ability of any interpreter to upset 
this conviction. 

After the reception I was able to spend some 
hours in the bazaar, and gaze, without attracting 
any attention, into the great courtyards of the 
mosques of Hussein and Abbas. It is difficult to get 
a general idea of these buildings, because the bazaar 
is built round their outer walls, and one comes on 
entrances in various parts of the bazaar rather like 
the different doors of the Stock Exchange. No one 
interferes with the foreigner as long as he does not 
actually enter the courtyard, but it is difficult to see 
very distinctly owing to the crowd of worshippers, 
money exchangers, pedlars and sightseers who 
throng to the shrines. The best view is from the 
roof of a neighbouring house when one has leisure 
to admire the gilded dome and minarets of Hussein 
and the enamelled dome of Abbas. The minarets of 
the Abbas are just being regilded by some pious 
Persian Shiah, so that they shine above the date- 
trees like twin stars. I am not sure, however, that 
I do not prefer the beautiful blues and pinks of the 
enamelled arabesque more than the glittering gold. 
There are several minor mosques in Kerbela and one 
Sunni shrine hidden away in a corner, with a tiled 
minaret, which would attract attention in any less 
wealthy city. 

There are two thousand Indian subjects in Ker- 
bela, so that my host the Nawab, who has never 
himself, I believe, been in India, but is a devoted 



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THE SACRED CITIES OF THE SHIAHS 215 

adherent of the Sirkar, has a good deal of work on 
his hands. The Indians are, however, well treated 
and give very little trouble. The pilgrims who 
visited Kerbela last year, he told me, exceeded 
100,000, which I can well believe, as I passed 
over 2000 as I drove next morning from Kerbela 
to Mosseyib and Sikandera, the next resting-place 
on the Bagdad road. Indeed, the whole route 
from Kerbela to Bagdad presented the appear- 
ance of the trail of a great army which has thou- 
sands of camp-followers in its train. They were 
nearly all Persians, but of every rank — some on 
foot, the majority on tired mules or donkeys, and 
a number in the basket-like deckhouses which 
they built out on both sides of the patient beast 
of burden. Once a Nawab of Bagdad passed me 
riding in top-boots, with his family in a glass case 
behind him slung between two mules. Later on a 
son-in-law of the reigning Shah drove past in a 
tarantass, the only wheeled vehicle on the road 
except the arabana. Altogether it was a strange 
motley throng marching through miles of sand and 
mud to where Hussein laid down his life for Islam on 
the banks of the Euphrates. The coffins alone, slung in 
couples over the mules' backs, are sufficient in number 
to make a Bagdad -Kerbela railway a paying enter- 
prise ; while the general aspect of the route would 
put the most sanguine hopes into the breast of a 
shareholder in the Anatolian Railway Company. 



CHAPTER XV 

BAGDAD 

It is hardly necessary to give any description of 
Bagdad, which has long been on the regular route 
of globe-trotters between Eastern Europe and India. 
The great city of the Abbasside Caliphs is now 
merely a commercial centre with a few notable 
shrines, such as that of Kazimain, in the neighbour- 
hood, and I prefer to deal with it shortly in its rela- 
tion to the advent of the new railway which is to 
revolutionise Mesopotamia. 

The community of European merchants is not 
at first sight imposing in point of numbers. The 
Bagdad branch of Messrs. Ilotz and Co. easily comes 
first among the British firms, and is followed by 
the trading-house of Messrs. Lynch — which is a 
separate concern from the steamer company — and 
Messrs. Sassoon. There is one German firm doing a 
considerable trade, and when that is mentioned there 
is little left with which to reckon. Still, there is an im- 
posing array of foreign consuls, which seems to point 
out that foreign nations have at least a prospective 
claim on the prosperity of Bagdad. The Russians 
have a Consul- General for political purposes only, 
since trade they have none. The German house has 
a full-blown consul to look after its interests : 



BAGDAD 217 

Austria -Hungary is represented by an official of wide 
experience and still wider popularity ; the three 
French subjects have a vice-consul to protect them 
against aggression ; America has a consular agent ; 
and last, but not least, Great Britain has a Consul- 
General and Political Resident, whose work is 
far from being a sinecure, seeing that there are 
2000 Indians in Kerbela alone, and a large 
number in Kazimain, close to Bagdad, while of the 
foreign trade of Bagdad between 60 and 70 per cent, 
concerns Great Britain and India. There is the 
usual foreign club, started by the British in the 
grounds of the British Residency. Cricket, golf, 
tennis, and billiards may be enjoyed in due season, 
and the climate is such that a European can thrive 
in it, as in March the wind is so bitterly cold that a 
fire is a cheerful necessity. Bain fell at frequent 
intervals throughout my stay, and during my tour 
through Hillah, Nejef, and Kerbela there was never 
a day when it was not more pleasant to be moving 
about out of doors than sitting in the shade. In 
summer the thermometer goes up to 12 6° Fahr., 
and the inhabitants descend by day to their cellars 
half beneath the ground, but the heat is nearly 
always dry, and the nights spent on the house- 
tops are said to be delightful. The one great 
drawback from a sanitary point of view is the 
disease which is politely called the bouton de Bag- 
dad, which visits all and sundry, leaving a lifelong 
scar on face or hand or foot. In other respects, con- 
sidering the crowded state of the bazaars and the 
usual habits of the people, Bagdad may be said to 



218 BAGDAD 

be an exceedingly healthy and almost invigorating 
place. 

Of course, as a trade-centre, Bagdad depends 
largely on the transit trade with Persia. The 
Kermanshah route is the easiest of all the ascents 
to the Persian plateau, and the cheapest. Hence 
Bagdad supplies all the Kermanshah district, 
including Burujird and Sultanabad, and meets on 
equal terms the northern current of trade at 
Hamadan. In Mesopotamia it supplies the wealthy 
towns of Kerbela, Hillah, and Nejef, taps the'grain- 
district of Kerkuk and the wool-growing slopes of 
the Kurdish hills, and meets at Mosul the stream 
of the import trade of Aleppo. In describing my 
journey to Hillah, Nejef, and Kerbela I have already 
pointed out what a boon a railway would be to 
these places. It requires no demonstration to 
prove that the pilgrim traffic alone would make a 
railway from Bagdad to Kerbela and Nejef a paying 
institution. 

The inroad of pilgrims goes on during six months 
of the year, and is attended with great hardships 
and considerable expense, in both money and time, 
which even to a Persian must occasionally be valu- 
able. Already the number given for last year reaches 
a total of ioo,ooo. It is easy to suppose that the 
figures would be doubled, and perhaps trebled, in 
a short time if the journey from the Persian border 
to Kerbela cost a few pence instead of a few pounds, 
and occupied as many hours as it now does days. 
The example of the little tramway from Bagdad to 
the shrine at Kazimain, which has proved to be a 




^■fcfr' 



BAGDAD 219 

perfect mint of money for the shareholders, is enough 
to show what might be done on a larger scale to 
Kerbela. The extension to Nejef might not be 
quite so lucrative, but as the construction would 
cost comparatively little, it could hardly fail to 
bring in adequate returns. Nejef is nearly one-third 
of the distance between Bagdad and the coast, and 
the receipts on the shorter portion would leave some 
margin for loss on the longer part. 

But there is no reason to suppose that the longer 
part would prove a failure. I have shown how 
impossible it is to convey the grain of the Hillah 
district to the coast without risk, delay, and ex- 
pense, which take away all the profit of the trade. 
A railway run in the interests of the agriculturists 
would find the carrying of grain to the coast a large 
item in the receipts, as the freight would be reduced 
to not more than a third of the present rates, while 
the risk would be entirely eliminated. Moreover, 
the cost of building such a railway, skirting the 
marshes and keeping out of the way of the floods 
would certainly not be prohibitive. It is diffi- 
cult to see, therefore, with the combination of 
the pilgrim traffic and the grain-trade, why a 
Bagdad-Basra or Bagdad-Koweit line should not pay 
its way. 

But the through trade of Bagdad has still to be 
taken into consideration. What that trade is no 
one can exactly say, for the figures in the consular 
report are based only on the cargo carried by the 
steamers of Messrs. Lynch Bros. Even so, there is 
an import trade shown for 1900 of ,£1,372,544, a 



220 BAGDAD 

figure which is far short of the real total when the 
Turkish steamers and the native craft are taken into 
consideration. I am assured by merchants of Bagdad 
that there is room for almost indefinite expansion in 
this trade whenever better means of communication 
with the coast are opened up. 

Now it is usually argued that railways cannot 
compete with waterways, an argument which is so 
misleading as to be positively untruthful in such 
cases as the present. When the waterway is a 
tortuous river, with a strong current which traverses 
500 miles where a railway would go 300, when its 
channel is uncertain and at particular periods of the 
year unnavigable, and when at best the steamers 
plying to and fro cannot safely draw more than 5 ft. 
or 6 ft., then the presumption is that the advantage 
would be all with the railway. But when the 
river is handicapped by regulations which prevent 
the development of carrying capacity so that the 
utmost tonnage of the steamers is reduced to a 
few hundred tons per week, much less than the 
railway could carry in a day, then the presumption 
in favour of the railway becomes a certainty. 

A very simple calculation will show the truth of 
the foregoing argument. The average freight charge 
from Basra to Bagdad is not less than 365. a ton. A 
railway could deliver goods in Bagdad at the rate of 
1 2S. a ton. It may be argued that the river steamers 
could lower their rates to meet the competition, but 
one can hardly believe that they could lower them 
from 36s. to 125. and still make a profit. It would 
be difficult indeed to overestimate the advantages 



BAGDAD 221 

which would accrue to the trade of Bagdad by 
breaking down the steamer monopoly. For it is not 
merely the enormous freight-charges that at present 
hamper import, but the delay in delivery is most 
exasperating. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
goods are as often six months on the way from 
London to Bagdad as not, and the delay is all 
caused by the congestion at Basra. Of course, 
native boats can be hired, and are hired, at greatly 
reduced rates, but the uncertainty and risk of this 
means of transport are so great that insurance com- 
panies refuse to insure the goods. With a railway 
merchants would be able to guarantee quick and 
safe delivery, and they would suffer no such losses 
from fluctuations in prices as they do now. The 
result would be that Bagdad goods which hold their 
own only at Hamadan, against the imports by way 
of Tabriz or Teheran and Resht, would in all 
probability drive the rival goods out of the market, 
and Bagdad might even aspire to supply Teheran 
with Manchester cottons. 

It is not merely in the transit trade that the 
merchants feel the want of cheap transport. Nearly 
all local improvements at Bagdad are checked by 
the enormous price of fuel. Foreigners use English 
coal, which can be brought up only by steamer from 
Basra at the rate of nearly £2 & ton, which adds 
considerably to the original price of the article. 
Natives use wood, which is even more expensive in 
the long run owing to the scarcity of trees in 
Mesopotamia. The consequence is that no works can 
be started which require artificial power, and they 



%n BAGDAD 

never will be started in Bagdad until some way 
of importing cheap fuel is discovered. 

Taking everything into consideration, then, a 
railway between Bagdad and the coast has every- 
thing in its favour as a means of fulfilling the 
proverbial long-felt want. The difficulties of 
construction are very small beyond the necessity 
of avoiding the inundations of the unruly Euphrates, 
and even that obstacle could be removed by a 
drastic system of waterworks and irrigation which 
almost any other Government than the Turkish 
would have undertaken long ago. That the 
Turkish Government will attempt anything of the 
sort now is hardly to be hoped, but the railway 
company should find no great difficulty in securing 
permission to undertake such works as will be 
necessary for the conservation of the railway em- 
bankment. 

It is sometimes objected that the lack of cheap 
labour will prove a serious stumbling-block. I could 
find no confirmation of this view in any quarter that 
I visited. The experience of the German explorers 
is just the reverse. They can get all the labour they 
want at 6d. a day, and they find the Arab not at all 
intractable. The fact is that the Arab, like most 
Eastern natives, thinks of almost nothing beyond food 
and money, and the idea of getting regular pay at 
good rates is one that should attract him greatly. Of 
course, he is not a European labourer, but there is no 
reason to suppose that he will prove inferior to 
the Indian coolie whom he certainly surpasses in 
physique ; nor will the building of a railway in 



BAGDAD 

the desert be subject to such long spells of heat and 
rain as is customary in the experience of railway 
builders in India. 

It is to be presumed that the railway company 
will begin building in both directions from Bagdad. 
The line to the north, according to the latest informa- 
tion, runs between Mosul and Bagdad along the 
right bank of the Tigris vid Tekrit. This, in the 
view of the Bagdad merchants, is a mistake, because 
it would be more profitable to cross to the left bank 
and take in the grain-producing district of Kerkuk. 
However this may be, there seems to be no such 
prospect of immediate success for the railway north 
of Bagdad such as there is to the southward, and 
it is curious that the railway scheme has always 
been spoken of as the Bagdad Railway, as if the 
extension to the Gulf were an afterthought and of 
little importance. In reality this extension, from a 
commercial point of view, is, in fact, by far the more 
valuable part of the whole scheme, and the part 
which promises immediate returns. That a conces- 
sion for that part of the railway at least should not 
have been secured by a British company is a deplor- 
able mistake, due almost without a doubt to the fact 
that a Mesopotamian railway has always been 
regarded by British travellers and British writers 
merely as a link in a possible continental route to 
India. Many writers, including such far-seeing men 
as Lord Ourzon, and more recently Lord Percy, have 
endeavoured to show that such an overland route to 
India is an idle dream, and, therefore, the idea of a 
Mesopotamian railway is not worth considering. 



224 BAGDAD 

Why the railway should not have been considered on 
its own merits it is difficult to see. 

As things stand the part between the Gulf and 
Bagdad appears to have every chance of proving 
both useful and remunerative. The country through 
which the line passes is slowly increasing in pros- 
perity, and under good government would become one 
of the richest agricultural districts in the world. But 
the point is that even under existing conditions it is 
not growing poorer, but richer. I have shown in a pre- 
vious chapter that the irrigation of Mesopotamia was 
never at any one time much greater or more exten- 
sive than it is to-day, and even under the Turks the 
area under irrigation increases rather than decreases. 
The drawback to the development of the country is 
the lack of roads and railways, but especially of 
railways. In the old days grain from Hillah could 
compete in the markets of the world ; but now 
that prices have fallen so much Hillah grain must 
rot on the ground until some method is devised of 
bringing it to market. A railway is the only solu-' 
tion. Supposing, however, that another form of 
government were set up in Turkish Arabia, and 
irrigation works were undertaken on a great scale, 
and the inhabitants of the country were encouraged 
to till the land instead of being discouraged in every 
way by the tax-collector, then Mesopotamia might 
become as rich and as populous as the Valley of the 
Ganges in proportion to its area. It is a mistake, 
however, to believe that such a state of things ever 
existed, even under Babylonian kings, or that it ever 
will exist under Turkish sultans. We have to go on 



BAGDAD 225 

existing data. Given even the present amount of 
prosperity, I maintain that lower Mesopotamia can 
very well support a railway, and it is a great pity 
that a German company and not a British one means 
to build it. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 

It may not be out of place at this point to jump for 
a moment to the Gulf of Alexandretta, where the 
advent of the Bagdad Railway produces a problem 
somewhat analogous to that which has arisen in the 
Gulf. Nor will it be a waste of time to describe 
briefly the route by which the railway will eventu- 
ally achieve the passage of the Taurus. 

The country through which the Bagdad Railway 
passes on its way from the Bosphorus to the Persian 
Gulf may be divided into two parts, the Anatolian 
plateau and the Mesopotamian plain. Unfortunately 
for the railway builder, it is impossible to go from 
the plateau to the plain without surmounting or 
piercing the great mountain range which acts as a 
buttress for the plateau and a ring fence for the 
plain. Whatever alignment the Anatolian railway 
syndicate might have chosen — and many were dis- 
cussed — the Taurus must still have blocked the 
way ; so it seems fitting that the route eventually 
chosen should be that which has been traversed 
from time immemorial by invaders from the east 
and by invaders from the west, as well as by the 
humbler traveller and merchant. This is the route 
which, skirting the western edge of the plateau of 



THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 227 

Asia Minor, seems always to be seeking a gap in the 
solid bulwark of the Bulgar Dagh until it hits on 
the ravine of the Chakit-su. Following that stream 
for a short distance, it turns the flank of the main 
range, and pierces a second ridge by means of the 
gorge known from Boman times as the Cilician 
Gates, and so debouches on the smiling Cilician 
plain just a few miles north of St. Paul's city of 
Tarsus. The descent from the plateau having been 
thus accomplished, there is still a serious obstacle to 
be overcome in the shape of the Giaour Dagh or 
Mount Amanus, which throws up a mighty barrier 
between the tiny Cilician plain and the huge, arid 
basin of the twin rivers of Mesopotamia. But from 
an engineering point of view, the Giaour Dagh does 
not present the difficulties which have to be dealt 
with in the passage of the Taurus. It is to the 
Taurus that one naturally turns as the great feature 
of the future railway. 

There are no hindrances to travel in this part of 
the Sultan's dominions. On the contrary, the 
journey from Tarsus up to Konia is so simple an 
affair that it may safely be recommended to all 
tourists who have a taste for grand mountain 
scenery, and an open-air life. The security with 
which one travels in Cicilia and Karamania must be 
attributed in part to the excellent influence of the 
British Consul resident at Mersina, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Massy, whose recommendation will open the 
door of any official dwelling-place in the country, and 
ensure ample official protection. Colonel Massy had 
just set out for his summer place in the hills above 



228 THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 

Mersina when I landed at that port, and I was glad 
to escape from the midsummer heat of the plain to 
the cool village of Gheuzni, which serves as hill 
station for the foreign consuls and richer merchants 
of Mersina. Four hours on horseback up a small 
mountain track ought to bring the traveller to the 
primitive little nest in the wooded foot-hills of the 
Taurus. In my own case a much longer time was 
necessary, owing to the fact that my Greek guide, 
who was hired in Mersina, had been over the track 
only once before. He lost his way just as darkness 
was coming on. We adopted, as I discovered after- 
wards, the identical footpath by which the Light 
Cavalry of Cyrus, guided by a treacherous woman, 
made its way through the mountain range, and took 
the Persian Army in the rear, while it was waiting 
to repel the Ten Thousand in what the Chinese 
would call " proper fashion " at the Cilician Gates. 
Fortunately we were prevented from pursuing our 
historical researches to the farther side of the 
Taurus, by meeting a friendly native, who turned 
us round and put us on the right track to Gheuzni. 
I found Colonel Massy a thorough enthusiast con- 
cerning the future of Asia Minor, and especially the 
region of the Taurus. Certainly there is no more 
enlightened ruler in Turkey, and none who has done 
more for the public welfare than Ferid Pasha, the 
late Wali of Konia, whose jurisdiction went half 
way through the Taurus ; while the old Kurd who 
rules over the Adana Vilayet, if he has no such 
public spirit as his colleague on the other side of 
the mountains, has at least a wholesome regard for 




THE CILICIAN GATES 




ROAD THROUGH THE TAURUS 



THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 

the British Consul. Perhaps a life spent largely 
in exploring one of the most beautiful mountain 
ranges in the world is conducive to a healthy and 
optimistic view of one's surroundings. However 
that may be, it is cheering to come across an 
optimist in Turkey, and Colonel Massy's opinion 
must be put in the scale against that of most 
foreigners, who can believe no good of Turkish 
officialdom, and can see nothing but ruin and decay 
in prospect for Turkey. 

It must be admitted that the little province of 
Cilicia is, in comparison with most parts of Asiatic 
Turkey, a progressive and prosperous country. 
Cotton growing and spinning have been developed 
in recent years to a large extent. Wheat is now 
cultivated on a large scale, and no less than sixty 
American reapers have gone into Mersina in the 
last year. The little railway of forty-one miles 
from Mersina to Adana is now more than paying 
its expenses after a long period of steady loss. 
There is even, as a token of the higher civilisation, 
an ice-factory in Tarsus, which makes a profit on 
the invested capital of 50 per cent. But much 
requires to be done to develop the resources of this 
singularly favoured region. Last year, for instance, 
75 per cent, of the cotton crop was" lost' for want of 
water, though there never was an easier country to 
irrigate. But it would cost, perhaps, ,£100,000 to 
organise a good scheme of irrigation, and who is 
going to invest such a sum ? 

Then, again, in the still more distant future, 
there are mineral resources to be developed which 



230 THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 

would add enormously to the riches of the province. 
There is copper ore, of which over 50 per cent, is 
pure metal, within a few miles of the sea-board, 
there are rich manganese, and chrome, and silver, 
and coal of fair quality all waiting to be exploited. 
Altogether there is a field for the capitalist in 
Cilicia, as long as he is not afraid to invest his 
money under local auspices. There is no lack of 
information on the point if the investor will read 
the excellent reports issued by the British Consulate 
at Mersina. 

At the time of my visit I was chiefly concerned 
about the prospects of the Bagdad railway in Cilicia, 
and no one could be more helpful in this respect 
than the British Consul, who knows nearly every 
yard of the triangular province between the Taurus 
and Mount Amanus and the Gulf of Alexandretta. 

It will be remembered that the terms of the irade 
allow the Anatolian Railway Company to connect 
Adana with the sea by a short railway, to be used 
only for the carriage of material. Now a glance at 
the map will show that Adana is already connected 
with the sea by the railway of forty-one miles, which 
joins the capital of the province to the port of 
Mersina. Mersina is certainly not the nearest point 
on the water to Adana, or to the route of the railway, 
as it passes across the Cilician plain. But, after all, the 
distance is so short in any case that it seems foolish 
to build a new branch line to the coast when 
there is a perfectly good one already in existence. 
It might be argued, of course, that Mersina is only 
an open roadstead and ill adapted to the landing of 



THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 231 

material. But this would be equally the case any- 
where on the Gulf of Alexandretta with the excep- 
tion of Alexandretta itself, which the Sultan will not 
hand over to the railway syndicate. The two places 
mentioned as probable sites for the railway harbour 
are Ayas and Youmourtalik, both on the little bay of 
Ayas on the north side of the gulf. But neither 
place is at all suitable for a port, since the landing is 
extremely shallow, and the silt of the river Djihun 
is a constant source of trouble. At both places there 
is a serious lack of fresh water, since the great aque- 
duct which used to bring water from the Giaour 
Dagh has long ceased to perform its functions. 
Possibly it might be rather cheaper to make a 
harbour at Youmourtalik than to throw out break- 
waters at Mersina, but when there is already a rail- 
way at Mersina there can be no possible advantage 
from a business point of view in selecting a new site. 
The German syndicate may have been influenced by 
one of two considerations, or perhaps by both, when 
they applied for the right to establish a new port on 
the Gulf of Alexandretta. First of all, the declara- 
tion of their intention would tend to lower the value 
of the stock of the Mersina- Adana Railway which 
could not stand any competition, and so the German 
syndicate would be able more cheaply to buy a con- 
trolling interest in that line, of whose stock they are 
said to possess already about one-third. Or there 
may be a political interest, above and beyond the 
mercantile advantages, to be gained by establishing 
a private port on the Gulf of Alexandretta. 

According to the irade of January 1902, the 



THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 

branch line and port which the German syndicate is 
empowered to make may only be used for the purpose 
of landing material while the line is in process of 
construction, and is not to be regarded as a perma- 
nent concession. But this is not the view taken by 
the members of the syndicate, who openly avow their 
intention of creating a harbour for the export of 
grain entirely controlled by the railway company, 
which would own the grain elevators, warehouses, 
and wharves. It is, indeed, essential for the 
prosperity of the country that there should be a 
place of export for all the grain grown south of the 
Taurus as well as a great deal that is grown north 
of the mountains about Eregli and Nigde. The 
Turkish Government wants all merchandise to be 
brought up to Constantinople, but it would obviously 
be killing the goose with the golden eggs to insist 
on carrying wheat all the way from Eregli to 
Haidar Pasha when it could be brought over a much 
shorter distance to the Gulf of Alexandretta 

From the point of view of the general public, 
Turkish and foreign, it is much better to have an 
open port at Mersina than a purely German harbour 
at some other point on the gulf; and judging by 
past experience a harbour which was controlled by 
a German syndicate might in a short time come 
under the protection of the German Government. 
It is only a minor objection that Ay as or Youmour- 
talik is at present a convenient anchorage for our 
Mediterranean Fleet. The main thing that we have 
to prevent in our own interests, and in the interest 
perhaps of Turkey as well, is the establishment of 



THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 

an exclusively German port on the Gulf of Alexan- 
dretta. Our action with regard to Koweit has 
already had the result of throwing cold water on 
German ambitions in the direction of the Persian 
Gulf, and one can hardly help drawing the conclusion 
from recent events that our Government has put 
obstructions in the way of the German syndicate 
carrying out its intentions on the Gulf of Alexan- 
dretta. Already the Germans have given up the 
Bay of Ayas as a possible site for their harbour 
because there the British Admiralty might have 
interests to protect, and though no spot has actually 
been decided on yet, the new harbour, if it is ever 
constructed, is more likely to be put down on the 
opposite shore of the gulf somewhere near Piyas. 
But whatever locality may be finally chosen, the 
British Government would do well to support the 
claims of Mersina, where there is already a prosperous 
community, an ample water-supply, and a branch 
line in existence, and where, above all, the port 
would be open to all nations. There seems to be no 
reason for conceding to Germany a private harbour 
in the Gulf of Alexandretta any more than in the 
Gulf of Persia. 

Leaving this controversial question of the future 
Mediterranean port of the Bagdad Railway, it is 
pleasant to turn to the great engineering feat 
which is necessitated by the passage of the Taurus 
Mountains. The railway, which meets hardly any 
difficulty after leaving Eski-Shehr, skims over the 
Anatolian plateau to Konia, which is the present 
terminus, and thereafter will run to Karaman and 



234 THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 

Eregli at an altitude of something over 3000 feet 
above the sea. At Eregli it is under the very- 
shadow of the great Bulgar Dagh, one of the most 
pronounced ridges of the Taurus. A few miles to 
the east of Eregli, however, there is a great rent in 
the massive range through which the Chakit-su, 
rising north of the mountains on the plateau above 
Eregli, finds its way. This ravine has been used 
for countless generations as the highway between 
the east and the west, and now the railway will 
be able to avail itself of nature's flaw ; so that the 
highest point in the alignment will be on the downs 
above Eregli, where the Chakit-su takes its rise, and 
where the altitude above the sea is about 4500 feet. 
Having pierced the Bulgar Dagh by means of this 
ravine, the old road turns to the right, being con- 
fronted by a secondary range through which the 
Chakit-su makes its way by a canon so narrow and 
precipitous that, in all human probability, it was 
never traversed by man until Mr. Mavrogodato, the 
engineer of the Bagdad Railway, cut a path through 
it recently in order to find a route for the line. The 
ancient road, instead of attempting the dangerous 
canon, turns to the right, mounting up again to the 
watershed between the Chakit-su and a tributary of 
the ancient Cydnus, or River of Tarsus. 

Following the tributary of the Cydnus the road is 
able to pierce the secondary range of the Taurus by 
a beautiful gorge, not so magnificent as the canon of 
the Chakit-su, but still grand enough in its way, 
the narrowest part being known to history as the 
Cilician Gates. 




CANON OF THEJCHAKIT SU, THROUGH WHICH 
RAILWAY WILL PASS 




ROAD SCENE IN THE TAURUS 



THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 235 

I know of no more romantic spot in the world, and 
none more beautiful on a moonlight night in mid- 
summer than this wooded gorge, once the highway 
of nations, now scarcely disturbed by the passing 
of an occasional string of soft-footed camels. The 
gates themselves can be reached in a long day's 
march from Tarsus on horseback, or in the comfort- 
able, coffin-shaped araba or phaeton of the country. 
Setting out his bed by a stream of clear water 
under the shadow of great limestone cliffs, the least 
imaginative traveller as he rests in the brilliant 
moonlight of Asia cannot fail to be stirred by the 
stupendous associations of the past. In this very 
spot the motley hordes of Xerxes and Darius have 
waited for the onset of Western armies. The 
adventurous spirit of the gallant Ten Thousand 
seems to breathe through the pine trees, and one 
might almost hear in the distance the steady tramp 
of the hoplites of the youthful Alexander. In the 
morning there are still associations, more proper, 
perhaps, to the sober light of day, when one passes 
through the gates and comes on the massive works 
which Ibrahim Pasha in these days of modern war- 
fare threw across the trough between the Bulgar 
Dagh and the secondary range of the Taurus. 

From Ibrahim's lines the route descends to the 
valley of the Ghakit-su, which it reaches at Bozanti 
Khan, a beautiful resting-place, where the Chakitsu 
has for a moment a brief breathing space between 
the ravine to the north and the great canon to the 
south. Here, I left my carriage for a day, and made 
my way on foot down the canon where the railway 



236 THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 

will eventually go. It was the work of hours to 
climb over rocks and ford the stream from side to 
side for a paltry mile or two until I reached a narrow 
part where the river was confined between two sheer 
walls of rock, and driven to such a fury by the con- 
straint put on it that further advance was out 
of the question. I afterwards heard from Mr. 
Mavrogodato that the canon opens up a little 
further on into a perfect little oasis, deep in a circle 
of precipitous mountains, and then closes in again 
for many miles, so that there will be from forty to 
fifty kilometres of almost continuous tunnelling and 
bridging, after which the line will emerge from the 
mountains a little north of Adana. This does not 
include from fifteen to twenty miles of ravine north 
of Bozanti Khan. It will be seen how important 
a part of the railway scheme is the passage of 
the Taurus. When it is completed, however, the 
part of the line which follows the course of the 
Chakit-su will rival any railway in the world in 
point of scenery. For though the Chakit-su is a 
poor stream compared with the Fraser River, yet 
the canon itself is, if possible, more magnificent 
even than the famous Fraser River canon of the 
Canadian Pacific Railway. 

North of Bozanti Khan the scenery suddenly 
changes. There is a dearth of trees and a barren 
look about the landscape which instantly recalls the 
Persian plateau or the South African karoo. Once 
through the ravine past Chifte Khan and on to the 
plateau beyond, one is travelling on the open veldt 
with all the proper effects of endless distances and 



THE PASSAGE OF THE TAURUS 237 

weird mirage. Across this familiar panorama I 
made what speed I could by Eregli and Karabunar, 
and reached Konia on the fifth day from Tarsus, 
almost a record journey, considering that I had 
spent a whole day off the road at Bozanti Khan. 



CHAPTER XVII 

GENERAL PROSPECTS OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 

The question of railway development in Asiatic 
Turkey is of such great importance in its bearings on 
the whole field of politics in Western Asia that it may 
be well, after having dealt at various times with dif- 
ferent portions of the subject, to form a more com- 
prehensive view of the great scheme known as the 
Bagdad Railway. The irade sanctioning the construc- 
tion of the railway was issued in January 1902, and 
in all main essentials the alignment has been 
definitely settled. It is possible to show that the 
enterprise will benefit Asiastic Turkey to an enor- 
mous extent and will repay a hundredfold the cost of 
the guarantee. By a friendly agreement on the 
part of the financiers interested in Turkey the 
necessary funds to provide a guarantee might very 
well be forthcoming. It requires a very small know- 
ledge of arithmetic to show that a guarantee of 
17,000 fr. per kilometre is quite sufficient when 
working expenses are deducted to pay a handsome 
profit on an outlay which is not supposed to exceed 
200,000 fr. per kilometre. In point of fact, however, 
the capital outlay in such cases is nearly always 
underestimated, because though in theory it may be 
easy enough to build a single line of railway for 



THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 239 

.£8000 a mile, in practice the cost is likely to be 
nearer ;£ 10,000. Still, allowing for a great deal of 
extravagance, the receipts guaranteed by the 
Sultan's irade should secure the payment of from 4 
to 5 per cent, on the capital invested. 

That the German syndicate is alive to the situa- 
tion is shown by the cleverness with which it has 
traced the railway. Granted that the best route for 
the northern portion of the line was to cross the 
Anatolian peninsula diagonally by way of Konia to 
Adana, and then to proceed by the easiest route over 
the Giaour Dagh and Kurt Dagh into the valley of 
the Euphrates, the alignment after that should, from 
a commercial point of view, have followed the foot 
hills of the mountains in a semi-circular sweep by 
Urfa and Diarbekir to Mosul. Then the line should 
have crossed the Tigris, and made another arc 
through the grain-growing district of Erbil and 
Kerkuk down to Bagdad, and so on across the two 
rivers again to Kerbela and Nejef and the Gulf. In 
this way the most populous and prosperous — the 
terms are merely relative — portions of Mesopotamia 
would have been served by the railway, and there 
would have been a not too remote chance of paying 
expenses. But what has happened is this. The 
trace, after crossing the Kurt Dagh, halts for a 
moment at a spot called Tel Habesh, ten kilo- 
metres south of Klis, in order to throw off a branch 
to Aleppo, and then makes almost a bee-line across 
the desert by B,as-al-Ain to Mosul, leaving the agri- 
cultural district of the foot hills to the north severely 
alone. Then, again, at Mosul it does not cross the 



240 GENERAL PROSPECTS OF 

Tigris to take in the well-watered Kerkuk region, 
but turns due south in a straight line to Bagdad, 
keeping always on the right bank of the Tigris. It 
does, however, throw off branches across the Tigris to 
Erbil, Kifri, and Khanikin. 

A good many critics have blamed the syndicate 
for preferring a long desert route to a rather longer 
but much more hopeful sweep through the agri- 
cultural belt, which lies at the foot of the great 
amphitheatre of the Taurus and Zagros Mountains. 
On the surface it does seem foolish to make a 
direct line from Mosul to Bagdad, with a number of 
branches across the river into the Kerkuk district, 
instead of allowing the main line to include Erbil 
and Kerkuk and Kifri. But a little consideration 
will show that there is a great deal of method in this 
apparent madness. Seeing that in any case the 
receipts on this portion of the railway will not for 
years reach the amount guaranteed by the Sultan's 
irade, it is a matter of perfect indifference to the 
railway company whether the line passes through a 
populous district or over a desert. The company 
takes in exactly the same amount of money in either 
case ; it is only the Turkish Government that is 
affected one way or the other. The company is bound 
down to make a permanent way of sufficient strength, 
however, to run trains at the rate of seventy -five 
kilometres an hour, inclusive reckoning. In order, 
therefore, to save capital outlay, it is better to run 
the line over the floor of the desert than to take it 
up and down among the foot hills of the Taurus. In 
other words, since the receipts will always be the 



THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 241 

same, a line which costs, say ^6000 a mile, is a much 
more profitable undertaking than one which costs 
^8000 or ^9000, and a clear half-million or so is 
saved by not crossing the Tigris by a bridge at Mosul. 
Having fixed on the shortest and cheapest route 
for the main line, it was a simple matter to arrange 
branches to various spots away from the trunk 
railway by which the grain-growing districts might 
be tapped, and the right to develop the petroleum 
fields of Mesopotamia secured. It will be remarked 
that branches will eventually go to Erbil and Kifri, 
east of the Tigris, and to Hit on the Euphrates, 
all places where the surface indications of petroleum 
are most pronounced, while the branch to Khanikin 
gives the syndicate control over the Bagdad end of 
the great trade route of Western Persia. Too much 
importance can hardly be attached to this point, for 
it is plain that if oil can be produced in large 
quantities in Mesopotamia, where it can be led 
along the level floor of the great Mesopotamian 
valley to the Persian Gulf, or carried in tanks 
down the Tigris River, the possibilities in store for 
the German syndicate are enormous. And the 
expense of the exploitation is comparatively small. 
The various branches of the railway running to the 
oil centres can be constructed very cheaply because 
the conditions concerning the gauge and strength of 
the railway apply to the main line alone. In fact, 
the branches need not be built at all unless oil is 
first proved to exist in paying quantities. The mere 
tracing of the line on paper secures the mining 
rights to the syndicate. 



242 GENERAL PROSPECTS OF 

The plan, therefore, is to make the cheapest and 
quickest main line from Adana to the Persian Gulf, 
in which the only serious difficulties will be the 
crossing of Mount Amanus, the bridging of the 
Euphrates in two places, and a long embankment, 
amounting practically to a viaduct across the narrow 
bit of inundated country between Bagdad and the 
Euphrates, where the spring floods often turn the 
desert into an open sea. Interest to the amount 
of 4 or 5 per cent, being secured on this under- 
taking there still remains to the syndicate the 
chance of developing an enormous oil traffic, to say 
nothing of other mineral resources, all of which have 
been thrown in, so to speak, with the railway 
concession and have cost the syndicate nothing 
whatever. 

The next question that arises is whether the 
Turkish Government or Turkey as a whole is likely 
to gain any advantage from the granting of so rich 
a concession to a foreign syndicate. It is hardly 
possible to hold two opinions on this subject. The 
material change which has come over Asia Minor 
since railways were introduced into the coast fringe 
is pronounced and indisputable. The British Rail- 
way, called the Smyrna- Aidin line, during the later 
years of the nineteenth century turned the famous 
valley of the Meander into a smilling garden, and 
the Kassaba line, originally British also, but now a 
French concern, has developed similar agricultural 
riches a little to the north, and has now joined the 
Anatolian plateau to the seaboard. Smyrna, the 
outlet of both railways, brings back to life the long 



THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 243 

dead prosperity of the Greek towns of Asia Minor. 
Further inland the line of the Anatolian Railway 
Company from Haidar Pasha to Angora earns a 
handsome profit, and is no longer a burden on the 
Sultan's exchequer, while the later extension, from 
Eski Shehr to Konia, though still dependent on the 
Government guarantee for the payment of interest 
on the capital outlay, is fast emancipating itself, so 
that in a few years it will be entirely self-support- 
ing. Thanks to the Anatolian railway system, the 
Anatolian plateau is becoming the great granary 
which it ought always to have been. Every year 
fresh land is brought under cultivation, and between 
Eregli and Konia I passed through miles of standing 
wheat in a district which a year or two ago was as 
innocent of the plough as the Sahara. 

The German company, acting with much energy 
and foresight, has not confined its attentions to 
simple railway construction, but has forced the 
almost uncivilised natives of the plateau to accept 
the latest types of farm machinery with excellent 
results. Away in the deserted village of Karabunar, 
where a short time since even a foreign missionary 
was as rare a sight as a comet, I found attractive 
advertisements of American reapers wherein stalwart 
Asiatics garbed in the rich colours which Western 
people always associate in their minds with the East, 
are seen blithely following the binder in a landscape 
distinctly reminiscent of Indiana. The point is, 
however, that not only the advertisements, but the 
machinery, were there, and the grain traffic of the 
railway is rapidly increasing. 



244 GENERAL PROSPECTS OF 

The moral influence of the foreigner is also widely 
felt. I have already referred to the benevolent rule 
of Ferid Pasha at Konia. Some of the roads in his 
vilayet could hardly be surpassed in Europe. The 
capital of his province is almost a model city, and 
only lately he opened a school for higher education 
in Konia, the like of which has not been seen in 
Asia Minor apart from the efforts of foreign missions. 
I shall not say that Ferid Pasha was Wali of Konia 
because the German company willed it so. But it is 
quite certain that the extension of foreign railways 
and foreign influence will secure the appointment of 
similar officials elsewhere. A power like the German 
syndicate can effect things which our consuls with 
only the backing of our Government — and very little 
of that — cannot hope to carry out. It may still be 
argued, however, that granted the advantages aris- 
ing out of the Bagdad Railway, it would be far 
better in the interests of the country that the align- 
ment should follow the foot-hills of the mountains 
guarding Mesopotamia on two sides, where there is 
an agricultural population, instead of striking across 
the barren desert. I have shown that the desert 
route is distinctly advantageous to the syndicate, 
but it is possible to maintain also that in the long run 
Turkey, too, will profit by it. 

It must be remembered that all Mesopotamia, or 
at least the greater part of it, is capable of cultiva- 
tion under proper auspices, and has in fact flourished 
in past centuries. The great wave of the Moham- 
medan invasion, however, swept over the basin of 
the twin rivers, carrying its hordes of devastating 



THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 245 

Arabs right up to the base of the mountains. 
Whatever can be done to recover lost territory is to 
the advantage of Turkey and the world at large. 
And a railway thrust out across the desert, away 
from the mountain marge, may be likened to a 
breakwater built out by engineers to protect the 
work of reclaiming land inside. In other words, the 
railway will push back the uncivilised scourge of the 
nomad tribes and produce once more a settled 
population in Northern Mesopotamia, while the 
portion of the line between Bagdad and the Gulf 
will perform a similar service for the lower part of 
the basin. If it cost the Government ;£ 1,000,000 
a year to pay the guarantee on the railway — and 
that is a very liberal estimate — it is impossible to 
say that the money is not well spent in the interests 
of both Eastern Europe and Western Asia. That 
the Turkish Government will also derive great 
military and strategical benefits from the railway 
is too obvious a fact to require demonstration. 

It only remains to say a word about the question 
of guarantee. It is generally supposed, if one may 
judge from the various comments from time to time 
in British papers and periodicals, that the only way 
to secure the necessary guarantee is to raise the 
tariffs on foreign commerce at the ports, and the 
question is pertinently asked, why should Great 
Britain, which is responsible for the bulk of the 
foreign trade of the Turkish Empire, consent to the 
further taxation of that trade ? There is a simple 
answer to this question, even if it were the only one 
to be asked. Our trade with Turkey amounted 



246 GENERAL PROSPECTS OF 

in 1899 to roughly .£10,500,000 sterling. In 1895 
it was over ^11,000,000, and in 1897 it even 
passed ,£13,000,000. It seems to be, therefore, 
a fairly valuable asset to the commerce of Great 
Britain, though it is for the moment on the down- 
ward grade. It is almost certain that the extension 
of the railway systems of Asia Minor will double the 
trade of the Sultan's Asiatic dominions in the course 
of the next ten or fifteen years, provided the ex- 
tension is allowed to go on. In this increase of trade 
we are not likely to obtain a share proportionate to 
our present predominance, because the great trunk 
railway will be in German hands, and because both 
German and American firms are showing greater 
activity in the field than their British rivals, and 
agricultural development is especially favourable, of 
course, to American specialties, such as reapers and 
farm machinery generally. But in any case we must 
have a very considerable increase of the trade of a 
country where we are so much interested, and it 
would be ridiculous to be obstructionists to a policy 
of railway development in order to save a paltry 
5 per cent, tax on our trade, which will surely 
diminish year by year until it is hardly worth con- 
sidering if we continue to exhibit the same callous 
indifference to the political and commercial affairs 
of Asia Minor which has so long been characteristic 
of our attitude towards that part of the Sultan's 
dominions. 

There is only one thing possible to be done if 
funds are to be raised for railway purposes. Some 
of the proceeds of indirect taxation must be got 



THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 247 

away from the Public Debt, and that is obviously- 
impossible without the consent of the creditors. 

I cannot here go into the intricate question of the 
unification and conversion of the Ottoman Debt. It 
will be sufficient to point out that if a scheme such 
as M. Rouvier's could be adopted whereby the 
creditors, instead of the bonds they already possess 
expiring at different times between now and 1945, 
should be given new bonds in exchange, redeemable 
in, say, fifty or sixty years, bearing a fixed rate of 
interest at 4 per cent., then the Turkish Govern- 
ment would be free to use as it pleased any pro- 
ceeds of indirect taxation accruing to it after interest 
and sinking fund were paid. 

At present, any increase in taxation simply goes 
into the pockets of the bondholders, provided that 
the increase is great enough to add \ per cent, to 
the interest. It is evident that the Turkish Govern- 
ment is directly interested in keeping down its 
revenue ; for not only does any increase in revenue 
go straight to its foreign creditors, but should the 
increase be sufficient to add \ per cent, to the 
interest, the price for the amortisement of the bonds 
automatically jumps to a much higher figure, so that 
the Government is in the peculiar position of being 
a direct loser by any substantial increase of its 
revenue. But under the unification scheme, the 
rate of interest would be fixed, and then the Govern- 
ment would be directly interested in obtaining a 
larger revenue from the assigned sources, and would 
be able to use the surplus in any way it pleased. 

The question [that next arises is whether or not 



248 GENERAL PROSPECTS OF 

the revenue can be increased to any large extent. 
In the opinion of experts in Constantinople it can. 
If, for instance, we take the taxes on tobacco, salt, 
and stamps, we find that while they amount in 
Roumania to 12.37 fr. a head, in Servia to 7.50 fr., 
and in Bulgaria to 5 fr. a head of the population, 
they amount in Turkey to only 2.10 fr. a head. Or 
take another example. In Roumania, the Govern- 
ment derives an income of ,£720,000 a year from its 
tax on spirits and liquor. In Turkey, with its 
infinitely greater population and no less liking for 
liquor, the tax only contributes .£260,000 to the 
exchequer. It is quite possible, therefore, that if 
the Turkish Government had any interest in secur- 
ing a larger revenue from indirect taxation, it could 
produce ,£1,000,000 sterling each year from various 
sources without touching the tariff at all. 

The difficulty is to get the bondholders to agree 
on the subject. At present they do not get 4 per 
cent., but they stand to get that or more if ever the 
commercial treaties are revised, and the other sources 
of revenue, like spirits, stamps, tobacco, and salt are 
more heavily taxed. On the other hand, they are 
refusing a certain 4 per cent, for a problematical 
increase which is never likely to occur. For why 
should the Turkish Government increase its taxes 
and raise its tariff for the purpose of putting money 
into the pockets of foreign creditors ? Such altruism 
is hardly to be expected. I believe the German and 
French bondholders would agree to the unification 
scheme, but the holders of Group B Bonds, which 
fall due for amortisement in 19 10, and which are 




CANON OF THE CHAKIT SU 



THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 249 

mostly held in England, object to the surrender of 
what they consider an advantage over the C and 
D Groups, which are not to be redeemed until 1935 
and 1945 respectively. Priorities fall due in 1932. 

There, then, is the gist of the whole matter. The 
tariff question is purely a side issue. The main fact 
is that the guarantee for the Bagdad Railway 
cannot be procured without the partial release of 
revenues which are assigned to the Public Debt. 
This release is impossible without the consent of all 
the bondholders to some scheme of unification and 
conversion. And so far the consent of the British 
bondholders has not been obtained. England, there- 
fore, appears in the light of an obstructionist to 
a great scheme for the regeneration of Asia Minor 
and Mesopotamia, even if it be only in the persons 
of private bondholders. At the same time, it must 
be admitted that we hold a trump card or two, and 
we should be foolish to throw them away. If our 
Government took an intelligent interest in the 
matter instead of being thoroughly and unfailingly 
bored with the politics of the nearer East, it might 
bring such influence to bear on the bondholders as 
would secure their co-operation in the conversion 
scheme in return for a very definite arrangement 
for the share of Great Britain in the control of the 
railway. At present, the German share will be 60 
per cent., or enough to secure the entire manage- 
ment of affairs. There the matter must be left for 
the present. But something will have been gained 
if the fact is grasped that the building of the rail- 
way is not to be paid for by means of increased taxes 



250 THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 

on British commerce. It is impossible to have a 
clear view of the issues at stake until it is seen by 
the general public, who in the long run decide our 
foreign policy, that this is only a very small and 
one-sided aspect of the whole business. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE OIL-FIELDS OP PERSIA 

The traveller from the east or south has a choice of 
four routes by which he may go from the Persian 
Gulf to the capital of Persia. He may go by Bunder 
Abbas and Kerman, the longest and most tedious 
journey of all. He may also land at Bushire and 
pursue his way over a series of desperate kotals to 
Shiraz and Isfahan, thus following the Indo-Euro- 
pean telegraph line and the mail-bags. That is 
by far the most frequented route and the most often 
described. A third way is to leave the mail steamer 
at Mohammerah, forty miles up the Shat-al-Arab, 
embark on the Karun river steamer for Bunder 
Nasri, close to Ahwaz, and then utilise the mule 
track opened by the enterprise of Messrs. Lynch 
Brothers between Bunder Nasri and Isfahan. The 
fourth route entails a river journey from Basra to 
Bagdad of four or five days, and thereafter a march 
of twenty-three or twenty-five days from Bagdad to 
Teheran by way of Kermanshah. A fifth way, and 
perhaps the most expeditious of all, would be found 
in a road from Ahwaz or Shuster on the Karun to 
Dizful, Khoremabad, Burujird, Sultanabad and so by 
Kum to the capital. This route was supposed to be 
one of the advantages to be gained by the opening of 



252 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

the Karun to foreign trade. But more than a decade 
has elapsed and the new road is still in the hypothe- 
tical stage, while for the present the country along 
the route is closed to all traffic by the unruly 
disposition of the Luristan tribes. For practical 
purposes, therefore, that means of entering the 
country may be disregarded. 

Of the four routes mentioned, the first is by far 
the longest, and it ceased to be the avenue of 
trade for Central and Northern Persia when the 
British East India Company moved its Gulf depot 
to Bushire 140 years ago. Since that time the 
stream of travellers who have gone from the Gulf to 
Teheran or vice versd, by way of Bushire, Shiraz, 
and Isfahan, has left an enormous deposit of litera- 
ture which has been carefully collated by Lord 
Curzon, who reached the sea by this route, and has 
left nothing further to be said on this subject. The 
Mohammerah-Bunder Nasri-Isfahan journey can now 
be made with comparative ease owing to the efforts 
of Messrs. Lynch, who have opened up a passage for 
mules through the Baktiari country, and have thus 
shortened the overland part of the journey by 250 
miles or thereabouts as compared with the Bushire 
route. As far as the capital is concerned the land jour- 
ney from Bunder Nasri to Teheran is almost equivalent 
in point of distance to that between Bagdad and 
Teheran, the distance in both cases being, roughly, 550 
miles. But while the Bunder Nasri route is, at present 
at least, only a variant of the Bushire-Isfahan route, 
the Bagdad-Kermanshah track opens up entirely 
different questions of trade, traffic, and markets, 



THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

to say nothing of politics. The Bagdad-Kerman- 
shah way is not so popular with travellers who 
traverse Persia in their passage from Europe to the 
East as is the Bushire route, in spite of its being 250 
miles shorter, chiefly because it is less endowed with 
historical and archa3ological interest. Kermanshah 
and Hamadan (Ecbatana) are not to be compared 
with Isfahan and Persepolis. Moreover, there is no 
" chapar" service on the road, and the traveller must 
go most of the way by caravan — a more comfortable 
but infinitely more tedious method of progression. 
Still there are, besides ordinary tourists, a number of 
foreign merchants in Bagdad who find it sometimes 
convenient to return to Europe vid Teheran, and 
there is already a considerable literature in existence 
dealing with Kurdistan and Luristan, between which 
the Kermanshah road forms almost a dividing line. 
Mrs. Bishop, twelve or thirteen years ago, gave a 
minute description of the main routes in this part of 
the world. None the less the importance of this 
trade channel from a British point of view, has been 
to a certain extent overlooked, nor is Lord Curzon so 
satisfying in regard to this portion of his subject as 
he is elsewhere, partly because he did not visit the 
western provinces himself, but more especially 
because statistics are available which were not in 
existence twelve years ago, and two new factors have 
been introduced very recently by the advent of the 
German railway, which may now at last be said to 
have entered the sphere of practical politics, and 
the effort just set on foot by a British capitalist to 
exploit the rich petroleum belt which runs from 



254 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

the confines of Kurdistan to the coast of the Persian 
Gulf. 

No apology is necessary for giving a general 
account of the present condition of this trade-route, 
though fortunately a detailed description of its 
physical aspects would, thanks to Mrs. Bishop, be 
an act of supererogation. 

For the resident merchant of Bagdad it is a simple 
matter to get a few mules together, and start on the 
road with a sufficient knowledge of Arabic and 
Persian to meet the ordinary requirements of travel. 
The visitor is not so fortunate. He must first pro- 
vide himself with a servant who can act as interpreter 
in two or three different languages, and as every 
Bagdadi who can speak a phrase or two of English 
regards himself as a highly-trained courier this is not 
merely a difficult matter but one involving consider- 
able expense. One is, in short, reduced to a choice 
between two or three professional travelling servants 
whose demands are increasingly exorbitant in inverse 
proportion to the amount of work they condescend 
to perform. I was fortunate enough to secure the 
services of the most honest and hardworking of the 
lot, a Chaldean Christian who considers it his special 
privilege to attend on their journeys all British 
travellers who come to Bagdad. I found him an 
excellent road companion, honest, ready witted, and 
a demon for work, with almost too great a predilec- 
tion for early hours in the morning. But when it is 
considered that he must be paid at the rate of four 
rupees a day, both while he is with you and for 
every day of his return journey — so that the expense 



THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 255 

of a native servant for a journey of 550 miles is not 
less than £20 — it will be seen that travelling in 
this part of Persia is not a cheap amusement. 

The hiring of mules is another difficulty . Five 
animals is about the minimum required for a single 
person. If a tent is carried, six will be necessary, 
though I should hasten to add that for travelling 
over the beaten tracks in Persia a tent is a useless 
encumbrance. Most travellers will prefer to buy a 
horse for personal use, though this is not the most 
economical plan. To begin with, horseflesh is ex- 
pensive in Bagdad, where the demand for the 
Bombay market is keenly felt ; secondly there is an 
export duty of £Y$ on all horses leaving the 
country ; and, thirdly, it is impossible to prevent 
your muleteer from appropriating for the use of his 
own animals the food which of right belongs to your 
horse. Besides quantities of chopped straw, my 
horse was supposed to devour twelve pounds of 
barley a day, and yet he lost flesh and was in a 
chronic state of ravenous hunger. After several 
days of bargaining I managed to secure four mules 
for the journey at the rate of fifteen tomans (rather 
less than £$) per mule from Bagdad to Teheran, 
and I was told that this was an extremely moderate 
price. Altogether, leaving out the price of my own 
horse, I found that a journey of 550 miles, which in 
Great Britain would occupy twelve or fourteen hours 
by rail, and could not possibly cost more than £5, 
necessitated in Persia an expenditure of more than 
,£50, and occupied twenty-one days of actual travel- 
lino-. I mention these sordid details in order to 



256 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

show what vast obstacles are put in the way of a 
country's progress when it possesses no modern 
means of communication. 

For an uncivilised country Persia is well adapted 
to road travel. It is quite unnecessary to carry any 
provisions for man or beast unless you insist upon 
luxuries. Eggs, rice, chickens and mutton are always 
to be had in the poorest village, and in the western 
provinces are ridiculously cheap. Milk and tea are 
generally procurable, and enormous pancakes of un- 
leavened bread form the chief article of local con- 
sumption. When freshly baked the bread is quite 
palatable, but when more than half a day old it 
resembles in size, appearance, and consistency the 
flap of a leather saddle that has been left out in the 
rain ; but it is always edible. Your horse lives well 
— when his food is not stolen — on chopped straw and 
barley, both of which in Western Persia are plentiful 
and cheap. What more could the most fastidious 
taste desire ? The night's lodging is not always all 
that could be wished, especially between the Turko- 
Persian boundary and Kermanshah. Here there 
are no caravanserais with " bala khaneh," or rooms 
on the roof for travellers who want something better 
than a stable-yard in which to sleep. A mud hovel 
is generally all that can be expected, with or without 
a door, and a hole in the wall for a window through 
which the snows in winter and the wet winds in 
spring find easy access. Still with a camp bed, a 
folding table, a cheap carpet bought on the road for 
two or three shillings, and a wood fire you can make 
yourself fairly comfortable. 



THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 257 

My contracts at last signed with my muleteers 
and servant, I left Bagdad within twenty- four hours 
of the advertised time of starting, which may be 
regarded as a triumph of punctuality for this part of 
the world. I soon discovered that the latter end of 
March was by no means too late for travelling over 
the Bagdad-Kermanshah route. Bight up to 
Teheran the nights were bitterly cold, the sun at 
midday was never overpowering, and, considering 
the reputation of Persia for dryness, I was astonished 
to find that a waterproof was the most useful article 
in my baggage. On the road to Kermanshah the 
rain fell literally in torrents, and thereafter heavy 
thunderstorms with showers of hailstones as large 
sometimes as pigeons' eggs were of frequent occur- 
rence, so that the road was often a quagmire through 
which the patient mules could hardly struggle at 
the rate of one mile per hour. On the whole, the 
weather during my passage through the mountains of 
Kurdistan was not at all different from what one would 
expect to experience in England at the time of year 
mentioned. What the bounty of heaven vouchsafed 
to the thirsty cornlands, the traveller could hardly 
take amiss, especially as the discomforts entailed 
thereby were more than counterbalanced by the 
welcome smell of wet earth, and the intense green of 
the young crops so grateful to the eye that has 
grown accustomed to the barren landscape of the 
Gulf, and the dreary khaki plains of Mesopotamia. 

For ninety miles or so the caravan route runs in 
a north-easterly direction to Khanikin, which is just 
short of the accepted Turko- Persian boundary, the 



258 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

Diala River being always a little to the left after it 
is crossed at Bakuba, and affording a pleasant frame- 
work of palm groves to the general picture. Bakuba, 
Shahreban, and Kizil-Robat are three considerable 
villages on the way, each being the centre of an 
agricultural district, which grows richer as one draws 
near to the hills of Kurdistan, and comes within the 
sphere of the spring rains. From Bakuba the 
Zagros Mountains, picked out with snow, can be 
seen on a clear day a hundred miles away, but it is 
only after passing Shahreban that the dead level of 
the plain is relieved by a long low ridge averaging 
400 or 500 feet above the flat, running at right 
angles with the route, and constituting the first 
ripple of the mountain surges, which break with 
crest succeeding crest on the Mesopotamian valley 
as regularly and as majestically as the Atlantic 
rollers on a western shore. Between Kizil-Robat 
and Khanikin a second and more pronounced ripple 
must be crossed, and at Kasr-i-Shirin, the next 
halting-place on the Persian side of the boundary, 
one is already in the trough of the big waves. 
The Diala River breaks at right angles through 
these ridges, it being a feature of rivers in Persia 
that they seldom stick to the valleys made for 
them by nature, but ingeniously work their way 
across the grain through flaws left in the ranges 
when the earth's crust hardened after her old 
primaeval commotions. And fortunately what rivers 
have been able to do, roads and railways may 
accomplish for themselves in the future. At first 
sight it would seem to be something like madness 



THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 259 

to dream of constructing a railway across such 
a series of gigantic ranges as lies between Mesopo- 
tamia and Central Persia. In reality the task, 
though difficult, is quite within the scope of 
ordinary enterprise, because nature has never left 
a single ridge in this part of the world without 
its "port" or its "nek." For the moment, how- 
ever, we are only concerned with the existing 
Anatolian Railway scheme, which includes a branch 
to the Turko-Persian frontier at Khanikin in con- 
nection with the Mesopotamian main line. As far 
as this part of the project is concerned there are 
no engineering difficulties whatever beyond what 
might be encountered in any county in England. 
What a future is awaiting this branch one gathers 
from the constant stream of traffic encountered on 
the road. Each night every caravanserai is packed 
with tired mules, and on the road one is hardly 
ever out of hearing of the musical bells of the 
caravan leaders. These droves of packed mules, 
intermingled with a stream of pilgrims, are almost 
the only incidents of monotonous days. 

At Shahreban, it is true, we found the whole 
population afield, mounted for the most part on 
prancing Arab horses, caracoling and plunging as 
their riders fired their rifles at random in the air. 
This was the great festival of Korban, when every 
one makes holiday and in a playful way endeavours 
to pay off all old scores by shooting his enemy in an 
apparently accidental manner. The casualty list at 
the close of the day is usually as great as that re- 
ported in the American papers on the morning after 



260 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

the firework celebrations of the Fourth of July. 
Needless to say the Turkish police force makes only 
a sort of perfunctory appearance, which in no way 
interferes with the amenities of the occasion. The 
advantage to the Turkish Government of this fes- 
tival is that it not only keeps green the feuds of 
y ester year, but it opens new quarrels for the future, 
so that among the Arabs every man's hand may be 
against his neighbour and not against the Govern- 
ment. 

At Khanikin, which is prettily situated on both 
banks of the Holwan, a tributary of the Diala, 
spanned by a substantial stone bridge, one passes 
the Turkish customs barrier, generally an amicable 
proceeding. The question of my horse arose, but 
the Turkish official who came and smoked my 
cigarettes while I sat at tiffin was willing to regard 
him as a beast of burden, and therefore not liable to 
the export duty. What arguments my servant had 
used to produce this decision it was not my business 
to know. The real frontier is crossed five or six 
miles beyond Khanikin, or rather, I should say, the 
temporary frontier which was fixed by the Turko- 
Persian agreement of forty years ago recognising the 
existing status quo. On the main route between 
the territories of the Sultan and the Shah the mili- 
tary strength of the Sultan is represented by a 
round mud tower about the size of one of the 
Spanish blockhouses in Cuba, made to accommodate 
about sixteen persons. Of fortifications there are 
none at all. A little further along, on the Persian 
side of the boundary, a square mud building in a 



THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 261 

Kurdish village by the wayside, houses some twenty 
soldiers of the Shah. Where European nations 
defend themselves from attack by the strength of 
their fortifications, the Turks and the Persians arrive 
at the same result by a mutual exposure to attack 
which makes a war equally dreaded by both Powers. 
One cannot help reflecting, however, that the advent 
of a railway from Scutari to Khanikin will effectually 
disturb the delicate equilibrium of a common weak- 
ness, and Persia will be forced either to undertake a 
similar enterprise within her own borders, or become 
even more dependent on the support of certain 
European Powers than she is at present. 

Here, as it has often happened before, strategic 
necessity may prove an economic boon. The strategic 
question, moreover, takes on a new importance as 
one arrives at Kasr-i-Shirin and finds oneself con- 
fronted with perhaps the most important attempt 
that has yet been made to develop the underground 
resources of the Persian kingdom. 

I have not forgotten the three or four abortive 
endeavours already made by foreign capitalists to 
exploit the naphtha belt which runs north-west and 
south-east from Kurdistan to the Persian Gulf and 
beyond to Beluchistan and India, roughly speaking, 
parallel to the rich Caucasian oil- bed. Nor have I 
overlooked the operations of the Persian Mining 
Corporation, which, twelve years ago, with a capital 
of a million sterling, light-heartedly undertook to 
develop the entire mineral wealth of Persia. The 
complete want of success of that corporation, though 
it was backed by so large a capital and by such an 



262 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

army of experts, by no means demonstrated the 
futility of all future operations in Persia. The 
reasons for the lack of success were manifold, but 
two deserve special mention here. The efforts of the 
corporation were diffused over so large an area, and 
the individual operations were of so varying a nature 
as almost to preclude success from the very start. In 
the second place the cost of transport, which is always 
the prime difficulty in Persia, seems to have been 
entirely overlooked. So much so that it was not 
until expensive machinery had been imported at 
enormous freight-rates, and work had begun on the 
rich manganese ore of the Kerman district that the 
fatal discovery was made that it cost from £<) to ^10 
to transport from Kerman to the coast at Bunder 
Abbas the ore which in London was selling at £\ 
per ton. Mines and machinery alike were abandoned 
to their fate, and similar discoveries having been 
made in other parts of Persia the Mining Corporation 
soon became a thing of the past. 

Mr. D' Arcy, who bought the oil concession two years 
ago, has, at all events, avoided these initial errors. 
He has confined himself to one district and one class 
of mining, and has considered first, and above every- 
thing else, the question of transport. The dearth of 
fuel, which was also a frequent obstacle in other 
cases, does not affect the present enterprise where 
naphtha is the quarry. On the other hand, to exploit 
the oil-beds of Luristan and Kurdistan is a task that 
would frighten any but the most determined capital- 
ist. The machinery for the purpose has to be trans- 
ported at enormous cost and with the most irritating 



THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 263 

delays vid the Suez Canal and the Tigris River, and 
is subjected during its passage through Turkish 
territory to all the dangers and difficulties of the 
Turkish Custom House. With no desire to malign 
that well-meaning institution it may be said that 
its employes neither understand nor reverence 
machinery, and I believe that some of the oil plant 
has been dumped down in Bagdad in such a condition 
as to make the strongest engineer weep. But this, 
after all, is only a small item in the total sum of 
difficulties. The susceptibilities of the Kurdish chiefs 
cannot be overcome in a day. It required many 
months of mingled tact and firmness to win over an 
intractable chief named Aziz Khan, who had special 
orders from the Governor of Kermanshah to give all 
assistance in his power to the superintending engineer 
of the new company ; and now the whole district of 
Kasr-i-Shirin has been thrown into a state of civil 
war by a feud between Aziz Khan and his nephew, 
in the course of which the chief has already lost 
two sons killed — a fine pair of striplings too young 
for so violent a death — and several tribesmen. 
The sympathy of the Englishmen in a calamity 
brought on through no fault of his own, but origin- 
ating in a scandalous intrigue on the part of 
a recent Governor of Kermanshah, has perhaps been 
more instrumental than anything else in establish- 
ing a good feeling between the chief and the oil 
company. But it will be admitted that to carry 
on mining operations in a country where your 
best friend among the natives and your most 
influential supporter may be shot by a relative at 



264 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

any moment, and where civil war is rampant, is not 
an easy task. 

But the most important point of all is the trans- 
port of the oil if or when it is procured. The scheme 
of Mr. D'Arcy is not lacking in boldness of concep- 
tion. Boring is to begin in the naphtha beds a little 
to the north of Kasr-i-Shirin, and thence a pipe line 
is to be laid through Kurdistan and Luristan to 
Dizful, and then across the torrid plains of Arabistan 
to Mohammerah. There tank steamers belonging 
to the company will await the oil and transport it 
to the markets of the world. The 360 miles of pipe 
line must cross several high passes, 5000 and 6000 
feet above the sea, and then pursue its way down 
the rugged Kerkah Valley through a country which, 
despite its proximity to Bagdad and the British 
steamers on the Tigris on the one hand, and to the 
often travelled Dizful-Khoremabad-Burujird route on 
the other, is still unknown and unexplored territory 
indicated merely by a blank in the map of the world. 
At the present moment even the Dizful-Khoremabad 
route is closed to traffic by the disorderly state of 
the Luristan tribes, so much so that the two French 
explorers, engaged in excavating the ruins of Susa, 
whom I met in Kermanshah, had been obliged to 
make their way north by following the line of the 
Pusht-i-kuh close to the Turkish frontier, a very 
roundabout journey and one not free from danger 
unless you are on good terms with the Vali of the 
Pusht-i-kuh, whose allegiance to the Shah is of the 
slenderest nature imaginable. On the whole, I did not 
altogether envy the lot of the three English engineers 



THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 265 

who were about to start on the survey tour for the 
pipe-line just after I passed Kasr-i-Shirin. With a 
large caravan, a Persian escort — for show more than 
efficiency — and money in the purse, the Lurs may 
be overawed or conciliated, but the difficulties of the 
Arabistan plains are great. I have since heard, 
however, that the survey proved entirely successful 
as far as it went. 

It may be a cause of wonder that the oil should 
not have been carried down the simple and safe 
incline to Bagdad and thence to the sea through a 
more or less settled country. Two reasons probably 
weighed against a solution so obvious. In the first 
place the pipe is to be utilised, not for the Kasr-i- 
Shirin district alone, but for the whole stretch of 
oil country at least as far as Ahwaz on the Karun. 
Secondly, apart from other considerations, to have 
dealings with one Oriental Power is quite sufficient 
without multiplying complications by entering 
Turkish territory. There is nothing, however, to 
prevent a subsidiary line from being laid to Bagdad 
if the enterprise prove successful. There, indeed, 
lies the whole crux of the matter. Will the ex- 
ploiters strike oil or not ? The surface indications 
are wonderful. Bitumen abounds, and oil is collected 
already in small quantities by the natives. Yet 
three companies at least have already fallen victims 
to these deceptive signs of wealth. So uniform and 
marked has been the failure to make anything out 
of this oil belt that certain experts go so far as to 
maintain that it contains no important oil-wells at 
all, and that where oil really is abundant, as in the 



266 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

Caucasus and in Pennsylvania, there are very few 
surface indications indeed, while in this case the 
wealth, such as it is, lies entirely on the surface. 
On the other hand, Mr. D'Arcy's advisers are ex- 
ceedingly sanguine ; so that where experts differ the 
outsider may well afford to await results. It is 
sincerely to be hoped, however, that this latest and 
most ambitious attempt to open up the resources of 
Western Persia will prove successful : for the con- 
sequences of success will be various and far-reaching. 
I cannot here do more than indicate the importance 
to the Anatolian Railway Company of having a 
supply of cheap fuel so close at hand for their 
Mesopotamian line. Nor is it necessary to enlarge 
on the great profits to be made if all goes well. 
What is far more important to the outsider, both to 
the Persian and to the foreigner, is the civilising 
influence which the enterprise will have on this 
hitherto uncivilised portion of the globe. In order 
to lay a line down the Kerkah valley British over- 
seers will have to be employed and British workers 
will have to superintend the pumping-stations, money 
will be brought into the country, and the Kurds and 
Lurs, who formerly lived on the fruits of pastoral 
pursuit largely eked out by brigandage, will be them- 
selves tamed and brought into the fold. In a word, 
civilisation may some day reign in Luristan as it does 
in other regions where British influence and enter- 
prise have made their way. The whole of Persia 
cannot fail to be affected by so important an addition 
to the country's assets and the good example may be 
followed in other directions. 



THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 267 

It may seem surprising that Russia should have 
acquiesced so quietly in a scheme which at one and 
the same moment threatens to hurt her oil-trade in 
the East, and gives Great Britain a considerable 
stake in Western Persia just about the debatable line 
between the Russian and British spheres of influence. 
Possibly the Russians are not greatly alarmed by the 
resuscitation of a project which has so often proved 
abortive. But in point of fact, the Russian Govern- 
ment did not acquiesce without attempting a counter- 
move. Years ago the Nobels and Rothschilds had a 
plan for connecting the naphtha beds of the Caucasus 
with the Persian Gulf by a pipe-line running north and 
south through Persia. This scheme was again brought 
to the front recently when Russia tried to include 
among the conditions of the new loan to Persia a 
clause authorising the laying of this pipe, and was 
only hindered from gaining her point by the interven- 
tion of the British Minister. It would have been the 
height of folly for Persia to have granted a concession 
which would have prejudiced the exploitation of her 
own resources. On other grounds, too, it would be 
inconvenient to have a Russian oil-pipe running 
from the north to the south of Persia, which could 
never be kept intact without a large protecting force 
of Cossacks along the route. A British pipe-line will 
not require a great display of military force, any more 
than does at present the Indo-European telegraph 
line. It is too early yet to predict any measure of 
success for an undertaking of this sort in Persia, 
where a month's sojourn is apt to turn the most 
sanguine to pessimism. I can only say that I found 



268 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

Mr. Eeynolds, the superintending engineer at Kasr- 
i-Shirin in a most hopeful state of mind after six 
months intercourse with the natives, and this was 
the more wonderful seeing that he was still waiting 
for his machinery to arrive, and was living with his 
companion, Mr. Holland, iD a bleak, uncivilised 
country, where, as he plaintively remarked, there 
was not a large enough tree on which to hang oneself 
within a hundred miles. 

For my own part, I found Kasr-i-Shirin by no 
means devoid of beauty. The town of mud huts is 
dominated by a modern castle, picturesquely situated 
on a hill, round whose base the swollen waters of the 
Holwan River rushed in spate. Across the stream 
were orchards, varied by a few date-trees, the last to 
be met with on the road to Kermanshah. Beyond 
lie the green distorted slopes of a high ridge of 
hills from which oil is soon to gush forth, and 
beyond that again rises an immense snow-covered 
range ending to the north in an abrupt headland, 
like Arthur's Seat and Salisbury Crags on a gigantic 
scale. That range is the main support of the great 
Persian plateau which is still two days' march away, 
and which is reached by the famous Tak-i-Girra Pass, 
or the Gates of Zagros, which has seen as many 
armies on the march to conquest as the Cilician Gates 
of the Taurus. At the Tak-i-Girra (which means 
apparently the arch of the loop' or winding pass, and 
has reference to an ancient archway to the left of the 
track as one makes the ascent) the traveller, who has 
been rising very gradually to higher levels ever since 
he left Shahreban, makes a sudden leap as it were 



THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 269 

from the footstool to the table, and finds himself after 
an hour's steep climb nearly 6000 feet above the sea, 
and in March at least in the region of snow. 

After making the ascent the track turns from east 
to south along a valley almost narrow enough to be 
called a defile, with dark forbidding mountains on 
either side, and many miles of stones and boulders 
under foot. The wretched pack-animals flounder 
painfully from boulder to boulder, slipping from time 
to time into a slough of mud, with the constant danger 
of a broken limb. Along the route lie the bones of 
hundreds of mules and horses, which have been sacri- 
ficed to the gross incompetency of a government 
which leaves its main routes in this disgraceful state, 
for the want of a small expenditure which the Shah 
would not hesitate to incur during half a day in 
some European capital. 

And yet the Tak-i-Girra pass is supposed to be 
the easiest approach to the plateau for any mer- 
chandise coming by way of the Gulf, and such heavy 
articles as pianos or stoves are generally sent this 
way to Teheran. Personally I cannot imagine any- 
thing much worse, especially in the early spring, 
when the snows are melting ; and the only thing 
that can be said for it is that there is only one serious 
pass or " kotal," whereas on the Bushire-Shiraz 
route there are many. 

After getting through the long defile at the top of 
the pass the route runs easily along to Kermanshah, 
through wider valleys and across several ranges 
which, however, have always an easy "nek" or 
" port," and present no difficulty to the road-maker 



270 THE OIL-FIELDS OF PERSIA 

or railway constructor. The valleys are fertile, and in 
March beautifully green with the winter wheat which 
has lately been released from its covering of snow ; 
but it is a monotonous landscape of barren hills and 
treeless valleys, and I was glad, on the tenth day from 
Bagdad to come upon the orchards of Kermanshah 
and to find myself in the hospitable quarters of 
Baron Wedel, the Director of Customs under the 
Belgian administration for the Kermanshah district. 
He has with him a European assistant, and there is 
now a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia at Ker- 
manshah, with young Mr. Rabino, son of the manager 
of the bank in Teheran, in charge, So that when, 
on the second day after my arrival, two French ex- 
plorers from Susa came in on their way to Paris 
we had such a European gathering as probably had 
never been seen in Kermanshah before. For my own 
part I was only too glad to extend my visit to the 
fifth day, and left my kind hosts with much regret 
when the time came for departure. 



CHAPTER XIX 

KERMANSHAH 

Kermanshah is a town of some 50,000 inhabi- 
tants, situated on the main caravan route from 
Mesopotamia to Persia, at a distance of 220 miles 
from Bagdad, and 330 miles from Teheran. The 
number of inhabitants given is merely an approxi- 
mation, since there is no census in Persia, and only 
the vaguest idea of accuracy with regard to figures 
exists among the natives. A Persian in Kerman- 
shah will generally put the total at 100,000, because 
that is a figure which is easily remembered and 
appeals to his imagination. Mr. Brown, who made 
a report for the Bank of Persia two years ago, 
reckoned the fixed population at 30,000, but he was 
on the cautious side in all his estimates. The 
director of customs, who is in the best position to 
arrive at the true figures, puts the fixed population 
at 50,000, with a large floating population of 
pilgrims, which, during half the year, may increase 
the total by more than 10 per cent. The town is 
remarkable for no conspicuous buildings nor outward 
signs of wealth. It is, as usual, a collection of single 
storied mud-bricked houses, with narrow winding 
streets and a commodious bazaar, but relieved from 
utter insignificance by its situation on the eastern 



272 KERMANSHAH 

slope of one of the low spurs of a great mountain 
range that extends far into Luristan on the south. 
Four miles to the east across the valley of the Kara-su 
River, the Bisitun range rises up sheer and rugged 
to a height of 3000 or 4000 feet above the level of 
the town, which is itself nearly 5000 feet above the 
sea. The climate is exceedingly cold in winter, not 
unlike that of England in spring, and unpleasantly 
hot for only two months in the summer, when the 
inhabitants retire as much as possible to the pretty 
gardens and orchards which lie a little further up 
the slope to the south of the town. 

Kermanshah has been peculiarly favoured by 
nature in many ways. Yet plague and cholera in 
the past, combined with the very backward state of 
the natives of Kurdistan and Luristan have left it 
still a mean-looking town of small dimensions, about 
which the best that can be said is that it contains 
fewer ruined and unoccupied houses than most other 
towns in Persia. It stands in the very centre of 
the richest grain-country of Persia, and perhaps of 
the whole East, for the simple reason that among 
the mountains of Kurdistan the winter snows and 
spring rains are so plentiful as to preclude in most 
years the necessity of irrigation, which is a sine qua 
non in most parts of Mesopotamia and Persia. At 
the same time the mountains are not a hindrance to 
agriculture, because they form well-defined ridges 
between which the valleys are broad, level, and 
exceedingly fertile. Where nature has been so 
liberal, man has done nothing to reap the benefit, 
and communications are so deficient in Persia that 



KERMANSHAH 273 

it is impossible to get an abundance of grain even 
to the comparatively local markets of Teheran on 
the one hand or Bagdad on the other. When I was 
in Kermanshah the prospects of the coming harvest 
were so good that wheat was actually selling for 
8 krans the kharvar, and barley for 10 krans. A 
kran is at present worth about 4}c£., and a kharvar 
is equivalent to 650 lbs. A simple calculation, 
therefore, will show that the price of wheat was a 
little over yd. per cwt., and of barley just gd. per 
cwt. These figures are not unique, though they are 
certainly unusually low. At the same time the prices 
in Bagdad, only 220 miles away, were six times as 
great. At Sultanabad I found already a considerable 
difference, wheat fetching about 25. 6d. per cwt., while 
at Teheran the price was multiplied twelve times, 
that is to say, wheat and barley were standing at 1 2 
tomans a kharvar, or 9s. a cwt. 

Though Teheran is but 330 miles from Kerman- 
shah, it costs at least twelve times what the grain is 
worth on the spot to transport it over that distance, 
for which the railway freight could not be more 
than yd. per cwt., or the equivalent of the local 
price, and might easily be a good deal less. It is 
not difficult to understand, therefore, that during 
the great famine in Teheran, when wheat had to be 
imported from Russia at enormous cost, the grain 
was actually lying rotting in the fields of Kurdistan. 
To add to the absurdity of the situation, an embargo 
has been placed on the export of cereals, so that up 
to last year the Kermanshah farmers might not 
send their surplus to Bagdad, to which the trans- 



274 KERMANSHAH 

port charges, though large enough, are comparatively 
speaking favourable. It is thanks to the efforts of 
Baron Wedel, the Director of Customs, that mer- 
chants are now allowed to export grain on this route 
subject to the discretion of Baron Wedel himself, 
whose business it is to see that the food-supply of 
the country is not impoverished. Still at best 
Western Persia can never make any adequate use of 
her enormous agricultural wealth until railways are 
built to facilitate transport. 

The other staple product of the Kurdistan and 
Luristan hills ought to be wool ; so enormous 
are the flocks of sheep for which the moun- 
tain slopes afford abundant pasturage. Unfortu- 
nately the tribes do nothing to improve the breed of 
sheep ; there is not a single press in the country, and 
the industry is in no kind of way organised. Hence 
the whole export of wool for last year, vid Kerman- 
shah, did not exceed ^5000. Opium forms the chief 
article of export, and accounts for ,£70,000 out of a 
total of ,£187,000. Gum tragacanth and gum bring 
in ^40,000. The £ 1 5,000 which appear in the export 
list as the value of carpets is almost entirely accounted 
for by the bales sent from Sultanabad by the Persian 
Carpet Manufacturing Company. There are no 
carpets of any value made in Kermanshah, nor is 
there any manufacturing industry of any sort, and 
the raw products which do leave the country by this 
route are only a small fraction of the potential 
abundance which would be produced by an indus- 
trious population under a decent form of government. 

But in other respects Kermanshah holds a strong 



KERMANSHAH 275 

commercial position as the focus at once of the out- 
going traffic and of the incoming tide of foreign com- 
merce. Every year from 100,000 to 125,000 shiahs 
pass through the Tak-i-Girra Pass to the shrine of 
Kerbela and Nejef, and every year not less than 8000 
dead Persians are carried over this route to their 
last resting-place by the tombs of Hussein and Ali. 
These pilgrims come from every part of Persia north 
of Shiraz, and they are drawn from all ranks of life, 
so that they leave a considerable deposit of wealth 
by the way. In the opposite direction comes a con- 
stant stream of caravans from Bagdad, bringing to 
the village and towns of the north-west Manchester 
cottons, French sugar, Indian spices, and occa- 
sionally English pianos, as well as all those luxuries 
of life which, being almost necessities, can stand the 
cost of transport through the Bay of Biscay, the 
Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf, and over the shallow 
bed of the Tigris and the desperate mountain tract 
of Kurdistan. As a port of entry Kermanshah 
hardly enters into competition with the Gulf ports, 
because it supplies a totally different area. It is 
only in Teheran that the Bagdad route clashes with 
the Bushire and Shiraz track, and there Bushire has 
matters practically its own way as far as ordinary 
goods are concerned. When it comes to pianos or 
other heavy articles, then the shorter land journey 
from Bagdad is preferred. The Kermanshah route 
in turn has its own way in the whole of the north 
and central west until the Tabriz influence is felt 
and the two streams clash at Hamadan, where 
about 75 per cent, of the foreign goods are manu- 



276 KERMANSHAH 

factures of Western Europe, which have come vid 
Bagdad. 

South of Hamadan, Tabriz has no influence what- 
ever, though in the " Gazetteer of Persia," published 
several years ago by the Indian Government, and 
not brought up to date, the amazing statement is 
made that Kermanshah is supplied with foreign goods 
from Tabriz. 

As far then as British cottons and French sugar 
are concerned, Kermanshah is an immensely rich 
field — rich, that is to say, for Persia — supplying as 
it does a great number of agricultural villages 
and small towns with Khoremabad, Burujird, Sul- 
tanabad, Daolatabad and Hamadan as chief clients. 
Though the other British routes are not represented 
in this sphere, Russia is making considerable inroads 
not into Kermanshah itself but into what may be 
called the sphere of the Bagdad- Kermanshah route. 
Russian sugar imported from Besht makes its way 
down to Daolatabad and Sultanabad, where it com- 
petes seriously with Marseilles sugar, which is of 
finer quality but more expensive. It is interesting 
to note in this connection that the Franco-Russian 
Alliance does not preclude a keen rivalry in 
trade. Of course Russian piece-goods are sold in 
Hamadan, which is a great distributing centre, 
absorbing the greater part of the trade of the 
Bagdad route ; and Russian trade penetrates even to 
Sultanabad and Burujird. Russian candles, lamps, 
and samovars are supreme in the whole district; 
but what surprised me considerably was to find, in 
a town like Sultanabad, which is well within the 



KERMANSHAH 277 

Kermanshah sphere of influence, nothing but Russian 
tea in the bazaar. This tea, I discovered, is grown 
by a Russian firm in Ceylon, transported to Odessa, 
and there made up in nicely decorated tins for the 
Persian market, which it reaches by way of Resht. 
It surely shows something lacking on the part of the 
British Indian tea-growers' enterprise that tea can 
be shipped by a Russian firm in Ceylon by such a 
roundabout way and still compete successfully with 
tea coming directly from India. 

On the whole there can be no doubt that the 
Russian trade in this part of Persia is not merely 
growing but it is growing at the expense of British 
Indian trade or at least it is growing proportionately 
more rapidly. This is due not merely to the 
enormous efforts made by the Russian Government 
to establish Russian trade in Persia by means of a 
commercial bank and roads built at Government 
expense and rebates on exports and other means of 
the same kind which our Government would never 
be induced to employ but also because the improve- 
ment of the Bagdad and Kermanshah route has been 
sadly neglected by the British authorities. If half 
the exertions had been made to improve that route, 
which have been made over the Karun Concession, 
I believe British trade in Northern Persia might be 
in a better position to-day than it is. For instance 
pressure might have been brought on the Turkish 
Government to improve the Tigris river service 
which at present is a quite unnecessary obstacle in 
the way of the development of the Bagdad route. 
And then it would have been of infinitely greater 



278 KERMANSHAH 

service to make a decent road from Bagdad to 
Hamadan than from Ahwaz to Isfahan. Unfortun- 
ately a German company got the concession for the 
Bagdad-Teheran road and the German Government 
having but very slender interest in the trade of the 
route, the concession proved as abortive as most 
other concessions in Persia, and has now lapsed. 

Quite unintentionally Lord Curzon himself was to 
blame for the neglect of this trade channel. In his 
chapter on Persian trade he dismisses the trade on 
the Bagdad route in a summary manner, because he 
enormously under-estimated the volume of goods 
imported. At that time there was no means of 
arriving at the true figures because we had no consul 
in Kermanshah and the returns of the customs which 
Lord Curzon used as his chief basis of calculation 
were notoriously false. Not only was the duty 
exacted less than the regulation 5 per cent., but 
under the farming system only a small portion of the 
real trade was likely to appear in any official esti- 
mate. Calculations based on Bagdad returns are 
equally erroneous because the Bagdad trade reports 
only take cognisance of the goods carried by the 
steamers of Messrs. Lynch, and the information given 
by British merchants cannot cover the foreign goods 
brought in by the Jewish merchants of Bagdad, who 
have their own agents in Manchester and do an 
exceedingly brisk business. At all events, the figures 
obtained by Lord Curzon in 1889 must have been a 
long way below the real totals. He estimated the 
imports of piece goods via Kermanshah from India 
and Manchester combined at ^T 170,000. Eight 



KERMANSHAH 279 

years later the merchants of Kermanshah who were 
tendering for the customs put the average import 
since 1894 at ,£530,000 sterling — a discrepancy not 
to be accounted for by a lapse of six years. Similarly 
the sugar imported from Marseilles to Kermanshah 
was valued by Lord Curzon at ;£T30,ooo. The value 
last year was ,£70,000 and it has been decreasing 
rather than otherwise in the past two or three 
years. 

Altogether, taking the figures of the customs 
house, Lord Curzon estimated the imports at 
.£232,530 and the exports at ,£95,266. Now eight 
years later when there was a consular report drawn 
up by a British consular official who visited Kerman- 
shah, the figures of the foreign trade were taken 
first from the actual returns of the customs house 
(which was farmed out for 86,000 tomans or roughly 
.£17,200) and also from an estimate made by a syn- 
dicate of merchants who were tendering for the 
customs on the basis of the average of the previous 
three years. It is almost impossible that this last- 
mentioned estimate should have been above the 
mark since it was made by a syndicate of merchants 
who hoped to make a profit on that basis. The 
totals, according to computation — taking the average 
of the years 1894, 1895, 1896 — were as follows: 
imports, .£812,304; exports .£138,600. There is an 
immense difference between these totals and those 
given by Lord Curzon. Fortunately there is now no 
reason to resort to guess-work. The customs are 
properly administered by the Belgian officials under 
Mr. Naus and the twelve months, 1 901-1902, was the 



280 KERMANSHAH 

first year that the rSgime was really in proper work- 
ing order and the full duty of 5 per cent, was 
exacted on foreign goods entering and leaving the 
country. The difference between the results of last 
year and those that had gone before is astonishing 
and at the same time gratifying to the Shah of 
Persia. Instead of 86,000 tomans in 1897, Baron 
Wedel collected last year exactly 300,000 tomans 
(about ^60,000) and remitted the net sum of 
296,000 tomans to Teheran when all expenses were 
paid. 

The value of goods imported was as follows : 

imports 4,680,000 tomans and exports 1,000,000 

tomans. At the present rate of exchange these 

figures are equivalent to ^866,000 for imports and 

;£ 187,000 for exports. These totals which are as 

correct as any statistics to be found in Persia, and 

far more so than most, show that the syndicate in 

1897 had left themselves only a modest leeway for 

profit in collecting the customs. They also show 

that in the past five years in spite of the vastly 

enhanced revenue the volume of imports for the 

route referred to has increased very little, if indeed 

it has increased at all, which I very much doubt. 

The fact is as I have endeavoured to point out in 

a previous chapter that the trade of this route 

is practically limited by the carrying-power of the 

Tigris steamers, which in turn are limited by the 

caprice of the Turkish Government. Nor is it 

possible for the trade to increase to any great extent 

until the German railway from the Gulf to Khanikin 

introduces an entirelv new element into the case. 



KERMANSHAH 281 

The figures I have furnished also demonstrate that 
Lord Curzon's estimates in 1889 were far too low, 
and they go to prove that the Bagdad route is only 
a little inferior in importance to the Bushire route 
itself. I have not the customs returns for the year 
1 901-1902 as far as Bushire is concerned, but the 
coDsular reports for the three previous years give an 
average total of almost exactly ,£1,000,000, so that 
as a port of entry Kermanshah is not 20 per cent, 
behind Bushire. 

As a port of entry for British and Indian goods 
Kermanshah is hardly behind Bushire at all, since of 
the ,£866,000 worth of goods brought to Persia vid 
Bagdad almost the whole amount is of British or 
Indian manufacture with the exception of ,£70,000 
worth of French sugar. That is to say, the British 
and Indian imports amount to something over 
,£700,000 in value. Now the average of the last 
three years at Bushire gives us only ,£775,000 worth 
of British and Indian goods, so that the difference is 
very small. As^a port for export Kermanshah 
cannot compare with Bushire, but the potentialities 
are infinitely greater. Here again the transport 
on the Tigris is an obstacle. The Persian Manu- 
facturing Company sends all its carpets to Europe 
by way of Bagdad, but Messrs. Ziegler, who send 
no less than £"60,000 worth of carpets to Europe in 
ordinary years, have now decided, because the goods 
are not subjected to the irritating delays of the 
Tigris river service, to export solely by Besht and 
the Caucasus, though that route is at least 20 per 
cent, more expensive than the Bagdad route. 



282 KERMANSHAH 

Enough perhaps has been said to show that the 
Bagdad- Kermanshah route is of the greatest impor- 
tance to British trade in Persia. Possibly the 
statesman may be inclined to despise a paltry sum 
like ^700,000 a year of purely British and Indian 
trade. If so his attitude is at all events comprehen- 
sible and we may let British trade in Persia go to 
the dogs in its own way. But if we believe that the 
trade of Persia is worth capturing, not so much for 
what it is to-day as for what it may become to- 
morrow, then we must demand of the British 
Government that it should be up and doing. 

Unfortunately the Karun Biver Concession has 
exercised too strong an influence over even such 
practical men as Lord Curzon. He has gone as far 
as to state that the proposed Dizful-Burujird road 
would bring Kermanshah and Hamadan into the 
scope of the Gulf and so enrich the cotton-spinners 
and Manchester. The Dizful-Burujird road I must 
deal with in a separate chapter ; suffice it for the 
present to point out that it is still a thing of the 
future and even if it were made it would not affect 
the import trade of Kermanshah or Hamadan 
in the slightest degree. Kermanshah is only 220 
miles from Bagdad by road. It would be at 
the very least 450 by road from Ahwaz supposing 
the direct route were opened up across the 
empty Luristan hills between Khoremabad and 
Kermanshah. The distance vid Burujird would be 
considerably over 500 miles. The same argument 
applies to Hamadan. Neither of these two centres 
would be affected at all by developing such a long 



KERMANSHAH 286 

land route when they are already served by Bagdad. 
Recently the Isfahan branch of Messrs. Hotz has 
considered the advisability of forwarding carpets 
from Sultanabad to Europe vid Isfahan and the new 
Ahwaz road made by Messrs. Lynch. But the 
freight] of this route would be 30 per cent, dearer 
than it would be vid Bagdad and the duration of 
the journey would be very little reduced. So that 
even for Sultanabad and Burujird the Karun Con- 
cession has so far provided no new conditions. 

The Kermanshah route will always continue to 
supply the richest agricultural part of Persia, and I 
have very little doubt that if the German railway 
scheme is realised it will bring Manchester goods 
much nearer to Teheran, and much more expeditiously 
than is at present possible. Yet the British Govern- 
ment has taken no interest in this route, and has 
done nothing at all to develop it. A continued 
pressure on Turkey might have rendered the Tigris 
river service a boon instead of an obstacle to trade 
and the money spent in joining Ahwaz to Isfahan 
would have been used to much greater advantage in 
improving the Tak-i-Girra Pass. A consular agent 
should have been appointed to Kermanshah in order 
that the Government should have had at least sound 
information about this route. Two years ago the 
post was offered to the Imperial Bank of Persia 
when that institution had no branch at Kermanshah. 
Now that a branch has been opened there the offer is 
withdrawn so that we have no official representative 
at Kermanshah, though we keep a consul-general 
at Meshed, where our trade is much smaller. 



284 KERMANSHAH 

Lastly, if Lord Curzon and, through him, the 
British public, which relies almost entirely on his 
book for its knowledge of Persia, had been more 
accurately informed about the trade of Kermanshah, 
both would have considered the prospects of railway 
development in that part of the world in a more 
hopeful light. As far as we are concerned the oppor- 
tunity is past. If the German railway comes to 
Khanikin it is not at all likely that facilities will be 
put in the way of any British company for continuing 
the line into Persia, and the old German road con- 
cession is likely to be revived and converted into a 
railway franchise. I can hardly imagine that any 
one who has travelled over this route cao hold such 
despondent views of railway developments in this 
direction as most writers on Persia seem to do. The 
railway question cannot be fully discussed at this 
point. I can only regret the lack of interest shown by 
our Government in Persia which has almost put the 
control of a Bagdad-Kermanshah-Isfahan railway 
beyond the reach of British enterprise. 



CHAPTER XX 

PEKSIAN OAKPETS 

From Kermanshah, which stands sentinel over the 
main route from the Persian plateau to the plains of 
Mesopotamia, the various routes branch out like the 
ribs of a fan, from a northerly to a south-easterly 
direction. One goes due north by Sena to Tabriz, 
another skirts the Bisitun promontory, and then 
turns in the same direction with the same final 
objective. The main channel of traffic points just a 
little north of east to Kangawar and Hamadan, 
which it must reach by making a detour to the 
north in order to circumvent the great unwieldy 
bulk of the El vend range, thereafter proceeding in a 
more or less straight line to Teheran. There is a 
shorter but less frequented track from Kangawar 
to Teheran, which passes by Toisarkan and the 
southern slopes of the Elvend ; but the usual 
alternative to the Hamadan route is to branch 
oif from Kangawar to Sultanabad and Kum, and 
so join the Isfahan Road, ninety or ninety-five miles 
south of the capital. Another trade channel follows 
the course of the Gamasiab River, really the upper 
stream of the Kerkah, and, skirting the great 
eastern rampart of the Luristan uplands, passes the 
picturesque Nahavand, and supplies the considerable 



286 PERSIAN CARPETS 

town of Burujird, as well as gives roundabout access 
to Khoremabad, the capital of Luristan. Finally, 
there is a more direct route to Khoremabad from 
Kermanshah, running straight over the Luristan 
hills (which correspond to the high veldt in South 
Africa), but very little used because in the whole 
144 miles there is hardly a single village after the 
Gamasiab Valley is left. The simplest route from 
Kermanshah to the capital, and that followed by the 
caravans and post-carriers, is by Hamadan. For 
travellers the way by Sultanabad is rather more 
attractive, because it embraces the chief centre of 
the carpet industry, passes the celebrated shrine of 
Fatima at Kum, and, though longer in point of 
actual measurement, may be made shorter in point 
of time by hiring a wheeled vehicle either at 
Sultanabad or at Kum. 

Hamadan, as the modern successor of the ancient 
Ecbatana, would have great historical interest if 
there were any remains of the ancient capital to be 
seen. Unfortunately, the habitations of the Achse- 
menian Kings were as ephemeral as their rock sculp- 
tures are ineffaceable. The name remains under 
a slightly altered form, and the industrious natives 
of the place peg out claims in the neighbourhood of 
the town, from which, by a simple washing process, 
they retrieve so many pieces of gold, among other 
relics, that Hamadan is described by the Indian 
Government's " Gazetteer of Persia," with its usual 
inaccuracy, as a gold-bearing district. The visitor 
may go out into the fields any day, where the 
washing is going on by means of streams of water 



PERSIAN CARPETS 287 

turned into trenches like irrigation works, may buy 
a square yard or so of soil, see it thrown into the 
runlet, and take his chance of the result. In this 
way a spice of Monte Carlo excitement is mingled 
with the legitimate interest of archaeological re- 
search. Otherwise Hamadan is only remarkable as 
being a distributing-centre for the whole of north- 
western Persia. It absorbs, perhaps, 60 per cent. 
of the imports by the Bagdad route, which here 
meet the streams of the Tabriz, and the Resht 
trade channels. That coming by Tabriz has di- 
minished in volume, as the influence of the Suez 
Canal has taken full effect, until Tabriz, which once 
supplied Kermanshah with foreign goods, has sunk 
to a position of merely local importance. The Resht 
trade, thanks to the fostering care of the Russian 
Government, is making rapid inroads on the proper 
sphere of the Bagdad route. There is also at 
Hamadan a considerable tanning industry, and 
manufacture in a small way of leather goods. In- 
dustries are so scarce and so backward in Persia 
that this one deserves special mention. 

Sultanabad is more worthy of a visit, though a 
smaller trade-centre than Hamadan, because the 
carpet manufacture for which it is famous is not 
only an industry but an art, which for centuries has 
been specially connected with the name of Persia. 
The town, which contains some 25,000 inhabitants, 
lies 160 miles east of Kermanshah, on the road to 
Kum, a caravan journey of from six to eight days. 
The general features of the journey may be disposed 
of very briefly. The mountain ranges are as lofty 



288 PERSIAN CARPETS 

as they are immediately to the west of Kermanshah, 
and at this time of the year, when they are covered 
with snow, exceedingly picturesque. On a bright 
day the landscape, as one comes on the triangular 
plain of Kangawar, is to the distant view almost like 
an Italian scene in winter. The little town, built 
compactly on low hills, is surrounded with orchards 
and poplars ; the plain, just beginning when I was 
there to show green signs of the coming crops of 
barley and wheat, is studded with villages, most of 
them raised above the general level like small 
fortresses. Eastwards the way to Teheran is barred 
by the massive bulk of the glistening Elvend, while 
to the south a long range of snows, shading gradually 
into the blue distance, gives a definite boundary on 
the east to the highlands of Luristan. The little 
village citadels, generally nothing more than mud 
ruins, but in some cases, as at Nahavand, retaining 
the dignity of a fortress, with moat and drawbridge, 
are eloquent of the days when Persia was even more 
unsettled, and the tribes were much more warlike, 
than they are at present. Generally speaking, the 
plains between the mountains grow wider as one 
gets farther east of Kermanshah, the villages are 
more numerous, more prosperous, and a shade more 
civilised ; the orchards are more frequent and more 
extensive, and the habitations are less like pigstyes 
and more like human dwellings. Daolatabad, which 
is half way between Kangawar and Sultanabad, is 
the centre of a smiling valley well watered by the 
Kulwan River, which afterwards, near Nahavand, 
becomes the Gamasiab, which in turn becomes the 



PERSIAN CARPETS 289 

Kerkah. It was here that I first met Russian sugar 
and a few Russian prints in a clean and well-stocked 
bazaar. 

Only as one gets east from Kermanshah the rain- 
fall decreases and cultivation becomes more and more 
dependent on irrigation, until the wide plain of 
Sultanabad is reached, where there are practically 
no purely rain-fed crops at all. The price of grain 
consequently rises appreciably with every day's 
march, and in Sultanabad it was three times as 
great as in Kermanshah. Still, in this part of 
Persia, at all events, the peasantry, though 
wretchedly housed and ignorant of all modern 
appliances for facilitating agriculture, seem at least 
to be industrious, to judge from the extent and 
ingenuity of their irrigation ditches. The caravan 
route is easy and the gradients -long but not 
arduous. There is one nek to be crossed before 
reaching Kangawar, where cuttings and a heavy 
gradient would be necessary for a railway. From 
Kangawar, which is lower than Kermanshah, that 
is to say, about 4500 feet above the sea level, the 
route ascends gradually and without much visible 
effort, to a height of 7000 feet, a day's march from 
Daolatabad. Thereafter it falls again, passing a 
high range by a most convenient natural port by 
the village of Tuda, and then, rising slightly past 
the village of Namdakoh, it has to make a sudden 
drop of nearly 1000 feet to the pretty little Karrarut 
valley, at the mouth of which, on the verge of a 
great plain, stands Sultanabad. It is possible to 
drive the whole way from Teheran to Kermanshah 



290 PERSIAN CARPETS 

by this route, and I actually met a waggon at a 
village near Daolatabad. As far as railway con- 
struction goes the only difficulties to be overcome 
are the nek between Bisitun and Kangawar, and 
the sudden descent just before reaching Sultanabad, 
and even these are of a very insignificant nature. 

At Sultanabad I was very speedily haled forth 
from my caravanserai by Mr. Lombaers, the manager 
of the Persian Manufacturing Company, and found 
myself in the middle of a charming little European 
community, Mr. Lombaers and his wife being natives 
of Holland, and the four Europeans, two of whom 
are married, in Messrs. Ziegler's firm being either 
German or Swiss. The Persian Manufacturing 
Company was originally a branch of the firm of 
Messrs. Hotz and Co., and is still closely connected 
with it, though the capital is divided, while 
Messrs. Ziegler and Co. still control their Sultanabad 
branch, of which Mr. Strauss is the manager. 
Messrs. Ziegler's firm, which does about three times 
as much in the way of exporting carpets as the 
Persian Manufacturing Company, possesses a con- 
siderable property on the outskirts of Sultanabad, 
with enclosed gardens and compound and buddings 
on a European scale of style and comfort only sur- 
passed in all Persia by the British Legation in 
Teheran. The two firms have exported in recent 
years carpets to the value of ,£75,000, while the 
native dealers in the district who send their wares 
vid Tabriz to Constantinople, have brought the total 
of foreign export from Sultanabad and the neighbour- 
ing villages to ,£100,000. Last year, however, the 



PERSIAN CARPETS 291 

market in Great Britain had become overstocked, 
and the pressure put on the producers had tended to 
lower the quality, with the result that they do not 
expect to net more than ,£60,000 this year. The 
war, too, must have had a certain baleful influence 
on the sale of expensive carpets in Great Britain. 
But on the whole ,£75,000 may be taken as a con- 
servative estimate of the value (before exportation) 
of the carpets sent abroad from the district of Sulta- 
nabad, which includes nearly two hundred villages 
within a radius of twenty-five miles of the town. 
Ten or eleven years ago Mr. Joseph Babino, the 
manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, in an in- 
teresting pamphlet on banking in Persia, put the 
total export of carpets from Persia as ,£136,000. 
It is not difficult, therefore, to see what an important 
share of this business is claimed by Sultanabad, and 
how much of the two foreign firms which are supreme 
in the country have done to develop this useful and 
interesting industry. For this reason, and also 
because very erroneous ideas are entertained about 
Sultanabad carpets, I am tempted to give a short 
account of the work done by Messrs. Ziegler and the 
Persian Manufacturing Company. 

Lord Curzon, in his chapter on Persian resources 
and manufactures, dismisses the Sultanabad industry 
in a brief and almost contemptuous manner, which 
leaves it to be implied that the introduction, not of 
European methods so much as European supervision, 
is responsible for the present lack of originality in 
carpet manufacture and the use of aniline dyes- 
His example has been followed by nearly every one 



292 PERSIAN CARPETS 

who speaks or writes about Persian carpets, and 
indeed more rubbish is talked and believed about 
them than is even the case with antique porcelain 
or Chinese cloisonne. Dr. Wills, for instance, who 
certainly ought to have known better, warns his 
readers to beware of carpets with dyed cotton 
borders, which he regards as a sure sign that they 
are " made for the market." This, indeed, is the 
phrase that is constantly used as a token of dis- 
paragement when speaking of modern work, and 
especially of the Sultanabad products, just as if 
ninety-nine out of every hundred carpets had not 
always been " made for the market." The result is 
that the slightly sophisticated traveller who turns 
up his nose at a Sultanabad carpet which, it is quite 
true, he could buy equally well in London, spends 
enormous sums on the veriest trash, which has been 
hawked for ages about the bazaars of Teheran and 
Isfahan, just because it is dirty and worn out, and, 
in a word, an antique. Of course, he desires some- 
thing which he cannot buy in Europe, something 
characteristic of the country, and herein doubtless 
he has reason, for if he wants something really 
characteristic of Persia he will do well to buy any- 
thing you please that is worn out, faded, and 
generally speaking worthless. This at least will be 
Persian. Or again, there are still in the country a 
few really valuable old carpets, made at enormous 
expense as offerings for some shrine or as gifts for 
kings or ministers. These are not in the market, 
however, can seldom be come by or bought, and then 
only at prohibitive prices. 



PERSIAN CARPETS 293 

The ordinary purchaser, who is not intent on 
mere age and dirt, and who wants a carpet because 
ifr is either useful, beautiful, or valuable, must buy 
modern wares, and it would hardly be going too far 
to say that he must patronise one of the foreign 
firms. To blame these firms for lack of originality 
or the use of inferior dyes is grossly unfair. Origin- 
ality in artistic work has long been dead in Persia. 
This is apparent to the most casual observer who 
glances at the modern tile work or silver work, or 
the carpets sold by natives. In carpets particularly 
there is not the slightest tendency to diverge from 
the same old designs which stamp the products of 
Beluchistan, of Kerman, of Yezd, of Khorasan, and 
of Kurdistan. The rawest amateur in looking at a 
native carpet can proclaim its origin in a moment, 
or can, at all events, give the original locality of the 
design and style of workmanship from which it is 
copied. The design is more or less badly executed, 
and the colours are more or less pleasing or the 
reverse, generally the reverse — and that is all. The 
die was made long ago, and has not been broken or 
renewed, but merely worn out. The most char- 
acteristic, perhaps, though not the most beautiful, 
are the designs peculiar to certain tribes — designs 
such as are found in the Baluchi carpets, or the 
Kurdish, or the Turkoman. The most beautiful, to 
European ways of thinking, are those more or less 
floral designs with large medallions in the centre of 
a square ground, and a broad and ornate border. 
Such flowing lines are found, for instance, in the 
Kerman carpets, and are quite different from the 



294 PERSIAN CARPETS 

angular figures which are generally regarded as 
characteristic of Persia or Arabia. The Herati 
figure and the Turkoman pattern are not angular, 
though they are thoroughly native, but they belong 
to a lower state of artistic development than the 
more organised, and yet more liberal curves of the 
really floral designs. But, then, these beautiful 
patterns' which occur also on the old tile work 
are not Persian at all in their origin any more than 
are the mural decorations of the Diwan-i-khas at 
Delhi, or the Taj Mahal at Agra, which have formed 
the basis of so much art work that is now associated 
with India. 

The patterns came from Europe in the days when 
Persia was still capable of appreciating European 
art, and the Persians have preserved them intact in 
some of their best carpets, with just the addition of 
a few birds and beasts, and fishes, which, as long as 
they are not too conspicuous, do not spoil the purity 
of the original conceptions. But in Persian hands 
even these designs have by now become stereo- 
typed and stale, besides gradually losing their pris- 
tine freedom of line. It is only in European museums 
that they can be seen at their best. Among the 
natives carpet-making has settled down into certain 
grooves, into which new ideas are introduced only 
through the vitiating medium of Manchester prints. 
But this is not entirely true of the carpets made 
under the supervision of the two European firms of 
Sultanabad. Here, if anywhere in Persia, variety, 
and occasionally originality of design is to be found. 
It must be understood that these firms do not super- 



PERSIAN CARPETS 295 

intend factories run on European lines. Their carpets 
are made in Sultanabad and the surrounding villages 
exactly as they are anywhere else in Persia. It is 
the business of the firms to supply the wools and the 
dyes and to dictate the patterns and to receive the 
work when finished. Sometimes they buy up carpets 
that are brought in to them by villagers who have 
made them with their own material according to 
their own ideas, but generally speaking each carpet 
is made according to instructions and subject to a 
contract price. They have hundreds of designs col- 
lected from all sources, copies of ancient patterns, 
designs from European firms or inventions of their 
own, while they have specially retained Persian 
designers who are paid to do nothing else but invent. 
I have looked through folios in the office of the Per- 
sian Manufacturing Company, which contain exact 
copies with the true colouring of the renowned 
Persian carpets in the mansions and museums of 
Europe; nor is there a famous carpet in exist- 
ence which cannot be copied for you exactly by 
one of the two firms, provided always that you 
are prepared to pay the price. They are, in fact, 
reinforced by all the ancient examples, and they 
introduce at the same time whatever there is of 
individuality or originality in carpet painting to- 
day in either Europe, America, or Persia. If it is 
argued that the old masterpieces are the best, that 
is only equivalent to maintaining that the well of 
invention in this direction has run dry, and that 
there is a natural limit to the decorative patterns 
which are proper for carpets. At all events, if you 



296 PERSIAN CARPETS 

cannot find originality here you will find it nowhere 
else in Persia. 

It is equally false and even more unfair to suggest 
that the two firms I have named are responsible in 
any way for the introduction of cheap aniline dyes, 
which has done so much to ruin the carpet industry 
in Persia. On the contrary, it is almost necessary 
to go to Sultanabad to avoid the pernicious influence 
of chemical preparation. Both the foreign firms have 
dyeing experts, and as they dye their own wool, and 
for the most part export carpets that are made with 
their own wool, one may be reasonably sure that the 
colours will not fade or ran. Indigo is used for 
blue, madder for red, and grape skins prepared with 
alum for yellow. The greens and browns and all the 
different shades are made from mixtures or dilutions 
of these vegetable substances. The result is not 
only seen in the durability of the colours but in the 
richness and softness of hue. It is not in Sultanabad, 
but in nearly all the other districts of Persia, that 
the use of aniline dyes — in spite of the embargo on 
their importation — combined with a natural crude- 
ness of taste, produces such distressing results. In 
other respects, also, such as the quality of the material, 
Sultanabad carpets are generally found to be superior 
and, as they are made for European or American 
use, their size and shape are adapted to European 
houses, which is a considerable advantage except in 
the eyes of those who consider that a carpet is more 
beautiful because it is made long and narrow to fit 
the general style of a Persian dwelling. It must, of 
course, be remembered that carpet-making in Sul- 



PERSIAN CARPETS 297 

tanabad, as elsewhere in Persia, is a commercial 
undertaking, and the vast majority of carpets sent 
to market are of moderate price and therefore 
articles of utility first and of beauty only so far as 
the price admits. My contention is simply this, 
that if you want a really fine Persian carpet of good 
design and excellent colour and are willing to pay for 
it you can get it from either of the two firms to 
which I have referred. Since this is the case, it may 
be asked why are not similar carpets made in Europe 
or America, where the enormous cost of transport 
would be saved ? The best designs are to be found 
in European museums, and for new designs European 
artists are infinitely superior to Persians. The colour- 
ing matter is certainly not peculiar to Persia ; indeed, 
the indigo is imported from India, while the wool 
and cotton employed are, if anything, of a distinctly 
inferior quality, and the same may be said of the 
silk. Is it that the Persian women and boys who 
make the carpets have a peculiar aptitude for the 
work ? Certainly not. Their work is so slovenly 
that it is almost impossible to find a carpet in Persia 
where the design is perfectly carried out or the colour 
scheme is without fault. 

Why is it, then, that carpets are made in Persia 
and transported at great expense to Europe ? The 
answer is very simple. It is a question of the price 
of labour. The process of carpet-making is somewhat 
as follows. The warp is strung up on a loom in a 
small village hut, hardly large enough as a rule to 
hold the contrivance. In all the Sultanabad carpets, 
and most of the fine carpets of Persia, the warp and 



298 PERSIAN CARPETS 

woof forming the ground work are of cotton. Four 
or five women — according to the size of the piece — 
then sit down to work, each taking a width of about 
two feet. They have no small boys, as in India, on 
the other side of the loom to read out the number of 
stitches of each colour in the pattern, but trust to 
memory and good luck ; hence the usual imper- 
fection of the design. Each stitch is made by tying 
the front and back thread of the warp together with 
a piece of coloured wool, whose ends are then broken 
off, leaving a double end hanging from the knot of 
perhaps three-quarters of a inch. This forms one 
stitch and the double ends constitute the nap. The 
process is repeated along the line with the proper 
colours according to pattern, and when a whole line 
is finished the shuttle is run through by hand with 
a cotton thread to form the woof of the ground work. 
Then the whole line is beaten down with a sort 
of hammer with blunt steel prongs fixed close 
together so as to insert themselves between the 
threads of the warp, and usually furnished with 
little bells so that the women may have music at 
their work. Then the hanging threads, thus beaten 
close to the line below, must be sheared off to an 
even length in order that the surface of the carpet 
may be level and compact. The nap is thus reduced 
to about a quarter of an inch. It is here that many 
faults are made. Mr. Lombaers had a special pair of 
scissors made for his own amusement, which, by a 
very simple contrivance, secures a perfect evenness 
of length and so produces a fine surface with a sheen 
^s of velvet. The Persians have no idea either of 



PERSIAN CARPETS 299 

making or using such contrivances : they shear away 
with enormous scissors in haphazard fashion, so that 
the nap is often irregular and the general effect 
spoiled. If the lines of stitches are well beaten 
down the warp and the woof ought to contain exactly 
the same number of stitches to the inch. Generally 
they do not ; either the beating is insufficient and 
the design becomes elongated or the warp has not 
been properly stretched, the threads grow too far 
apart in the working, and the design is spread out 
horizontally as when one stretches a piece of elastic 
with a pattern on it. Either fault when exaggerated 
becomes a fatal defect in a carpet. It will be seen 
that the work is tedious but not difficult ; yet the 
Persian women have to be trained to it from their 
childhood. One of the foreign ladies of Sultanabad 
took lessons from a headworker among the Persian 
women, and in ten days surpassed her teacher, who 
had been at it since she was three years old, and 
who, having been beaten by her pupil, ran away in 
disgust. 

European women could certainly do the work 
more conscientiously and efficiently, and the employ- 
ment of a few simple devices, such, for instance, 
as Mr. Lombaers's scissors, would ensure a better 
result. But then, consider the cost of labour. A 
woman working at a piece two feet wide can finish 
one line of stitches in half an hour. If the carpet 
is to be of moderate quality there must be ten lines 
of stitches to the inch, that is to say, she finishes a 
piece of carpet two feet wide by one inch in length 
in five hours ; in other words a square foot in thirty 



300 PERSIAN CARPETS 

Lours. By resorting to the rule of three we find 
that it would take one woman 3600 hours to make 
a carpet twelve feet by ten. As four or five women 
would work at once on a carpet cf this size, the 
final result works out at 900 hours, which in Persia, 
with its many high days and holidays, means the 
best part of a year. I saw one large carpet on the 
loom in Sultanabad — six yards by four I think it 
was — which had already reached the end of its 
second year, and was a month or two short of com- 
pletion. If the carpet is to be of finer quality the 
stitches must be closer together, and the labour 
expended will be doubled or trebled. 

By far the greatest item, therefore, in the cost of 
a carpet is the expenditure of labour. In Persia all 
the carpets, except at Kerman and perhaps Yezd, 
where bovs are employed, are made by women, who, 
being at best little more than slaves in the Mussul- 
man household, are paid the veriest starvation wages, 
if, indeed, they are paid at all. In the Sultanabad 
district they get half a kran a day, which is 
equivalent to 2^d., with an occasional cup of tea 
thrown in. Machinery — even if it could obtain 
the same results, which it cannot — would still be 
more expensive, and even female labour in Europe 
would be fifteen times as costly. Hence a moderately 
good Persian carpet of 1 20 square feet, which fetches 
^"12 in London, could, I believe, be made much 
better in Europe as far as workmanship goes, but it 
would cost ^120, and no one would buy such an 
article at such a price. Or, again, the really fine 
pieces of work, which fetch as much as five shillings 



PERSIAN CARPETS 301 

per square foot when exported, would, if made by 
hand in Europe, cost something like ^iooo each, 
which, as Euclid would say, is absurd. 

That, then, is why carpets are made in Persia 
under European supervision and transported, at a 
cost of 30 per cent, of their original value, to 
Europe instead of being made in Birmingham. 
That there exists any special faculty for the industry 
or the art in Persia cannot be believed by any one 
who examines the method or its results. Fortu- 
nately for the British and American householder, the 
Persian woman is still a slave. If ever she is eman- 
cipated or raised out of the Mohammedan abyss to 
a higher level in the scale of existence Persian carpets 
will become a thing of the past. As it is a good 
carpet is exceedingly rare. Be the designer never 
so artistic, the weaver will make mistakes if she 
possibly can. 

It is customary among amateurs to look first at 
the back of a carpet and count the stitches, but this 
is the least criterion of a carpet's quality. In the 
first place the design must be beautiful, and this is 
hard to come by ; while secondly, it must be truly 
worked out. Generally it is not properly divided, or 
it is executed in a slovenly manner, or it is elongated 
or stretched horizontally as described above, produc- 
ing a sort of grimace like a countenance reflected in 
the hollow of a spoon ; in the third place, the colours 
must be good and fast and comely, a thing seldom to 
be attained by the Persian, even if you give her the 
colours. She is almost sure to put them in the wrong 
places, and is especially fond of changing the shade 



302 PERSIAN CARPETS 

of the background of the design two or three times 
in the course of one carpet. Where the shades are 
really distinct the carpet loses greatly in value. If 
those three conditions are given, then it is time to 
count the stitches in order to estimate the amount 
of labour expended. A large carpet, in order to come 
within the means of the average purchaser, will con- 
tain about ninety stitches to the quarter zar, which 
is ten and a half inches — roughly, nine to the inch. 
A well-made carpet of this quality should be sold for 
about is. Sd. per square foot in London. Small rugs 
such as those that are made at Shiraz and Kerman 
may be much finer, and contain fifteen or sixteen 
stitches to the inch. These fine carpets are not really 
intended for the floor, but in Persia are hung on the 
walls like tapestry. Silk carpets, which are some- 
times very beautiful, are costly, not because they are 
made of silk, for the difference in material is a small 
matter, but because the number of stitches to the 
inch is greater and the labour expended enormous. 
At Karcheun, a little village near Sultanabad, there 
is an old landed proprietor, a rich man, who has the 
most beautiful silk carpets woven for himself on a 
ground of gold thread. The ground is left bare of 
silk and the pattern only put in with the silk nap, 
giving a relief to the design which on the rich gold 
ground produces the most charming effect. The old 
man would never sell to a feringhi ; he reserves his 
wares for presents to Shahs and Ministers. It is, 
however, almost a misuse of terms to call such 
works of art carpets. They are really mural decora- 
tions. 



PERSIAN CARPETS 303 

But even the more homely woollen article is a 
fascinating fabric which fortunately can still be made 
in Persia. I have seen carpets on the walls of houses 
in Sultanabad which the connoisseur would rave over 
if he were only convinced that they were a hundred 
years old. Doubtless many of them will live to be 
valuable antiques. Only it should be said to the 
credit of the foreign trading-houses, that they, and 
they alone, keep alive the spark of art in this waning 
Persian industry. They also do a good deal in this 
and in other directions to bring a little of the wealth 
back to Persia which is constantly being drained 
away to pay for foreign goods. Whatever tends to 
increase the total of exports from Persia is to be 
welcomed if the country is to be saved from the 
utter financial degradation to which it is at present 
hastening. 



CHAPTER XXI 

ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 

I cannot leave the country between Bagdad and 
Teheran without endeavouring to arrive at some 
definite idea of the extent of British interests in this 
part of Persia, and the share taken by the British 
Government in developing these interests. In 
Persia, as in China, one cannot move anywhere 
without hearing woeful tales of the decline of British 
influence and prestige, and the dangerous competi- 
tion which is threatening to overwhelm British 
trade. But in Persia and China alike, though the 
dirge is repeated ad nauseam, it is difficult to find 
any one who can put his finger on the seat of the 
disease, or suggest a possible remedy. The British 
Government is invariably held up to scorn, yet it is 
not often that even a possible coarse of action is 
suggested, and the practical result of the whole 
jeremiad is nil. I wish to follow a rather different 
course, to deal with a few concrete facts which may 
demonstrate the lethargy of the Home Government, 
and to suggest possible means of counteracting the 
evil results of that lethargy. 

The area under discussion is a small one, but in 
no other part of Persia has the neglect of the British 
Government been more conspicuous, and nowhere 



ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 305 

might the exerting of a little energy prove more 
beneficial to our legitimate interests. I have 
already pointed out that the import trade of Great 
Britain and British possessions with Persia vid the 
Kermanshah route is not less than .£700,000 per 
annum. This, it may be argued, is a ridiculously 
small item of the great bulk of British commerce, 
and not worth making any fuss about. In return it 
is only necessary to point out that it comes very 
near the total reached by Bushire, which is the main 
port of entry for British commerce, and exceeds the 
returns of all other ports where British trade is 
concerned, including Tabriz. Yet we have no 
consul at Kermaushah, not even a consular agent. 
There is, it is true, a Consul-General at Bagdad ; 
but one may look in vain through the consular 
reports of Bagdad for anything more than the most 
perfunctory notice of the transit trade with Persia. 
So little, indeed, was known in the past of this trade- 
route that, as I have already shown, even Lord 
Curzon, who left no stone unturned in his search for 
accurate information, estimated the import trade of 
Kermanshah at a little more than a quarter of its 
present value, which there is good reason to believe 
has increased very little in the last ten years. 
Other errors have since been rife. 

Despite a carefully compiled consular report in 
1897, which gives a very fair idea of the existing 
trade of the route based on the calculations of a 
syndicate which was about to tender for the farming 
of the customs — calculations which obviously would 
not err on the side of exaggeration — another report 

u 



306 ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 

was made a year or two later for the Imperial Bank 
of Persia. It seems to ignore the existence of the 
consular report, and returns to old miscalculations 
which have been triumphantly refuted by the net 
customs revenue collected last year. In the 
" Statesman's Year-book " for 1 902 Kermanshah 
is not mentioned among the important towns of 
Persia, though five or six towns are given whose 
populations are smaller, and whose trade is, com- 
paratively speaking, insignificant. Lastly, I find in 
the report made for the Imperial Bank of Persia 
a suggestion that the Bagdad-Kermanshah route 
might suffer by the opening of the Ahwaz-Isfahan 
road, which is about as likely to compete with it as 
the Quetta-Nushki route. Even Lord Curzon fell 
into the mistake of supposing that the opening up of 
the much-talked-of Ahwaz or Shushter-Burujird road 
would cause Kermanshah and Hamadan to draw 
their supplies from Mohammerah. Kermanshah is 
220 miles from Bagdad. The Burujird road would 
bring it within 460 miles of Ahwaz. Hamadan, 
which is a still more important centre than Kerman- 
shah, is about 350 miles from Bagdad, that is to say, 
100 miles less than its distance from Ahwaz. The 
difference between the river carriage from Moham- 
merah to Ahwaz, and that from Basra to Bagdad, 
would not make up the loss on the increased road 
transport. It is quite true, on the other hand, that 
a large amount of the present Kermanshah trade 
which at present goes to Burujird and Sultanabad 
would be deflected to the Ahwaz-Burujird road, if it 
was ever made. 



ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 307 

But there is still left a great grain-producing 
district between Kermanshah and Hamadan, which 
has a potential wealth that has never yet been duly- 
appreciated, and which will always be supplied with 
foreign goods from Bagdad, the opportunities being 
equal. It is even possible that the best route from 
the Gulf to Teheran might be found to be vid 
Bagdad. As it is, heavy articles from Europe, such 
as pianos and stoves, come this way owing to the 
comparative shortness and smoothness of the track. 
The smoothness is, perhaps, exaggerated by most 
writers. The bad part of the road, near the Tak-i- 
Girra Pass, cannot be much better than the Bushire- 
Kotals, especially in winter and spring, when snow 
and rain add to the horrible state of the stony 
portion of the track. Only the extent of the bad 
ground is not so great. It is impossible to give 
exact figures of the cost of transport in Persia, which 
varies according to the season and the price of grain. 
Roughly it amounts to ^14 per ton to carry goods 
from Bagdad to Teheran, whereas it costs £1% to 
^20 from Bushire to the capital. It would seem, 
then, that the Kermanshah route is more ad- 
vantageous than the Bushire-Isfahan route, and yet, 
with a few exceptions, all the European goods im- 
ported to Teheran — exclusive of Russian manu- 
factures — come by way of Bushire or Tabriz. The 
reason is not far to seek. For goods coming by way 
of Bagdad an extra £2 per ton must be allowed by 
river freight and break of bulk. Then there is a 
transit duty of 1 per cent, through Turkish territory 
and an enhanced duty at Kermanshah, owing to 



308 ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 

the extra cost of transport, which is taxed by the 
customs in addition to the cost value of the goods. 
So that the actual charges per ton come to nearly, if 
not quite, as much as the freight from Bushire to 
Teheran. 

These things being about equal, there is this great 
disadvantage of the Bagdad route, that the carrying 
capacity of the river steamers is strictly limited, and 
the congestion of goods at Basra so great, that six 
months is frittered away in what are at present un- 
avoidable delays, which are further increased by the 
absurd quarantine regulations at Basra. The result 
is that the time of transit between London and 
Teheran vid Bagdad is almost double what it is 
between the two capitals vid Bushire, though 
vid Bagdad the land journej 7 is at least 200 
miles shorter. I saw the other day two stoves in 
Teheran which had been exactly one year on the 
journey by way of Bagdad, and even then had 
arrived in a worthless condition. Goods coming by 
way of Bushire take, as a rule, about six months to 
complete the journey. Yet there is nothing in the 
nature of things to prevent the Bagdad route being 
both quicker and cheaper. As regards Teheran the 
matter may not be of great importance, but things 
are different when we come to the whole Kermanshah 
and Hamadan districts, which in respect of their 
wealth have been but little appreciated, and which 
are now being gradually invaded by Russian goods 
from the north. In the whole of Southern Persia, 
from British Beluchistan to Luristan, there is no 
country to compare with the more favoured west, 



ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 309 

where the rainfall, if not always abundant, is at 
least sufficient to support a large agricultural and 
pastoral population living in countless villages, with 
a congeries of smaller towns like Burujird, Khoreni- 
abad, Sultanabad, Daolatabad, Kangawar, Naha- 
wand, Sena, and many others, all within a circle, 
whose centre lies between Kermanshah and Hamadan. 
and whose radius is about a hundred miles. This is 
a country well worth developing. 

The question is : What has the British Govern- 
ment done, or left undone, to develop the trade of 
this region, and what can it do ? Thirteen years 
ago, when the Karun River had been opened with 
such sanguine hopes to the trade of the world, it 
was intended to build a road from either Ahwaz or 
Shushter to the capital, passing on its way the 
towns of Dizful, Khoremabad, Burujird, Sultanabad, 
and Kum. Enterprises in Persia were then " boom- 
ing" and with a little encouragement from the 
British Government almost anything could have 
been undertaken. The British Government, how- 
ever, preferred to rest on its laurels. • A small sub- 
sidy was granted to Messrs. Lynch for the steamer 
which they ran between Ahwaz and Mohammerah, 
but the making of the road to Isfahan through the 
wild country of the Bakhtiaris — a task which might 
have daunted the most enterprising of firms — was 
accomplished without the smallest assistance on the 
part of our Government, and without eliciting as 
much as a word of thanks. In the meantime there 
came the affair of the Mining Corporation, the un- 
pleasant incidents of the Lottery Concession, the 



310 ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 

unsatisfactory result of the Tobacco Monopoly, and 
the name of Persia became anathema to the London 
Stock Exchange. Consequently the road scheme has 
languished and faded out of sight. Messrs. Lynch, 
with notable enterprise, have succeeded in opening 
up the Ahwaz-Isfahan route to traffic, the Bakhtiari 
Chiefs are thoroughly well disposed towards us, 
having seen the pecuniary advantage to be gained 
thereby, and last year all the material for building 
the new British telegraph line through Central 
Persia was carried over the Lynch road. But the 
Ahwaz-Isfahan route hardly comes within the scope 
of the present inquiry. 

The two routes which are of special importance to 
Western Persia are the Bagdad-Kermanshah route 
and the long-talked-of Ahwaz-Burujird route. For 
most purposes the Bagdad-Kermanshah way could 
always maintain its position as the great trade 
channel of Western Persia. It has been the high- 
way of armies and caravans as long as history goes 
back, and might still serve most commercial ends 
if a few improvements were made. It is not 
necessary to build a macadamised road from Bagdad 
to Teheran, nor is it possible to attempt anything of 
the sort, since the expense would be very great and 
the profits nil. Besides, macadamised roads do not 
necessarily decrease the cost of transport. On the 
Russian road between Besht and Teheran the freight 
charges are rather greater now that the road is 
built than they were before — amounting to the large 
sum of ninepence per ton mile — and the traffic is still 
carried on chiefly by means of mules and other pack- 



ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 311 

animals. All that need be done on the Bagdad- 
Kermanshah road is to spend a little money on im- 
proving the passage through the Zagros Mountains, 
so that the route might be made available and safe 
at all periods of the year. Unfortunately no one is 
likely to spend a penny on the Tak-i-Girra Pass. 
The Persian authorities do not care about it ; no 
private company could make any money out of it ; 
and the British Government would be horrified at 
the bare notion of spending a sixpence to improve a 
trade-route in Persia, especially one about which no 
person in the Foreign Office knows anything. Then 
there is the great crux of the river navigation. 
Unless the British firm which navigates the Tigris 
is allowed to put on extra boats on the run from 
Basra to Bagdad the trade on the Bagdad-Kerman- 
shah route must always be strictly limited to the 
carrying capacity of the present river steamers. A 
year or two ago Messrs. Lynch secured the right to 
attach a barge to each steamer as a temporary 
measure. The permission has now become more or 
less permaneDt, and there has been a considerable 
increase in the trade of Bagdad in consequence. 
But there the expansion ceases. There will always 
be a congestion at Basra, a delay on all goods carried, 
and unnecessarily high rates as long as the present 
state of things lasts. It can hardly be believed that 
the resources of British diplomacy have been ex- 
hausted in the endeavour to remove this most impor- 
tant restriction. 

A German syndicate can obtain a concession to 
run a railway line over the length and breadth of 



312 ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 

Asiatic Turkey, and yet a British company of long 
standing, with the whole force of the British Embassy 
behind it, cannot secure the right to run another 
steamer between Basra and Bagdad. It seems in- 
credible, yet I have been told on the best authority, 
not once but many times, that this is actually the 
case. Since Turkey is thus obdurate, and refuses to 
develop her own natural lines of communication, we 
are driven to a new route, and the only alternative 
to the Bagdad -Kermanshah road is the Ahwaz- 
Burujird-Teheran road, for which a concession has 
been held by the Imperial Bank of Persia for more 
than ten years. If the road were ever opened up 
to traffic it would have this advantage over the 
Bagdad route that it lies entirely within Persian 
territory and is therefore subject to no transit duty, 
and to none of the vagaries of the Turkish quarantine 
regulations. The Imperial Bank of Persia has re- 
tained the concession and worked at the beginning 
of it from Teheran in a fitful though useful way. 
But obviously road-making is not banking business, 
nor would the directors of any bank sanction the 
raising by the bank of money to embark on so specu- 
lative a venture as road-making in Persia. So far an 
excellent road — excellent, that is for Persia — has 
been made at considerable expense as far as Kum. 
Beyond Kum the mule track has been improved and 
in a few places metalled, so that it is possible to drive 
as far as Sultanabad, though as yet there are no tolls 
on that portion of the road and no relays of horses. 
The bank has, I believe, written off about ,£85,000 
on account of the road, and is not prepared to go any 



ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 313 

farther in the matter. In fact the concession and 
the going concern will very soon be sold. If ,£85,000 
has been spent on making one-third of the road — and 
that by far the easiest third — what sum is likely to 
be required in order to carry on the original scheme 
right down to the Karun ? The Russians, be it re- 
membered, have spent just half a million sterling on 
their Resht-Teheran road, a distance of 200 miles as 
compared with the 350 still remaining between 
Sultanabad and Ahwaz. 

No one in his senses would recommend the spend- 
ing of any such sum on any road in Persia, especially 
over a route which ought at no distant date to be 
used for a railway. Besides, metalled roads do not 
materially help transport in Persia, and certainly do 
not cheapen it. Still, something must be done, 
and must be done quickly, about the Teheran -Ahwaz 
route. Unless the British Government or some 
British firm moves in the matter the bank will have 
to sell back the concession and the road, as far as it 
is made, to the Persian Government, which is exactly 
the same thing as giving it to Russia. Nothing 
could conceivably hurt our reputation so much in 
Persia as the giving up of the Teheran-Kum road, 
which for more than a decade has been managed by 
Englishmen and has been known as the British road. 
Moreover, this portion of the Teheran- Ahwaz route 
has a double value as being a portion also of the 
regular trade-route between Teheran and Isfahan, 
the highway par excellence of Persia. How, then, 
can the existing concession be taken over without 
the expenditure of a sum of money which would 



314 ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 

frighten a British Chancellor of the Exchequer out of 
his wits? It can be done by exercising only a 
moderate amount of common sense. The Russian 
road was costly, partly because half the money went 
into the wrong pockets, and partly because the folly 
of building a metalled road for males to travel over 
was not appreciated. Similarly the ,£85,000 written 
off against the Kum road in the books of the bank 
does not all represent money spent on the road. The 
amount of mismanagement, too, which was lavished on 
the road was worthy of the traditions of foreign 
enterprise in Persia. Now at last the Kum road 
pays its way, so that if the British Government were 
to buy the concession cheap there could be no great 
loss on the transaction. 

As for the extension, the main thing to remember 
— and it is a most important point — is that for trade 
purposes in a country like Persia a made road is 
quite unnecessary. The difference beween the cost 
of a road and the cost of a mule-track is enormous. 
Between Sultanabad and Ahwaz an improved mule- 
track could be made with all the bridges needful for 
a sum not exceeding £20,000. It is an easier under- 
taking than the Ahwaz-Isfahan route, which did not 
cost much more than a quarter of that sum. Only, 
the Luri chiefs must be " squared." A suggestion 
was made to me by an authority on such matters in 
Teheran, which seems very feasible. The chiefs 
should be paid a lump sum down for the right to 
make a road through their country, and this sum 
should be deposited for them in the Bank of Persia, 
which will always give 6 per cent, interest on 



ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 315 

deposits. Then if the chiefs do not carry out their 
part of the bargain they can easily be fined, or their 
whole interest for a year might be forfeited. If 
the British Government were to deal with the 
question of the chiefs and were further to grant a 
small guarantee on the opening up of the route, or 
perhaps if the Government were to buy up the exist- 
ing concession and hand it over to a company to 
work it, then not only a great step would be taken 
towards developing Western Persia, but a great 
danger would be removed. For if our Government 
does not act very soon in the matter the bank will 
sell the concession and it will inevitably fall into the 
hands of Russia. The sum to be expended is a 
trifling matter compared with the interests involved. 
At the outside ,£15,000 or ,£20,000 should purchase 
the concession, and half the sum again would settle 
the Luri chiefs. If the Government was] willing to 
sink an amount then the route to Ahwaz could be 
profitably opened up by a private company, and what 
is also important, the Teheran-Shiraz route could be 
improved and come more under British influence. 
That such a move would strengthen our position 
in Persia enormously is shown by the activity with 
which Russian agents have of late been stirring up 
the Luri chiefs to oppose us, and have even been 
tampering with our friends the Bakhtiaris. If, on 
the other hand, our Government is lukewarm in the 
matter, and grudges this small expense, Russia will 
eventually come down to Isfahan, we shall suffer 
disgrace in the eyes of the Persians, and another nail 
will be driven into the coffin of British prestige. 



316 ROUTES IN WESTERN PERSIA 

One has no scruples in advocating most strongly 
the effective opening up of the Ahwaz-Teheran 
route — by a mule-track, be it clearly understood — 
because at a small expense it would help to prepare 
the way for the railway which we shall soon be 
forced to build from the Gulf to Teheran. The 
question of railways cannot, however, be discussed 
in this chapter. It is sufficient to point out what 
can easily be done, and what must be done unless 
our trade and political influence are to go steadily 
back in Persia. There should also be an increase in 
our consular service for Western Persia. It is 
hardly less than scandalous that we have not even 
a consular agent in Kermanshah or anywhere in 
all Luristan. As usual the outside critic maintains 
that the British merchant is quite able to take care 
of himself, just as if a private merchant were able 
to press reforms on the Turkish or Persian Govern- 
ment. One often wonders why the British nation, 
and in this case the people of India, are forced to 
keep up the most expensive diplomatic and consular 
services in the world, only to be told that it is not 
the business of those services or of the Government 
to foster or coddle British trade, which should long 
ago have learned to walk by itself. If we were to 
change the metaphor, and regard our competitors in 
trade as soldiers in a war of commerce, who fight 
under cover of heavy artillery against the British 
manufacturer with no guns at all, we should arrive 
at a much more truthful picture of the great struggle 
which is ceaselessly raging around us. 



CHAPTER XXII 

TEHERAN 

Whatever may be one's opinion of the pleasures of 
road travel in Persia, it will always be found enjoy- 
able after nearly a month of caravaning to come on 
an oasis like Kum, where, instead of a battered 
caravanserai or a filthy mud hovel, the traveller 
finds almost luxurious lodging at the rest-house of 
the Road Company, which, in point of size and com- 
fort, might almost vie with an inferior up-country 
hotel in India. If he comes from the West he sees 
also for the first time the various conveniences of a 
post-house on a main route in Persia. He can at a 
few minutes' notice order a relay of horses to take 
him on to Teheran, or, better still, he can engage a 
phaeton, and so cover the last ninety miles of his 
journey in the incredibly short space of twenty hours 
with comparative ease and little fatigue. The phaeton 
is a species of tarantass with low wheels and no faci- 
lities for carrying baggage : in fact, a vehicle singu- 
larly ill-adapted to the requirements of Persian 
travel. It is also rather costly, the fare from Kum 
to Teheran, including the minimum tip for the driver 
on each stage, amounting to just £&. Yet to drive 
ninety odd miles in less than twenty-four hours is in 
Persia so much like putting on seven-leagued boots 



318 TEHERAN 

in any other country that one would gladly pay 
treble the price to be relieved from the monotony of 
caravan pace. 

It was pleasant to wake up as we changed horses 
at Aliabad just before sunrise, and to see for the 
first time the beautiful white cone of Demavend, the 
Fujiyama of Persia, which is visible by day to the 
traveller long before he reaches Kum on his way 
from the Gulf, and serves as a mark to sailors on the 
Caspian from a little east of Enzeli to Bunder-i-Gez. 
When I saw it first in the early morning — storm- 
clouds having obscured it from view the night before 
— it was looking its best at a distance of seventy 
miles or so. which was sufficient to separate the great 
sugar cone from the rough mass of the Elburz range, 
and yet not too great to rob the mountain of its im- 
posing grandeur. The saffron rays of the morning 
lighted on 7000 feet of pure snow, while the moun- 
tain billows below were still in shadow and nothing 
could be distinguished on the intervening desert 
except the glimmer of the great salt lake to the 
right of the road. 

As the fresh horses tore down the slopes of the 
ridges towards Teheran — encouraged by both the 
brisk air of the desert and the promise of bakshish 
to the driver — we came on a great cavalcade of 
horsemen stretched for miles along the road, and 
followed at length by two closed victorias and a few 
phaetons. The new Governor of Shiraz was on his 
way from the capital to his post. After crossing the 
fine stone bridge which is one of the achievements 
of the English Road Company we mounted the last 



TEHERAN 319 

ridge which separated us from the Plain of Teheran, 
and saw at length the green mass, larger than the 
other oases in the desert, which indicates the capital. 
Situated at the foot of the great Elburz rampart, 
which at the time of my visit was still covered for 
iooo feet with snow, in a plain thirty miles wide at 
least, on which the irrigated fields stood out at this 
season like green squares on a chessboard, with 
Demavend standing sentinel among the clouds to 
the north-east, Teheran might be made a fitting 
capital for a great empire. As it is, being possessed 
of not a single building of note, and surrounded by 
insignificant walls of mud brick, enlivened at the 
gateways with the most deplorable tile-work, the 
city of the King of Kings has nothing beyond its 
natural surroundings to recommend it to the view of 
the approaching traveller. 

From the summit of the last ridge the one feature 
added by human effort to the landscape which 
strikes the eye is the gleaming dome of the mosque 
of Shah Abdul Azim, which flashes like a helio- 
graph from the heart of a large grove a few miles to 
the south of the city. One notices, also, as one 
draws nearer to the capital, a large building on the 
road with an iron roof painted red, which turns out 
to be the sugar factory erected by Belgian capital, 
but, like every other enterprise of the sort in Persia, 
abandoned and useless. The little railway which runs 
parallel with the road from Shah Abdul Azim to the 
south gate of Teheran — a distance of about six miles 
— is an exception to the rule : it is positively in 
working order, and the receipts exceed the expenses. 



320 TEHERAN 

Inside the city there is a tram line with cars drawn 
by horses, which is managed by the railway company 
— now a Russian concern — and this, too, pays its way. 
Driving through the dusty streets and across the 
uneven cobbles of the principal square to the street 
of the Legations I came to the signboard of the 
English hotel, one of the few foreign designations in 
Teheran which are not printed in Russian, and found 
comfortable quarters in a picturesque little courtyard 
full of trees and flowers. 

Teheran is still out of the track of the regular 
globe-trotter, and will continue to be so until it is 
connected by rail with Europe and India. In spite 
of the bracing climate and the brilliant sunshine of 
Persia it may be safely asserted that, apart from 
archaeological interests, there are few countries in 
the world which are not a great deal more attractive 
to the traveller. Nevertheless, political or commercial 
considerations have drawn so many Europeans in 
recent years to the Shah's capital that a description 
of the city at this time of day would be altogether 
out of place. I shall only, before plunging into the 
bewildering vortex of Persian statistics, indulge in 
the respite of a little orientation in order to fix the 
point of view from which the progress of affairs must 
be judged at the present moment. Strange to say, 
to talk of the progress of affairs in Persia, that most 
sedentary of countries, is for the moment no abuse of 
terms. In travelling through the country you may 
be surprised to find how fresh and up-to-date is every 
paragraph in Lord Curzon's standard work begun, 
laboured at, and finished more than ten years ago ; 



TEHERAN 321 

or for the matter of that the immortal " Haji Baba 
of Isfahan " seems to live to-day in half the Persians 
you meet, with the self-same surroundings and local 
colouring which greeted Morier on his way from 
Bushire to Teheran close on a century back. But at 
Teheran, the focus of foreign influence and intrigue, 
events are succeeding one another at such a rapid 
rate that even Lord Curzon's summing up of the 
political and commercial situation is fast becoming 
obsolete. 

The departure of the Shah and the long Moharram 
holiday, which practically puts a stop to business for 
a fortnight, had made Teheran quieter than usual 
when I arrived. The foreign Ministers were resting 
from their labours, and many of them were not in the 
capital. Mr. Griscom, the United States representa- 
tive, who is, perhaps, the youngest minister in the 
service of any Foreign Office, was on a tour to Isfahan 
and Hamadan. The German Minister was in Europe, 
leaving the affairs of the nation in the hands of 
another very young man, Baron Kiihlmann, who, 
being well on the right side of thirty, may claim to 
be the youngest charge d'affaires at present in exist- 
ence. I was fortunate to catch our own Minister 
just before he started on a flying trip to Isfahan. 
The foreign merchants were for the most part waiting 
for the Moharram festivities to close, and speculating 
in the meantime on the probable result of the extra- 
ordinary efforts being made to push Hussian trade in 
Persia. Even the concession-hunters had ceased to 
trouble, having migrated with the spring to Europe 
to sell their concessions and to start syndicates, 

x 



322 TEHERAN 

leaving behind them only a jetsam of unsuccessful 
promoters of foreign industry in Persia. For the 
searcher after knowledge such a season as this is 
perhaps the most advantageous, since it is just at the 
quietest moments that real schemes have time to 
mature and the essential features of the situation 
become less obscure. Moreover, the men who are 
really powers in Persia have leisure to converse. 

Outside the Legations there are four men of com- 
manding position in the foreign element of Teheran 
to-day. First, in virtue of his long service in Persia, 
extending over thirty-five years, and his wonderful 
knowledge of the country and its capabilities, stands 
General Houtum-Schindler, who has filled almost 
every post which it has been possible for a foreigner 
to fill in the service of the Shah from the time that 
he left the department of the Indian Government 
Telegraph. There is hardly an article on Persia in 
any encyclopaedia or official publication or year-book 
which has not been written by General Schindler, or 
at least with his assistance. Latterly he has not 
been in the best of health, and he seldom goes outside 
the walls of his compound, but he is still the source 
of information to which all travellers instinctively 
turn, and from which no one has ever been sent 
empty away. If he is now a trifle pessimistic about 
the future of Persia, and especially about the future 
of British interests in Persia, that is no more than 
might be expected in one who has seen what he has 
seen during the whole of his career. It is still a 
liberal education in all things Persian to go and sit 
in his study in the afternoon where he is surrounded 



TEHERAN 323 

by newspapers and magazines in every European 
tongue, all of which he diligently reads, and to hear 
him discourse on a subject about which it may truly 
be said that he has forgotten more than most people 
have ever known. 

Next to him as regards seniority of service in Persia 
comes Mr. Joseph Babino, the manager of the Imperial 
Bank of Persia. Mr. Babino has been in Persia as 
long as the bank itself, that is to say, about thirteen 
years, and has brought an acute mind to bear on the 
desperate intricacies of Persian finance. He combines 
the effects of an early training in that great school of 
banking, the Credit Lyonnais, with a knowledge of 
Eastern ways and Eastern finance gained by a long 
service in Egypt, and certainly, as far as the English 
language goes, he may be said to be the only authority 
on the monetary system of Persia. His pamphlet 
written for the Institute of Bankers very soon after he 
came to Persia, is practically as true now as it was 
ten years ago, while a more recent paper read before the 
Statistical Society only last year gives an admirable 
summary of the economical situation in Persia to-day. 

It is characteristic of the British Government, at 
all events where the politics of the East are con- 
cerned, that while it possesses a wealth of such 
trained men as Mr. Babino ready to render it every 
service, it rarely asks their advice, and still more 
rarely follows the advice when given. The Bussian 
Government acts in a very different way. It also 
possesses in the manager of the Bussian bank — 
originally the Banque de Prets, now the Banque 
d'Escompte and really a branch of the Bussian State 



324 TEHERAN 

Bank — an exceedingly able financier, who plays in 
Persia a part similar to that filled by Mr. Pokotilov, 
the manager of the Russo- Chinese Bank in China. 
Indeed, since he is the protege of M. Witte, it is not 
certain that he does not indirectly wield a greater 
power than the present occupant of the Russian 
Legation. At all events the head of the Russian 
Bank in Teheran, being not only a financier but a 
trusted agent of his own Government and also an 
important factor in the commercial undertakings 
which the bank fosters, may be regarded as one at 
least of the most powerful men in the Persian 
capital. 

Last, but not least, of the four predominant figures 
is Mr. Naus, the Director- General of Customs for 
Persia. In most other countries the controller of 
customs is merely a paid official of the Government, 
entrusted with certain routine work which has no 
political significance. In a country like Persia, how- 
ever, where the customs have been placed in the 
hands of a foreign staff, and where the money 
collected at the ports is almost the only available 
security for the raising of foreign loans, the con- 
troller may, if he likes, become a political factor of 
importance. There is nothing, for example, to 
prevent Mr. Naus filling in Persia the place which 
in China has for so many years been occupied by 
Sir Robert Hart. Indeed, the possibilities in the 
case of Mr. Naus are even greater ; for while the 
famous " I.G." has always shown what is perhaps a 
constitutional disinclination to invest his office with 
a political significance, his Belgian counterpart in 



TEHERAN 325 

Persia strikes one as being of a different and more 
ambitious character. Mr. Naus is a large powerful 
man of the fair Flemish type, with a big head on his 
broad shoulders, and a strong, not to say cruel, jaw. 
His utterance, sharp, incisive, and slightly guttural, 
with an almost ferocious rolling of the " r's," leaves no 
doubt on the mind of the hearer as to the intention 
of the speaker. To converse with him for five 
minutes is to be convinced of his executive ability, 
and his power to control his subordinates. 

Mr. Naus' record speaks for itself. Brought out 
to Persia from the Customs Department of Belgium, 
in 1898, he first of all undertook the collecting of 
duties at Tabriz and Kermanshah. So successful 
was the first attempt to do away with the pernicious 
system of farming the customs, that the experiment 
was soon extended, until in 1 900 nearly all the ports 
of entry were included in the new regime. By the 
end of the twelvemonth, March 1900 to March 
1 90 1, the customs revenue had increased 50 per 
cent., though the full 5 per cent, duty was not 
yet exacted at all the ports. The year 1901- 
1902 was even more successful. The full duty 
was collected at every barrier except at Moham- 
merah, where the Sheikh still farmed the customs, 
with the result that the total sum collected (of 
which the figures are not yet published) was just 
about double what the Persian Government used to 
obtain when Mr. Naus first arrived from Europe. 
That the new regime should have been inaugurated 
without mistakes was not to be expected. I have in 
a former chapter pointed out the errors of judgment 



326 TEHERAN 

which have been committed in the Gulf, where the 
subordinates are a long way from headquarters. 
Nor are we here concerned with the question 
whether the establishment of foreign control over 
the customs under Belgian direction has been 
beneficial or otherwise to British interests in 
Persia. 

As a means of collecting revenue the new regime 
has been entirely successful, and as such it may be 
duly admired as one of the very few instances of 
foreign management iu Persia which have not proved 
total failures. Moreover, lest there should be any 
misconception, it is only fair to point out that the 
control of the customs is in no sort of way in the 
hands of Bussia. Not long ago an Anglo-Indian 
traveller, who had returned to Europe by way of the 
Seistan route, remarked in a public address that the 
Belgian customs were simply Bussian under another 
name, or words of like effect. Whether this is so 
remains to be seen ; one can only say that in view 
of the present facts the remark is wholly unjustified. 
There is not a single Bussian in the Customs De- 
partment, nor have the Bussians any interest at all 
in the collection of the customs, save in so far as the 
greater part of the revenue so collected is hypothe- 
cated as security for the Bussian loans, and this 
might equally have been the case if Mr. Naus and 
all his subordinates had been British. That the 
controller of customs is pro-Bussian rather than pro- 
British may very well be the case — he would hardly 
be a Belgian if he were not — and anyhow, as an 
ambitious man, with expansive ideas, he would 



TEHERAN 327 

naturally side with the Power that has a far-sighted 
and constructive policy in Persia. 

For that reason it is difficult to avoid the con- 
clusion that Great Britain is likely to be handicapped 
in the future by the presence of the Belgians as a 
factor in Persian politics. But to state that Russia, 
through the Belgians, has even now the control of 
the Persian customs is neither just nor true, nor is it 
right to withhold from Mr. Naus the credit that is 
already due to him as an exceedingly able adminis- 
trator. In a wonderfully short space of time he has 
presented the Shah with a new and tangible asset 
which that monarch has already mortgaged. In the 
meantime Mr. Naus has been preparing a new set of 
commercial treaties, which may produce a still greater 
customs revenue, and are believed by many to be 
framed for the special advantage of Russia. That 
we shall know when the new commercial treaty with 
Russia is promulgated. One thing is quite certain — 
that we shall hear a good deal more of Mr. Naus 
before we have done with the Persian question. 

These, then, are the four great men of Teheran, 
leaving aside the Diplomatic Corps, which may be 
said to be in Teheran, but not of it — the members of 
the various legations being little more than transient 
visitors, whose actions are controlled by foreign 
cabinets or Ministers for Foreign Affairs and dictated 
by political emergencies altogether outside of Persia. 
Down below, on a quite different level, are the 
numerous concession hunters and those whose con- 
cessions have actually crystallised into industries 
which are for the most part complete and unmitigated 



328 TEHERAN 

failures. These may be divided into two classes — 
the optimists and the pessimists. To the first class 
belong those whose schemes are still on paper and 
who, therefore, still entertain hopes of extracting 
capital from the more gullible investors of Europe. 
To the second class belong those whose schemes have 
materialised and failed and who, therefore, have little 
more to hope for in either Europe or Persia. As it 
happened the optimists had mostly departed for 
Europe when I reached Teheran. Their name is not 
legion. Indeed, the class which is rapidly becoming 
extinct, would seem to be represented almost entirely 
by two famous and inveterate concessionists. Their 
trump card is still a great railway concession, which 
was obtained from the Persian Government, about 
twenty years ago, and has never yet reached even 
the syndicate stage. It is registered in the French 
Legation, which will have none of it since the Franco- 
Russian Alliance bound the interests of France to 
those of Russia in the East. Naturally no other 
legation is likely to take it up, so that, for all the 
optimism of the sanguine owners, it is likely to remain 
a concession and nothing more. 

On the other hand, the Belgians — it always seems 
to be the Belgians who start these schemes — have 
left their monuments in and about Teheran, still 
tended by a dwindling staff of managers and workers 
whose ill success has jaundiced their view of foreign 
enterprise in Persia. There is, for instance, the sugar 
factory — a fine building with plenty of foreign ma- 
chinery, which was to have done wonders for Persian 
industry. Unfortunately the originators of the 



TEHERAN 329 

enterprise had forgotten to calculate the amount of 
beetroot available for the manufacture of sugar, and 
it was not until the capital had been spent and the 
work started that the total supply was found to be 
just sufficient to keep the factory going for six 
months in every three years. The gas works have 
suffered a similar fate. There is nothing wrong with 
the works or the number of lamps which were put up 
in a few of the streets of Teheran. There are also 
large coal mines within forty miles of the city. But 
the simple fact had been overlooked that owing to 
the abnormal cost of transport in Persia the coal 
could not be delivered in Teheran at a price much 
below ^5 a ton. Hence the experience of the gas 
works. The sanguine management had entered into 
a three years' contract to supply a Persian dealer 
with the refuse coke — so that the gas works must go 
on making coke at a heavy loss though they have 
ceased to make gas. Another company — Belgian, of 
course — started a glass factory in Teheran, but the 
result was disappointing. 

Then an attempt has been made to improve farming 
in Persia by starting a model village with fresh 
stock, good seeds, and a dairy regulated according to 
the experience of Europe and America. The manager 
arrived, a Belgian, but one with a wide knowledge of 
farming in the Western States of America. He was 
given a village on the south side of Teheran, which 
was inhabited by notoriously bad characters ; the 
good European seed which he distributed was readily 
absorbed, but never reappeared in the shape of crops 
His prize cattle from Russia were unable to breed 



330 TEHERAN 

with the Persian cow ; his dairy, from which much 
was hoped, was the least successful of all because in 
the first place everything he bought, whether it was 
fodder or cattle or milk, was sold to the " feringhi " 
at prohibitive prices ; and secondly, not a single 
Persian would touch cream or butter or cheese which 
was polluted by the management of an infidel. In a 
word, the Persians ensured his discomfiture before he 
had so much as started work. He is now longing 
for the time when his contract will close and he may 
return to what his adopted countrymen call " God's 
own country." 

In going to Teheran at the season at which I was 
there one is confronted almost entirely with the 
pessimist view of foreign enterprise in Persia. I was 
hardly surprised to find that this pessimism was 
particularly marked where the interests of Great 
Britain were concerned. Russian trade has been 
making rapid strides lately in the north, and is even 
penetrating to Isfahan and the south, to the detri- 
ment, it is said, of British trade — and as for 
Russian prestige and influence they are now supreme 
throughout Persia. This view, which seems to be 
held by every one in Teheran, has also been expressed 
by many writers in Europe, but by none so vigorously 
as a certain Dr. Rohrbach, who, after a rapid journey 
through Persia in 1901, contributed an article on 
the country to the " Prussian Year-book," in which 
he states, and endeavours to prove, that the future 
of Great Britain, as far as Persia is concerned, is 
absolutely nil. " England's zukunft im Lande vorbei 
ist, vorbei vom Golf bis an der Kaspi, von den Alpen 



TEHERAN 331 

Kurdistans bis zur pforte von Indien " (" England's 
future in the land is past, from the Gulf to the 
Caspian, from the mountains of Kurdistan to the 
gates of India) ". If this were really true it would be 
a very serious matter. If it is not actually true to- 
day but may become so to-morrow, it is still more 
serious, just as sickness must cause more anxiety 
than death. There is such a strong feeling among 
those who ought to know something about Persian 
affairs that if it is not true now it is a state of things 
which can only be averted by means of a strong and 
determined effort that I feel induced to examine the 
facts of the case as far as they can be ascertained in 
a country like Persia — and this in spite of the 
copious magazine literature already devoted to the 
subject, which seems always to miss the essential 
points and is seldom well informed. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

The general opinion in Teheran is that Russia is 
driving Great Britain out of the field in Persia. I 
have already quoted the sweeping statement made 
on this subject in the pages of the " Prussian Year- 
book " by a German traveller. He merely expressed 
in writing what every one, of whatever nationality, 
constantly repeats in conversation in Persia. The 
cry is not a new one, but it has grown in volume in 
recent years, and there are many facts which seem 
to justify it. Nothing can conduce more effectually 
to the carrying out of a wise British policy in Persia 
than a clear understanding of these facts. 

For the sake of convenience I shall divide the dis- 
cussion of the whole question into three parts. First 
and foremost, we have to decide whether it is true, 
as is frequently asserted, that Russia is capturing the 
trade in Persia, which once was so largely British ; 
secondly, it is important to know what has been 
done by either Power to advance its trade, and 
whether it is true that Russia has a great advantage 
in the matter of communications ; thirdly, it remains 
to deal with the constant assertion that while 
Russian political influence has grown to enormous 
proportions at the capital of the Shah, the prestige 



GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

of Great Britain has not only waned but has ceased 
to exist. 

The trade question may be regarded as by far the 
most important, because for a Power like Great 
Britain, whose policy is almost entirely directed by 
commercial motives, it is necessary above all things 
to know whether we have real trade interests in 
Persia, and whether those interests are increasing 
or decreasing. 

There is the initial difficulty in dealing with this 
portion of the subject that there are no trustworthy 
figures to be obtained in Persia. There is, indeed, 
no other country in the world where it is easier, by 
a little statistical juggling, to prove that of two con- 
tradictory propositions both may be true. The only 
possible means of escaping a reductio ad absurdum 
lies in appraising each set of figures at its true 
value, or, to put it more forcibly, to extract the 
modicum of truth from each tissue of falsehood. To 
be completely successful in the task is practically 
impossible. I shall be content if I can modify the 
sweeping statements which have been made by 
those who have glanced only at one set of figures, 
and that perhaps the least trustworthy, without 
taking the trouble to discriminate or compare. 

Two landmarks may be chosen at the outset in 
order to keep the discussion within reasonable 
bounds. The first of these is the admirable sum- 
ming up of the commercial situation in Persia about 
the year 1890 by Lord Curzon, which offers an 
excellent standard of comparison, and the second is 
the set of figures which emanated from the office 



334 GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

of the new Customs Administration for the year 
1 900- 1 90 1, the Persian year beginning on March 21, 
according to our calendar. 

The author of the standard work on Persia, after 
a minute and laborious research, estimated the total 
foreign trade of Persia about the year 1890 at from 
,£7,000,000 to £7,500,000 sterling, divided between 
imports and exports in the ratio of two to one — i.e., 
£"5,000,000 imports, and £"2,500,000 exports. He 
also gives a lower estimate, based on another series 
of facts or so-called facts, but he evidently prefers 
the higher total. Of this trade England and all 
British possessions absorbed about £"3,000,000, of 
which ,£2,000,000 might be imports into Persia, and 
,£1,000,000 exports from Persia. Russia, on the 
other hand, even on her own showing, could not 
claim more than £"881,920 of the imports, and 
,£1,164,968 of the exports, a total of a little over 
£"2,000,000. 

In those days, therefore — not much more than ten 
years ago — of the whole trade of Persia, amounting 
to ,£7,500,000 sterling, Great Britain and her de- 
pendencies accounted for 40 per cent, and Russia for 
26 or 27 per cent. But if we confine our attention 
to the imports, which for our commerce are of far 
greater importance than the exports, the comparison 
was even more favourable to us. Our share was still 
40 per cent., while that of Russia was only 17.6 
per cent. 

It may be argued that these figures are at best 
only approximations, and very rough approximations; 
and, indeed, it would be easy enough to take excep- 



GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 335 

tion to many of Lord Curzon's computations. But 
to do so would lead to hopeless confusion, while on 
the other hand it must be remembered that since 
any calculation in Persia partakes of the nature of 
guesswork, we can only come to any conclusion at all 
by accepting the results of the most painstaking 
research that has yet been devoted to the subject. 

Then let us look for a moment towards the other 
landmark. The figures given out by Mr. Naus, and 
published in the " Statesman's Year-book " for 1902, 
refer to the year March 21, 1900, to March 21, 1901, 
and they have been quoted by almost every writer 
who has dealt with the subject in the newspapers 
and magazines of the last few months. Moreover, 
as emanating from the bureau of the Belgian Ad- 
ministration, they command a respect which is not 
accorded to most Persian statistics, not even to 
consular reports. When compared with Lord 
Curzon's figures of ten years before, they exhibit 
a most remarkable and melancholy decline in British 
trade, and a corresponding advance on the part of 
Russia, quite sufficient to justify the most pessimistic 
predictions. The total trade of Persia is given as 
,£8,000,000, an increase of only ,£500,000 over Lord 
Curzon's estimate for 1889. Of this sum Russia 
claims ,£4,501,000, or 56.3 per cent., and Great 
Britain .£1,920,000, or 24 per cent. 

If we turn to the column of imports, the disparity 
is not quite so striking, but is still great enough 
to be exceedingly discouraging. Russian goods, 
according to the table, amounted in value to 
^28,58,000, or 55.9 per cent, of the total, while 



336 GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

the British and British Indian imports were valued 
at only £1,400,000, or 27.4 per cent. The sum 
total of imports is entered as ,£5,107,000, or only 
£"107,000 above the round sum given by Lord 
Curzon ten years before. 

Now, the melancholy thing about this table of 
figures is not so much the relative advance made by 
Russia as the actual — not comparative — falling off 
in British imports. It should be here explained 
that throughout the discussion I regard British trade 
as embracing the trade of India and other British 
possessions. Instead of the £2,000,000 of 1 889-1 890, 
we find only £ 1 ,400,000 in 1 900- 1 90 1 . The exports 
to British possessions have also fallen off woefully, 
though that is a matter which does not so directly 
concern our manufacturing prosperity. 

It is curious that so extraordinary a change in the 
commercial conditions of Persia should have been 
accepted by British writers without any further 
inquiry. And this is not entirely due to the general 
apathy in England with regard to Persian affairs, for 
I find the same calm acceptance of these sad figures 
in an article in the January number of the Quarterly 
Review for 1902 which is not only an eloquent 
demand for a clearer understanding of the Persian 
and Mesopotamian questions, but is evidently written 
by some one who is in close touch with the passing 
events of the Persian capital. 

His apparent knowledge of Persian affairs should 
have warned this writer not to take as accurate the 
testimony of any statistics that ever came out of 
Teheran without at least some attempt to check 




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GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 337 

them. In reality this Customs House report is 
unreliable and is, in fact, not a Customs House 
report at all. That is where the author of the 
article in the Quarterly has been misled. 

The year in question was the first in which the 
Belgian Administration took more or less complete 
charge of the various ports of entry into Persia, the 
only place of any importance still omitted from their 
jurisdiction being Mohammerah. Still, as it was 
only the first year, and it was impossible all at 
once to impose the full duties and to abolish all 
the old abuses which had grown up under the 
farming system, Mr. Naus, the Controller of Cus- 
toms, published no report whatever; nor has there 
been, as yet, any customs report for a year's trade in 
Persia. 

It is only fair, then, to state that Mr. Naus is not 
responsible for the publication of figures in the 
" Statesman's Year-book " or elsewhere. He did, 
however, give what figures he had to one or two 
people in Teheran, with permission to use the in- 
formation for publication if they so desired, and it is 
perfectly correct to state, as did the writer of the 
article in the " Statesman's Year-book " that the 
figures given were kindly furnished by the Customs 
Administration. But this is a very different thing 
from a customs report for which the Controller of 
Customs would be directly reponsible. 

It remains, then, to consider how far these figures, 
informally given out to a few individuals in Teheran, 
expressed the actual facts of the case. For my own 
part I regard them as quite untrustworthy. On the 



338 GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

face of the matter it must be evident to any one 
who knows anything about the trade of Persia that 
the imports into the country must have increased 
more than ,£107,000 in the last ten years. 

For not only do consular reports show an increase, 
but, if they are not to be taken seriously, one has 
only to look at the increase of shipping in the Gulf 
on the one hand, and the enormous efforts being 
made by Russia in the north to monopolise the trade 
of Persia, to be convinced that the volume of trade 
and to a less extent the sterling value of trade 
must have increased more than 2 per cent, in ten 
years. It is equally obvious that British trade, 
which still has almost a monopoly of the Gulf routes 
and the Bagdad route, which is predominant as far 
north as Isfahan, and still competes on rather more 
than equal terms with the trade of Russia in Tabriz 
and Hamadan, and which is by no means extinct in 
Teheran and Meshed, can hardly have fallen to less 
than half the value of its rival, which ten years ago 
it so far outstripped. 

These superficial reflections, which are, never 
theless, confirmed by observation on the spot, are 
sufficient to cast a good deal of doubt on the so-called 
customs returns. But when we come down to figures 
the doubts are changed to certainties. 

The Administration reports of the Persian Gulf 
for the year 1900 show a total trade in British and 
British-Indian goods with the Gulf ports of 
,£1,500,000. If we add to this total ,£295,154 for 
the import of British goods into Mohammerah and 
,£700,000 on account of the Kermanshah route, 



GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 339 

which I have discussed at length in a previous 
chapter, and ,£260,000 for the transit trade by way 
of Trebizond — and this is a minimum figure — we 
arrive at a total of not less than £"2,750,000 for the 
value of British and British-Indian imports into 
Persia. 

This estimate could be further enlarged by a few 
other items such as the small trade on the Seistan 
route, and the imports into one or two insignificant 
ports like Chahhar. But how can it be reconciled 
with the £"1,400,000 of the customs figures ? It is 
a common practice to sneer at consular returns, 
especially in a country like Persia, where there are 
very few consuls de carriere in the service of the 
British Government. But the figures I have quoted 
are not entirely taken from consular reports. 

I have compared a number of independent autho- 
rities on the subject of the Tabriz trade, and the 
lowest estimate that can be given of British trade 
coming into Tabriz (including the import of Indian 
tea) is £"260,000. As regards Kermanshah we have 
the consular report of 1897 with the estimate made 
by the syndicate of merchants who wished to tender 
for the customs, and the actual returns of last year 
in the books of the custom house which at least 
furnishes us with a minimum figure, and £"700,000 
is likely to be under rather than over the true 
amount. 

As for the Administration reports of the Gulf 
furnished by the Indian Government Press, their 
trade statistics are based almost entirely on the 
manifests of British steamers which practically 



340 GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

monopolise the trade of the Gulf, aided by the 
invoices of the foreign trading firms which certainly 
would not overstate the value of imports that have 
to pass through a customs house. No account is 
taken of the desultory commerce with India, which 
is served by the native sailing-craft. I see no reason 
at all, therefore, why the British officials in the Gulf 
should be supposed to have given exaggerated reports 
of the British trade with the Gulf ports. 

Two facts should be borne in mind in attempting 
to account for the extraordinary discrepancy between 
the total I have arrived at and the total given by the 
Customs Administration. In the first place, Moham- 
merah, which is responsible for .£295,154, was not 
under the jurisdiction of Mr. Naus, and, in the 
second place, the Administration reports of the Gulf 
deal with the year reckoned from the 1st of January 
to the 1st of January following, while the customs 
year is reckoned from the 21st of March — and it is 
possible thai the Bushire and Lingah and Bunder 
Abbas merchants endeavoured to avoid the enhanced 
duties which came in force with the new regime on 
March 21,1 900, by getting in the bulk of the goods 
for the year before that date. But even these con- 
siderations will not account for the difference between 
£"2,750,000 and £"1,400,000. 

Must we, then, impugn the figures given in the 
" Statesman's Year-book " and elsewhere ? I am 
convinced of the absolute straightforwardness of the 
authority on Persia who gave these figures to the 
world. There cannot be a shadow of doubt that he 
received them from Mr. Naus, who undoubtedly gave 



GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 341 

the totals as he got them from the various branches 
of his department. But, as it is hardly necessary to 
point out, customs returns, while they fix a minimum 
figure, may still give an inaccurate idea of the volume 
of trade. The new regime was hardly in working 
order, and it seems to have been particularly irregular 
in those places which were farthest removed from the 
eye of the controller. There is no doubt that the 
revenue was not properly collected at Kermanshah 
until Baron Wedel, the present director, was sent to 
the post. I do not for an instant mean to say that 
the late director of customs of Bushire, who met with 
an untimely death last year, was not strictly honest 
in his dealings. It is only sufficient to suppose that 
coming to the Gulf, where the revenue collected 
under the old farming system had been ridiculously 
inadequate, and where the new system had not been 
tentatively begun previously as in the north, he was 
unable in the first year to exact proper duties or to 
arrive at the true value of the trade. He did not, 
in fact, collect more than 3 per cent, at the outside 
as an average rate, and it may very well be that in 
adding up totals in Teheran the customs revenue of 
the Gulf was taken as a criterion of the trade of the 
Gulf ports on a basis of 5 per cent., the legal duty, 
which would result in under-estimating the true 
volume of trade by two-fifths. 

It may be argued at this point that if British trade 
was undervalued the same may be true of Russian 
trade. All we can say on that point is that we have 
the very best indications from independent sources 
that British trade was undervalued, while all the 



342 GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

estimates that can be got of Russian imports from 
merchants themselves and other independent sources 
such as the great Russian transport company (the 
Caucase Mercure) seem to show that the customs 
estimate is quite high enough. Nor is it at all 
unlikely that the new administration was more 
effective in the north within easy reach of Teheran 
than in the distant south. I have, moreover, a rather 
curious means of confirming this view, which is not 
conclusive, but is, nevertheless, of sufficient interest 
to set down here. 

The Customs Administration has promised its first 
real report for the trade of the year 1 901 -1902. In 
the meantime Mr. Naus was good enough to furnish 
me with the figures for the first six months of the 
year as well as those of the first six months of the 
previous year with which they are compared. There 
was no distinction made between nationalities or 
ports of entry in the lists he gave me, but he volun- 
teered the information that the increase in the value 
of the trade was almost entirely in favour of Great 
Britain and her dependencies. On examining the 
figures I discovered that there was an increase of 26 
per cent, in the imports for the first six months. If 
this average were to be kept up for the rest of the 
year the total increase in imports for the year 1901- 
1902 over the previous year would be ,£1,327,820, 
and if the increase were to continue to be in favour 
of Great Britain and India the share of the imports 
for the whole year held by British and Indian manu- 
facturers would be £2,727,820. 

These are two big assumptions, it is true, yet it is 



GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 343 

curious that the sum arrived at corresponds with 
the ,£2,750,000 which I gave as the more correct 
estimate of British trade. If we allow for a small 
proportion of the increase in the customs figures 
falling to other nations, it must also be remembered 
that the customs returns still omit Mohammerah 
with its £295,154 of British and Indian imports. I 
would not be at all surprised, then, judging from 
what Mr. Naus himself told me, to find that the 
customs returns for 1 901-1902 attribute to Great 
Britain almost as large a share of the imports as I 
have given for 1 900-1 901 ; that is to say, the amount 
in the customs books will be almost doubled. 

But can it really be a fact that the value of British 
imports has increased 100 per cent, in one year? 
Most decidedly not. Last year's Administration re- 
ports for the Gulf have not yet reached Teheran, 
but I know from personal inquiry that British trade 
in the Gulf increased very little, if at all, last year. 
It may have risen a little at Bunder Abbas, but it 
probably fell at Bushire, so that the total is hardly 
altered. At Bagdad it varied very little, and at 
Tabriz, if it increased at all— which I cannot dis- 
cover — the amount must have been insignificant. 
If, therefore, the customs returns show an increase 
in the value of British imports of from 90 to 100 per 
cent, over the previous year, one can only conclude 
that the returns of the previous year were quite 
wrong as regards this portion of the trade. 

On the whole I am firmly convinced by personal 
inquiry and by published reports of our own consuls, 
which I would not regard as conclusive if they were 



344 GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

not backed by abundant local evidence, that while 
the value of Russian imports, as given in the table 
furnished in the " Statesman's Year-book," is more 
or less correct, the value of British imports is tre- 
mendously underrated to the extend of nearly ioo 
per cent., and that the true estimate should not be 
short of ,£2,750,000. Then it follows that Russia, 
instead of possessing 55.9 per cent, of the import 
trade has not more than 44.4 per cent., while Great 
Britain and her dependencies still hold 42.4 per 
cent. 

If one is inclined to be particularly scrupulous, 
one may reckon that about 2 per cent, should be 
knocked off the British total, because British goods 
coming from a greater distance have an enhanced 
value at the port of entry, which the manufacturer 
does not receive. It is impossible to calculate the 
difference exactly, but I doubt whether it amounts 
to very much, since both Indian and British goods 
arrive at the port of Bushire much more cheaply 
than Russian goods at the port of Resht. It is only 
at Tabriz and Kermanshah that we are at a disad- 
vantage in this respect. 

Roughly, then, the position to-day amounts to 
this. Greater Britain's share of Persian trade, as 
far as imports are concerned, has, if anything, in- 
creased in the last ten years (from 40 per cent, to 
42.4 per cent.), while in absolute value the increase 
has been even more marked. We now import goods 
to the value of ,£2,750,000, instead of .£2,000,000, 
which means an increase of about 2>7 P er cent. 

I know that there is a good deal that is hypo- 



GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 345 

thetical about these figures, yet such as they are, 
they are much more reliable than the table given 
by the " Statesman's Year-book," which has been 
responsible for a great deal of unnecessary lamenta- 
tion. If any one took the trouble to examine and 
compare the statistics given in that book of reference 
alone, he would immediately have his surprise ex- 
cited. For instance, without a word of explanation 
the figures of the Persian Gulf Administration re- 
ports are printed on the very next page to the 
customs table which they so emphatically con- 
tradict. A little below will be found the following 
remarkable statement : " Persia has a large trade 
with Eussia, amounting for imports to about 
,£850,000, and exports to ,£350,000." It is im- 
possible to say where these figures come from. 
Probably from some ancient consular reports of 
fifteen years ago. 

After so much contradiction it is not surprising 
to find on one page the information that Persia ex- 
ports carpets each year to the value of ,£140,000, 
and on another page that carpets to the value of 
,£143,000 were exported by way of Trebizond in 
1900, and to the value of ,£22,610 from Meshed to 
Eussia. If we add exports of carpets by way of 
Eesht and Bagdad and the Gulf we shall soon get 
up to a total of at least ,£250,000. 

In reality, considering the absence of decent 
communications in Persia, we have little cause to 
be dissatisfied with the progress of British trade 
in Persia. It is only when we begin to compare 
our progress with that made by Eussia in the same 



346 GREAT BRITAIN VERSUS RUSSIA 

time that we find serious grounds for apprehension. 
Russia has more than trebled her imports in ten 
years, while we have only increased ours by 37 per 
cent., and even on the basis of the calculation made 
above she has now a slightly larger share of the 
import trade into Persia than her rival who, ten 
years ago, so easily surpassed her. That is to say, 
while we have rather more than held our own, Russia 
has driven all other competitors into a very far 
corner of the field, and threatens to encroach even 
on our territory very soon. 

The situation is quite serious enough — though I 
must postpone the discussion of the rise of Russian 
trade to another chapter. What I hope to have 
established is this : That Great Britain and India 
have still a large share of the import trade of Persia, 
larger, in fact, than they had ten years ago, and 
almost, if not quite, as large as that of Russia, in 
spite of the erroneous figures which have lately been 
accepted as true. It is of great importance to see 
this clearly. Since there is a danger lest the opinion 
should arise that British trade in Persia is on the 
decline, is doomed to fall away altogether, and is 
therefore not worth fighting for even on the bloodless 
fields of diplomacy. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

KUSSIA'S POLICY 

That there is no reason as yet to despair of British 
trade in Persia has been sufficiently demonstrated. 
We still hold over 40 per cent, of the import trade, 
and our commerce is on the increase. If we kept 
our eyes on this side of the question, there would 
be no apparent cause for lamentation. It is only 
when we turn to the Russian side, and see the great 
advance made in recent years by our rival, that we 
begin to show signs of alarm varying in degree 
according to our different temperaments. The 
volume of imports from Russia into Persia has more 
than trebled in ten years, and the volume of Persian 
exports to Russian territory has been multiplied at 
the same rate. The question that arises is : Where 
is this rapid advance going to stop, and what chance 
have our manufacturers of competing against it ? 

Many people, especially in Teheran, regard the 
north as already gone as far as we are concerned — 
the north including Tabriz, Teheran, and Meshed — 
and serious inroads are being made on Isfahan and 
the central district generally, to say nothing of the 
recent raids on the south carried out by means of 
the newly subsidised steamers from Odessa. The 
pressure brought to bear on our commercial forces 



348 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

is so insistent that there is a danger of panic spread- 
ing in the ranks, ending in defeat and utter rout. 
In order to avert such a disaster a serious effort is 
required on our side, such an effort as perhaps only 
the Government, or private individuals backed up 
by the Government, can make. But before we move 
in the matter it would be as well to know first if the 
danger is as imminent as is generally supposed ; and 
secondly, what means the Russians are employing 
to ensure success, and whether these means are of 
a sort to make that success permanent. 

When you come to examine the existing condition 
of trade in Northern Persia, you will, as an outsider, 
be struck not so much with the overwhelming pre- 
dominance of Russian trade as with the very respect- 
able "show" still made by the British manufacturer. 
To talk of the north being given over to Russia is 
pure moonshine. With the exception of the small 
towns on the northern slope of the Elburz range 
which are supplied with foreign goods by way of the 
Caspian, there is not a single centre of any impor- 
tance where British manufactures are not very well 
represented. It must be remembered that a few 
miles to north or south, or east or west makes a 
great difference in a country like Persia, where trans- 
port is so abnormally expensive — amounting generally 
to &d. or gd. per ton a mile. Hence curious con- 
ditions arise. Teheran, for instance, is more given 
over to Russian trade than Tabriz, which is much 
nearer to the Russian border, the reason being that 
at Tabriz the effect of the Trebizond route is strongly 
felt, while at Teheran it is not felt at all. Meshed 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 349 

is even nearer to a Russian railway, yet the Trans- 
caspian route is still so expensive that it has by no 
means overpowered the import trade with Manchester 
and Bombay by way of Tabriz and the long Bunder- 
Abbas-Kerman caravan route. It is quite true 
that the British imports into Tabriz have dwindled 
sadly from the magnificent totals of the early part of 
the last century — supposing these totals to have been 
correct. They only amount to about half of the 
imports of ten years ago ; indeed, the figures for 1900, 
which show not much more than a value of ,£260,000 
for British and Indian goods, are rather insignificant. 
But one reason for this decrease has been the opening 
of the Suez Canal, which has turned traffic to 
new routes. Hamadan, for example, which not 
long ago drew almost entirely on Tabriz for its 
foreign supplies, is now served by the Bagdad- 
Kermanshah route. Tabriz, therefore, is really a 
local market in a comparatively speaking rich 
district, and no longer presumes to feed Teheran. 
It is rather difficult to obtain even approximately 
correct figures regarding the trade of Tabriz, since 
the information gleaned from the customs returns of 
Trebizond, and from the foreign houses here, do not 
always tally with the consular reports which the 
British representative at Tabriz draws up based on 
information given by the local merchants. Without 
any pretensions, therefore, to exactness where exact- 
ness is impossible, it may be stated that the annual 
import trade of Tabriz amounts to about ,£750,000, of 
which a third part belongs to Greater Britain, a third 
to Russia, and a third to other European nations. It 



350 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

is probable that the Russian trade will increase as 
the Tiflis-Erivan railway nears the Persian border at 
Julfa. Yet it is interesting to note that Russia's 
present share of the trade consists chiefly of articles 
such as sugar and petroleum, in which we do not 
compete. In cotton goods and woollens the propor- 
tion of Russian imports is doubtless growing, but is 
still insignificant — perhaps not more than 10 per cent, 
of the whole. It was a wise move on the part of the 
part of Messrs. Ziegler to organise the carpet industry 
at Tabriz just as they had done already at Sultana- 
bad. Through this means a large number of carpets, 
valued at ,£143,000, go from Tabriz to Europe by 
way of Trebizond, and their value returns in the 
shape of manufactures from Western Europe. 

When we come to Teheran it is extremely difficult 
to arrive at any definite conclusions at all regarding 
the predominance of Russian trade. For the last two 
years the Russian Government has been straining 
every nerve to push its wares over the new Resht - 
Teheran road, which was built at such cost with 
money to a large extent supplied by the Government 
itself. The imports by way of Resht amounted to 
nearly £"1,500,000 in value, while there is still a 
considerable trade done with Teheran by the more 
difficult but cheaper track to Meshed-i-Ser on the 
Caspian. A good deal of the trade of the Resht 
route stops at Kasvin, or is diverted from there to 
Hamadan, from where it filters slowly down to 
Sultanabad, and even Burujird. But about two- 
thirds comes on to Teheran, and supplies not only 
the capital itself but Kum and Kashan, and now, 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 351 

to a certain extent, Isfahan. It is quite obvious that 
no such volume of British manufactures ever reaches 
Teheran — indeed, it is only in piece-goods that we 
can compete at all with the Russian manufacturer. 
How far we maintain a footing in this respect it is 
difficult to say. There is only one foreign wholesale 
firm in Teheran which sells British goods at all, and 
that is the firm of Messrs. Groeneweg, Dunlop, and 
Co., the agents of the Dutch firm of Hotz and Co. 
Messrs. Groeneweg, Dunlop, and Co. import piece- 
goods from Great Britain and Russia in about equal 
quantities; all the other Manchester wares that 
reach Teheran are brought up from Isfahan by native 
merchants. A very large amount of cotton goods is 
imported from Moscow by the Russian Ban que 
d'Escompte and sold at low rates on credit to the 
Persian merchants. On the whole it is probable 
that the Moscow manufacturers, who ten years ago 
could hardly compete against Manchester in Teheran, 
have now captured about two -thirds of the market. 

At Meshed, curiously enough, Russia, in spite of 
her railway and road, has not yet monopolised the 
trade. Where Russia imports goods to the value of 
,£180,000 Great Britain and India still contribute 
about ,£150,000. The whole trade in cotton goods 
is not much more than .£80,000, of which Russia 
sends ^50,000 and Great Britain the rest. India, 
of course, profits by the demand for tea, which is 
worth some ,£60,000 to her annually, in spite of the 
doing away of the transit trade by way of Persia to 
Central Asia. 

Is it really true, then, that our trade interests in 



352 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

Northern Persia are gone ? Surely not, since at 
Tabriz we hold our own up to the present, at Hama- 
dan we have a,n advantage over our rivals, at Meshed 
we should at least preserve the monopoly of the tea 
trade, and only at Teheran do we appear to be fatally 
losing ground. The Russians have made great 
strides with the aid of rather big stilts, but it is 
hardly time to abandon the field entirely. 

There are two reasons generally assigned for 

Russian predominance in the trade of the north — 

first the advantage of her position, and secondly her 

bounty system. I am inclined to think that the 

second reason has more to do with the matter than 

the first, and if this should prove to be the case her 

present success might turn out to be of an artificial 

sort, apt to collapse at any moment. Moscow is 

certainly nearer to Teheran than Manchester is. 

But for trade purposes distances must not always be 

measured by miles. As far as Teheran goes, the 

advantage held by Russia is far more apparent than 

real. The present freight-charges from Moscow to 

Teheran average not less than ^"18 a ton — about 

three roubles per pood. Prices vary in summer and 

winter, the railway charges in Russia being lowered 

in summer to compete with the river navigation. 

The cost of transport on the road from Resht to 

Teheran also varies according to the season of the 

year. I am assured, however, by the agent of the 

Kavkaz Merkur (the Caspian Steamship Company) 

that three roubles per pood is rather under than over 

the average — and the price from Moscow to Enzeli, 

on the Caspian, is exactly equivalent to transport 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 353 

from Enzeli to Teheran, that is, 1.50 roubles per 
pood. Turning to the Bushire route, which is almost 
the only one which now supplies Teheran with 
European goods, we find that the cost of freight by 
steamer from Manchester to Bushire is about 45s. 
per ton for piece-goods — that is, for a ton of 20 cwt. 
— steamer freights being regulated according to 
cubic feet for the most part. From Bushire to 
Teheran the transport by caravan costs on an average 
nearly £20. Hence the transport for piece-goods 
from Manchester to Teheran may be set down as 
costing about ^22 per ton on the average as against 
£\Z per ton from Moscow to Teheran — the time 
occupied on the former journey being considerably 
the longer, and often exceeding nine months. 

It is important to point out here that the Besht- 
Teheran road, which has cost Bussian capitalists and 
the Bussian Government together close on half a 
million pounds, has in no way diminished the cost of 
transport by that route ; on the contrary, the charges, 
owing to the heavy tolls levied, are at least 10 per cent, 
higher than they were when there was nothing but 
a mule-track over the Elburz range ; and so it comes 
about that merchants in fine weather often use the 
old Meshed-i-Ser route, which is nothing but a bad 
mountain path, in preference to the new and expen^ 
sive carriage road, I shall have to enlarge on this 
fact later on in discussing communications in Persia. 
For the present it is sufficient to explain that, con- 
trary to the assertions so often made by writers on 
this subject, the Besht-Teheran road has in no way 
conferred a benefit on Bussian trade by lowering 

z 



354 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

the cost of transport. It has only made communi- 
cation with the Caspian possible at all seasons of the 
year, and so quickened the carriage of goods and 
rendered breakable wares more secure from damage. 

Now the difference between ;£i8 and £22 in the 
cost of transporting a ton of piece-goods, though it 
cannot be altogether disregarded, is not sufficient to 
make the Manchester manufacturer succumb before 
the comparative neophyte in Russia. 

It is a much more serious matter when we come 
to the bounty system. The Russian Government 
allows a drawback of 5.40 roubles per pood on all 
cotton goods exported into Persia. That is to say, 
the merchant is relieved of that amount, supposed 
to be paid in duty on the raw material. This pre- 
mium amounts to the enormous sum of ,£35 on every 
ton of cotton goods sent from Russia to Persia. It 
may be argued that as the Manchester manufacturer 
imports his raw cotton free of duty this export pre- 
mium, being only a rebate of duty, merely puts the 
Russian manufacturer on an equal footing with his 
rival. This argument might hold good if the 5.40 
roubles per pood really represented the duty already 
paid on raw cotton ; but in point of fact it can only 
represent the very highest duty that can be paid, 
since the tariff varies and Persian cotton can be im- 
ported to Russia with only a 5 per cent. dut} T . A 
great deal of raw cotton also comes from Transcaspia 
on which the manufacturer pays no duty at all. In 
any case, the manufacturer is relieved in this way 
of a certain amount of taxation which his Manchester 
colleague has to pay in the shape of income tax. In 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 355 

view of this huge premium, the advantage of £4. or 
even ^a ton in transport expenses appears insig- 
nificant. Indeed, it is quite certain that Moscow 
could hardly compete at all with Manchester if the 
export premium were removed. 

The result for the moment is that the volume of 
Russian imports is swollen in an artificial manner, 
which may flatter the pride of the Government or 
the manufacturer, but in the meantime it has so 
flooded the far from capacious market with cheap 
Russian piece-goods, that the dealers have no need 
to import fresh wares for another twelvemonth and 
a depression in trade is almost sure to follow. Still 
the policy undoubtedly hurts the Manchester manu- 
facturer, who not unnaturally wants to know why 
his Government cannot do something to help him in 
turn. But what can the Government do ? Obviously 
no party in British politics would ever dream of 
imitating the elaborate system of premiums on 
exports which is of such assistance to Russian trade. 
There only remains to devise some means of cutting 
down the transport expenses in Persia so as to 
enable the British merchant to sell his goods in 
Northern Persia at a lower price. I have pointed 
out that the existing advantage which Russia 
possesses in this respect is not very great ; but it 
will gradually become greater if no steps are taken 
on our side. The extension of the Tiflis-Erivan 
railway to Julfa will deal a serious blow to our trade 
with Tabriz by way of Trebizond, and, of course, 
when that line is prolonged, as it must eventually 
be, to Tabriz and Kasvin and Hamadan, with a 



356 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

branch to Teheran, it will be high time for the 
British manufacturer to fall back and entrench him- 
self somewhere about Shiraz unless — and it is a big 
reservation — our Government has done something in 
the way of a counter-move. 

Short of taking the bull by the horns and building 
railways ourselves we can really eiFect very little as 
far as Northern Persia goes. Let us suppose for the 
sake of argument that the Ahwaz-Isfahan route 
secures the trade for the north which at present goes 
by way of Bushire. At the very best a saving of 
from ^3 to £4. might be effected on the whole cost 
of carriage from the Gulf to the capital ; but then 
the route is closed in winter. Or again, the Ahwaz- 
Dizful-Burujird route may be opened by the company 
which is at present being formed to take over the 
concession from the Imperial Bank of Persia. The 
saving in this case would not be greater, but the 
road would be available all the year round. The 
question is whether such a small reduction in the 
cost of transport will produce any change in the 
markets of Teheran. Against a rival working on a 
thoroughly sound basis the saving of £3 or £\ a ton 
might not avail much. Yet against Russia I believe 
it might prove efficacious for the moment as a means 
of bringing the present strain on the Government's 
resources to a breaking-point — as far as Persia is 
concerned. The Russian manufacturer, thanks to 
his Government, can sell his piece-goods in Teheran 
at a cheaper rate than he can in Moscow itself, in 
spite of the heavy cost of transport. To bring this 
about the Government must disburse at least half a 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 357 

million roubles per annum in hard cash, and, includ- 
ing the export premium on sugar and losses in con- 
nection with certain trade enterprises, the total sum 
expended per annum on fostering trade in Persia 
cannot be less than 1,000,000 roubles. Even if the 
lowering of our transport rates has little immediate 
effect, it will tend to increase this lavish expenditure 
on our rival's side. And it still remains to be seen 
whether the result of this expenditure will justify 
the means. Already the game has been pushed 
rather far, and when I was in Teheran, a number of 
Persians have refused to take delivery of goods ordered 
by them from Russia because they find it impossible 
to get rid of their old stock. The Persian, in 
accordance with the Mohammedan law, has no 
scruples about refusing to carry out a contract 
which intervening circumstances have turned to his 
disadvantage. 

It will not do, however, to count too much on the 
failure of a system which we have always been taught 
to regard as economically unsound. To begin with, 
the Russian Bank, which means simply the Russian 
Government, has now issued loans to the extent of 
32,500,000 roubles to Persia on excellent security 
at the rate of 5 per cent. These loans were 
contracted for at a discount of 15 per cent., so 
that the Russian Government pockets a commis- 
sion of no less than 4,850,000 roubles, and still 
has an excellent investment at 5 per cent. There 
is, therefore, a sum very little short of ,£500,000 
sterling to cover the expenses of pushing Russian 
trade in Persia. In this way it comes about that 



358 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

the wretched Persia, and not Russia, pays the 
Moscow manufacturer to undersell his Manchester 
competitor. 

There is still a question whether or not the game 
in Persia is worth the candle. What, after all, is a 
trade that only amounts altogether in exports and 
imports to ,£9,000,000 or ^10,000,000 per annum? 
Russia evidently thinks it is worth capturing. And, 
indeed, it is only in her dealings with Russia that 
Persia can be considered to be on a sound commercial 
basis. For several years, whatever trade reports 
may say, the exports from Persia to Russia have just 
about balanced the imports from Russia, and they 
have been carefully and wisely fostered by Russia, so 
that they have kept pace with the imports. With the 
exception of opium, gum, and carpets, all the raw 
products of Persia, find by far their readiest market 
in Russia, or at least are exported by way of Resht 
and the Caucasus. In recent years rice, cotton, silk, 
wool, and dried fruits have been produced in larger 
quantities than ever before in Persia, and the bulk of 
the export goes to Russian territory, where it is dealt 
with very tenderly by the customs. In the southern 
or British zone, the reverse is the case. The exports 
have by no means kept pace with the imports, and 
the only product which has really gone up in volume 
is opium. The considerable export trade in grain, 
on which the prosperity of Southern Persia largely 
depends, has been almost ruined by the embargo put 
on the export, which has now become a permanent 
condition of affairs. It stands to reason that a country 
is apt to buy in the market where it sells ; hence an 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 359 

enormous advantage accrues to Russia through the 
export to the Caucasus. It also requires little 
argument to prove that a country which imports 
more than it exports must be living to a certain 
degree on its capital, and so is becoming gradually 
impoverished. I have found many people in Persia 
who maintain that it is quite impossible for such a 
state of things to have existed for twenty years, and 
that the statistics which have so long declared the 
balance of trade to be against Persia in the ratio 
generally of two to one must be hopelessly inaccurate. 
They argue that if the balance of trade were against 
Persia, money would be leaving the country, currency 
would be scarce, and prices would fall ; whereas, in 
reality, prices have risen and gold drafts on London 
are cheap. This is just the sort of argument that 
leads to nothing in Persia, because in a country so 
devoid of communications, no general statements are 
possible, nor are the same economic conditions to be 
found throughout the land. 

For instance, it is impossible to prove that prices 
have risen as a whole in Persia. Silver prices have, 
of course, been doubled in the last twenty years 
owing to the depreciation of silver. Land, and 
food, and labour has become intrinsically dearer in 
Teheran, where there is a steady increase of the 
foreign element, and it is here, perhaps, that 
observations are most frequently made. Yet 
throughout Western Persia the price of grain is 
lower to-day than it has ever been in the memory 
of living man as far as I can discover — and that is a 
weighty fact which upsets the belief in rising prices. 



360 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

The cheapness of gold drafts on London is easily 
enough accounted for by the scarcity of currency, 
which gives the kran a fictitious value. As to the 
scarcity of currency, there can be no doubt at all. 
It is for this reason that the kran, which has an 
intrinsic value at present of rather less than ^d., 
circulates at the rate of about \\d. The scarcity is 
partly attributed to the rottenness of the mint, 
which cannot turn out more than 3,000,000 tomans 
annually (i.e., less than ^600,000), so that a result 
is obtained similar to that which was obtained in 
India by the closing of the mints. But also it is 
necessary to believe that a good deal of money does 
leave the country, for the fresh krans that every 
year go out from Teheran never come back again, 
and they cannot all be hoarded. Unfortunately 
trade reports are useless as far as throwing light on 
the export of specie goes. All one can say with 
certainty is that there are millions of krans in 
Mesopotamia ; that they used to go in such quanti- 
ties to Transcaspia that the Russian Government, 
forbade their circulation, and is even now taking 
measures to prevent them coming in, and that there 
is constantly a scarcity of them in Persia itself which 
gives them a fictitious value. 

Finally, all the gold which not many years ago 
was quite common in the bazaars of the north, 
especially in Tabriz, has almost entirely disappeared, 
even from the Shah's treasury, and that is distinctly 
a bad sign. And really it is difficult to see why one 
should disbelieve the evidence of statistics such as 
they are in Persia, which, however inaccurate they 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 361 

may be, never vary in this one respect, that they 
always show a balance of trade against Persia. It is 
argued sometimes that a good deal of merchandise 
or raw produce finds its way across the border where 
there is no customs house. But this argument tells 
both ways. A good deal comes in by the same 
unrecognised channels, and one illicit traffic of this 
sort, the import of arms along the Gulf coast, is of 
considerable importance. In the long run we are 
driven to accept the facts as they appear before us, 
and to believe that Persia is partly living on her 
capital, but this only in the southern or British zone. 
If this is so it stands to reason that our trade with 
Persia will soon cease to expand, unless we also do 
our utmost to increase the total of the exports, and 
since the exports must largely consist of raw pro- 
ducts, which will not stand heavy transport charges, 
we must improve the means of communication in 
Persia. 

So we always come round to the same conclusion 
— to combat Russian progress in the north, where 
we have no reason as yet to give up the fight, we 
must lower the transport charges. Our economic 
ideas forbid us to use other weapons, but this at 
least must be done by the Government or with the 
Government's assistance. Boads as a commercial 
speculation have been proved to be hopeless in 
Persia. Therefore, if we can only build roads or 
open mule-tracks the British Government must find 
the money or guarantee the interest on the capital 
expended. And even this step will not save us when 
Bussia brings her railway across the Persian border. 



$62 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

As for our own sphere in the south, that also can be 
only be developed by improving communications so 
as to encourage exports, and by forcing the Persian 
Governors to abolish the disastrous embargo on the 
export of grain. We have a double reason, therefore, 
for beginning work in earnest. We have to meet 
Russia on her own ground, which I shall endeavour 
hereafter to show is only hers on sufferance, and we 
have to prevent our own sphere from going to com- 
plete rack and ruin. The question of communications 
then must be considered. 



CHAPTER XXV 

RUSSIA'S POLICY— {Continued) 

Since it is clear that we can only meet the advance 
of Russian trade in Persia by improving communica- 
tions south of Teheran to the Gulf, it is as well to 
understand the possible nature of such improve- 
ments. Beyond paying a subsidy to the company 
that runs a single steamer between Mohammerah 
and Ahwaz, the British Government has done abso- 
lutely nothing at all to further the interests of its 
merchants in Mesopotamia or Persia. The Indian 
Government, after many years, has spent a little 
money in opening the Nushki-Seistan route, which 
may tend to facilitate the transport of tea to 
Khorasan ; but this is in the main a strategical 
measure. Russia, on the other hand, has acted 
differently. On the north-west side she is pushing 
her Caucasian railway down to the frontier, which 
will be reached in two years more at the very out- 
side. Railhead was already at Erivan in 1901. On 
the direct route to Teheran the Resht-Teheran road 
has been made at enormous expense. On the Khor- 
asan side Meshed has been joined with the railway 
at Askabad by a good road. 

On our side private enterprise without any 
Government aid has built the road from Teheran 



364 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

to Kum, and extended it in a sort of way to Sul- 
tanabad, thereby doing a service to Russian rather 
than British trade, and another private company has 
opened a track with two bridges between Ahwaz 
and Isfahan, which will be of considerable use when 
merchants and muleteers can be persuaded to use it. 
A suggestion that seems to meet with general ap- 
proval is that the long-talk ed-of Burujird- Ahwaz 
road, of which the Kum road is the first portion 
(beginning from Teheran), should at last be taken 
properly in hand. I have in a previous chapter 
dealt with the advantages to be gained by opening 
up this means of communication. 

If the route is to be opened — and the attempt is 
certainly worth making — I believe a mule track to 
be better for practical purposes than a carriageable 
road {route carrossable). It is a great mistake to 
think that carriage roads make transport cheaper. 
In Persia, at all events, they do not, and Russia has 
found this out to her cost, after spending enormous 
sums on her Besht road. She has made the journey 
much more comfortable for travellers — and we are all 
truly grateful — but her merchandise pays higher 
transport charges than it did before the road was 
built. 

If the scheme is seriously entertained, it ought 
to be attempted with Government assistance and a 
Government guarantee. If the British Government 
were to undertake this task, not a very great one, 
were at the same time to give a little assistance to 
the Ahwaz-Isfahan route, and finally were to insist 
on the extension of navigation on the Tigris so as to 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 365 

improve the Bagdad-Kermanshah route, our trade 
would certainly gain some small advantage, at least 
in Southern and Western Persia. It only remains 
for the British Government to find the means. We 
should then be able to meet Russian trade in the 
north on equal terms as far as transport charges are 
concerned, though we should still have the premium 
difficulty to face. 

But the real difficulty which stands in the way of 
the development of Persian trade and Persian pros- 
perity would hardly be affected by these small under- 
takings. The increase of commerce in this country 
depends so largely on the moving of raw products 
that it is impossible to make any headway without 
railways. 

Here, for example, is a list of prices for grain, 
which is a lesson in itself. Wheat sells for 105 
krans per kharvar (650 lbs.) in Teheran, 40 krans 
per kharvar in Sultanabad, and 10 krans per kharvar 
in Kermanshah. Barley costs 90 krans in Teheran, 
20 krans in Sultanabad, and 5 krans in Kermanshah. 
The finest road in the world between Teheran and Sul- 
tanabad and Kermanshah would only to a very small 
degree modify these glaring disparities. As long as 
we depend on road transport alone it will cost ten 
times at least what the grain is worth to bring the 
abundant food-supply of Western Persia to the 
capital, which is only 300 miles away. And as long 
as the present conditions last the kindly fruits of the 
earth in Persia must rot on the ground in districts 
where the population is far too small to consume its 
own supplies. 



366 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

Take another example. The Persian Mining Cor- 
poration, which was liquidated eight years ago, found 
rich mines of manganese ore in the Kerman district. 
Though the mines were only 300 miles from the Gulf 
it cost £9 or ;£io per ton to carry the ore to the 
shore at Bunder Abbas. Naturally the mines had 
to be abandoned. A railway could have furnished 
transport at the rate of 10s. a ton and left a hand- 
some margin for profit. Within forty miles of 
Teheran there are coal mines sufficient in capacity to 
supply the whole of Persia. Yet the cost of coal in 
Teheran varies from £4. to £5 a ton. So one might 
go on ad infinitum. It is impossible to develop the 
resources of Persia without railways, and it is impos- 
sible to increase our imports to any large extent 
unless these native resources are developed — on the 
contrary, the tendency will be in the opposite direc- 
tion. 

Against the building of railways on our side there 
are two hindrances. First of all there is a general 
belief that railways in Persia can never pay, and 
secondly, there is the Russo-Persian secret protocol 
which put off the building of railways in Persia 
until 1900, and is said to have been renewed, though 
no one here seems to know exactly for what period. 
As regards the first objection, it is difficult to see on 
what precise grounds it has been raised. There are 
many parts of Persia in which the movement of 
grain would be very great, the minerals are only 
vaiting to be worked, and the foreign goods traffic 
is considerable. At least, there is no comparison 
between a country like Uganda and a country like 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 367 

Persia, whose trade is already formed and whose 
agricultural industry is already very great. Yet the 
Uganda Railway is expected to pay in ten years 
time. As for the difficulties of construction, they 
are far from being insuperable. Persia in conforma- 
tion is so exactly like South Africa that railway 
building in Cape Colony may be taken as a useful 
model from which to draw conclusions. The same 
plan would have to be followed of building lines 
from the shore up to the plateau, through and over 
great mountain barriers. In South Africa the 
average cost, including rolling stock, was only a 
little over ;£ 10,000 per mile. In Persia, with its 
cheap labour and cheap food, and the abundant 
supplies of labour close by in India, the cost might 
be considerably lessened, especially if the South 
African gauge were adopted. The trade centres 
and cultivated area are infinitely greater than they 
were in Cape Colony when railways were started 
there. There is no reason in the world why the 
right railways should not pay their way from the 
very start. 

The question is what are the right routes for us. 
Time was when this might have been a difficult 
matter to decide, but circumstances have changed, 
and in changing have contracted our sphere of 
action. The line which most people consider to be 
the most serviceable in Persia is that which would 
run from Bagdad to Kermanshah, and so on by 
Sultanabad or Burujird, Isfahan, Yezd, Kerman, 
and on to Beluchistan. I cannot help thinking that 
the idea of such a railway is to a certain extent 



368 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

fostered by the old longing for an overland route to 
India. A very short calculation would suffice to 
show that such a railway would never land one in 
either Bombay or Calcutta more quickly than the 
infinitely more comfortable steamer. But in any 
case we are not concerned with that question here, 
for the very simple reason that the Bagdad- 
Beluchistan alignment, though it may be kept as an 
ideal, is beyond our power to construct. Thanks to 
our own blindness, we have allowed the concession 
for a Mesopotamian Railway as far as Khanikin to 
fall to a foreign syndicate, and even if the syndicate 
does not build it immediately we cannot do anything 
on that side of the Persian border. And it is obvious 
that to start building a railway at Khanikin or Ker- 
manshah would be as sensible as to start in the 
planet of Mars. We must begin where we have a 
base of supplies, and that brings us at once either to 
the Karun or the Gulf. It is generally supposed 
that it would be hopeless to attempt an ascent from 
Bushire — though it must be remembered that until 
last January the country between Bushire and 
Shiraz had never been surveyed, and all opinions 
on the subject are vague and rather worthless. 
Some day it is to be hoped that Shiraz will be 
connected with Bushire by rail. 

But for the present we must look elsewhere, and 
Bunder Abbas and Mohammerah are the only 
starting-points that suggest themselves. Of these 
two the first to be chosen is Mohammerah, owing 
to the attractiveness of the Burujird-Teheran route, 
with branches to Kermanshah and Hamadan on the 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 369 

west side, and to Isfahan and Shiraz on the east. 
It would be perfectly safe to start this line with a 
capital of ,£5,000,000, but the £5,000,000 could not 
be raised without the guarantee of our Government. 
Will or can our Government act in the matter? 
There is the crux. A low guarantee of 2 j- per cent, 
for ten years would, I believe, be quite sufficient to 
attract the capital, and it must be remembered that 
the whole capital would not be expended until the 
greater part of the time was expired, so that at the 
very worst the Government would not have to find 
more than £"100,000 a year. Russia is spending 
that amount, and more, on pushing her trade, with 
this difference, that she is spending it on premiums 
which only prop up the fabric of commerce in a 
temporary manner. A guarantee on a railway has a 
more permanent value, and is less opposed to the 
accepted principles of political economy. This rail- 
way, which would be followed as soon as possible by 
a similar line from the coast, at Bunder Abbas to 
Kerman, and Yezd, and Isfahan or Kashan, would 
form an advanced base for the ideal line across 
Persia, which cannot be built until branches are first 
pushed up from the coast to carry material. It 
would develop trade in Southern and Western Persia 
at a rapid rate, and, above all, it would give us a 
tangible advantage over Russia in the markets of 
the north. This is a most important fact, which 
seems to have been entirely overlooked on our side, 
though it doubtless has received due consideration 
in Russia. 

Whenever Teheran is connected by railway with 

2 A 



370 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

the Gulf, or, rather, with the Karun, the cost of 
transport will not exceed 30s. per ton. Add to this 
the 45s. for piece-goods from Manchester and we get 
a total of £$ 1 5s. per ton from England to Teheran. 
Against this rate, which is a wonderful reduction 
from the existing .£22, what can Russia do? By 
building her railway on from Erivan to Tabriz, 
Hamadan, and Teheran, the very best she could hope 
to do would be to reduce the cost of transport from 
Moscow to Teheran to half its present amount — i.e., 
1 . 50 roubles per pood. It costs 1 . 50 roubles at present 
to carry a pood from Moscow to Enzeli. This, I 
may say, is an average reckoning. In summer when 
the Volga is open the freight either by rail or river is 
lower — in winter it is higher — but according to the 
agent of the Kavkaz Merkur 1 . 50 roubles from Moscow 
to Enzeli is an average price per pood (36 lbs.). All the 
differential freight-rates in the world cannot make it 
cheaper to Teheran It would still, therefore cost 
£9 a ton to bring piece-goods by rail from Moscow 
to Hamadan or Teheran, as against the existing £1%, 
and the English piece-goods would have an advan- 
tage of ^5 5s. in the transport. No wonder Russia 
has determined to prevent us from building railways 
in Persia. So far from the North of Persia being 
naturally the Russian sphere, the reverse is the case. 
With a proper system of railways in Persia it would 
be impossible for Russia to compete with us in 
Teheran and perhaps even in Tabriz and Meshed 
without resorting to an increased bounty on exports, 
which is almost out of the question. 

Surely, if our statesmen had recognised this simple 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 371 

fact we should never have allowed the Russian 
Government to conclude its railway agreement with 
Persia in 1 890, or, at least, we should have refused 
to recognise it from the very first. Unfortunately 
we have recognised it from the outset, and we seem 
to go on consenting to its renewal without a murmur. 
Yet what, after all, is this famous protocol ? Simply 
a private agreement between the two Governments 
which has never been communicated to any other 
Power, and which, in point of fact, does not officially 
exist for us at all. And yet, if you mention railways 
to any one in Teheran, you are at once ruled out of 
court on the score of this agreement which has never 
been published, and concerning which no one outside 
the Russian Legation and the Persian Foreign Office 
seems to know whether it has been renewed for five 
or for ten years. Surely, it is a monstrous thing 
that Great Britain, the Power that has done so 
much for Persia, and still commands her entire 
seaboard on the south, should submit to such a con- 
dition of affairs. Our tobacco monopoly which failed 
was bad enough in its way, but not to be compared 
with an agreement which delivers over the whole 
question of railway building in Persia to the Russian 
Government. It may be argued that Russia is 
equally bound with ourselves. So she is at present. 
But if we recall the events of 1889 we shall remem- 
ber that the original protocol gave to Russia the 
entire monopoly of railways in Persia as a sort of 
counterblast to the Imperial Bank concession and the 
mining concession to Great Britain. When it was 
discovered that the Mining Corporation was not such 



372 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

a formidable affair as had been supposed at first, and 
it was seen, perhaps, that the time was hardly ripe 
for a coup which could hardly fail to arouse antago- 
nism even in England, the terms of the protocol 
were altered and the monopoly was changed to a sort 
of option on railways in Persia by the agreement 
signed in 1890. 

But why in the world should Great Britain be 
bound by this agreement ? We know nothing about 
it officially, and even our officials do not seem to 
know for how many years it has been renewed. 
And supposing there were a secret agreement be- 
tween Russia and Persia whereby Persia ceded to 
Russia all the ports on the Gulf, would we quietly 
fold our hands and say that we could do nothing as 
long as the agreement was in force ? Yet the one 
is not more important than the other. Briefly the 
building of railways with British capital from the 
Gulf to Teheran would dash to the ground the whole 
card castle of Russian predominance in Northern 
Persia by dealing a death-blow to her trade. On 
the other hand, the building of Russian railways 
south would be almost as disastrous for our trade, 
for we do not imagine that the system of differential 
rates which obtains in Russia would fail to exercise 
its full force against British goods coming in by way 
of the Gulf. And Russia let the cat out of the bag 
when she applied for the monopoly of railways in 
1889. What she wants is still the monopoly and 
her method of securing it is fairly simple. She is 
fast getting the Shah and his Government as much 
into her power that in another year or two he will 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 373 

be unable to refuse Russia anything. In the mean- 
time she is bringing her lines up to the frontier so as 
to be ready for the railway attack. Not that she 
means to come to the point too soon. I do not 
believe that there will be any railway built into 
Persian territory by Russia for several years to 
come ; at least, I know that the Russian Government 
has given assurances to the Caspian Steamship 
Company, " the Kavkaz Merkur," that there was 
no clause in the recent loan agreement granting a 
railway concession from Julfa to Tabriz and Teheran. 
This railway would seriously hurt the steamer trade 
on the Caspian and it would also render useless all 
the money spent on the Resht-Teheran road. 

It is still too soon to advance a rail into Persia 
which might give the British a chance of building on 
their side. The Shah must be rendered so subservient 
that he will refuse all railway concessions to Great 
Britain. For it must be always remembered that 
unless Russia can secure the monopoly of railways in 
Persia, she will lose rather than gain ground by the 
introduction of the iron road. 

It is interesting, in this connection, to read the 
paragraph headed " The Ineptitude of Russian 
Policy " in Lord Curzon's chapter on railways in 
Persia. It seemed to Lord Curzon ten or twelve 
years ago that Russia could merely lose by her selfish 
policy of postponing railway construction. In the 
interval of ten years, commercial and industrial 
enterprises were to be steadfastly and tranquilly 
pursued ; roads, the natural precursors and feeders 
of railways, were to be constructed through the 



374 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

country ; European systems of business and manage- 
ment were to become familiar to the people. Above 
all, the Power most likely to profit by the respite 
was not to be Russia but Great Britain, by whose 
capital the natural resources of the country were to 
be developed in the interim, and it was on more 
reliable data that Great Britain was ultimately 
to take up the question of railroad extension in 
Persia. 

No forecast of events could possibly have been 
more dismally belied. Lord Curzon wrote the para- 
graph when the Mining Corporation and the Tobacco 
Concession were in the heyday of their youth, when 
the Imperial Bank of Persia seemed destined to 
reform the monetary system of Persia under British 
auspices, when a great trunk road was to be built 
from the capital to the Karun with British money. 
Yet, though it is always easy to be wise after the 
event, it is difficult to see how it could ever have 
escaped the notice of those who were in Persia 
when the Mining Corporation came into existence, 
that to attempt mining operations in a country 
without railways or rivers — unless indeed gold or 
diamonds were the quarry — must end in total disaster. 
And it passes the wit of man to understand how 
industrial enterprises were to be steadfastly pursued 
without machinery, which could not be imported, 
except at a prohibitive cost. 

The British capital that was tranquilly to foster 
these enterprises has either been withdrawn or sunk 
beyond hope of recovery. The roads which were to 
be the precursors of railways are conspicuous by their 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 375 

absence, and if the railways are to wait until they 

can use the roads as feeders, there is no need for any 

Hussian agreements to keep railways out of Persia. 

As for our trustworthy data, on the strength of which 

we were ultimately to build railways, we stand 

exactly where we were ten years ago, save, perhaps, 

that our chance of building the railways is rather 

more remote than ever. In the meantime, Russia, 

who would have been handicapped immensely by a 

forward move on our part, has kept us at bay while 

she has been bringing her own railway system up to 

the Persian frontier. The commercial route for a 

Russian railway is undoubtedly by way of the 

Caucasus and Tabriz ; yet even to-day, she is not 

ready to start work in Persia because her railhead is 

still a year or two from the border. We, on the 

other hand, can never be more prepared than we are 

to-day, and to-day we are no more prepared than we 

were ten years ago. Our base is waiting for us on 

the Karun or the Gulf; we can begin working at a 

moment's notice ; our material can be laid down at a 

much lower cost than is possible at Erivan or 

Askabad ; and the climb from sea level to the plateau 

will not grow less arduous if we sit and look at it. 

What people mean when they say that Persia is not 

ready for railways it is difficult to comprehend. 

Being without waterways she can only develop her 

internal resources by means of railways, and railways 

alone can add to her present rather slender stock of 

wealth. 

Historically, it is true, roads are the precursors 
of railways, but so are bows and arrows the pre- 



376 RUSSIA'S POLICY 

cursors of rifles, yet we do not offer to equip the 
Persian soldiers as archers. If instead of saying 
that Persia is not ready for railways we were to 
transfer the remark to Russia, there would be a good 
deal of truth in it. Russia is not yet ready to build 
railways in Persia, so she has " bluffed " us into 
postponing railway exploitation sine die, and we who 
are ready, or at least as ready as we shall ever be, 
have been weak enough to be " bluffed." Barring 
the Russian protocol, the field is singularly open to 
us. The only concession still in existence belongs, 
I believe, to M. Boital, who has sold an interest in 
the concern to M. Kolischer. Both are noted con- 
cession-hunters, but unfortunately neither has a 
Government behind him. The concession is for a 
line from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf, and was 
granted some nineteen years ago. As it contains no 
time-limit, there is some doubt about its legality — 
provided there is any legality at all in such matters 
— and if it were to prove an obstacle it could 
probably be bought up very cheap. We had a 
verbal understanding with the late Shah that no 
railway should be built south of Teheran until we 
were first consulted, but no such agreement could 
be binding on his successor unless it were at least 
committed to writing. What we want now is a 
written assurance on this point, and a definite 
understanding as to the time for expiration of the 
Russian protocol, which we should absolutely refuse 
to recognise beyond the year 1905. Then by 1905 
we ought to have capital and material ready to 
commence operations at once. If we do not, we 



RUSSIA'S POLICY 877 

shall wake up some morning to find our opportunity 
gone, and some other Power in our place. We shall 
raise objections, as we have done, to the Mesopota- 
mian Railway, and play the dog in the manger, and 
make things unpleasant for everybody, especially 
ourselves, simply because some other Power wants 
to step in to undertake work which we will not do 
ourselves. 

If we had begun quietly with a line from the Gulf 
to Bagdad twenty years ago, instead of worrying 
about an overland route to India, there would have 
been no Koweit question to-day, and our influence 
would have been supreme from the Gulf to the 
Mediterranean. Now that that chance is gone, the 
next best thing we can do is to build a line without 
more ado from Mohammerah to Teheran. If we 
keep beating about the bush with talk of roads and 
mule-tracks and other antiquated devices for wasting 
time, we shall presently find a Russian railway on 
its way to Isfahan and the Gulf, and the dog in the 
manger will be barking loudly again. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

WANTED, A BBITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 

If it is true, as I have endeavoured to show, that 
the great advance made by Russian trade in Persia 
in the past four or five years is mainly the result of 
her system of premiums, and based on no permanent 
economic or geographical conditions ; if, furthermore, 
it has been demonstrated that with proper com- 
munications between the Gulf and Northern Persia — 
by which I mean not mule-tracks nor roads, but 
railways — the British manufacturer would be placed 
at an advantage over his Russian competitor, which 
even the premium system could hardly overcome 
without serious loss to the Russian Exchequer, then 
all the talk which one hears in Teheran about the 
effacement of British interests in Persia must be 
taken with a large grain of salt. The effacement 
may come if Russia is allowed to continue on her 
hitherto victorious career ; but the remedy still lies 
in our own hands. Since trade is to-day the pivot 
on which all politics turn, we have only to push our 
trade interests in Persia in order to restore the old 
balance of prestige and influence. 

That the balance has been rudely disturbed, the 
most optimistic subject of the King can hardly deny. 
One event in itself has given Russia a lead, which 



WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 379 

we shall find great difficulty in reducing. That was, 
of course, the Persian Loan of 1900. Before that 
time it was difficult to point to any concrete fact 
which proclaimed the predominance of Russia. Dr. 
Rohrbach, whose pamphlet I have already quoted, 
and who found last year, evidently to his great 
satisfaction, that our zuhunft was altogether 
vorbei, attributes our fall to our failure to support 
the Zil-es-Sultan as a candidate for the throne of 
Persia. The present Shah, he says, was the Russian 
nominee, and the Zil was the pronounced friend of 
Great Britain. In leaving the Zil to his fate when 
the old Shah clipped his wings in 1888, we lost, so 
this Dr. Rohrbach thinks, our great chance. This 
little theory must have been furnished straight from 
the imagination of the German writer. There never 
was the slightest inclination on the part of Great 
Britain either to support the eldest son of the old 
Shah in his high estate at Isfahan, or to suggest that 
Nasr-ed-din should desert the custom of the Kajars 
and nominate as his successor a son who was not of 
royal birth on his mother's side. The actual suc- 
cessor, the present Shah, had the support as much of 
Great Britain as of Russia, nor could we possibly 
have interfered to alter the succession, even if we 
had desired to do so. The story is pure fiction, and 
is worth mentioning here only in order to show what 
far-fetched reasons a German Anglophobe can pro- 
duce in order to account for a state of things which 
he would like to prove to be in existence. 

When we come to speak of the loan we are on very 
different ground. The great advantage which the 



380 WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 

Russians have reaped through it might have been 
ours. The extraordinary foolishness of the British 
Government in allowing the chance to slip can be 
palliated only on the grounds that we were at the 
moment in the throes of the South African War, and 
could think of nothing else. It is important, how- 
ever, to point out that Sir Mortimer Durand, then 
Minister at Teheran, did his utmost to save the day, 
but his efforts and those of Mr. Babino, the manager 
of the Imperial Bank, were unavailing against the 
rancour of the London Stock Exchange on the one 
hand — which had old grievances against Persia — and 
the preoccupation of the Foreign Office. Our 
Ministers have often to bear the odium of an error 
which they have worked hard to avoid, and the 
Foreign Office is not sorry to let the blame rest where 
the public sees fit to put it. To make things even 
the Minister gets a decoration and promotion. But 
would not the public be better served if the Minister 
were allowed freer play to his judgment in the first 
place ? 

Things being as they are in Persia, the Bussian 
Loan of 1900 has only been the beginning of a snow- 
ball which increases in size as it rolls on. Those 
who have a knowledge of Persian affairs foresaw at an 
early date that the first loan would not go very far, and 
their apprehensions have been fulfilled by the issue 
of a new loan of 10,000,000 roubles early in 1902. 
Financially, the conditions of the new loan were 
identical with those of the first, but what private 
concessions were at the same time extracted we 
cannot tell. We only know that Bussia does not grant 



WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 381 

favours for nothing. In the meantime Persia is as 
helpless as a fly in a spiders web. She cannot 
redeem the original loan of ,£2,250,000 for ten years, 
and meanwhile she can borrow from no Power but 
Russia. In her recent financial straits the Imperial 
Bank came forward to assist her, but could not, of 
course, advance a £"1,000,000 on its own responsi- 
bility. The British Government might have done it 
through the Bank, but the Shah could hardly have 
availed himself of that course without getting into 
trouble with Russia, and in any case the British 
Government showed no signs of coming to his aid. 
So the Shah is now in a position where he cannot 
possibly pay off the loan without borrowing from 
another Government, and he cannot borrow from 
another Government until the loan is paid off. 

Still, on the surface, the situation does not appear 
so serious. The service of the double loan amounts 
to less than £200,000 a year, which is paid out of 
the customs receipts. But as the customs receipts 
now amount to about £"430,000 under the Belgian 
administration in place of ,£230,000, the Shah can 
pay the interest and instalments of the loans, and 
still enjoy as large a revenue as he did four years 
ago. Unfortunately the borrowing has not stopped. 
Of the 10,000,000 roubles received from Bussia 
some months ago there are not 1,000,000 left. All 
the rest has gone in paying off arrears and in the 
expenses of the trip to Europe. Consequently, when 
the Shah returned from Europe, he was exactly as 
badly off as he was before he borrowed the 10,000,000 
roubles, and he will have to go to Russia once more. 



382 WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 

Then comes another loan, fresh conditions, more of 
the customs revenue absorbed until the limit will be 
reached, the interest and instalments will not be 
forthcoming, and Russia will take over the ad- 
ministration of the customs, the Gulf ports being 
excluded. 

Whence, it may be asked, comes this constant 
inability to meet expenses on the part of a Govern- 
ment which until ten years ago had never borrowed 
money outside its own dominions ? The answer is 
very simple. These deficiencies have been going on 
for several years, and have been met by accepting 
loans from the banks which were paid back out of 
the Shah's treasury until that source was emptied 
and a new method of raising money had to be found. 
The lack of funds is the direct result of the fall in 
the price of silver. The inland revenue of Persia 
is drawn mainly from the land tax, and the land tax, 
though assessed in various ways in various parts of 
Persia, has for years been fixed locally at certain 
rates. Consequently as the price of silver fell the 
revenue decreased at a rate which could not be 
counterbalanced by increased exactions. The result 
is that the sterling value of the revenue, which 
amounts now to about .£1,500,000 all told, is much 
less than it was fifty years ago, though the popula- 
tion has increased and the public expenses are much 
greater. It may be remarked in parenthesis, how- 
ever, that the fall in revenue has not been a relief to 
the labouring class, on whom almost the entire burden 
of taxation has finally rested, by a method of devo- 
lution characteristic of Persia. Nothing now can 



WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 383 

save Persia from financial ruin but a drastic over- 
hauling of the revenue system, by means of which 
taxes would be readjusted to existing values, and a 
due share of the taxation would fall on the shoulders 
of the well-to-do. Such an overhauling will never 
be undertaken by Persian officials, and a joint com- 
mission is not likely to be appointed to the task by 
Great Britain and Russia, so we return to the 
original proposition, that financial ruin must be the 
result. 

Financial ruin |for Persia means Russia's oppor- 
tunity, as she is the only Power to whom the Shah 
can turn in his extremity. What we can do to 
avert the impending doom it is not easy to say. We 
had our chance and refused it. The only relic that 
we saved was the revenue of the Gulf ports. The 
Province of Fars was excluded from the hypotheca- 
tion of the Persian customs to the Russian loan. At 
present the Gulf ports bring in less than a third of 
the whole customs revenue, and perhaps they will 
never bring in more. But there is one port which is 
still in doubt, and that is Mohammerah. Moham- 
merah is not, seriously speaking, a Gulf port, and it 
is certainly not in the Province of Fars. No one con- 
sequently seems to know whether Mohammerah was 
excluded or not from the conditions of the Russian 
loan. Two years before the first Russian loan was 
made, the British charge d'affaires in Teheran secured 
a document from the Shah in which a distinct 
promise was made that the customs of the ports of 
Southern Persia should never be hypothecated to 
any foreign Power except Great Britain. In spite 



384 WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 

of this document, which certainly includes Moham- 
merah in its scope, the Russian agreement of 1 900 ex- 
cludes only the Gulf ports and the Province of Fars, 
and there is always a question whether Mohammerah 
is, strictly speaking, a " Gulf port." At the time 
the loan was arranged, and even at the present 
moment, the Karun port was not regarded as being 
of much importance, especially as the revenue was 
not collected by the Belgians, but was farmed out 
for a few tomans to Sheikh Khazal. Still, Moham- 
merah has great potentialities, for at least three 
different reasons. First of all, the attempt is being 
made to supply Isfahan by the Ahwaz route, and the 
whole west of Persia up to Teheran by the proposed 
Burujird route. These routes have effected nothing 
of importance as yet, but they may do something in 
the future. Secondly, Mohammerah is to be at the 
end of the pipe line which is to be laid by the new 
English oil company through Luristan. This also is 
a purely speculative matter, but the possibilities are 
great. Thirdly, if ever we build railways in Persia 
— unfortunately a very big " if" — Mohammerah is 
almost sure to be the port of the first route adopted. 
This is the most important reason of the three, for if 
a Mohammerah-Burujird-Teheran railway were ever 
built it would absorb a large part of the Bushire 
trade and almost all the transit trade for Persia 
through Bagdad. 

Without any stretch of the imagination one can 
foresee a future when Mohammerah will contribute 
a larger share of the customs revenue than any other 
port in Persia, It is sincerely to be hoped, there- 



WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 385 

fore, that our Government will insist on the exclusion 
of Mohammerah from the terms of the Russian Loan 
Agreement. 

We ought, of course, to have excluded Kerman- 
shah as well, since that is distinctly in our commercial 
sphere. Even Tabriz should not be liable to the 
establishment of a Russian customs house. But 
these ports of entry are certainly mortgaged, and it 
is useless to cry over spilt milk, otherwise we should 
never be done lamenting the folly which has given 
Russia such a hold over the finances of Persia, and, 
at the same time, allowed her to push her trade 
against ours with money taken out of Persian pockets. 
I have already pointed out that the commission on 
the two loans, together amounting to close on half a 
million sterling, has afforded to the Russian Govern- 
ment a nice little reserve from which to pay export 
premiums on Russian manufactures going into Persia. 
It is curious to notice in this connection how our 
methods differ from those of the Russians. On our 
side, we are constantly paying money into the Shah's 
treasury. We give him a subsidy, for example, for 
the Indo-European telegraph line, and we pay half 
the cost of the line from Teheran to Meshed, which 
we do not use except for the messages to the Consu- 
late at Meshed. The Imperial Bank of Persia pays 
a royalty to the Throne which must never fall below 
^5000 per annum. The Russians, on their side, do 
just the reverse. They establish a bank in Teheran, 
which is now nothing more than a branch of the 
Russian State Bank, which not only pays no royalty ? 
but does its best to cut out the Imperial Bank of 

2 B 



386 WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 

Persia. They push their trade in Persia with the 
proceeds of their large profits on the Persian loan ; 
and they actually have the use of the Teheran-Meshed 
line for all their telegraphic messages from Teheran 
to Moscow or St. Petersburg, though Great Britain 
and Persia pay for the upkeep of the line. It really 
seems that in the little intrigues which are drawing 
Persia closer to Russia, Great Britain is playing the 
unenviable part of the mari complaisant. 

The evil effects of the Russian loan would not be 
so great if we could in any way restore the financial 
equilibrium in Persia. But it must be clearly under- 
stood that there is no time to lose. Another Russian 
loan will be called for in all probability this year, so 
certain are the prospects of a deficit. That a deficit 
could be changed into a surplus with the greatest 
ease under a proper administration of the Revenue 
Department is obvious to any one who has any 
knowledge of the iniquitous system of tax collecting 
in Persia. But Great Britain cannot offer men to 
handle the revenue, since Persia is debarred from 
employing the services of Englishmen and Russians 
alike. Equally impossible is it for us to agree with 
Russia on the subject, since the refusal of Russia to 
co-operate with us in the matter of the loan has 
shown the hopelessness of such an arrangement. To 
bring in other foreign administrators, such, for 
instance, as Germans, is a possible course, but one 
that does not exactly commend itself to us. How- 
ever pleasant Germans and Frenchmen and Russians 
may be as individuals, there is a bias against Great 
Britain which cannot be concealed. The Austrians 



WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 387 

and the Americans, whom we may regard as our 
friends, and who at least would be impartial, have 
too small an interest in Persia to make their inter- 
vention at all probable. That the Germans or the 
French or the Belgians should prefer to assist Russia 
in her Persian policy, which is directly opposed to 
the trade interests of these nations, is sufficient proof 
of the lengths to which Anglophobia will carry even 
the sanest nations. French sugar is being pushed 
slowly out of Persia by the Russian bounty system, 
while German trade has not a ghost of a chance in 
Persia againsb Russian competition, yet France and 
Germany find the money for the carrying out of 
Russian policy, and German writers go so far as to 
talk indignantly about the British monopoly of the 
Gulf trade, just as if we had closed the Gulf to 
foreigners as Russia has closed the Caucasus and the 
Caspian. 

The Dutch are naturally against us, and it is not 
surprising to find the firm of Hotz and Co. (which 
Lord Curzon indignantly declares to be a British 
firm) assisting the advance of Russian trade. That 
it should import Russian goods, and act as the agents 
of Russian manufacturers in Persia, merely shows 
that it is composed of good men of business. But 
it is certainly curious to find a so-called English firm 
acting as agents in the Gulf of the new Russian line 
of steamers. We have, for the moment, most of 
Europe against us, and one could not regard with 
anything but misgiving a pendant to the Belgian 
customs in the shape of a foreign administration of 
the inland revenue of Persia. Yet the inland revenue 



WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 

must be taken in hand. So here we have a problem 
for British statesmanship. 

Next to the Loan Agreement, Russia has a great 
advantage over us by means of the secret Railway 
Protocol. At the time the protocol was drawn up 
in 1890 it was not apparently looked on with appre- 
hension by any British critics. It came in answer 
to the Karun concession, the Imperial Bank conces- 
sion, and the Mining Corporation, and one can under- 
stand how even an astute observer like Lord Curzon 
might have been taken in by the apparent superiority 
of the British plums. But in the course of twelve 
years the situation has changed. The Railway 
Protocol now stands out clearly as a most important 
factor in Persian politics, and as a refutation of the 
slighting remarks made by Lord Curzon about the 
ineptitude of Russian policy. The Russians learned 
some time ago what we have not yet grasped — the 
supreme political importance of railway control in 
the East. Her expansion during the last generation 
has been by means of railways and railway conces- 
sions, and she could very well afford to laugh at 
mining concessions in Persia as long as she had the 
means of communication, without which mining 
operations are impossible, in her powerful hands. 

But this secret protocol has been sometimes mis- 
understood. Dr. Rohrbach, for instance, thinks that 
Russia has the right to settle when and how and 
where railways shall be built in Persia. This is a 
very liberal interpretation to put on an agreement 
which simply postpones all railway building in Persia 
for a certain number of years. As soon as the period 



WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 389 

stated elapses Russia is on exactly the same footing 
as Great Britain. The time of the original protocol 
was up in 1900. As part of the loan conditions it 
was extended, some say until 1905, others until 19 10. 
But whatever may be the exact term, the object of 
the extension must be to give Russia time to exact a 
much greater concession. In the meantime she is 
getting her railway system brought up to the Persian 
border, and the respite has been of the greatest 
advantage to her. For where would Russian trade 
be in Persia to-day if we had begun railway building 
ten years ago ? But it is quite obvious that respite 
alone is not all she wants, nor is it likely that the 
loan of the year was procured by the Shah without 
some further concession. I have been told, on fairly 
good authority in Teheran, that one of the conditions 
of the last loan was nothing less than the monopoly 
of railways in Persia, which Russia nearly obtained 
in 1889 — in fact, did obtain for the moment. Even 
if this is an exaggeration, we do not know what con- 
ditions the next loan will bring forth, or the next 
loan will bring forth, or the next again, or the one 
after that. Nothing, therefore, is more essential than 
that we should find out exactly when this protocol 
expires and then come to a definite agreement with 
the Shah about railways south of Teheran. And we 
want the agreement in writing. 

This railway question, I take to be of far the 
greatest importance in Persia. All the suggestions 
about understandings with Russia, or spheres of in- 
fluence, or partition, or integrity, are airy vapourings 
which leads us nowhere. We have already an under- 



390 WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 

standing with Russia about the integrity of Persia, 
dating back to the year 1834 and renewed again 
many times since. In 1888 notes were actually ex- 
changed on the subject and verbal assurances given. 
If we were to try until Doomsday to come to agree- 
ment with Russia about Persia we could get nothing 
out of her more valuable than this understanding, to 
which Lord Cranborne has recently referred and which 
is worth as much as all similar understandings with 
Russia. Some writers have suggested as a panacea 
the recognising of our different spheres of influence. 
One would have thought that we had had enough of 
spheres of influence in our recent Chinese experience. 
Besides, there are at least two 'parties to such a policy, 
and there is not the slightest reason to suppose that 
Russia would ever put her signature to any spheres 
of influence agreement. In reality there is nothing at 
all to be gained by proclaiming our sphere of influence, 
because if we have not already got a sphere of in- 
fluence in Persia writing words down on paper will 
not give us one. Above all, we should guard against 
a policy which, even if Russia should fall in with it, 
would result in handing over the north to our rival 
while we kept the south open for the rest of the 
world, including Russia. 

As for a partition of Persia that is just one of those 
things which must never be mentioned, but yet 
are likely enough to happen. Since, however, it 
must not be mentioned, it is not much use discussing 
it here. Still, there is a trend of events which is 
often contrary to the trend of opinion — a sage remark 
for which I have to thank a Shanghai friend — and 



WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 391 

when we are protesting most loudly our adherence to 
the status quo we may be secretly convinced of the 
inevitableness of a debdcle. In China we cannot dis- 
guise from ourselves that what may be called partial 
partition has gone a long way, and has been arrested 
only by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty — a singularly 
heroic remedy. In Persia we have no other Power 
to rely on except ourselves. The only other Power 
which has even an adjacent interest in the matter is 
Germany, and we have had enough of Anglo -German 
agreements. On the other hand, the chances of 
saving Persia from the consequences of her own folly 
are exceedingly small. Any one who at a distance has 
formed ideas of raising up a Mohammedan rampart 
between ourselves and Russia has only to stay a 
month in the country to have all such ideas rudely 
dispelled. Islam buried its talent in the ground 
some centuries ago, and has never taken the trouble 
even to dig it up. As for Persia, you will search 
the East in vain for a people or a Government more 
doomed to decay. 

In China and Corea we admire many character- 
istics of the people while we condemn the corrupt 
systems of government. In Persia — apart from the 
lawless tribes, who have their rude qualities — we are 
face to face with a people at least as corrupt as its 
Government, and nothing worse could be said than 
that. Such a people and such a Government cannot 
much longer escape the salutary rod of foreign control. 
It is merely a question as to whether the rulers 
will be many or single. But in the meantime we 
must talk about the integrity of Persia. No Under 



392 WANTED, A BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 

Secretary for Foreign Affairs would be recognisable 
unless he had the word integrity or the phrase status 
quo on his lips. But while we talk of integrity we 
should not be idle. If we have a sphere of influence 
in Persia we should do well to develop it before some 
one else steps in to assist us, and personally I should 
prefer to regard the whole of Persia as our sphere of 
influence. That is the Russian way, and it generally 
ends in the important part falling to her share, while 
she still has a fighting chance of the rest. In actual 
fact the whole of Persia would be, commercially 
speaking, in our net — as far as textile manufactures 
go — if our railway was only pushed as far north as 
Hamadan and Teheran. The whole aim and object of 
our policy in Persia first and last should be, railways. 
Russia may have all the political prestige she wants 
as long as we control the railways from the Gulf to 
Teheran. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 

Before leaving the question of communications in 
Persia, I should like to add a postscript to a previous 
letter on the subject. The postscript is suggested 
by a journey over the Teheran-Resht road, about 
which we have heard so much. As about 90 per 
cent, of the foreigners who visit Teheran enter or 
leave Persia by this road, which has now been open 
about two years, it is quite unnecessary to describe 
the route ; but it may be useful to correct one or 
two misstatements which have been freely made with 
regard to this Russian undertaking, and which 
have a direct bearing on the whole question of 
road- making in Persia. The old caravan route 
from Resht followed the course of the Sefld Rud 
River, through the wooded gorges of the Elburz 
range to where that river is joined by the Shah Rud, 
just about Menjil. It then turned south by the 
valley of the Shah Rud to Pachinar, where the Shah 
Rud is joined in turn by the small stream called the 
Pachinar River, which rises south of the Elburz 
range, in the downs above Kasvin. The caravan 
route, however, did not take this opportunity of 
piercing the range of mountains, but struck straight 
for Kasvin from Pachinar over the top of the range 



394 ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 

by a track to the east of the narrow gorge of the 
Pachinar stream, and so attained a height of over 
7000 feet above the sea. 

This old route had the disadvantage of being fre- 
quently blocked by snow for many weeks in the 
winter. The Russians, when they came to build 
their carriage road, very naturally altered the align- 
ment a little to the west after passing Kasvin, 
utilising the natural " port " which is afforded by the 
gorge of the Pachinar stream, and instead of climbing 
over the Elburz range began descending actually 
before the range was reached, so that the highest 
point of the road is on the plateau near Bekende, 
two stages beyond Kasvin. Here the elevation is 
about 5000 feet or a little under, and the route can 
always be kept open in winter. But even the 
Persians could hardly have overlooked this obvious 
passage for so many centuries. The fact is that for 
many miles — from Bekende to Pachinar — the valley 
is so narrow and rugged that it was on the whole 
easier to climb the extra 2000 feet even in winter ; 
and the Russians could only utilise the valley by 
cutting a road out of the precipitous mountain sides 
at great expense. For about 100 versts from Bekende 
right down to Siarud within 35 versts of Resht, with 
only a short break about Menjil, where the Shah 
Rud joins the Send Rud and the valley opens out at 
the junction, the new road is simply a ledge with a 
steep wall of rock on one side and a precipice on the 
other. 

From a picturesque point of view the route is 
delightful. One passes with abrupt transitions from 



ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 395 

the open plateau about Kasvin to the bleak rocky 
gorge of the Pachinar stream, and from the barren 
gorge to the luxuriant forestry of the Send Hud 
valley. Judged as a means of communication, how- 
ever, the road makes a very poor show for the 
amount of money spent on it. It is so narrow — in 
many places barely 1 5 feet wide — that two vehicles 
cannot pass each other, and as the turns and twists 
round the precipitous contours are both many and 
sharp, there is no knowing what may be ahead of 
the reckless Persian driver. In parts of the road 
there is a low parapet on the precipice side, in other 
parts there is none, so that a sudden collision may 
be followed by very serious consequences. It is not 
surprising that accidents are of frequent occurrence. 
During my passage I came across two European 
travellers who had been upset, fortunately in both 
cases where there was no precipice, and one of them 
was seriously injured. Only a short time ago a large 
waggon went over the side, and was smashed to 
pieces, horses, passengers, and all, and a little later 
the carriage of a Russian friend of mine was precipi- 
tated into the Send B,ud, while he himself was 
luckily on foot. Such minor accidents as broken 
wheels or springs are of everyday occurrence. You 
are certain to find soon after starting that some 
portion of your phaeton or victoria is on the point of 
giving way and must be tied up with rope or string. 
Sometimes it is the tyre that is coming off. I have 
seen a door pulled off its. hinges at the post-house 
and a lamp torn from the wall in order to procure 
two nails to repair a tyre. In my own case I had to 



396 ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 

get out at stated intervals and hammer the nut of 
my hind axle with a stone to prevent the wheel 
from coming off. When you know that one of the 
wheels of your phaeton is dependent on a loose nut 
it gives you no sense of security to see your Persian 
Jehu nonchalantly burying his face in his hands to 
light his pipe with the reins looped loosely over his 
arm while four badly harnessed horses are tearing 
along a ledge 18 feet wide with sharp turns at a 
speed of eight or nine miles an hour, which is strictly 
prohibited. Nothing seems to upset the equanimity 
of the driver. At Pachinar, where I found a fellow 
traveller badly injured through the overturning of 
his carriage, the driver came up smiling for the usual 
tip of two krans for the stage, though the accident 
was due entirely to his careless driving. It may be 
a matter of wonder that the Russians who built the 
road do not organise the carriage service. This is 
exactly where the unsurpassed talent for boycotting 
exercised by the Persians prevents all improvements. 
A Russian contractor did attempt to organise a 
caravan service for goods, but after finding that his 
mules and donkeys either died of starvation or fell 
over the precipice he gave the business up as a bad 
job. And so the carriage service is in the hands of 
a Persian, and the results are only too plainly to be 
seen. 

Apart from the evils of the carriage service, the 
road is far from being a satisfactory piece of work, and 
compares most unfavourably with the fine metalled 
ways of the Caucasus. Nominally the road from 
Pir-i-Bazar to Teheran (Pir-i-Bazar being the port of 



ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 397 

Resht)"is $$7 versts, but of that distance 141 versts 
(about 100 miles) between Kasvin and Teheran can 
be left out of account, since the road had existed 
between these points for years, and of the rest it was 
only 100 versts between Bekende and Sia Rud that 
presented real difficulties. These included a new 
bridge over the Send Rud near Menjil, and a great 
deal of blasting. The Russian company started with 
a capital of 1,000,000 roubles, which was afterwards 
increased until the Government had to step in with 
further capital to the amount of about 3,000,000 
roubles and a guarantee of 5 per cent on the capital 
invested by the company. The total amount ex- 
pended was about ,£480,000, and the result is not a 
chaussee, but a narrow road badly metalled, which 
requires constant repairs. In spite of the high tolls 
levied by the Russian Government, it is difficult to 
collect enough money to pay the guaranteed interest 
to the private company, and at the same time to 
keep the road in proper condition. The large sum of 
money sunk by the Government, amounting roughly 
to 3,000,000 roubles, brings in no return whatever. 
Trade between Teheran and Russia has certainly 
been facilitated in winter time by the new road, but 
the cost of transport, so far from being made cheaper, 
is now at least 10 per cent, dearer than it was before 
the road was made. Even the traveller who can sit 
more or less at his ease in his phaeton or landau all 
the way to Resht from Teheran, must pay liberally 
for the luxury, and many people regret the cheaper 
though more tiring days of chapar riding. That 
Russian trade owes its recent advance to this new 



398 ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 

means of communication is more than doubtful. As 
I have before endeavoured to show, the real causes 
for the increase of the import of Russian piece-goods 
and Russian sugar are to be found in the large 
premiums paid by the Government to the exporters 
of these articles, and the great efforts made by the 
Russian Bank in Teheran to push Russian wares. 

The Teheran-Resht road is not even a military 
asset of great importance, since it is not made to 
accommodate the passage of an army ; though in this 
connection it may be worth while to point out that 
the road is not, as many critics have asserted, 
impracticable for artillery. A road along which a 
waggon with four horses abreast can be driven can 
surely accommodate even a siege train, to say nothing 
of field batteries. But the military question is not 
really important. If Persia were in a mood to de- 
fend herself against Russia, which she never will be, 
the passage of the Elburz could easily be rendered 
impossible, however good the road might be. Russia 
will never need to approach Persia in a warlike way 
from the shores of the Caspian when she has a clean 
run into Tabriz by way of Erivan, and an equally 
simple task before her in Khorasan. It may well 
be asked, then, what Russia has got out of her lavish 
expenditure on the Resht-Teheran road. The answer 
is : Nothing at all beyond the privilege of having 
Russian toll gates and Russian toll-collectors right 
up to the capital of Persia, which adds something to 
her prestige. According to our ideas the Emperor 
of Russia is hardly getting his money's worth, but, 
as he has no House of Commons to inquire into the 



ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 399 

matter, that is not likely to disturb his peace of 
mind. When we consider that this very route is 
marked out as one of the railway lines of the future 
the waste of money on the road seems all the greater, 
and speaks eloquently of the strong desire of the 
Russian Government to push its political influence 
in Persia at all costs. ^500,000 would have gone 
a long way in constructing a railway over this short 
distance, and as far as assistance to trade goes, a 
tenth of that sum expended on improving the landing 
facilities at Enzeli would have been of more service 
than the road. But Russia is not ready to extend 
her railways into Persia yet, nor would she get any 
political prestige out of dredging the bar at Enzeli. 

Seeing that, in spite of our predominance in the 
Gulf, we have done nothing in all these years to im- 
prove the wretched landing at Bushire, it hardly 
becomes a British traveller to complain about Enzeli. 
Yet the difficulty of getting from Resht to the 
steamer is a sore trial to the temper. There is first 
a drive of six miles to Pir-i-bazar, then a boat carries 
the passenger a few miles down the river of Resht to 
the lagoon, where he must wait for the arrival of a 
steam launch to take him across the lagoon to 
Enzeli. At Enzeli he gets into another boat which 
conveys him and his luggage to the custom house, 
where, if he has satisfied the custom house officials, 
he may embark in a sea-going boat strong enough to 
carry him through the surf on the bar to the steamer, 
which is lying in the worst roadstead in the Caspian. 
Having, after a day's hard work and multitudinous 
arguments with coolies and boatmen, reached the 



400 ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 

not too comfortable refuge of the Russian steamer, he 
will probably have to wait many hours a victim to sea- 
sickness while the steamer rolls helplessly about at 
the mercy of the inhospitable Caspian Sea. 

It is not to be wondered at if on arriving at Baku, 
where the steamer comes up to the wharf and he 
finds himsef in a town with wide streets and sub- 
stantial stone buildings, among which is a moderately 
good hotel, he imagines that at last he has returned 
to the haunts of civilised people. Yet travellers 
coming in the opposite direction and leaving Europe 
behind them, when they come on the barren, treeless 
Baku with its forest of oil-pumps and smell of 
petroleum, think that they have reached the very 
jumping-off place of the world. 

Before leaving Besht I had ascertained the rather 
curious fact that British cotton goods are still sold 
in fairly large quantities in Besht, where they have 
proportionately a larger hold on the market than 
they have in Teheran. They come to Besht by way 
of Bagdad and Kermanshah and Hamadan, the last- 
named place being the distributing centre for North- 
Western Persia. But now the Manchester goods 
are gradually being driven out of Besht by Bussian 
wares, and particularly as far as white piece-goods 
are concerned, by the manufactures of a Baku cotton 
mill recently set up by a great Caucasian millionaire 
named Takieff. 

M. Takieff, who is a Tartar, was only a few years 
ago a stonemason in Baku. Having got possession of 
some landed property, he was lucky enough to strike 
oil to such an extent that he was able to sell out to 



ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 401 

a British company for 5,000,000 roubles. He is now- 
said to be worth 20,000,000 roubles, and yet, I have 
been told, he can neither read nor write. About a 
quarter of this huge fortune he has invested in a 
brand new cotton mill put up in the outskirts of 
Baku, partly for philanthropic reasons, since M. 
Takieff is a lover of his own race and would like to 
increase the industrial prosperity of the Caucasian 
Tartars. In many ways Baku is splendidly adapted to 
be a great manufacturing centre. Cotton grows close 
at hand in Mazanderan, round about Erivan, north 
of Baku at Derbent, and a little farther afield in the 
rich Ferghana district of Central Asia. With the 
exception of the Persian cotton these are all excellent 
staples, and it costs much less to bring them to Baku 
than to take them all the way to Moscow. Baku 
possesses, moreover, a good harbour, and is close to 
the extensive markets of Persia and Asia Minor. Of 
course, fuel is cheap and abundant. The Moscow 
manufacturers looked on M. Takieff's enterprise with 
disfavour, and so strong was the pressure they 
brought to bear on the Goverement that for eight or 
nine months the Caucasian millionaire was forbidden 
to carry out his undertaking. The iniquitous pro- 
hibition was at last removed, however, and the mill 
is now in full swing. Eighteen thousand spindles 
were at work when I visited the factory and 650 
looms, but the machinery has since been exactly 
doubled, and now there will be 36,000 spindles and 
1300 looms in motion. The chief difficulty is the 
want of water. Baku with nearly 250,000 inhabi- 
tants, is still dependent on condensed sea water — a 

2 G 



402 ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 

fact which is characteristic of Russian enterprise. 
Labour is also more expensive than one would expect, 
partly because Tartar women cannot be employed, 
and partly because such good wages are obtained in 
the oil- works. 

Hence it comes about that the Persian who works 
for A^d. a day in his native land wants 2s. in Baku. 
The lack of water for dyeing purposes has as yet 
prevented M. TakiefFs factory from turning out 
coloured goods, but his white material has already 
secured a good market in Persia. The mill is 
managed by Englishmen schooled to their work in 
Manchester, and the whole establishment is wonder- 
fully complete and well found even to the extent of 
providing education for the boys employed at the 
spindles. It may console the Manchester manufac- 
turer to reflect that as soon as the factory is working 
at a profit there will be a move made to get rid of 
the foreigners, and then deterioration will set in. But 
if Baku were, let us suppose, in American hands, 
what a future would be in store for that murky, oily 
spot ! Backed by regions of extraordinary fertility, 
with cotton, silk, wool, and every kind of mineral in 
abuD dance in the Caucasus, with cheap fuel and a 
good harbour, and all Asia for a market, there is 
hardly any limit to the potentialities of the situa- 
tion. Under the Russian Government these poten- 
tialities are far from being realised. The Russians are 
neither a commercial nor an industrial people, and, 
strange as it may seem,, there is hardly a penny of 
Russian capital invested in the rich portion of the 
Russian dominions. The oil-fields are either in the 



ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 403 

hands of Caucasians or of foreigners. The capital is 
mostly foreign. The minerals over towards Batum 
are being worked by British and German companies. 
The magnificent pastoral and agricultural riches of 
the country are only half exploited by the natives 
with no assistance from the Government. Russia 
herself only owns the railway, and the much-talked- 
of pipe line which is to conduct the oil from Baku to 
Batum, a distance of 560 miles. The line has so far 
reached Michaelovo, which is only about 120 miles 
from Batum. The remaining 440 miles have still to 
be laid. 

At present there is a serious depression in Baku. 
Out of 2500 wells 1000 were not working when I 
was there, and the price of oil has sunk to a des- 
perately low figure. The prices recently were 5 
kopeks per pood for refined oil and 7 kopeks for 
crude — that is to say, about one farthing and a third 
of a penny respectively per gallon. The refined oil 
is cheaper than crude oil owing to the demand for 
liquid fuel. At such prices the smaller producers are 
being ruined, especially in cases where land has been 
bought at auction from the Russian Government at 
the rate of 8 or 10 kopeks per pood royalty, or 
more than the oil fetches in the market. Though 
the prices are so low the Russian Government charges 
no less than 60 kopeks per pood excise duty on the 
domestic article, or 1200 per cent, ad valorem, so 
that Baku oil can be sold cheaper in Great Britain 
than it can in Russia. The result is detrimental to 
Baku industry. Another reason for the depression 
in trade at Baku is the want of combination among 



404 ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 

the producers, who are entirely in the hands of the 
distributors, who keep down prices and make enor- 
mous profits. This is a difficulty which in America 
would certainly be removed. Another obstacle lies 
in the cost of transport. The railway charges 14 
kopeks per pood for freight to Batoum, so that oil 
which costs from 5 to 7 kopeks a pood in Baku 
costs 26 kopeks by the time it is put on board the 
steamer at Batum. Hence it is impossible for Baku 
to compete with Texas in the sale of liquid fuel even 
in the east of the Mediterranean. The riots in Baku 
and Bavaria, which were simultaneous with the 
movements in Poltava and Kharkof and Moscow, 
are indications that the Russian Government may 
carry its present fiscal policy too far. When Russian 
piece-goods are cheaper in Teheran than in Moscow, 
when the Government is almost giving away Russian 
sugar to Persian consumers, when a domestic tax of 
1200 per cent, is levied on Russian oil while the 
foreign consumer escapes the burden, and when 
royalties have to be paid to the Russian Government 
which actually exceed the price of the oil that pays 
the royalty, it takes a good deal of faith to persuade 
oneself that M. Witte's financial policy is really cal- 
culated to benefit the Russian producer, and is not 
framed rather with other ends in view which are not 
purely commercial. 

On the whole, the passage from Persian to Russian 
territory inspires two rather contradictory emotions. 
In the first place one is glad to find that the shadow 
of Russian predominance in the trade and politics of 
Persia which grows darker as Teheran is approached 



ON THE RUSSIAN ROAD 405 

from the south, seeming to lie like a heavy pall 
especially over the imaginations of British subjects 
in Persia, is produced by a far more flimsy substance 
than might have been expected. The road built by 
Russia to the capital of Persia on closer inspection 
turns out to be a very poor affair, on which money 
has been recklessly expended. As for Russian indus- 
trial enterprise, a visit to the oil-wells in Baku which 
are sunk by foreign capital, to the refineries which 
are the property of foreign companies, to cotton mills, 
which are managed by Manchester engineers and 
Manchester master weavers, to the copper and man- 
ganese mines which are being exploited by British 
capital, is sufficient to make one suspicious about the 
legitimate character of the expansion of Russian trade 
south of the Caspian. On the other hand, one is 
mournfully impressed by the fact that in spite of 
her unbusinesslike and spendthrift methods, Russia 
is steadily attaining her political ends in Persia 
and at the same time threatens to deprive our 
manufacturers of a promising market because our 
Government will not make up its mind to take 
the simple steps that are necessary to check Russian 
advance. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA VIA THE CAUCASUS 

There are two possible routes from Russia to Persia 
on the west side of the Caspian Sea. The first lies 
along the coast of the Caspian from Baku to Resht 
and on to Teheran by way of the new Russian road. 
The second goes from Tiflis to Erivan, and thereafter 
down the valley of the Aras to Julfa and on to Tabriz. 
The more direct of the two would naturally appear 
to be the Baku-Resht route ; at least this would 
reach Teheran by the shortest line. To go away 
back to Tiflis in order to reach the capital of Persia, 
which lies in almost the opposite direction, is appar- 
ently to adopt a most roundabout method of approach. 
Yet a glance at the map will reveal the fact that 
Tiflis, Erivan, and Tabriz are really on the natural 
line of communication between the industrial centres 
of Russia and Teheran, provided always that the 
great Caucasus range can be pierced by the iron 
road. Vladikavkaz is only 136 miles by the famous 
military chaussee from Tiflis, and one can hardly doubt 
that this connection will eventually be made, thus 
saving between 500 or 600 miles of the long detour 
by way of Baku. 

In the meantime a railway has been pushed over 
the Anti-Caucasus to Alexandropol, and from there 




MAP SHOWING RELATIVE POSITIONS OF RUSSIA AND PERSIA 

Black lines show railways existing. Dotted lines show railways in 
course of construction 



RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 407 

lines run south-west to Kars and south-east to 
Erivan, and no farther obstacle, except the bridging 
of the Aras at Julfa, lies between the Russian rail- 
head at Erivan and Tabriz, while from Tabriz to 
Teheran the way lies equally open. The Russian 
Government has evidently chosen this route for the 
present in preference to the Baku-Resht-Teheran 
line — which must eventually follow — partly perhaps 
because it does not come into direct competition with 
the subsidised steamers of the Kavkaz-Merkur on 
the Caspian, partly because it is the most direct way 
of reaching Persia, provided Vladikavkaz can be 
joined to Tiflis, and partly because the portion of the 
line from Tiflis to Alexandropol kills, strategically 
speaking, two birds with one stone, for it enables the 
Government to establish a railway base at Kars 
against Turkey on the one hand, and at Erivan 
against Persia on the other. Before Alexandropol 
is reached the railway crosses the great mountain 
range which upholds the Armenian plateau by a pass 
which is over 7000 feet above the sea, and the 
Armenian plateau having once been reached, Persia 
and Asia Minor are both easy of access. There is no 
way of getting up to the table-land of Persia except 
by climbing over one at least of the supporting 
mountain ranges. Russia is able to accomplish this 
feat inside her own territory, and her railway once 
over the Anti-Caucasus is from an engineering point 
of view already in Persia. 

There is no intention for the present of reverting 
to the Baku-Resht route, nor yet to a subsidiary 
line which has been partially prospected between 



408 RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON PERSIA 

Evlakh on the Baku-Tiflis line and Lenkoran, but 
which could not be more than a branch railway- 
intended to develop the fertile steppes in the lower 
valley of the Kur and the Aras. On the other 
hand the continuation of the Tiflis-Alexandropol line 
to Erivan has been carried out in the last two years 
with considerable rapidity and success. Trains now 
run daily from Tiflis to Kars, and twice a week on 
the new section between Alexandropol and Erivan. 
In order to travel over the new line I left the 
Baku-Tiflis express at the station of Akstafa, the 
old starting-point of the caravans for Tabriz. From 
here a fine chaussee leads due south to Erivan, a 
distance of 173 versts (about 120 miles). The first 
fifty miles of the road lie along the beautiful valley 
of the Akstafa River, gorgeously wooded, up to 
Delijan, a pretty village "4000 feet above the sea, 
which is used by the rich Armenians of Baku as a 
hill-station in summer. By a wonderful succession 
of zigzags the chaussee thereafter reaches the summit 
of the pass 7420 feet above the sea, and at the same 
time comes out on the Armenian plateau. There are 
any number of roads leading in a parallel direction 
from the Georgian trough over the Anti-Caucasus to 
the plateau beyond, and all exhibit the same features 
— the beautiful wooded ascent on the north side of 
the range and the more gradual slope on the south 
side to a plateau devoid of trees, and totally different 
in aspect from the luxuriant Georgian valley. 

The special features which are peculiar to the 
Akstafa- Erivan road are first the great Sevan Lake, 
which lies just south of the pass at an elevation of 



RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 409 

6340 feet above the sea, and secondly, the glorious 
view of Ararat which unfolds itself to the eye of the 
traveller soon after he leaves the side of the dreary 
lake. It is almost worth while undertaking this 
drive simply to feast on fresh sea-trout from the 
waters of Sevan ; otherwise, to one who has left 
Persia and all its ills behind at Resht, it seems like 
a retrograde movement to return to the valley of 
the Aras and the dry slopes about Erivan, which 
recall too vividly the landscape of Kermanshah or 
Hamadan. Yet it is interesting to see what Russia 
has done for this dependency of hers. But for 
Russia Erivan would be just such another town as 
Kasvin or Hamadan, and one is bound to abmit that 
whatever shortcomings Russian civilisation may have 
it is infinitely superior to that of Persia. The streets 
of Erivan cannot boast of much in the way of metal- 
ling, but they are wide and straight. The buildings 
are far from beautiful, but they are more or less 
substantial, while the ruins which generally compose 
half of a Persian town are here conspicuous by their 
absence. The town is made picturesque by its circle 
of gardens, in the midst of which rich Armenians 
have built pleasant dwellings, which give an air of 
prosperity to the whole place. Indeed, there can be 
no doubt that Erivan is prosperous. For many years 
the town has been on the direct trade-route between 
Russia and Tabriz, which was rendered more service- 
able by the Akstafa-Erivan- Julfa road ; and now 
communications have been improved by the advent 
of the railway of which Erivan is for the moment the 
terminus. The result is seen in the enlargement of 



410 RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 

the town and the growth of its trade. The exports 
are mostly raw products of which the most important 
is cotton. 500,000 poods are sent away from Erivan 
annually, amounting in value to just .£500,000 ster- 
ling, which is a large sum for a community of less 
than 30,000 souls. Wine, too, and excellent brandy 
are exported to the extent of 6000 barrels each year, 
and it is just here that the difference between 
Russian Armenia and Persia is characteristically 
marked. 

Persia grows abundance of wine, which is so badly 
made that it cannot be kept more than a year, and at 
best is a despicable beverage. In Trans-Caucasia, 
with the same quality of grapes, good wine is nearly 
always made, and once at Edgmiatzin one of the 
reverend fathers brought out for me a bottle from 
the inner bin of the famous monastery which would 
have put most of the Rhine vintages to shame. 
With cotton the results are similar. In Trans-Caspia 
and Trans-Caucasia the cultivation of the plant is so 
well carried out that the product is not much inferior 
to that of Egypt or America. The Persian cotton, 
on the other hand, is generally inferior stuff, which 
is useful only for mixing with the rest. 

Another source of wealth to Erivan is the increase 
in the military force and the new military buildings 
which have followed the coming of the railway ; for 
with the railway extension Alexandropol is ceasing 
to be the chief base on the south side of the Anti- 
Caucasus, and is being replaced on the one hand by 
Kars, and on the other by Erivan. As usual there 
is the little public park or garden where military 



RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 411 

bands discourse music of a kind. On the day 
of my arrival in Erivan the town was gay with 
flags in honour of the Emperor of Russia's name- 
day, and nearly the whole population was con- 
gregated in the little square in the centre of the 
town listening to the band. The Russian element 
seemed entirely military, or at least official ; for there 
was hardly a Russian to be seen out of uniform. 
This, indeed, is true of all the country south of the 
mountains, and in a lesser degree of all Trans- 
Caucasia, where the official element is very strong. 
One is thankful to get away to Batum, where uni- 
forms are not quite so universal, and where the 
humble civilian feels that he has a right to breathe. 
At Erivan I was bothered half a dozen times a day 
by inquiries as to my business, my intentions, and my 
probable destination until I began to feel like an 
escaped criminal. One may be excused for turning 
Pharisee and thanking heaven that in this respect at 
least we are not as other European nations are. 

I found that the railway was not yet in complete 
working order. Still the bulk of the Russian mer- 
chandise destined for the Tabriz market is now 
brought as far as Erivan by rail instead of being 
sent over the chaussee from Akstafa. In this way 
1 20 miles of road carriage is saved, and the extra 
freight on the railway between Akstafa and Erivan 
is not worth considering. The result is that Russian 
textiles and sugar can be delivered at Tabriz much 
cheaper than goods from Western Europe coming 
by way of Trebizond. Moscow goods can be con- 
veyed to Erivan at rates varying between 1.20 roubles 



412 RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 

(i rouble and 20 kopeks) in winter and 90 kopeks 
in summer, the railway charges being reduced in 
summer to meet the competition of the Volga 
steamers. From Erivan to Tabriz (a distance of 
about 200 miles) the transport by waggon as far as 
Julfa and by caravan between Julfa and Tabriz costs 
80 kopeks per pood, so that altogether goods can be 
conveyed from Moscow to the Tabriz market at rates 
which do not fall below 1.70 roubles in summer and 
never exceed 2. 20 roubles in winter. The carriage from 
Trebizond, on the other hand, varies according to the 
season between 3 and 4 roubles per pood. In 
other words, the average freight paid on Russian 
goods coming into Tabriz amounts to about £\i 10s. 
a ton against ^2ia ton paid on merchandise from 
France, Great Britain, or Germany coming by way of 
Trebizond. 

The advantage in favour of Russia will be further 
increased when the railway is pushed on to Julfa, 
and still more so when it reaches Tabriz. Very little 
can be done to assist our merchants in this field since 
the improving of the Trebizond route would not affect 
the price of transport. Already wheeled vehicles 
can be taken as far as Bayazid, on the Turkish 
frontier, yet the caravan rates are not cheaper, but 
rather more expensive than they are on routes in 
Persia, where wheels are not used at all. The same 
remark applies to the Erivan-Tabriz route, the 
greater part of which consists of a made road, practi- 
cable for waggons. Since, therefore, transport by 
way of Trebizond can be made cheaper only by build- 
ing a railway through Turkish Armenia, and since no 



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RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 413 

one now living is at all likely to witness such a line 
built, we must be prepared to see the Tabriz market 
delivered gradually over to Russia unless railways are 
built through Persia from the south. The astonish- 
ing thing is that Manchester goods still hold their 
own in Tabriz. In spite of their advantage in the 
matter of freight and the much greater assistance of 
the large export premium paid on Russian prints and 
sheetings, Moscow manufactures are sold in the 
Tabriz market only to a very limited extent. This 
can be explained only by the fact, pointed out to me 
by a rich Armenian merchant, that a very cheap 
selection of goods is sent to Tabriz from Western 
Europe in order to compete with the growing Russian 
trade. Hence it is that Russian cottons are often of 
much higher quality than Manchester goods, as they 
could well afford to be when they have an advantage 
of £% i os. a ton in the freight, and are further 
cheapened by a premium of nearly ^35 a ton on 
export into Persia. In Teheran the better quality 
of the Russian goods secures them a larger sale, 
which is further facilitated by the action of the 
Russian bank, whose chief business seems to consist 
in pushing Russian commerce. In Tabriz apparently 
the Russian bank is not quite so active and the pro- 
vincial population is content with goods of a lower 
quality. 

Dr. Rohrbach, whose writings I have once or twice 
quoted already, suggests that German textiles might 
be brought more readily into the Tabriz market if 
German steamers were to run direct from the North 
Sea ports to Trebizond, and if the existing carriage 



414 RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 

road were extended beyond Bayazid through Persian 
territory to Tabriz. This suggestion serves only to 
show how far he, in common with most other writers 
on the subject, has failed to understand the whole 
question of communications in this part of the 
Eastern hemisphere. To begin with, the freight 
between Western Europe and Trebizond is a matter 
of no practical importance whatever, since at most it 
amounts to a few shillings per ton, and a shilling or 
two more or less on the sea carriage cannot appre- 
ciably affect the ultimate price of goods that have to 
pay ^21 per ton for the land journey. In the 
second place, the extension of the carriage road from 
Bayazid would seem to be an even more futile 
remedy in view of the fact that in almost every case 
where carriage roads have been made in place of the 
old mule- tracks the cost of transport has been raised 
rather than lowered. If roads were built by the 
various Governments concerned for the good of the 
public, which might use them free of charge, the 
result might be slightly — but only slightly — different. 
As it is, where private companies, or foreign Govern- 
ments, or the Governments of the countries them- 
selves, build roads as a sort of commercial under- 
taking, and charge high tolls in order to keep the 
roads in repair, and at the same time to pay if 
possible some interest on the capital expended, then 
the advantage gained by using waggons in preference 
to pack-animals is more than counterbalanced by the 
tolls. As Russia has grasped, more than any other 
Power to-day, the simple fact that cheap and rapid 
railway communication is the most important factor 



RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 415 

in Eastern politics, she is likely to overreach us very 
rapidly as long as we oppose her with road schemes 
which are to railways what a superannuated donkey 
is to an automobile. 

Russia has also a great faculty for rapid railway 
construction. The extension from Alexandropol 
to Erivan was partially open to traffic about a year 
after it was seriously taken in hand, though the 
distance is 144 versts — about a hundred miles, and 
the curves and gradients are difficult. 

With us a railway when it is opened to traffic is 
generally finished in every way, as far as perfection 
can be predicated. The Russians, on the other hand, 
aim at getting the rails laid over the whole distance 
as rapidly as possible, so that trains can run over 
the line in a sort of fashion years before the perma- 
nent way has any kind of real permanency. Between 
Erivan and Alexandropol, for instance, there are 
three streams to cross, none of them requiring a bridge 
of more than one or two short spans. Yet, though 
passenger trains have been running for months, 
two out of the three bridges are not complete. Then 
there is a difference of more than 2000 feet between 
the valley of the Aras and the plain of Alexandropol. 
In negotiating the rise the line has to wriggle its 
way through the spurs of the great Alagoz Mount 
tain. Here there are cuttings still to be made, 
curves to be readjusted, and embankments in process 
of construction, so that for a space of twenty miles 
or so the entire alignment is only temporary. Again, 
most of the railway stations are not yet built, and 
the rolling-stock is extremely limited. But still 



416 RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 

trains are run somehow or other, and the new 
section far more than pays its working expenses long 
before it is really finished. This system of railway 
building has its advantages and its disadvanages, 
but the advantages would seem to outweigh the dis- 
advantages. In the long run it is, perhaps, rather 
expensive, since so much temporary work has to be 
done only do be abandoned when the permanent 
alignment is finished, and lives are often lost through 
derailments and broken bridges. On the other hand 
communications are opened very rapidly, and the 
line is already earning a good income long before it 
is, properly speaking, in existence. 

During this semi- construction period the running 
expenses are very small in comparison with the 
receipts, for the travelling public, knowing that it 
is lucky to have a railway at all, puts up with any 
amount of crowding and discomfort. One prefers, 
for instance, to pay 8s. for a seat in a packed second- 
class carriage, and so to cover the distance to 
Alexandropol in eight hours, rather than spend two 
whole days and a night on the road in a rickety 
phaeton, for which the charge would be £$ or £^. 
In most respects the line is well and substantially 
built. In spite of the difficult work in crossing the 
Anti-Caucasus between Tiflis and Alexandropol the 
standard five-foot gauge of Russia is maintained, 
and the rails are fairly heavy; I think 65 lbs. or 70 lbs. 
per yard. The line is single, but there are sidings 
at intervals of six miles so as to facilitate military 
movements. The alignment between Alexandropol 
and Erivan follows more or less the course of the 



RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 417 

Arpa Chai for sixty versts (forty miles) in a southerly 
direction past the base of Alagoz, then turning south- 
east it continues to " serpent " through the spurs of 
that mountain for twenty versts until it reaches the 
open valley of the Aras. At ioo versts it passes a 
mile or so north of the considerable town of Sardara- 
bad; at 122 versts it crosses the Abaranz stream, 
and at 130 the Zanga, both tributaries of the Aras. 
The country here is green and well watered by irri- 
gation canals, while the towering mass of Ararat 
across the Aras affords a continual feast for the eye. 
At 132 versts the main line, which is by this time 
proceeding eaet-south-east along the level floor of 
the Aras valley, comes to a stop, and a branch 
running almost due north for twelve versts brings one 
to Erivan, prettily embowered in its gardens several 
hundred feet . above the main level of the valley. 
No work has been done yet beyond this point on 
the way to Julfa and Tabriz, but the intention 
evidently is to carry on the work at no distant date, 
nor is there the slightest difficulty to be overcome 
until the Aras has to be bridged at Julfa. Already 
the line into Russian Armenia is a financial success, 
and will become more so when the permanent way 
settles down and the rolling-stock is increased ; yet 
this country is exactly similar to Persia — in fact was 
less than 100 years ago part of Persia — where we 
are constantly told railways can never pay. 

At the present moment Russia is nearest to Persia 
at Askabad. From there a railway could be carried 
through to Meshed at any moment and prolonged, 
if necessary, to Teheran and to Seistan. Many 

2 D 



418 RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 

people have thought that a line through Khorasan 
from Askabad is the first railway which Russia will 
build in Persia, the idea being that the strategical 
advantages of such a line would naturally commend 
themselves to the Russian Government. 

But the Russian advance on Khorasan and Seistan 
being almost entirely of a political nature must be 
made to co-ordinate with the commercial attack by 
way of the Caucasus. To act prematurely in either 
direction would be to court ultimate defeat, so that 
though the Russian Government may be now quite 
ready to lay a railway from Askabad into Khorasan, 
that step cannot be taken until they are equally 
prepared on the side of Tabriz, and certainly not 
before the time when they have so gained a control 
over the Shah's purse and the Shah's will that they 
can construct lines in Persia without leaving the 
way open to other Powers to do the same thing ; 
that is to say, their monopoly of railway concessions 
in Persia must be secured. 

On the Tabriz side they have, as I have described, 
got their railway in fairly good working order as far 
as Erivan, from which the way lies perfectly open 
before them down the valley of the Aras to Julfa, 
a distance of a little over ioo miles. That they 
contemplate an immediate extension cannot be 
doubted. The alignment of the existing line has 
been chosen obviously with this end in view, as it 
leaves Erivan twelve versts on the left and points 
straight down the Aras valley. Even the number- 
ing on the verst posts stops short at the Zanga 
crossing and begins afresh for the remaining twelve 



RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 419 

versts to Erivan, showing plainly that Erivan is off 
the main line. To complete the railway to Julfa is 
now a matter of less than two years, but even then 
the Russian base on the Persian border will not be 
quite satisfactory, because the long detour by Baku 
makes the journey from Moscow to Julfa at least 
500 miles more than it might be if there were a 
short cut through the Caucasus from Vladikavkaz 
to Tiflis. It is quite possible, therefore, that the 
Russians will not advance over the border towards 
Tabriz until this connection is made. The construc- 
tion of a line of 1 30 miles or so through the Caucasus 
range would be extremely expensive^ but not at all 
impracticable, and the receipts on the Baku-Tiflis- 
Batum line are now so enormous that the Govern- 
ment can well afford to be extravagant. For the 
year 1901 the net receipts of the Baku-Batum line 
amounted to ^1500 per mile after all expenses were 
paid. That is to say, the line showed a profit of 
about 15 per cent, on the capital invested. I sup- 
pose there is no other railway of 560 miles in the 
world which can produce such figures. 

This brings us to the final question, which is not 
yet satisfactorily answered — whether or not Russia 
is really prepared to carry out the programme which 
she seems to have set before her in Persia. We are 
too often in the habit of consoling ourselves for the 
ground which we have surrendered to Russia in this 
part of the world by reflecting that the great 
Northern Power is going ahead too fast, that she is 
breaking up internally, that she is going bankrupt, 
and that sooner or later there will be a crash. Such 



420 RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 

prophecies may generally be explained on the ground 
that the wish is father to the thought, and as far as 
Russian expansion in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia is concerned our predictions are singularly 
unfulfilled. 

Some writers complain that Russia has done 
nothing to develop or colonise the Caucasus, and 
wonders why in the world with so much to do in her 
own territory she should desire to expand into 
Persia. To begin with, it would be equally per- 
tinent to ask what we wanted with Rhodesia and 
the Soudan when we have all Canada and Aus- 
tralia before us. But even the premisses of such an 
argument are not true. Russia is not naturally a 
commercial Power, and she has not done for the 
Caucasus what we should have done if we had been 
in her place. But she has established peace in a 
country where for centuries peace has been unknown, 
she has built roads and railways, and she has left the 
natural genius of the Armenians and the capital of 
foreigners to do the rest. The Armenians openly 
abuse the Russians, but they forget that under Rus- 
sian Government they enjoy a prosperity which was 
never dreamed of before. Only compare Erivan 
with Tabriz or Erzerum, and the difference is at 
once apparent. Mr. Lynch, who is generally impar- 
tial, complains that the Russians have not built 
enough roads in the country. He would find great 
advances in this direction if he visited the country 
to-day. Even the hated Edgmiatzin is joined to 
Erivan with a fine chaussee, and how many metalled 
roads would he find in South Africa outside of the 



RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 421 

towns ? In this respect of roads alone the Caucasus 
is ahead not only of most British colonies, but also 
of the whole west of the United States of America. 
As for the colonising question, the critics seem to 
forget that the Caucasus and Transcaucasia have 
already a population equal, or nearly equal, to that 
of Canada, though you might subtract Transcaucasia 
from Canada and hardly notice the difference. There 
is no territory for Russian colonists to fill up except 
land which is either under snow most of the year 
or totally devoid of rainfall. In a country like 
Russia, where emigration is managed and controlled 
by the State, it is impossible to believe that a large 
portion of the stream which goes to Siberia might 
not be turned aside to Transcaucasia if the Govern- 
ment so willed it. But there is no pressing need for 
population in Transcaucasia, while there is in Siberia, 
and so the Russians do not come in large quantities 
to the beautiful valleys of Georgia or the uplands of 
Armenia. Those Russians whom one sees in Armenia 
are settled on the most unpromising territory, 
and can hardly be expected to compete on even terms 
with the natives of the country, who have all the best 
lands. 

In Transcaspia the benefits of Russian rule are 
apparent from the way in which the desert is becom- 
ing fertile, and Ferghana cotton is beginning to cap- 
ture the Moscow market. 

The whole argument based on the supposed back- 
wardness of Russia as an Imperial Power falls to the 
ground as soon as one visits the countries in 
question and sees with one's own eyes what Russia 



422 RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 

is doing. Nothing could be more fatal to our own 
policy in Persia than to formulate it on the under- 
standing that Russia has already absorbed more 
of Asia than she can conveniently digest, or that 
her colonies are a serious burden to her. Con- 
sidering that her Trans-Caucasian Railway system 
is a mine of wealth, it may be gathered that she 
will have no difficulty in continuing a strong rail- 
way policy right into Persia. 

When it is argued, as it is by many of our own 
nationality, that we have no proof that Russia 
desires to absorb Persia, there is an excellent 
answer in the existing facts. If Russia does not 
contemplate a peaceful descent on Persia, why are 
her railway engineers all over the country ? Why 
did five of them explore the route from Teheran 
Ho Bunder- Abbas, disguised in some cases as Ar- 
menian merchants or German entomologists, but 
wearing Russian uniform ? Why have two Russian 
engineers surveyed a line from Tabriz to Kerman- 
shah within the past two years? Why does the 
Russian Government spend money on export 
premiums to Persia which she spends in the case 
of no other country, and why does she endeavour 
to capture the trade of Persia more than of other 
much more important markets ? There exist 
already maps of Persia in the Russian Legation at 
Teheran in which railway systems for the whole 
of Persia are mapped out, and if it is argued that 
it is a good deal easier to make railways on paper 
than over real territory one need only reply that 
in this respect, at least, Russia has always been 



RUSSIA'S ADVANCE ON PERSIA 423 

as good as her word. Only two things hinder her 
advance into Persia at the present moment. First 
of all, she has not moved her base right up to the 
Persian border, nor can she do so for a year or two. 
In the second place, she has not yet got such a 
hold on the Shah's Government as to obtain a 
monopoly of railway building in Persia, and until 
she does that it suits her better to hold on to the 
existing agreement prohibiting the building of rail- 
ways altogether. 

Our policy, if it is to be successful in Persia, 
must aim at taking advantage of the two weak 
points in the Russian armour. We should easily 
get ahead of her in railway construction, while 
our base is secured to us in the Gulf, and in 
order to do this we should aim above all things 
at putting an end to the Russo-Persian Railway 
Agreement, to which we have never been a party, 
and which is opposed to all rules of justice and 
progress. Now thab we have Lord Curzon to 
direct affairs in India we are taking a few active 
steps in Persia. We have, for instance, actually 
surveyed a little of Southern Persia, which before 
was known accurately only to the Russians. But 
capital will not flow into Persia without the guaran- 
tee of the British and Indian Governments, so we 
may just as well resign all hopes of doing anything 
to develop Persia by railways at once, unless the 
two Governments are prepared to offer a low guaran- 
tee to British capitalists. Whether we shall ever 
take such a step or not is more than doubtful ; 
yet our future in Persia depends on it. Russia 



424 RUSSIAS ADVANCE ON PERSIA 

lays her plans beforehand, and spends her money 
with a definite object in view. We do neither, 
and yet complain that our prestige is going or 
gone. The remedy is very simple and lies in our 
own hands. 



THE END 



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